

This article was downloaded by: [Parent, Joe]

On: 2 July 2009

Access details: Access Details: [subscription number 912846647]

Publisher Routledge

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK



Cambridge Review of International Affairs

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:

<http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title-content=t713409751>

Duelling and the abolition of war

Joseph M. Parent ^a

^a University of Miami,

Online Publication Date: 01 June 2009

To cite this Article Parent, Joseph M.(2009)'Duelling and the abolition of war',Cambridge Review of International Affairs,22:2,281 — 300

To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/09557570902877943

URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09557570902877943>

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Full terms and conditions of use: <http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf>

This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

Duelling and the abolition of war

Joseph M Parent¹
University of Miami

Abstract *Political scientists have long compared war to duelling in the hope that war could be abolished like duelling, that is, at the hands of a normative campaign. However, there has been limited investigation of duelling's past. What can the history of duelling teach us about the future of war? This paper advances two arguments. First, by refining the conventional wisdom, it argues that duelling's demise was caused less by normative campaigning than by the timing of industrialization. Second, it argues that although duelling is not an analogous institution to modern war, its ancestor, feuding, is. Writings on feuds contribute a complementary literature to the limited data on war, which is helpful for thought experiments and hypothesis testing. Further, feuding's fall was caused more by the growth of state capacity than by normative campaigning. In sum, neither the history of duelling nor that of feuding confirms the view that ideational factors played the principal role in suppressing these practices; therefore, we should reconsider how the abolition of war might occur.*

Introduction

For international relations scholars, slavery and duelling are textbook cases of how enduring practices collapsed relatively quickly in the face of changed norms. Many see in these examples hope for the abolition of war. John Mueller (1989, 9–13; 2004a, 2, 162, 207), Michael Mandelbaum (1998–1999, 34–35) and Norman Angell (1933, 203), among many others, have seen war following the pattern worn by slavery and duelling: a campaign of ideas that rendered a time-honoured practice uncivilized, unfashionable and obsolete (see also Gaddis 1998, 295; Jervis 2005, 28; Mead 1940; Wright 1953, 369). The practical importance of these historical parallels is high; at base are claims about the causes of domestic and world peace.

Because duelling and war are violent dispute resolution mechanisms but slave trading is not, duelling is the more apt comparison to war. Yet, despite this, slavery has received more attention than duelling (Ray 1989; Keck and Sikkink

¹ Deep thanks to Joshua Baron, Richard Betts, Consuelo Cruz, Jon Elster, Brian Ferguson, Victor Glowacki, Stacie Goddard, Robert Jervis, Abigail Parent, Christopher Robinson, Jack Snyder, Tjarko Strutz and Kenneth Waltz. Remaining errors are not theirs. Funding from the Columbia University Conflict Resolution Network (CUCRN) gratefully acknowledged.

1998, 41–51; Kaufmann and Pape 1999). Inside international relations, the best work on duelling has been short and covered little space or time—not a single article has been devoted to the topic (Waltz 1959, 51–54; Wright 1983, 174–179; Mueller 1989, 9–13). Outside international relations, the best work has had a limited purview and poor engagement with international relations theory (Clark 1958, chapter 2; Elster 1999, 203–238; Schneider 1987; Schwartz et al 1984). Without cross-national, long-term comparisons, scholars have lacked critical information for assessing duelling's demise and its relation to war's abolition. The present work attempts to address this lacuna. The central question is: what can duelling teach us about war?

I argue that the history of duelling has much to teach students of international relations, but not in the way presently believed. Two main arguments will be developed. First, the basic causal narrative of how duelling collapses is misunderstood. Duelling did not die at the hands of a normative campaign; anti-duelling ideas resonated according to the timing of industrialization. Duelling is essentially a relic of feudalism; as feudal elements fall in a society, duelling shares their fate.

Second, duelling is a weak analogy to modern war because it takes place solely where a moderately strong state already exists—a poor parallel to international politics. Duels miss the defining feature of wars, an anarchic setting. However, the ancestor of duelling, feuding, is a rich empirical complement to the study of international relations. It is an enlightening analogy to modern war, and literature on feuds opens up useful vistas for thought experiments and hypothesis testing. As for the decline of feuding, the growth of the state is the central factor in its fall. The bottom line is that neither the history of duelling nor that of feuding supports the notion that ideational factors can be the chief cause of the collapse of violent self-help behaviours such as war.

The paper is structured in the following manner. The first section defines terms and lays out the prevailing view of duelling. In the second part, I unpack the logic behind the main arguments. The third segment discusses research methods and traces the historical evolution and extinction of duelling, and the fourth weighs the utility of duelling in explaining the abolition of war. Finally, the fifth section sums up the analysis.

Groundwork

To begin, foundational definitions and concepts must be specified. Anarchy is defined as 'a situation in which no overarching authority has enforcement power over politically autonomous actors' (Snyder 2002, 7); conversely, hierarchy depicts situations of overarching enforcement authority. Norms, to borrow from Peter Katzenstein (1996, 5), 'describe collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors with a given identity'. Norm entrepreneurs are individuals advocating change in dominant norms. Duelling is defined as aristocrats seeking satisfaction for points of honour by crossing swords or exchanging pistol fire; feuding means kin-based vengeance within a society.

Although participants of feuds and duels engage in similar talk about honour and right and settle scores by similar means, the exclusivity, legality and validation of claims are not the same. Feuding is an inclusive, legal dispute resolution practice between groups while duelling is an exclusive, illegal dispute

resolution practice between individuals. Generally, feuding vindicates solely the winner; might makes right. In contrast, duelling vindicates both participants, win, lose or draw. Inverting Carl von Clausewitz (1976, 605), the grammar of feuding and duelling is the same, but their logic is different.²

Intriguingly, the meaning of the word 'honour' changes in societies as they transit from feuding to duelling. When the state is weak, honour adheres primarily to clan or household possessions, but as the state grows more capable, honour attaches to status or class prerogatives. This holds true linguistically across dispersed cultures (Nye 1993, 16; McAleer 1994, 3; Ikegami 2001, 49–51, 216, 227; Stewart 1994, 144). There may be good reason for this. Where weak central authority exists, there are greater incentives for real or fictive kin groups to coordinate for security. However, where stronger central authority exists, there are increasing incentives to compete for a larger share of collective goods, and classes are often effective means to do so.³

Next, let us turn to the conventional view of how duelling passes away. No author argues that norms alone eliminated the practice of duelling, but the standard account is that norms are the preponderant part of the explanation. Mueller is the most recent and influential exponent of this view and so his arguments will represent the prevailing perspective on duelling and war. In his words:

In some important respects war in the developed world may be following the example of another violent method for settling disputes, dueling.

...

Dueling died out as a general practice ... not so much because it was outlawed (like liquor—and war—in the 1920s), but because the 'public prejudice' ... changed in this particular. ... a consensus emerged that dueling was contemptible and stupid.

...

[Gentlemen] do not avoid dueling today because they evaluate the option and reject it on cost–benefit grounds ... they do not avoid it because it has become rationally unthinkable. Rather, the option never percolates into their consciousness as

² Mueller incorrectly references Clausewitz's (1976, 75) remark, 'war is nothing but a duel on a larger scale'. As a Prussian officer, he was familiar with war and duels and therefore could be expected to make a judicious comparison. For better or worse, in the original, Clausewitz (1980, 191) does not use the German word *Duell*, opting instead for the more general term *Zweikampf*. *Duell* is what we mean by 'duel' today, whereas *Zweikampf* comes close to the original meaning of *duellum* (the modern word 'duel' derives from *duo* and *bellum*, war between two), *zwei* meaning 'two' and *Kampf* meaning 'fight', 'struggle' or 'battle'. Clausewitz is only making an abstract point about strategic interaction, not invoking the historical practice of duelling as an informative analogy.

³ Etymologically, the material bases of power may be reflected in the derivations of 'feud'. The word 'feud' may descend from the same sources as 'foe' or it may derive from 'fee' or 'fie' (related to 'fief'), meaning 'cattle' or 'property' (see also Latin *pecus*, meaning 'cattle' or 'property', and German *Reich*, meaning 'empire or rich'). Many societies believed in some form of cattle mercantilism, substituting bovine for bullion (see also Evans-Pritchard 1965, 49; Chagnon and Irons 1979, 87; Ericksen and Horton 1992, 71). This offers confirmation of Kenneth Waltz's remarks (1979, 123) on the power of structure. On the relation of material factors to enforcement and violence, see Holmes and Sunstein (1999) and Ericksen and Horton (1992, 74).

something that is available—that is, it has become subrationally unthinkable.
(Mueller 1989, 9–13)

Mueller sees duelling as a practice supported by attitudes; when decentralized norms turn against pro-duelling attitudes—casting duellists as uncivilized, unfashionable or archaic—the practice withers away. This is a cultural contagion argument, an ideational claim most at home with social constructivist accounts of world politics. Duelling's death was not a victory of expedience; anti-duelling norms were ideas whose time had come. Why cultural contagion could not just as easily work in reverse and bring duelling back into fashion is never explained.

Mueller does not specify a causal mechanism, but to put the strongest face on his argument I examine the mechanism used in the best constructivist scholarship: transnational normative campaigns.⁴ In such campaigns, forward-thinking elites agitate for new ways of perceiving and interacting with the world; their arguments are convincing, and where minds and emotions are changed behaviour follows. If the Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) is right and 'wars begin in the minds of men', then duelling could offer a crucial model for how persuasion might promote permanent peace.

Main arguments

I disagree with the conventional view. Expressing my full dissent entails two arguments. The first argument is that material factors were decisive in abolishing the duel. Duelling was extinguished, and anti-duelling ideas resonated, according to the timing of industrialization. Some states, capable of rigorous law enforcement, chose not to throw their full weight against duelling, employing less intelligent and less severe penalties. These lethargic enforcers were late developers. The reason is that duelling is an exclusionary norm that lends itself to the purposes of threatened feudal elites. As feudal elements declined and fell in a society, duelling did too.

As previous work has argued, there is a constellation of differences between early- and late-industrializing states: the propensity for dictatorship, democracy, revolution, and territorial expansion (Gerschenkron 1966; Moore 1993; Skocpol 1979; Snyder 1991; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; see also Hirschman 1977; Viner 1972; Kaysen 1990). This work builds on that literature and adds one more difference: the propensity for duelling. For reasons that remain disputed, some states began industrializing before others, and while industrialization strained all societies the states industrializing later experienced different domestic pressures because they attempted to rapidly catch up to the prior wave through the 'advantages of backwardness' (for example, copying successful innovations without the expensive trial-and-error process of inventing them).

The timing of the industrialization of a state correlates with patterns in its internal organization. As Jack Snyder writes (1991, 56–57):

⁴ Constructivists have made cases for similar dynamics operating in the demise of apartheid (Klotz 2002), the formation of security communities (Adler and Barnett 1998, 38), the end of the Cold War (Evangelista 1999) and decolonization and intervention (Crawford 2002).

Early industrialization is associated with diffuse elite interest, mobile capital, and the diffusion of power in a democratic political system. ... As early as the eighteenth century, landed aristocrats were receiving much of their income from their commercial ventures, not just from agricultural rents ... They shared many interests with the bourgeoisie.

...

late industrialization correlated with a pattern of concentrated, immobile elite interests and a cartelized political system ... [elites] were tied to the exploitation of immobile factors of production.

...

This produced centralized industrial structures with concentrated interests and left the preexisting military–feudal elite unintegrated into the nation’s economic transformation.

In essence, elites in late-industrializing states had less in common with the lower classes, and were more vulnerable to upstarts.⁵

The causal mechanism behind duelling and anti-duelling norms is normative cascades (Kuran 1997; Laitin 1998; see also Risse-Kappen 1994). When a critical mass of individuals in a society comes to believe a new norm is superior to an old one, a tipping point is reached and the old norm switches from prevalent to exceptional. What conditions favour anti-duelling cascades? They are early industrialization and defeat by an early-industrializing state.

Exclusionary norms are discriminatory social behaviours that help determine which individuals are best to cooperate with; they are practices that screen one type of person from others (Veblen 1994; Posner 2002; Hardin 1995, chapter 4). Duelling was exclusionary because it prohibited elites from accepting challenges from commoners, and stigmatized those who refused challenges from other elites. This is not sheer altruism or class-consciousness; ready duellists stood to reap personal benefits and advantageous reputations through their exploits.⁶

Many exclusionary norms were available, so why did elites in some states choose duelling and not those in others? In early-industrializing states, non-violent exclusionary norms were a relatively cheap (relative to risking death) way to distinguish oneself. Elites had more time to adjust to modernity; diffuse elite interests made it difficult to surmount collective action problems and invoke a martial–feudal past that few shared and even fewer found relevant or profitable. But in late-industrializing states, elites were more exposed to the advancing middle class. An atavistic elite, who had defined themselves by their sword-bearing function in the past, could hoard opportunities by referencing martial heritage and noble privileges that the rising middle class did not share

⁵Note that the pattern of late development is analytically distinct from the Protestant ethic. Both early- and late-industrializing areas were generally dominated by Protestants, and in Japan, a country not known for its Protestantism, the pattern of late development holds.

⁶This claim is explicitly functionalist—the reason for the emergence of duelling norm is that feudal elites individually and collectively benefited from duelling. Such an account explains the similarities between Japanese and European practices when the cultures were not in close contact.

(Schumpeter 1991; Tilly 1998, 9–11, 94). Because of their concentrated interests, it was less arduous for late-industrializing elites to overcome collective action problems, hijack legal systems and sustain atavistic duelling norms.

The other condition that favours anti-duelling norms is gradually eroded in an early-industrializing state. The mechanisms behind this correlation are numerous. Interstate competition induces imitation of dominant powers and socializes states; this is sometimes referred to as the ‘sameness effect’ (Waltz 1979, 127–128; Resende-Santos 2007). On this view, defeat delegitimizes elites whose status rests on martial grounds, and encourages institutional emulation of the victor (Hintze 1975, chapter 7; Skocpol 1979, 23; Porter 1994, 15–19). Victory tends to go to states with greater material capability, and early industrializing states tend to possess greater domestic capital stock and better access to credit that furnish a hefty edge in war. Moreover, leading states advance their interests by legitimizing practices and institutions similar to their own (Spruyt 1994, 28). Thus, duelling dies in late industrializers when the power of elites is dislocated, through either loss in war or Pyrrhic victory.

The above causal story shares with the conventional view the belief that normative cascades produce outcomes. Where the two views differ is on how important material conditions are. The lack of self-help behaviour, for Mueller (2004b, 201), ‘primarily derives not from the Leviathan-like capacities of the policing system but rather from human nature, which overwhelming tends to eschew violence’. He places the heaviest stress on cognitive and ideational factors, and wholly overlooks late industrialization and loss in war. I reverse Mueller’s causal priority, countering that ideational factors are not strong as independent variables, and are in fact mostly derivative of material conditions such as the timing of industrialization.

My second argument is that feuding, duelling’s lineal ancestor, is analogous to war and provides a complementary literature to the study of conflict under anarchy. Feuding, like war, takes place in a weakly institutionalized environment, with recognizable rules of engagement and analogous actors to conflicting states, bystanders and mediators (Cooney 1998). Feuding, like war, features contending claims that are typically self-judged, self-monitored and self-enforced. Self-help behaviour often validates the rightness of the winning side; there is no binding higher authority to appeal to. While not transhistorical, the practice of feuding shows surprising homogeneity over time and space—much as political realists think about war (Howard 1979; Howard et al 1994; Mearsheimer 1998).

Although societies have used a variety of dispute resolution mechanisms, not all of them are equally common and merit the same amount of scrutiny. In the best anthropological study of feuding, Karen Paige Ericksen and Heather Horton (1992, 60, 69) found that over half of their standard cross-cultural sample of 186 societies practised feuds.⁷ Previous international relations treatment of anthropology and

⁷See also Keith Otterbein and Charlotte Swanson Otterbein (1965). What of the societies that did not feud? This work put top priority on examining societies that look most like international society, and that required focusing on societies with ensconced violent dispute resolution practices. Yet that does not mean that the more pacific societies are not worth study. Perhaps some of them once featured feuding but relinquished the practice; perhaps some were in conditions that made feuding unnecessary; perhaps they offer insights on mitigating or transcending the dangers of anarchy. These are worthy issues for future research, but for now it must suffice to indicate subsequent avenues of enquiry.

primitive jurisprudence has conflated conflicts within and across societies (Masters 1964; Morgenthau 1993, 255; Snyder 2002, 11; see also Keeley 1996; Otterbein 1970; 2004). Feuding, by contrast, is a type of conflict solely within rather than between societies, and this is useful to students of world politics who believe that states form an 'anarchical society' (Bull 1995).

Feuding offers much to scholars and students. For scholars, there is only one international system, and it changes slowly. Like counterfactual reasoning, using historical analogies may be a helpful, albeit imperfect, route to expand our options for hypothesis testing and thought experiments (Van Evera 1997, 25–26; Tetlock and Belkin 1996). There is a wealth of historical and anthropological work on feuding societies, and this information provides provocative heuristic devices to examine arguments and analyse how different systems operate and adapt. For students, feuding offers exciting, vivid examples of behaviour in anarchy. Feuding is less complicated than modern warfare and encourages interdisciplinary research and methodological pluralism.

Does the history of feuding nourish the belief that a normative campaign can bring down violent self-help? It does not. Feuding falls because increasingly centralized states tamp down brutal behaviour; leviathans are relatively skilled at containing escalation and deterring public violence. And what this depends upon most is not norm entrepreneurs but access to growing resources to train and deploy armies, police and judges (Erikson and Parent 2007; Holmes and Sunstein 1999).

My argument should not be mistaken for material determinism. I am asserting that the international distribution of power conditions how concentrated power is domestically, and that the domestic distribution of power conditions which norms receive negative feedback. Norms that clearly handicap a state's competitiveness face severe obstacles to becoming established. But norm entrepreneurs who make appeals within these, often broad, parameters may wield great influence. Sometimes cultures change for reasons endogenous to a culture, but I do not believe the evidence supports such an argument in the case of duelling.

History: the rise and demise of duelling

To test the arguments, this section presents a short history of duelling and feuding. The arc of the narrative is as follows: While the provenance of feuding is lost in prehistory, evidence of it dates back about 4000 years. In Europe, feuding first became formally institutionalized in AD 501, when the feud emerges in feudalism, in the form of judicial duelling. But both feuding and judicial duelling were eclipsed by the ascent of the modern state, and the centralization of state power provoked an aristocratic backlash that produced duelling. This backlash was overcome faster in early-industrializing states than in late industrializers.

With respect to methods, my account is necessarily small-*n* and correlational. The universe of reliable data is not large enough for meaningful statistical tests, nor do meaningful cross-national statistics exist. Because social structure often works its influence over the heads of participants, it is unlikely that a process-tracing approach would yield smoking-gun evidence. If Mueller's argument is correct, duelling will fall when the idea of its obsolescence catches on and becomes contagious. If my argument is correct, anti-duelling ideas will only resonate in

particular contexts: in early-industrializing states or states upstaged by early-industrializing states.

For my independent variable, I use the standard interpretations of when states industrialized, grouping countries as early, middle or late. I pass over late late developers because their duels do not have adequate social-scientific scholarship. For my dependent variable, I assess duelling qualitatively, based on historians' presentation of the frequency and lethality of duels. States are classified as major, minor or intermediate duellers. The cases are selected because they display variation on the independent and dependent variables, and are the cases previously used, albeit haphazardly, to draw conclusions about the abolition of war.

Feuds

Examples of feuding are common across time and space. The oldest extant account of a feud is from *The Epic of Gilgamesh*, but other ancient accounts can be found in the Bible (Genesis 4:1–16), Homer's *Iliad* and *Odyssey* and Tacitus's *Germania*. There is strong scholarship on feuding in places as distant as medieval Iceland (Miller 1990; Posner 1996, chapter 14) and Japan (Ikegami 2001), the British Isles (Brown 1986; Macaulay 1983, 407; Fletcher 2002; Anonymous 1999; 2008) and South America (Chagnon and Irons 1979; Ferguson 1989; 1990), as well as twentieth-century Africa (Evans-Pritchard 1965; Middleton and Tait 1967; Beattie 1960; Radcliffe-Brown 1965; Stewart 1994, part 2), the Middle East (Ginat 1987; Bourdieu 1999; Black-Michaud 1975; 1986) and the Balkans (Boehm 1983; 1984; Hasluck 1954; Allcock 2000).

What ties these cases together is not just that kin-based vengeance was an element in their societies; they also share a host of traits that comprise a familial resemblance. In all cases honour figures prominently, and the language of gift giving (and its inverse, payback) between honourable people is typical (Blundell 1991, 29; Hansen 1999; Dover 1974). Conflicting claims are self-judged, self-monitored and self-enforced, and there is no higher authority for appeals; God is thought to favour the just side. Feuds tend to run a course of escalating proportionate violence until exhaustion, at which point a largely self-enforcing settlement of blood money and/or banishment is mediated.

As has been argued elsewhere many times, what crushes the frequency and intensity of violent domestic self-help, such as feuding, is the budding capability of states (Tilly 1993; Mann 1988; Porter 1994). Not to belabour the case, but an old and new example will illustrate the process. In 1592, some Japanese farmers came to blows over irrigation. Following prevailing custom, a local mediator interposed to conciliate the sides. But central authorities contravened custom and executed 83 farmers, including a 13-year-old stand-in for his father, plus the mediator (Ikegami 2001, 153–154).

So too when Australia established itself as a central authority in the highlands of Papua New Guinea, the state displaced local self-help conventions. Traditionally, order had been maintained through a system of mutual raids, ritualistic killing and cannibalism. With a stronger central authority, village leaders remained active in dispute resolution; however, killings and cannibalism were curtailed by heavy penalties imposed by Australian authorities (Schieffelin 1995; see also Bowen 1989). In both cases, fearsome central authority cropped local self-help.

Judicial duelling

European feuding transitioned to duelling through the intermediary step of judicial duelling. In 499, Gundobald, the pagan King of Burgundy, convened a conference in Lyons to discuss religious and political problems (Gibbon 1994, 4, 61–64, 80–82). He was trying to consolidate his power by killing the last of his three brothers, strategically protected by Clovis, King of the Franks. At this conference, Gundobald asked a bishop named Avitus why, if the Christian King of the Franks was so religious, he was so belligerent toward Burgundy. Avitus answered,

We are ignorant of the motives and intentions of the king of the Franks: but we are taught by scripture that the kingdoms which abandon the divine law are frequently subverted; and that enemies arise on every side against those who have made God their enemy. (Gibbon 1994, 4, 62)

The conference dissolved in disagreement and the Franks and Burgundians fought to a standoff. A truce was drawn up and Clovis withdrew. Gundobald quickly violated the treaty, surprising and slaughtering his brother.

To brace for another war with Clovis, Gundobald sought the affections of his citizens through mild and impartial laws, incorporating informal practices into formal code. Published in 501, one of these popular reforms was judicial duelling—that is, institutionalized feuding, which replaced the more disliked trials by fire and water. The state was strong enough to advocate a popular dispute resolution method, but not yet strong enough to displace it. When Avitus objected to the new method of justice, Gundobald retorted ‘that the event of national wars and private combats is directed by the judgment of God; and that his providence awards the victory to the juster cause’ (Gibbon 1994, 4, 81). Not long after, Clovis’s sons conquered Burgundy.

In spite of this, Gundobald’s argument swept Europe, and by 967 the church as well. Priests and monks practised judicial duelling, and their august imprimatur helped spread the practice. As legal measures are wont to do, judicial duelling degenerated into an excessively capacious category and that provided excuse enough for regents to intervene.⁸ Judicial duelling was aided, though eventually put down, by elaboration of the ‘king’s peace’, which authorized the king to put down any quarrel in his domain. Canute the Dane and William the Conqueror after him were early proponents of the process that evolved into equal protection for citizens under royal control. Since the king could seldom project force far enough to tolerably enforce justice, it was left to local customs to keep some semblance of order. In time, growing state power would exercise the once-flimsy right of the king’s peace, and this growth of central power would quell feuding, legalized or otherwise, and spur the rise of duelling. By the thirteenth century, Saint Louis pioneered measures that clamped down on judicial duelling, and other kings were not far behind.

⁸On legal analogies, see Edward H Levi (1949, 9–27) and Cass Sunstein (1996). The practice sank so low that a judicial duel was staged between a man and a dog, the latter being the sole witness to a crime (incidentally, the dog won). See Kevin McAleer (1994, 15–19, 216). For more on the history of Canute the Dane, William the Conqueror and the king’s peace, see William Graham Sumner (1992, 310), David Hume (1983, 1) and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr (1991, 84–85, 101).

Duels

Duelling's popularity soared after a dispute between Charles V and Francis I in 1528. Charles reproached the French King for breach of faith and offered to vindicate himself in a duel. Recriminations bandied about, and, though the kings never went to the trouble of facing each other, the exchange changed the manners of European aristocracy (McAleer 1994, 16–20; Guicciardini 1984, 399–400). Example was not the only royal sanction; kings authorized and presided over tournaments, jousts and public duels between noblemen. This continued unabated until 1547, when a court favourite died in front of Henry II.

What kings had encouraged they did not have the resources to control, and, as regents and clergy increasingly came down on the practice, disapproval only heightened its popularity. Aristocrats adapted the duel to advance class interests, attempting to stay out from under the king's growing thumb and keep commoners down (McAleer 1994, 19). Courts, staffed by aristocrats, were biased enforcers of anti-duelling laws, and kings could be promiscuous pardoners of duellists. Nevertheless, duelling fared differently across countries, depending on the timing of industrialization.

*Britain.*⁹ Britain is usually considered the earliest developer (along with the Netherlands, another state not known for duelling). British elites acclimated to modernity more smoothly than their later-industrializing, Continental counterparts. Although prominent thinkers had sympathy for duelling—Adam Smith and Thomas Hobbes, for instance¹⁰—duelling in Britain was minor. Initially, duelling in Britain was comparable to its Continental cousins. Yet as time went on duelling in Britain faded faster than elsewhere in Europe and this correlated with British success in commerce and industry, which began slowly but accelerated swiftly around the late eighteenth century (Kennedy 1989, 149; Polanyi 1957). An 1843 military duel startled Parliament and public opinion to such an extent that the articles of war were amended to dishonourably discharge duel participants and anyone with knowledge of a duel who failed to prevent it, as well as to deny army pensions to widows of duellists. Shortly after, duelling went extinct in Britain.

*France.*¹¹ France industrialized later than Britain, but earlier than Germany, and this matches its intermediate duelling culture. Law afforded mild protection to duellists, and politicians of the highest rank duelled repeatedly without stain on their reputation. Defeat in the Napoleonic Wars did not bring an end to the duel because most of the winning coalition practised duelling (it also helped that the Concert of Europe was designed to retard liberalization). Similarly defeat in the

⁹ This discussion owes much to Alan Macfarlane (1979), Barrington Moore (1993, chapter 1), Norman Davies (1999), Adam Ferguson (1995, xx, 20–22, 86, 103), Hume (1983), Joel Samaha (1974, 71), Francois Billacois (1990, 26–33), Richard Fletcher (2002), Oliver W Holmes, Jr (1991), Douglass North and Robert Thomas (1973, 132), Markku Peltonen (2003), Robert Shoemaker (2002) and James Landale (2005).

¹⁰ For elite reactions to duelling in the British Isles, see Adam Smith (1982, 480, 122–123; 1976, 308), Thomas Hobbes (1985, 10.49, 23.31, 27.20, 27.35), Sidney (1996, 488), Coke (2004, 2, 903–908) and Blackstone (1979, 4, 145–146)

¹¹ For this section, I draw on Billacois (1990), Robert Nye (1993), Gabriel Tarde (2001), McAleer (1994), Moore (1993, chapter 2), VG Kiernan (1988), Eugen Weber (1976) and Robert A Schneider (1987).

Franco-Prussian War abetted duelling because France lost to a state that embraced duelling. However, the next war furnished the finishing stroke to the duel. France's victory in World War I was in name only, and due in large part to the assistance of early industrializers like Britain and the United States.

*United States.*¹² The United States is an excellent test case because it features early industrialization in the north, late industrialization in the south and a weak state in the west. The north looked economically and politically similar to Britain, without a feudal aristocracy. The Burr–Hamilton duel brought little honour to its victor—indeed immediately following the duel Aaron Burr fled to Georgia. There was a small smattering of duels in the north, but duelling died in the north approximately when it died in Britain.

Despite sharing cultural stock and a constitution, north and south exhibited starkly different conduct.¹³ The south industrialized late and consequently duelling in the south was more frequent and longer lasting than in the north. Southern elites generally, and those in the public eye specifically, wanted to set themselves above slaves, immigrants and new money. Duelling was celebrated and showed no signs of abating until the Civil War. But with that cataclysm duelling was dealt a crippling blow from which it never recovered.

In the west and parts of the rural south, wide-open spaces with few people and even fewer government officials made recourse to feuds necessary and sometimes noteworthy (for example, the Hatfields and the McCoys and Wyatt Earp). Even when central authority extended to the frontier, local constables were reluctant to crack down on cowboys, since they provided a boost to the local economy. Still, as the government grew stronger, feuds dried up.

*Japan.*¹⁴ Japan was a late developer and also featured a durable, developed duelling culture. The samurai practised something akin to judicial duelling: registered revenge, wherein one applied to the government to be allowed to seek violent redress of grievances. Samurai also duelled in a manner comparable to, though less formalized than, European duels. Duelling tropes retained some resonance and were bolstered during Japan's successful wars, but duels disappeared after Japan's defeat in World War II. The outstanding fact about Japanese duelling, is that in spite of developing independently of Western influence for most of its history, its evolution looks very much the same as duelling's evolution in the West.

¹² My discussion here owes a debt to Louis Hartz (1991), Don C Seitz (1966), Dick Steward (2000), Kenneth S Greenberg (1996), Edward L Ayers (1984), Richard Nisbet and Dov Cohen (1996), Steven Stowe (1987), Rollin Osterweis (1949), Moore (1993, chapter 3), Clement Eaton (1975), David Courtwright (1996, chapter 5), Joseph J Ellis (2002, chapter 1), Joanne Freeman (2001) and Gordon Wood (1993, 39–42, 207, 271).

¹³ Some argue that the duel in the south was a cultural importation. The argument is that after the English Civil War democratic roundheads settled the north and aristocratic cavaliers the south. Held up to historical scrutiny, this claim crumbles. However, feuding was slightly more prevalent in areas settled by Scotch-Irish, who had long feuding lineages to draw on and apply to the sometimes anarchic New World (see Eaton 1975).

¹⁴ This section utilizes H Paul Varley et al (1974), Karl Friday (1997), Moore (1993, chapter 5), Eiko Ikegami (2001), Charles Tilly (2003) and Sumner (2002, chapter 13).

Germany.¹⁵ Germany is a quintessential late developer and possessed a ferocious duelling culture. Germans preferred pistols at close range and mocked the effeminate duels of the French. Education granted no immunity: Johann Wolfgang von Goethe approved of duelling, Heinrich Heine, Alexander von Humboldt, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels partook in it and Otto von Bismarck exchanged shots with a political rival while his wife was pregnant with their third child.¹⁶ A duellist himself, Max Weber wrote (1958, 311) that if Americans wanted to be fully recognized as citizens they had to follow convention and join social clubs, sects or societies. In Germany, the parallel was joining a duelling fraternity or officer corps: 'He who did not succeed in joining was no gentleman; he who despised doing so, as was usual among Germans, had to take the hard road, especially in business life.'

Prussia passed its first anti-duelling law in 1652, but to minimal effect. German duels peaked in the late nineteenth century, but, because of an elevated effort from the Kaiser, declined slightly afterwards. For the same reasons as in France, the end of the duel came with World War I. The Nazis attempted to revive duelling with little success, and the effort died with them. Duelling fraternities still exist in Germany, but Germans have duels like humans have tails—only in vestigial form.

In sum, duelling's demise was not driven by decentralized contagion; it correlated with industrialization. Early industrializers, like Britain and the northern United States, had minor duelling cultures. Middling industrializers, such as France, had intermediate duelling cultures. And late industrializers, like Germany and Japan, had major duelling cultures. France lost its duelling culture when early-industrializing allies were necessary to save it from defeat, and duelling was broken in all the other major duelling states by decisive defeat in war.

Discussion

The critical failing of analogizing from duelling to war is that feuds and war are conflict in anarchy and duels are conflict in hierarchy. So while war, feuding and duelling descend from the same origins, only war and feuding are functionally analogous. If duelling were a condign comparison for contemporary world politics, some authority would be as relatively powerful over states as, say, sixteenth-century states were over subnational groups.

Yet current world politics is not as hierarchic as sixteenth-century states, and if it were we should see what the history of duelling implies: second-tier powers insistently fighting to assert a norm of exclusivity. Furthermore, we see nothing resembling judicial duelling. The United States is a hegemon, providing some

¹⁵For this section's literature, see McAleer (1994, especially 93–98), Billacois (1990), Kiernan (1988, chapter 15), Fritz Stern (1987, 102–108, 279), Gordon A Craig (1982, 161), Kurt Tauber (1963) and Ute Frevert (1995).

¹⁶Ever the realist, the Iron Chancellor was reluctant to risk his wife's wrath and opted to leave her uninformed. He later described how he stood 'in that lovely spot in the woods on the shores of the lake with the sun shining and the birds singing' and thoughts of his wife almost made him 'turn back from the brink'. See Frevert (1995, 148). Like their American and French peers, German politicians used duels as publicity stunts.

security and stability to various parts of the globe, but it does not run a world state. The United States does not claim a monopoly over the legitimate use of force and it is frequently slow to stop wars, piracy and ethnic cleansing.

Instead we see interstate disputes bearing a striking resemblance to feuds. States in international politics, like groups in feuding societies, function not in ideal-type anarchy but in a weakly institutionalized environment. States, like feuding groups, persistently worry about honour and reputation (Wohlforth 1993, 11, 25, 28; Lebow 2003, 271; Mercer 1996; Kagan 1995, 8, 243, 569), and cite it as a reason for the outbreak of hostilities, as in the War of 1812 (Foster as cited in Perkins 1961, 435). But this conception of honour is not illegal, nor is it attached to class status. Quite the reverse, great powers reserve for themselves the final say on the legitimate use of force, and have not fought each other for what appears to be the longest period on record, though they have had little scruple about wars with non-peer states.

International diplomacy simulates the social obligations of friendship and kinship, employing the language and tropes of gift giving and its inverse (O'Neill 2001, chapters 6–10). In world politics, conflict often escalates until exhaustion, when peacemakers step in to mediate, and banishment and blood money have their international analogues. Since countries cannot relocate, banishment is approximated by severing contact with offending states, like the United States has done, for example, with Iran and North Korea, or sanctions, such as those visited on South Africa for apartheid. Instances of blood money include the compensation the United States paid to Mexico after the Mexican–American War, and the restitution the United States disbursed to Japan after an American submarine, the USS *Greeneville*, accidentally sank a Japanese trawler.

As a rebuttal to the type of argument advanced here, Mueller remarks (1989, 13) in a footnote, 'it is sometimes held that duelling died out because improved access to the legal system provided a nonviolent alternative. But most duels were fought over matters of "honor," not legality.' Mueller's misunderstanding of honour captures several flaws in the conventional view. In the circumstances that most resembled international politics, honour and legality were identical. What honour means in these conditions is best put by William Miller (1990, 303): 'honor was more than just the pure warrior ethic, although at root it still meant "don't tread on me." ... Honor translated into practical advantage. It could even be practicality itself.'

Mueller contends that the abolishment of duelling relied mainly on novel arguments; it was a 'peculiar necessity' that was defeated by timely ideas. But why do ideas resonate? The fundamental idea that violent self-help is wrong is deceptively simple, yet it assumed various forms and attained various levels of acceptance at different times and places. Ingenious ideas are constantly kicked up in the dusty stampede of politics; most of them settle back down to be trampled on. What explains variance in norms' effectiveness?

I have argued that material factors greatly circumscribe the power of norms. With respect to duelling, church and state condemned the practice for centuries before it collapsed. Mueller's account explains poorly why duelling sprouted in the first place, why it died much earlier some places than others and why it is unlikely to re-emerge. It is a striking coincidence that the decline of duelling correlates so strongly with early industrializers, and one that no previous work has considered. Because prior scholarship did not scrutinize cross-national and

historical differences in duelling, political scientists have overestimated the power of cultural contagion in explaining its demise.

As for feuding, state capacity goes farther than norms in explaining and predicting violent self-help behaviour. States are competent at containing and deterring public violence and this is in large measure a function of material capabilities. My research revealed no case where feuding became 'unfashionable' without a leviathan. The crucial conclusion is that while norms had some power to restrain feuds, they were a wooden gate that, if lowered imprudently, violence would barrel right through. Even high-capacity states can limit but not eliminate descendants of feuding, such as gang warfare and homicidal revenge (Huntington 1994, 39).

Lastly, a loose end in this discussion is the role of norm entrepreneurs. Although the initiators of feuding are lost to history, the norm entrepreneurs of judicial duelling and duelling have left evidence for posterity—and in both cases normative leadership appears causally weak. In the former instance, it is unsurprising that the leader of a small state, fearing conquest by a larger state, would contrive to boost his power—in essence that necessity was the mother of invention. Gundobald's policy was contagious and spread across Europe, like Napoleonic nationalism would later (Posen 1993). Ironically, though both regimes were snuffed out rather swiftly, their innovations were adapted by others to better compete.

In the instance of Francis I and Charles V, normative change was unintended and deleterious to royal authority. Kings condemned duelling with more alacrity and stamina than they had praised it, and yet duelling caught on like wildfire. If rulers and priests were influential norm entrepreneurs, why did it take them so long to terminate a practice they once helped create? Considering how rapidly and tenaciously judicial duelling and duelling took hold, and how Japanese practices followed a similar course despite little Western contact, the evidence suggests that entrepreneurs were largely adventitious. Had Gundobald, Francis and Charles never been born, the history of duelling would likely look fundamentally the same.

Strikingly, no names stand out in the defeat of duelling; its collapse resembles less a parade than a riot. Unlike slavery, ultimately, there was no campaign to abolish duelling, no group to take the credit, no persuasion but the timing of industrialization and failure in war. It is noteworthy that such a significant normative shift as the end of duelling—a practice that had prospered for centuries—required practically no leadership.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have argued that duelling can teach us much about war, but not in the way commonly supposed. First, the abolition of duelling was not simply an idea whose time had come. Anti-duelling norms only resonated under specific conditions: in early-industrializing states or states militarily overawed by early-industrializing states. This argument helps flesh out the conditions for normative change. Where the conventional view saw cultural change as the preponderant cause and norm entrepreneurs as the core causal mechanism, this paper sees culture as a secondary cause and norm entrepreneurs as highly dependent on

material conditions. Where the conventional view believed ideas to be remarkably fluid and practices malleable, this work counters that ideas shifted predictably with distributions of power, and practices changed less because of verbal persuasion than because of material interests.

Second, duelling does tell us about the abolition of war, but mostly by bringing to our attention its predecessor, feuding. Feuding is an analogous institution to war because it is a violent dispute resolution in a thinly institutionalized, anarchic setting. International relations teachers and scholars should avail themselves of feuding's vast and rich literature, which can complement our empirical inquiries and vivify how units function in anarchy. Feuding was eventually quashed through the state-building enterprise and the expansion of the king's peace. Were war to be abolished eventually, a world state-building enterprise may be necessary to do so. Whether a world state is a probable or desirable outcome is a separate discussion best addressed elsewhere (Kant 1991; Waltz 1979, 112; Wendt 2003). Regardless, the conclusion is that neither the history of duelling nor that of feuding supports the hope that ideational factors can play the primary role in domesticating anarchy.

References

- Acemoglu, Daron and James A Robinson (2006) 'Economic backwardness in political perspective', *American Political Science Review*, 100:1, 115–132
- Adler, Emmanuel and Michael Barnett (1998) 'A framework for the study of security communities' in Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds) *Security communities* (New York: Cambridge University Press), 29–66
- Allcock, John (2000) *Explaining Yugoslavia* (New York: Columbia University Press)
- Angell, Norman (1933) *The great illusion* (New York: Putnam)
- Anonymous (1999) *Tales of the elders of Ireland*, transl Ann Dooley and Harry Roe (New York: Oxford University Press)
- Anonymous (2008) *The Mabinogi*, transl Patrick Ford (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press)
- Ayers, Edward L (1984) *Vengeance and justice: crime and punishment in the 19th century American south* (New York: Oxford University Press)
- Beattie, John (1960) *Bunyoro: an African kingdom* (New York: Holt)
- Billacois, Francois (1990) *The duel: its rise and fall in early modern France*, transl Trista Selous (New Haven: Yale University Press)
- Black-Michaud, Jacob (1975) *Cohesive force: feud in the Mediterranean and Middle East* (Bristol: Basil Blackwell)
- Black-Michaud, Jacob (1986) *Sheep and land: the economics of power in a tribal society* (New York: Cambridge University Press)
- Blackstone, William (1979) *Commentaries on the laws of England*, vols 1–4 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press)
- Blundell, Mary Whitlock (1991) *Helping friends and harming enemies: a study in Sophocles and Greek ethics* (New York: Cambridge University Press)
- Boehm, Christopher (1983) *Montenegrin social organization and values* (New York: AMS Press)
- Boehm, Christopher (1984) *Blood revenge: the anthropology of feuding in Montenegro and other tribal societies* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press)
- Bourdieu, Pierre (1999) *Outline of a theory of practice* (New York: Cambridge University Press)
- Bowen, John R (1989) 'Poetic duels and political change in the Gayo highlands of Sumatra', *American Anthropologist*, 91:1, 25–40
- Brown, Keith M (1986) *Bloodfeud in Scotland, 1573–1625: violence, justice and politics in an early modern society* (Edinburgh: John Donald)

- Bull, Hedley (1995) *The anarchical society: a study of order in world politics*, 2nd edn (New York: Columbia University Press)
- Chagnon, Napoleon and William Irons (eds) (1979) *Evolutionary biology and human social behaviour: an anthropological perspective* (Massachusetts: Duxbury Press)
- Clark, George (1958) *War and society in the seventeenth century* (New York: Cambridge University Press)
- Clausewitz, Carl von (1976) *On war*, transl Michael Howard and Peter Paret (eds) (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press)
- Clausewitz, Carl von (1980) *Vom Kriege: hinterlassenes Werk* [On war: posthumous works] (Bonn: Ferd. Dummlers Verlag)
- Coke, Edward (2004) *The selected writings of Sir Edward Coke*, vols 1–3, ed Steve Sheppard, (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund)
- Cooney, Mark (1998) *Warriors and peacemakers: how third parties shape violence* (New York: New York University Press)
- Courtwright, David (1996) *Violent land: single men and social disorder from the frontier to the inner city* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press)
- Craig, Gordon A (1982) *The Germans* (New York: Putnam)
- Crawford, Neta (2002) *Argument and change in world politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press)
- Davies, Norman (1999) *The Isles: a history* (New York: Oxford University Press)
- Dover, Kenneth J (1974) *Greek popular morality in the time of Plato and Aristotle* (Indianapolis: Hackett)
- Eaton, Clement (1975) *A history of the old south*, 3rd edn (New York: Macmillan)
- Ellis, Joseph J (2002) *Founding brothers: the revolutionary generation* (New York: Vintage Books)
- Elster, Jon (1999) *Alchemies of the mind: rationality and the emotions* (New York: Cambridge University Press)
- Ericksen, Karen Paige and Heather Horton (1992) ‘“Blood feuds”: cross-cultural variations in kin group vengeance’, *Behaviour Science Research*, 26:1–4, 57–85
- Erikson, Emily and Joseph M Parent (2007) ‘Central authority and order’, *Sociological Theory*, 25:3, 244–267
- Evangelista, Matthew (1999) *Unarmed forces: the transnational movement to end the Cold War* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press)
- Evans-Pritchard, EE (1965) *The Nuer: a description of the modes of livelihood and political institutions of a Nilotic people* (New York: Oxford University Press)
- Ferguson, Adam (1995) *An essay on the history of civil society* (New York: Cambridge University Press)
- Ferguson, R Brian (1989) ‘Do Yanomamo killers have more kids?’, *American Ethnologist*, 16:3, 564–565
- Ferguson, R Brian (1990) ‘Explaining war’ in Jonathan Haas (ed) *The anthropology of war* (New York: Cambridge University Press), 26–55
- Fletcher, Richard (2002) *Blood feud: murder and revenge in Anglo-Saxon England* (New York: Penguin Press)
- Freeman, Joanne (2001) *Affairs of honour: national politics in the New Republic* (New Haven: Yale University Press)
- Frevort, Ute (1995) *Men of honour: a social and cultural history of the duel*, transl Anthony Williams (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell)
- Friday, Karl (1997) *Legacies of the sword: the Kashima-Shinryu and Samurai martial culture* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press)
- Gaddis, John Lewis (1998) *We now know: rethinking Cold War history* (New York: Oxford University Press)
- Gerschenkron, Alexander (1966) *Economic backwardness in historical perspective* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press)
- Gibbon, Edward (1994) *The decline and fall of the Roman Empire*, vols 1–6 (New York: Everyman)
- Ginat, Joseph (1987) *Blood disputes among Bedouin and rural Arabs in Israel* (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press)

- Greenberg, Kenneth S (1996) *Honour and slavery* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press)
- Guicciardini, Francesco (1984) *The history of Italy*, transl Sidney Alexander (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press)
- Hansen, Mogens Herman (1999) *The Athenian democracy in the age of Demosthenes* (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press)
- Hardin, Russell (1995) *One for all: the logic of group conflict* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press)
- Hartz, Louis (1991) *The liberal tradition in America* (New York: Harcourt Brace)
- Hasluck, Margaret (1954) *The unwritten law in Albania* (New York: Cambridge University Press)
- Hintze, Otto (1975) *The historical essays of Otto Hintze*, transl Felix Gilbert (New York: Oxford University Press)
- Hirschman, Albert O (1977) *The passions and the interests* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press)
- Hobbes, Thomas (1985) *Leviathan* (New York: Penguin)
- Holmes, Oliver Wendell, Jr (1991) *The common law* (New York: Dover)
- Holmes, Stephen and Cass Sunstein (1999) *The cost of rights: why liberty depends on taxes* (New York: Norton)
- Howard, Michael (ed) (1979) *Restraints on war: studies in the limitation of armed conflict* (New York: Oxford University Press)
- Howard, Michael, et al (1994) *Laws of war: constraints on warfare in the Western world* (eds) (New Haven: Yale University Press)
- Hume, David (1983) *The history of England*, vols 1–6 (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund)
- Huntington, Samuel P (1994) 'The errors of endism' in Richard Betts (ed) *Conflict after the cold war: arguments on causes of war and peace* (Needham Heights, Massachusetts: Allyn & Bacon), 33–43
- Ikegami, Eiko (2001) *The taming of the samurai: honorific individualism and the making of modern Japan* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press)
- Jervis, Robert (2005) *American foreign policy in a new era* (New York: Routledge)
- Kagan, Donald (1995) *On the origins of war and the preservation of peace* (New York: Doubleday)
- Kant, Immanuel (1991) 'Idea for a universal history with a cosmopolitan purpose' in Hans Reiss (ed) *Kant: political writings* (New York: Cambridge University Press), 41–53
- Katzenstein, Peter (1996) 'Introduction: alternative perspectives on national security' in Peter Katzenstein (ed) *The culture of national security* (New York: Columbia University Press), 1–32
- Kaufmann, Chaim and Robert Pape (1999) 'Explaining costly international moral action: Britain's sixty year campaign against the Atlantic slave trade', *International Organization*, 53:4, 631–668
- Kaysen, Carl (1990) 'Is war obsolete? A review essay', *International Security*, 14:4, 42–64
- Keck, Margaret and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) *Activists beyond borders* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press)
- Keeley, Lawrence (1996) *War before civilization: the myth of the peaceful savage* (New York: Oxford University Press)
- Kennedy, Paul (1989) *The rise and fall of the great powers* (New York: Vintage)
- Kiernan, Victor G (1988) *The duel in European history: honour and the reign of aristocracy* (New York: Oxford University Press)
- Klotz, Audie (2002) 'Transnational activism and global transformations: the anti-apartheid and abolitionist experiences', *European Journal of International Relations*, 8:1, 49–76
- Kuran, Timur (1997) *Private truths, public lies: the social consequences of preference falsification* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press)
- Laitin, David D (1998) *Identity in formation: the Russian-speaking populations in the near abroad* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press)
- Landale, James (2005) *Duel: a true story of death and honour* (New York: Canongate)
- Lebow, Richard Ned (2003) *The tragic vision of politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press)

- Levi, Edward H (1949) *An introduction to legal reasoning* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press)
- Macaulay, Thomas (1983) *The history of England*, ed Hugh Trevor-Roper (New York: Penguin)
- Macfarlane, Alan (1979) *The origins of English individualism* (New York: Cambridge University Press)
- Mandelbaum, Michael (1998–1999) 'Is major war obsolete?', *Survival*, 40:4, 20–38
- Mann, Michael (1988) *States, war, and capitalism* (New York: Basil Blackwell)
- Masters, Roger D (1964) 'World politics as primitive political system', *World Politics*, 16:4, 595–619
- McAlear, Kevin (1994) *Duelling: the cult of honour in fin-de-siecle Germany* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press)
- Mead, Margaret (1940) 'Warfare is only an invention—not a biological necessity', *Asia*, 40:8, 402–405
- Mearsheimer, John (1998) 'The false promise of international institutions' in Michael Brown et al (eds) *Theories of war and peace* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press), 332–376
- Mercer, Jonathan (1996) *Reputation and international politics* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press)
- Middleton, John and David Tait (eds) (1967) *Tribes without rulers* (London: Routledge)
- Miller, William Ian (1990) *Bloodtaking and peacemaking: feud, law, and society in Saga Iceland* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press)
- Moore, Barrington (1993) *Social origins of dictatorship and democracy: lord and peasant in the making of the modern world* (Boston: Beacon Press)
- Morgenthau, Hans J (1993) *Politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace* (New York: McGraw Hill)
- Mueller, John (1989) *Retreat from doomsday: the obsolescence of major war* (New York: Basic Books)
- Mueller, John (2004a) *The remnants of war* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press)
- Mueller, John (2004b) 'Why isn't there more violence?', *Security Studies*, 13:3, 191–203
- Nisbet, Richard and Dov Cohen (1996) *Culture of honour: the psychology of violence in the south* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press)
- North, Douglass C and Robert Paul Thomas (1973) *The rise of the Western world: a new economic history* (New York: Cambridge University Press)
- Nye, Robert A (1993) *Masculinity and male codes of honour in modern France* (New York: Oxford University Press)
- O'Neill, Barry (2001) *Honour, symbols, and war* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press)
- Osterweis, Rollin (1949) *Romanticism and nationalism in the old south* (New Haven: Yale University Press)
- Otterbein, Keith (1970) *The evolution of war: a cross-cultural study* (United States: HRAF Press)
- Otterbein, Keith (2004) *How war began* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press)
- Otterbein, Keith and Charlotte Swanson Otterbein (1965) 'An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth: a cross-cultural study of feuding', *American Anthropologist*, 67:4, 1470–1483
- Peltonen, Markku (2003) *The duel in early modern England: civility, politeness and honour* (New York: Cambridge University Press)
- Perkins, Bradford (1961) *Prologue to war* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press)
- Polanyi, Karl (1957) *The great transformation: the political and economic origins of our time* (Boston: Beacon Press)
- Porter, Bruce D (1994) *War and the rise of the state: the military foundations of modern politics* (New York: Free Press)
- Posen, Barry (1993) 'Nationalism, the mass army, and military power', *International Security*, 18:2, 80–124
- Posner, Eric (2002) *Law and social norms* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press)
- Posner, Richard (1996) *Overcoming law* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press)
- Radcliffe-Brown, Alfred R (1965) *Structure and function in primitive society* (New York: The Free Press)

- Ray, James Lee (1989) 'The abolition of slavery and the end of international war', *International Organization*, 43:3, 405–439
- Resende-Santos, Joao (2007) *Neorealism, states, and the modern mass army* (New York: Cambridge University Press)
- Risse-Kappen, Thomas (1994) 'Ideas do not float freely: transnational coalitions, domestic structures, and the end of the Cold War', *International Organization*, 48:2, 185–214
- Samaha, Joel (1974) *Law and order in historical perspective: the case of Elizabethan Essex* (New York: Academic Press)
- Schieffelin, Edward L (1995) 'Early contact as drama and manipulation in the southern highlands of Papua New Guinea: pacifications as the structure of the conjuncture', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 37:3, 555–580
- Schneider, Robert A (1987) 'Swordplay and statemaking: aspects of the campaign against the duel in early modern France' in Charles Bright and Susan Harding (eds) *Statemaking and social movements: essays in history and theory* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press), 265–295
- Schumpeter, Joseph (1991) *Imperialism and social classes*, transl Heinz Norden (Philadelphia: Orion Editions)
- Schwartz, Warren, Keith Baxter and David Ryan (1984) 'The duel: can these gentlemen be acting efficiently?', *Journal of Legal Studies*, 13:2, 321–355
- Seitz, Don C (1966) *Famous American duels: with some account of the causes that led up to them and the men engaged* (New York: Books for Libraries Press)
- Shoemaker, Robert (2002) 'The taming of the duel: masculinity, honour and ritual violence in London, 1660–1800', *Historical Journal*, 45:3, 525–545
- Skocpol, Theda (1979) *States and social revolutions: a comparative analysis of France, Russia, and China* (New York: Cambridge University Press)
- Sidney, Algernon (1996) *Discourses concerning government*, ed Thomas West (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund)
- Smith, Adam (1976) *An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press)
- Smith, Adam (1982) *Lectures on jurisprudence*, ed RL Meek, DD Raphael and PG Stein (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund)
- Snyder, Jack (1991) *Myths of empire: domestic politics and international ambition* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press)
- Snyder, Jack (2002) 'Anarchy and culture: insights from the anthropology of war', *International Organization*, 56:1, 7–45
- Spruyt, Hendrik (1994) *The sovereign state and its competitors* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press)
- Stern, Fritz (1987) *Dreams and delusions: the drama of German history* (New York: Knopf)
- Steward, Dick (2000) *Duels and the roots of violence in Missouri* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press)
- Stewart, Frank Henderson (1994) *Honour* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press)
- Stowe, Steven (1987) *Intimacy and power in the old south* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press)
- Sumner, William Graham (1992) *On liberty, society, and politics: the essential essays of William Graham Sumner*, ed Robert Bannister (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund)
- Sumner, William Graham (2002) *Folkways: a study of mores, manners, customs, and morals* (New York: Dover)
- Sunstein, Cass (1996) *Legal reasoning and political conflict* (New York: Oxford University Press)
- Tauber, Kurt (1963) 'Nationalism and social restoration: fraternities in post-war Germany', *Political Science Quarterly*, 78:1, 66–85
- Tetlock, Philip and Aaron Belkin (eds) (1996) *Counterfactual thought experiments in world politics: logical, methodological, and psychological perspectives* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press)
- Tarde, Gabriel (2001) *Penal philosophy*, transl Rapelje Howell (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction)
- Tilly, Charles (1993) *Coercion, capital, and European states, AD 990–1992* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell)

- Tilly, Charles (1998) *Durable inequality* (Los Angeles and Berkeley: University of California Press)
- Tilly, Charles (2003) *The politics of collective violence* (New York: Cambridge University Press)
- Van Evera, Stephen (1997) *Guide to methods for students of political science* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press)
- Varley, H Paul et al (1974) *The Samurai* (New York: Penguin Books)
- Veblen, Thorstein (1994) *The theory of the leisure class* (New York: Penguin Books)
- Viner, Jacob (1972) *The role of providence in the social order: an essay in intellectual history* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press)
- Waltz, Kenneth (1959) *Man, the state, and war: a theoretical analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press)
- Waltz, Kenneth (1979) *Theory of international politics* (New York: McGraw Hill)
- Weber, Eugen (1976) *Peasants into Frenchmen: the modernization of rural France, 1870–1914* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press)
- Weber, Max (1958) *From Max Weber: essays in sociology*, transl HH Gerth and C Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press)
- Wendt, Alexander (2003) 'Why a world state is inevitable', *European Journal of International Relations*, 9:4, 491–542
- Wohlforth, William C (1993) *The elusive balance* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press)
- Wood, Gordon (1993) *The radicalism of the American revolution* (New York: Vintage)
- Wright, Quincy (1953) 'The outlawry of war and the law of war', *American Journal of International Law*, 47:3, 365–376
- Wright, Quincy (1983) *A study of war*, 2nd edn, ed LL Wright (Chicago: University of Chicago Press)