Chapter 21
Truth, Trivialism, and Perceptual Illusions

Otávio Bueno

Abstract Dialetheism is the view according to which some contradictions (i.e., statements of the form, A and not-A) are true. In this paper, I discuss three strategies to block dialetheism: (i) Contradictions cannot be true because some theories of truth preclude them from emerging. (ii) Contradictions cannot be true because we cannot see what it is like to perceive them. Although that does not undercut the possibility that there are true contradictions that we cannot perceive, it makes their introduction a genuine cost. (iii) Contradictions cannot be true because if they were, we would end up sliding down into believing that everything is true (trivialism). Even if the dialetheist is not committed to that slippery slope, it is crucial that the dialetheist establishes that trivialism is unacceptable; but it is not clear how that could be done successfully. Graham Priest has considered these strategies (in his Doubt Truth to be a Liar), but I argue that none of his responses successfully block them.

Keywords Dialetheism · Truth · Trivialism · Perceptual illusions · Graham Priest

Mathematics Subject Classification (2000) Primary 03B53 · Secondary 03A05

21.1 Introduction

According to dialetheism, some contradictions that is, statements of the form A and not-A are true (Priest [14, 15]). Few would be naturally disposed to agree with the view, but Graham Priest has defended it with great ingenuity and care. And Priest is certainly right in emphasizing the significant role that inconsistency plays in our understanding of logic, rationality, and various methodological issues. Even if you are not prepared to follow Priest all the way down, and believe that there are true contradictions, the encounter with the dialetheist is bound to make you rethink some of your deepest held assumptions.
It is not easy to argue with dialetheists, and some, such as David Lewis, have noted that one cannot argue against them, since there is no foothold on uncontested ground (Lewis [12]). Whether this is right or not is not an issue I need to address here (see, e.g., Bueno and Colyvan [5]). What I would like to explore are some strategies in terms of which one could resist dialetheism. Priest has considered them in *Doubt Truth to Be a Liar* (Priest [14]), but it is not clear to me that he has adequately blocked them. In particular, I will discuss three such strategies:

(a) **First strategy**: Contradictions cannot be true because some theories of truth preclude them from emerging. A serious commitment to these theories rules out the commitment to dialetheism.

(b) **Second strategy**: Contradictions cannot be true because we cannot see what is like to perceive them. Although that does not undercut the possibility that there are true contradictions that we cannot perceive, it makes their introduction a genuine cost.

(c) **Third strategy**: Contradictions cannot be true because if they were, we would end up sliding down into believing that everything is true (trivialism). Even if the dialetheist is not committed to that slippery slope, it is crucial that the dialetheist establishes that trivialism is unacceptable. But it is not clear how that could be done successfully.

Let me consider each of these strategies in turn.

### 21.2 First Strategy: Resisting True Contradictions from Some Theories of Truth

Here is a line of argument that someone who is committed to certain theories of truth could invoke in order to resist dialetheism. Consider the traditional coherence theorist who believes that truth is ultimately a matter of having a coherent belief system. There is, of course, the familiar issue as to whether this is indeed an account of truth or rather an account of justification. However the issue is resolved, the traditional coherence theorist would insist that there are independent reasons to think that consistency is a necessary component in a coherent system. On the traditional coherence picture, without consistency, we obtain triviality, and a trivial system—in which everything is true—would not be coherent, since it would both have and lack every conceivable property. This is a good reason for the traditional coherence theorist to keep consistency as a requirement. In other words, given that the traditional coherence theorist has no independent reason to believe that a coherent belief system can be inconsistent, or that we can be justified in believing in inconsistent systems, the coherence theorist has no reason to entertain the possibility of inconsistent coherent systems. This provides the resources for the traditional coherence theorist to avoid being committed to dialetheism.
Of course, the traditional coherence theorist did not have any knowledge of para-consistent logics. Such logics would only be explicitly developed much later. Consider then an enlightened coherence theorist, who is now aware that inconsistency and triviality should be distinguished. With a paraconsistent logic in place, an inconsistent system need not be trivial. There is no need to keep consistency as a necessary requirement for a coherent system if what we really want to avoid is triviality. Is the enlightened coherence theorist a dialetheist?

Not necessarily. After all, even though an inconsistent coherent system is entertained, the enlightened coherence theorist need not be committed to the conclusion that there are true contradictions. Strictly speaking, in a coherence theory, truth is a property of overall systems rather than individual statements. Thus, even though an inconsistent coherent system may be true, on the coherence theory it does not follow that there are true contradictions.

The idea is that the enlightened coherence theorist can resist dialetheism without begging the question. At no point has the enlightened coherence theorist assumed that contradictions cannot be true. In fact, given that a paraconsistent logic has been invoked, the central logical resource for dialetheism is in place. So, the dialetheist can no longer complain that the position has been illegitimately excluded from consideration. Rather, the enlightened coherence theorist has an argument to resist dialetheism, since on her conception truth (or justification) is a property of whole systems, not of individual statements.

It may be objected that this response is not adequate. After all, what is at issue now is whether according to the enlightened coherence theorist there are inconsistent but true coherent systems. So the issue has moved to the level of whole systems rather than particular statements. But are there reasons to think such systems exist in the first place? Nothing from the enlightened coherence account—as an account of truth (or justification)—settles the matter. The world would have to be such that it allowed for true but inconsistent coherent systems. But the argument now turns on how the world is rather than on what is required from a theory of truth. So a very different kind of argument than the one provided by the dialetheist needs to be offered.

But is this not precisely the dialetheist’s argument, namely, that nothing in the enlightened coherence theory rules out dialetheism? To answer this question, it is important to be clear about what we expect from a theory of truth. Clearly, theories of truth have been formulated quite independently of dialetheism. So why should they suddenly be required to rule out this particular philosophical view? Consider an analogous argument. A coherence theory of truth—as a theory of truth—does not rule out Aristotelian physics, Newtonian mechanics, alchemy, or a number of other false theories. If these theories are ruled out, it is because they are ultimately false; but that is the outcome of the relation these theories bear to the world. It is not a feature of the coherence theory alone. So just because the coherence theory does not rule out alchemy, that does not mean, of course, that we should now all be alchemists, any more than Aristotelian natural philosophers, Newtonian physicists, or dialetheists. In the end, it is unclear what exactly the dialetheist gains by insisting
that certain theories of truth do not rule out dialetheism. Why should anyone expect that dialetheism—or any other philosophical or scientific theory—be ruled out on the basis of a theory of truth alone?

Clearly, this general response is similarly open to the traditional coherence theorist. If coherence is taken seriously—and it is by coherence theorists—then contradictions cannot be true. Since contradictions are individual statements, and not features of overall systems, they are not the kinds of things that, according to the coherence theorist, truth can be suitably assigned to. And whether there are true inconsistent whole systems turns on how the world ultimately is rather than on particular commitments emerging from one’s theory of truth—and this is as it should be. (Of course, a paraconsistent logic would be needed to accommodate such inconsistencies at the level of entire systems without triviality.)

It should be noted that, on this coherentist conception (enlightened or not), the statement “snow is white” is similarly not truth-apt, even though it is part of a coherent system. Some may argue that this consequence shows that the version of the coherence theory I am considering is just inadequate, since it flies in the face of ordinary practice and common use of the truth predicate. But I take it that, at least in a context where dialetheism is at issue, flying in the face of ordinary practice is not an objection that has much force. What counts is the overall explanatory balance of the resulting view, and, in this particular case whether there are suitably formulated versions of the coherence theory of truth that block dialetheism.

I insist that this move does not beg the question against the dialetheist. Dialetheism was not even a possibility when the traditional coherence theories were first formulated. One would need to wait until the development of paraconsistent logics before dialetheism could be seriously entertained. Without a paraconsistent logic explicitly in place, we would immediately obtain triviality if we were to be committed to an inconsistent system.

It might be objected that all that the dialetheist needs is an implicit paraconsistent logic, in the way in which the Aristotelian syllogistic system is paraconsistent. There is no need for an explicit, fully articulated paraconsistent logic to be developed in order for dialetheism to get going. Consider, for instance, the syllogism:

(P1) All men are mortal.
(P2) Some men are not mortal.
Therefore, all men are blue.

This is, of course, an invalid argument according to Aristotelian logic. The premises are contradictory, but not everything follows from them. Explosion (the principle according to which everything follows from a contradiction) is then blocked. Since blocking explosion is considered a central feature for a logic to be deemed paraconsistent, and given that Aristotelian logic has that feature, it is indeed paraconsistent (see da Costa and Bueno [7], and Priest [13]). Despite being minimally paraconsistent, Aristotelian logic was not developed as a way of providing resources to handle reasoning involving inconsistencies. In this sense, such a logic—whatever its para-
consistent status—would not be of much help to the dialetheist. It is not surprising that dialetheism only emerged when the suitable resources of paraconsistent logic were in place.

The point here is that, by taking into closer account the particular features of the coherence theory of truth, this proposal—both in the traditional and enlightened forms—has the resources to block dialetheism. The dialetheist may complain that the coherence theory is inadequate for other reasons. But this means changing the argumentative strategy. The argument no longer can be: the coherence theory of truth does not block dialetheism, and so, if you are a coherence theorist, there is no reason, based on your theory of truth alone, for you not to be a dialetheist. The argument needs to be: the dialetheist rejects some features of the coherence theory of truth (such as, the fact that it relies on consistency as a requirement for coherence), and by rejecting these features, the resulting theory no longer blocks dialetheism.

This raises the issues as to whether the resulting coherence theory, without the consistency requirement on coherence, would still count as a coherence theory, and whether the changes envisaged by the dialetheist are independently motivated. These are points that the dialetheist would still need to argue for. But one may wonder what would be gained from this exercise. After all, it would not be philosophically surprising that a reformulation of the coherence theory that is offered so that it becomes compatible with dialetheism turns out to be so compatible!

A similar style of argument applies to other theories of truth. For example, according to Priest, the semantic conception of truth does not block dialetheism (see Priest [14, pp. 45–47]). In order to avoid the semantic paradoxes, Tarski introduced a hierarchy of languages in which the truth predicate of the object language could not be defined in that language. As a result, the liar sentence is not expressible in any language of the hierarchy, and the paradox is blocked.

On Priest’s view, such a hierarchy is not essential to the semantic conception of truth, and should be rejected (see Priest [14, p. 46], and [15, Chap. 1]). Of course, by rejecting the hierarchy of languages, the semantic conception is unable to block the semantic paradoxes. It is no longer surprising that dialetheism could no longer be resisted.

The problem here should now be familiar. Similarly to what happened in the last point made in the discussion of the coherence theory, Priest has rejected the feature of the semantic conception of truth that allowed the theory to resist the paradox. By substantially weakening that theory, it is not surprising that dialetheism can no longer be avoided. But anyone who takes the semantic conception of truth seriously, as Tarski did, is unlikely to recognize the weakened version of the theory as still a candidate for a semantic conception. For a distinctive feature of that conception, at least as Tarski developed it, is the acknowledgement that semantically closed languages, such as English, are ultimately inconsistent. In order to ensure that the formal languages under consideration are not semantically closed, and thus are not open to semantic paradoxes, Tarski formulated the now familiar hierarchy of languages. As a result, such a hierarchy is indeed constitutive of the semantic conception, which would thereby be entirely disfigured without it. So, the conclusion that the semantic conception of truth does not avoid dialetheism is not warranted. And it should
be expected that if one reformulated that conception by excluding the hierarchy of languages, it would become compatible with dialetheism. But little would be gained by this exercise. It is a much more controversial point to claim that one should reject the hierarchy of languages—a point that the dialetheist does make—but which the defender of the semantic conception is unlikely to concede, for the reason just noted.

I think that the same point applies to all of the other theories of truth that Priest considers in Chap. 2 of *Doubt Truth to Be a Liar* (Priest [15]). Properly developed, and perhaps a little more sympathetically presented, each of these theories has the resources to resist dialetheism. The only exception is the deflationist theory. This theory, as presented, for example, by Horwich [11], since it does not impose any constraints whatsoever on the disquotational schema, does seem to invite dialetheism. It is not surprising then that those who are sympathetic to deflationism about truth end up working so hard to develop a well-motivated account of how the semantic paradoxes can be resisted (see, e.g., Field [8]).

### 21.3 Second Strategy: Can We Perceive Contradictions?

A second strategy to resist dialetheism insists that contradictions cannot be true because we cannot see what is like to perceive them. Although that does not undercut the possibility that there are true contradictions that we cannot perceive, it makes their introduction significantly more costly. After all, given that we have no access to what contradictions are like, it is just expected that some would try to resist being committed to their existence.

The dialetheist, however, argues that we can perceive contradictions—or, at least, we can know what is like to perceive them (Priest [14, pp. 57–61]). Various kinds of perceptual illusions illustrate that. Consider, for instance, the Penrose figure. These are ascending stairs, and by starting at any point in the figure and moving upward anti-clockwise, you return to the same spot where you started. Thus, you end up at a point that is higher than itself (and that is also not higher than itself). At this moment, you have perceived a contradiction.

The Penrose figure should be distinguished from the Schuster figure. According to Priest ([14, p. 59]), the latter is not a case of perceiving a contradiction, since it does not depict an inconsistent situation. Rather, the picture is constituted by two different perfectly consistent drawings (a three-legged object and a two-legged one) pasted together. We cannot visually parse the whole drawing, but we can clearly see each of its two parts. Priest takes the situation with the Penrose figure to be different, given that the whole object can be perceived: we perceive here a truly inconsistent object.

It is not clear, however, that the two cases are different. In both examples, rules of perspective are violated. In the Schuster figure, convention codes about how to draw a three-legged object and a two-legged one are violated. A central principle that governs the representation of an object under perspective is that one should not draw what cannot be seen from the point of view that is adopted when picturing that
object (see Gombrich [10]). This principle is clearly violated in the Schuster figure, in which two different perspectives are simultaneously adopted in order to produce the image. It is not surprising that we have trouble parsing it. The same point applies to the Penrose figure, since it also adopts two distinct perspectives: one according to which the point you started ascending the stairs is lower than the other points in the stairs, and one according to which that point is higher. The trick, once again, emerges from the simultaneous combination, in a perfectly symmetric way, of two different perspectives. The figure can be perfectly divided into two planes: a right one and a left one, crossing vertically the stair that is closest to the viewer. The careful symmetry used in the composition of the image gives the sense that it is an ordinary stair.

Note that the point here is not to state that, in the Schuster figure, there is an object that has two legs from one perspective and three from another. I have no reason to believe that any such object exists. Rather, the point is that the Schuster figure involves two distinct perspectives that are brought together in order to produce the image—quite independently of the issue as to whether there is any object that the figure represents. (Priest presumably will not disagree with this point.)

Can we say that the Penrose figure is an inconsistent object? It is not clear to me that we can. The figure violates a central principle of perspective, since two different perspectives are used simultaneously to produce the image. But within each plane of perspective, the rules of perspective are thoroughly followed. This explains the perfect sense of familiarity that the image initially has. It is in virtue of this symmetry that the image initially just seems to be an unremarkable arrangement of stairs. In this sense, the Penrose figure yields a slightly different phenomenology than the Schuster figure. But in the end it also generates some dissonance—a sense of puzzlement—when after always walking down a set of stairs one suddenly reaches the highest point of those stairs! Now, clearly, the fact that an image is composed in terms of two different perspectives does not entail that the object that is being depicted is inconsistent. Picasso’s drawings of Dora Maar violate the same principle of perspective that the Penrose image does. But clearly, this gives us no reason to believe that Picasso’s lover was an inconsistent object. At best, a different convention code is invoked to produce the image.

Now, what is the significance of realizing that the Penrose figure does not depict an inconsistent situation? If we are not really looking at an inconsistent object, then the argument to the effect that we know what is like to perceive a contradiction no longer seems persuasive. Remember that the dialetheist is trying to offer us an account of what is like to perceive an inconsistent situation (a contradiction). If we can find that out without effectively looking at an inconsistent object, one may wonder how reliable the answer is.

But perhaps it is enough for the dialetheist’s purposes simply to address the phenomenology of the perception of an inconsistent situation—whether that situation is indeed inconsistent or not. To the question: “What would it be like to perceive a contradiction?” the dialetheist replies: It would be like getting trapped in the situation depicted in the Penrose figure, where one finds oneself both at a point higher and lower than itself. Even if the object depicted in the figure is not really inconsistent, we
know what is like to perceive a contradiction by examining carefully what happens when we look at the Penrose image.

I do not think this response succeeds, though. The difficulty here is that how can we know that contradictions do look the way the dialetheist reports them as looking—unless we already have reason to believe that (a) the object that we are looking at is indeed inconsistent, and (b) perception works reliably in the presence of inconsistent objects? With regard to (a), if the object in question is not inconsistent, what grounds would we have to think that the phenomenology described corresponds to the relevant sort of object? Being trapped in the situation depicted by the Penrose figure is not phenomenologically unlike perceiving an anamorphosis (a distorted drawing that appears correctly only when viewed from a particular point). Both cases involve careful, perverse manipulation of the rules of perspective. And both fail to guarantee that the objects in question are inconsistent. With regard to (b), what grounds do we have to believe that perception works reliably in the presence of inconsistent objects? If the observable world is consistent, as Priest argues it is (Priest [14, pp. 62–64]), it does not seem that we have even grounds to determine whether perception functions reliably in an inconsistent context. We lack the opportunity to do that. So, more needs to be said before we can be reassured that we know what is like to perceive an inconsistent situation.

JC Beall and Mark Colyvan [3] argue that we do have good reason to believe that the world—including, in particular, its observable parts—is inconsistent, and that contradictions in fact abound. Their considerations are not based on drawings of presumably impossible objects—they explicitly mention, and disregard, Escher’s drawings—but on the pervasive vagueness of language and the assumption that a paraconsistent approach to vagueness is the only one that does not fail (Beall and Colyvan [3, p. 565]). On their view:

You might think that some Escher’s drawings apparently represent inconsistent objects but that these drawings do not give us reason to believe that the world is inconsistent. There’s an important difference, though, between the Escher-like figures and our case: it’s hardly plausible that Escher’s drawings are the best representations of the world. (Indeed, most people don’t think they represent at all.) On the other hand, the language of our best scientific theories is supposed to not only represent, but accurately represent. Thus, if the language of our best scientific theories (indispensably) involves vague predicates, then as naturalistic philosophers we have good reason to believe that this vagueness is a feature of the world. […] This is not intended to be an argument for vagueness-in-the-world, we merely wish to show that considerations of vagueness provide a significantly better case for observable contradictions than Escher-like drawings (Beall and Colyvan [3, p. 568]).

So whenever we experience a Sorites-like patch of colors ranging from blue to purple, “the purplish-blue object is both blue and not blue” (Beall and Colyvan [3, p. 565]). Contradictions, Beall and Colyvan insist, do abound!

Does this argument go through? I do not think it does. It relies on two assumptions that turn out to be highly problematic. The first is that a paraconsistent approach to vagueness is the only that is not ruled out. But what reasons do we have to believe that this assumption is true? Let us return to Beall and Colyvan’s purplish-blue object. The phenomenology of seeing such an object has none of the puzzlements we experience.
when we look at allegedly inconsistent objects, such as the Penrose or the Schuster figures. In contrast with experiencing these figures, there is no difficulty to parse a purplish-blue object: no cognitive dissonance is involved there. (A related puzzlement emerges when we reason through a contradiction, such as the one involved in the liar paradox: we experience conflicting conclusions that we derive—prima facie, the liar sentence is true and it is not true.) The fact that experiencing the purplish-blue object is not accompanied by any such corresponding cognitive phenomenology suggests that rather than exemplifying a contradictory vague entity, we have more reason to consider it as a consistent vague object: it is not determined that the object is blue and it is not determined that the object is not blue. That is all. No contradiction is in fact needed—or invoked—here. To assume a paraconsistent approach of vagueness in this case just seems unmotivated.

The second assumption that Beall and Colyvan rely on is the indispensability argument. According to this argument, we ought to be ontologically committed to all and only the entities that are indispensable to our best theories of the world (Colyvan [6]). And, they continue, since our best scientific theories invoke vague predicates, we should conclude that there are vague objects in the world. But clearly we quantify over all kinds of things—even indispensably so—we have no reason to believe exist: fictional objects, average moms, and perfectly frictionless planes are obvious examples. Quantification and ontological commitment are, thus, best kept apart (Azzouni [1]). To mark ontological commitment, one needs an existence predicate. Quantification only indicates the range of the objects that one is considering—whether they exist or not is a separate matter (Bueno [4]).

As a result, even if we granted, for the sake of argument, that a paraconsistent approach to vagueness were the only workable solution to the problem of vagueness, we cannot conclude that vagueness is a feature of the world. Thus, the intended conclusion that there are observable contradictions in the world is, once again, blocked.

21.4 Third Strategy: Sliding Down into Trivialism

A source of worry against dialetheism—although definitely not a good one—is that if we accept that some contradictions are true, we will end up having to believe that everything is true. Of course, this would only be the case if we adopted classical logic. Since the dialetheist does not do that, but adopt instead a paraconsistent logic, this worry does not get off the ground. But once it is claimed that some contradictions are true, it is important for the dialetheist to distance the view from the claim that all contradictions are true. After all, under very reasonable assumptions, this is equivalent to the claim that everything is true. This is trivialism. To make sure that there is no slippery slope from dialetheism to trivialism, it is important for the dialetheist to resist that view.

Given that the trivialist does not discriminate anything, since he or she takes everything to be true, trivialism is obviously not very plausible. But how can it be refuted? It turns out to be something far from trivial. One would need to show that

otaviobueno@mac.com
something is untrue. But the trivialist would agree with that, since “something is untrue” is also true, given that everything is true!

To refute the trivialist, Priest provides a transcendental argument, according to which the conditions of possibility of choosing something is that one believes that certain actions will have certain effects. This means believing certain things and not believing others. And this is precisely what the trivialist is unable to do, given that he or she takes everything to be true. As Priest notes:

To choose how to act is to have a purpose: to (try to) bring about this rather than that. [...] Choosing is an irredeemably goal-directed activity. And [...] such an action is incompatible with believing everything. It follows that I cannot but reject trivialism. Phenomenologically, it is not an option for me. This does not show that trivialism is untrue. As far as the above considerations go, it is quite possible that everything is the case; but not for me—or for any other person. (Priest [14, p. 70])

This is an intriguing argument. It concedes that one cannot refute trivialism. But it tries instead to undermine the existence of trivialists. It is not clear, however, that the argument succeeds. The phenomenology of the trivialist may actually not be all that different from the dialetheist’s. The dialetheist believes that some contradictions are true, but decides to act on some other beliefs: the consistent beliefs, not the contradictory ones. Of course, the dialetheist has a story to offer here. Since the observable world—in particular, the parts of the world in which we act—is consistent, the dialetheist will typically not face a situation in which a course of action requires commitment to an inconsistent state of affairs.

But precisely the same argument also applies to the trivialist. The trivialist also selects the beliefs he or she will act on. Some will seem more appropriate than others for certain tasks. The trivialist can even tell a story—exactly the same story as the dialetheist’s—about the consistency of the observable world. This would explain the phenomenology of the trivialist’s choice, in exactly the same way as the dialetheist explains it.

One may resist this conclusion by insisting that Priest is not constrained at all to act only on consistent beliefs, since actions depend on beliefs about more than just what is directly observable. Even if we grant this last point, the objection still would not go through. For whatever the sources of one’s actions—whether they are grounded on beliefs about the observable or not—given that these actions can only be realized in the observable part of the world (which is the only part we inhabit), and since that part, according to the dialetheist, is consistent, the dialetheist will never face a course of action that requires the realization of an inconsistency. And precisely the same point goes for the trivialist.

It might be argued that this cannot be right. After all, the trivialist will also believe in the negation of every aspect of the story just told. That is right. But, of course, that does not undermine the trivialist’s account! In an interesting way, believing everything is remarkably similar to not believing anything, which is often taken to be a skeptical position.\(^1\) Interestingly enough, the phenomenology of choice in Pyrrhonian skepticism won’t be much different from the descriptions given so far.

---

\(^1\) Priest in fact considers the skeptic in this context (see Priest [14, p. 69]).
The Pyrrhonist acts without beliefs in anything having to do with the ultimate nature of things (since the skeptic suspends judgment about these matters). But this does not prevent the Pyrrhonist from acting, since similarly to the dialetheist and the trivialist, it seems to the Pyrrhonist that certain courses of action are better than others. This does not require the skeptic to be committed to any substantive belief about the way things are. It is enough that things just seem to be in a certain way.

Note also that the dialetheist’s response to the trivialist, which is content with just describing the dialetheist’s own phenomenology, would be welcomed by the Pyrrhonist, who similarly just describes, in a non-dogmatic way, the content of his or her own experience. Trivialism, although obviously not a plausible view, has still to be undermined. Unless the dialetheist is able to do that, the plausibility of dialetheism can always be questioned.

21.5 Conclusion

I discussed three strategies that one could invoke to resist dialetheism: one based on the theory of truth, another on perceptual illusions, and a third on trivialism. In each case, the dialetheist’s arguments were found wanting. In the end, despite all of the alleged benefits brought by the view, dialetheism can still be resisted.

Acknowledgments My thanks go to Jeremy Morris, Shane Oakley, and Scott Shalkowski for very helpful discussions. Thanks are also due to an anonymous reviewer for the comments on an earlier version of this work.

References


otaviobueno@mac.com