Partisan Webs: Information Exchange and Party Networks. (With Seth Masket and Hans Noel)
British Journal of Political Science, July 2009.
Abstract: What is a party? We argue that the formal party apparatus is only one part of an extended network of interest groups, media, 527s, and candidates. We systematically measure a portion of this network by tracking transfers of names between political organizations. Our analysis reveals two distinct and polarized networks corresponding to a more liberal Democratic group and a more conservative Republican group. Formal party organizations, like the DNC and RNC, hold privileged positions within these networks. They tend to receive information, while other groups funnel information toward the formal party.
Polarized Agents: Campaign Contributions By Lobbyists (With Jennifer Nicoll Victor)
PS: Political Science and Politics, July 2009.
Abstract: This research note examines the partisan tendencies of campaign contributions by lobbyists. We find that individual lobbyists tend overwhelmingly to donate to one major party or the other. We also find that many lobbying firms also have a strong partisan tendency. Finally, donations toward House members were heavily tilted toward the majority party, while the two Senate parties were essentially even.
Note: This is the first of multiple planned papers on the connections between lobbyists and members of Congress.
in Why Not Parties? ed. Nathan Monroe, David Rohde, Jason Roberts. 2008.
Abstract: This chapter explains how a simple majority of the Senate can restrict filibustering using unconventional parliamentary tactics. Then I discuss the debate over filibusters against judicial nominees from 2003 to 2005, explaining the strategy of both sides and the composition of the "Gang of 14."
Effort, Intensity and Position Taking: Reconsidering Obstruction in the Pre-Cloture Senate.
(With Kathleen Bawn)
Journal of Theoretical Politics, January 2008, 67-92.
Abstract: Effort is a crucial element of the legislative process – writing bills, forming coalitions, crafting strategies, and debating. We develop a model in which legislative decisions are the product of competitive effort by two teams, one trying to pass new legislation, and the other to block it. Teams choose effort levels based on preferences over the policy outcome, political rewards for effort, and opportunity costs, and the team that produces more effort wins. We apply this model to four cases of major legislation from the pre-cloture Senate: passage of the Federal Reserve Act in 1913, the Ship Purchase Act of 1915, the Ship Arming bill of 1917, and the adoption of the Senate cloture rule in 1917. These cases demonstrate the value of looking beyond legislative voting and the rules that structure it, and of including effort as a key element of the legislative game.
Strategic Party Government: Party Influence in Congress, 1789-2000
(with Matthew Lebo and Adam McGlynn)
American Journal of Political Science July 2007, 464-481 )
Abstract: Why does the influence of Congressional parties fluctuate over time? Building on prevailing answers, we develop a model, Strategic Party Government, which highlights the electoral motives of legislative parties and the strategic interaction between parties. We test this theory using the entire range of House and Senate party behavior from 1789 to 2000 and find that the strategic behavior of parties complements members’ preferences as an explanation for variation in party influence. Specifically, the strongest predictors of one party’s voting unity are the unity of the opposing party and the difference between the parties in the preceding year. Moreover, we find strong links between party behavior in Congress and electoral outcomes: an increase in partisan influence on legislative voting has adverse electoral costs, while winning contested votes has electoral benefits.
Cloture Reform and Party Government in the Senate, 1918-1925
Journal of Politics August 2006
Abstract: Why does filibustering persist in the U.S. Senate? This article analyzes senators’ preferences toward majority cloture from 1918 to 1925, a crucial period in Senate history. I find that majority party members were more likely to support stricter cloture rules, but support for cloture reform diminished within both parties for senators far from the party median. I find little evidence that support or opposition to cloture reform was linked to seniority, prior House experience, legislative activism, or state size. These findings are consistent with the micro-level claims of conditional party government theory.
Filibuster Reform in the Senate, 1913-1917
in Party, Process, and Political Change in Congress, Volume 2, ed. David Brady and Mathew McCubbins, Stanford University Press, 2007
Abstract: This chapter explains a seminal event in Senate history: the adoption of the Senate's first cloture rule in 1917. I develop a general theory of institutional choice and then test that theory using the Senate's choices from 1913 to 1917 as cases. During this period, support for majority cloture was clearly weak. President Wilson altered senators' calculations by "going public" against Senate filibustering in March 1917. In response to public outrage, senators adopt a cosmetic rule that embodied the de facto balance of power in the Senate: at the time, a sustained filibuster required at least a third of the chamber.
Position-Taking and Cosponsorship in the U.S. House
Legislative Studies Quarterly May 2003
Abstract: Bill cosponsorship has become an important part of the legislative and electoral process in the modern House of Representatives. Using interviews with congressional members and staff, I explain the role of cosponsorship as a signal to agenda setters and a form of position taking for constituents. Regression analysis confirms that cosponsoring varies with a member's electoral circumstances, institutional position, and state size, but generally members have adapted slowly to the introduction of cosponsorship to the rules and practice of the House.