Going to the Mattresses:
Filibustering in Congress, 1789-1901
This paper is a summary of the first half of my manuscript on obstruction in the historic House and Senate. It features a formal model of obstruction, careful measurement of the dilatory tactics used during the historic period, and statistical analysis of historic filibustering. Among other findings, this paper demonstrates that there was more obstruction in the historic House than the Senate, and links this pattern to the larger and growing size of the House.
Parties and Agenda-Setting in the Senate, 1973-1998 (with James Fowler)
We analyze the influence of party and preferences on Senate agenda-setting. We find a significant majority party advantage in getting bills reported from committee, but otherwise little variation within parties based on preferences. In addition, our results suggest that Senate committees are more likely to report bills written by committee leaders and senior members, or bills with cosponsors. This suggests that Senate agenda-setters are sensitive to cues that bills are high-quality and relatively easy to pass.
Available Upon Request...
For me, papers are often multi-stage projects: draft, get feedback, improve. A number of my papers are in an early or intermediate stage of this process. If you read an early draft of one of my papers, you may find that later drafts are vastly improved. If you are interested in reading and commenting, please contact me for discussion drafts of any of these papers:
1) The Electoral Consequences of Party Loyalty in Congress (with Jamie Carson and Matthew Lebo). This paper tests the relationship between party unity and incumbent's electoral fortunes. We find that vote share declines with party unity, and this effect is contingent upon the partisan leanings of the incumbent's constituency. Presented MPSA 2006; Latest draft Sept. 2007.
2) Strategic Party Leadership (with Matthew Lebo). In an extension of the Strategic Party Government model, this paper tests the claim that Congressional party leaders serve as electoral "generals"; legislators replace their leaders when they are disappointed with electoral outcomes. We find the expected pattern in the House (ask Dennis Hastert!) but not the Senate, suggesting that Senate leaders are not held accountable for electoral outcomes. Presented MPSA 2007; we will fold this paper into a book manuscript on Congressional parties.