

The Rational Roles of Intuition¹

Elijah Chudnoff

Abstract: Intuitions are often thought of as inputs to theoretical reasoning. For example, you might form a belief by taking an intuition at face value, or you might take your intuitions as starting points in the method of reflective equilibrium. The aim of this paper is to argue that in addition to these roles intuitions also play action-guiding roles. One form this takes is internal to theoretical reasoning: in addition to serving as inputs to theoretical reasoning, intuitions also guide it, enabling the transmission of justification through inference. They play a similar role in guiding practical reasoning, enabling an action to be done for a reason. After making a case for assigning intuitions these additional action-guiding roles, I consider what it is in virtue of which an intuition can play such roles. I conclude by exploring the implications intuition's playing these roles might have for two philosophical debates, one about the viability of moral intuitionism, and one about the epistemology of inference.

We have attitudes, such as beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, and intentions. Some of these are more reasonable than others. We have experiences, such as perceptions,

¹ I presented an earlier version of this work focused on inference to the philosophy department at The University of Florida. I thank John Biro, Robert D'Amico, Kirk Ludwig, Greg Ray, and Gene Witmer for helpful discussion on that occasion. I thank Michael Slote for extended discussion and written feedback that helped shape it into its present form.

bodily sensations, recollections, imaginings, and—I would add—intuitions. Some of these play a role in making some of our attitudes more reasonable than others. By the rational roles of a type of experience I mean, to a first approximation, the roles experiences of that type play in making some of our attitudes more reasonable than others.

There are some subtleties to the notion that need sorting out. Consider an example. Smith wonders whether there is mail in his mailbox. So he checks. In it he sees some mail. This visual experience makes it more reasonable for Smith to believe that there is mail in his mailbox than that there isn't. In one sense Smith's visual experience has already played a rational role. In jargon: it has made it the case that Smith has propositional justification for believing there is mail in his mailbox. The story continues. Smith takes his visual experience at face value, and so forms the belief that there is mail in his mailbox. Smith's belief is more reasonable than some others he might have formed—e.g. that there is no mail in his mailbox—and, once again, this is due, in part, to Smith's visual experience. In jargon: Smith's belief that there is mail in his mailbox is doxastically justified, and, plausibly, it is because it was formed by Smith taking his visual experience at face value.

So an experience of yours can play a rational role by making it the case that you have justification for some attitude. Call this the *justifying role*. In addition, your experience can play a rational role by making it the case that one of your attitudes is justified. Call this the *basing role*. Finally, if your experience does make it the case that one of your attitudes is justified, then, plausibly, it does so because your attitude was formed in response to it. Your experience explains why you have the

attitude; call this the *explanatory role*. The three roles are connected in the following principle:

Connecting Principle: For subject S, experience E, and attitude A, if E justifies S in having A, then S can form A in response to E, and if S does form A in response to E, then E makes S's attitude A justified.

In considering the rational role of an experience, it is important to distinguish its three aspects—its justifying, basing, and explanatory aspects—but it is also important to keep in mind their inter-connections.

In this paper I will explore the rational roles intuitions play. Two have been discussed widely recently. In one, intuitions ground immediate doxastic justification, rather like Smith's visual experience does. In the other, intuitions contribute to mediate, specifically inferential, doxastic justification, rather like the premises in an argument. I discuss these briefly below. My main aim, however, is to argue that intuitions play additional rational roles. Roughly: they guide action—both mental and bodily. Here is the plan.

In section 1, I set out some assumptions I will make about the nature of intuitions. In section 2, I discuss the first two rational roles just mentioned. In section 3, I argue that there are action-guiding rational roles intuitions play, which should not be assimilated to the first two. In section 4, I take up the question of what it is in virtue of which intuitions can play these action-guiding rational roles. And in section 5, I consider what significance the fact, if it is a fact, that intuitions play them

might have, in particular for debates about the viability of moral intuitionism and the epistemology of inference.

1. What Are Intuitions?

Consider three theses about perception:

(1) Perceptual experiences are *sui generis* experiences; they should not be identified with doxastic attitudes or dispositions—such as beliefs, or inclinations to believe.²

(2) Perceptual experiences possess presentational phenomenology; whenever you seem to perceive that p, there is some q (maybe = p) such that—in the same experience—you seem to perceive that q, and you seem to be sensorily aware of the chunk of reality that makes q true.³

(3) Perceptual experiences fit into your stream of consciousness like experiential atoms; they are not constituted by your other experiences, such as your imaginings and conscious thoughts.⁴

² Cf. (Jackson 1977), (Evans 1981), (Peacocke 1983), (Searle 1983), (Foster 2001), (Huemer 2001). (Armstrong 1968) is a well-known proponent of the opposing view; see also (Glüer 2009).

³ Cf. (McDowell 1994), (Robinson 1994), (Sturgeon 2000), (Foster 2001), (O’Shaughnessy 2002), (Crane 2005), and (Johnston 2006). All agree that perception possesses presentational phenomenology, though not all adopt the same gloss on what this amounts to. I explore the nature of presentational phenomenology further in (Chudnoff forthcoming).

⁴ Contrast the views of some earlier writers according to which perceptual experiences—as opposed to mere sensations—are supplemented by imagination. For discussion see Strawson’s “Imagination and Perception” in (Strawson 2007).

In my view intuition is similar to perception with respect to the first two points, and dissimilar with respect to the third. That is, I endorse the following theses about intuition:

- (4) Intuition experiences are *sui generis* experiences; they should not be identified with doxastic attitudes or dispositions—such as beliefs, or inclinations to believe.⁵
- (5) Intuition experiences possess presentational phenomenology; whenever you seem to intuit that p, there is some q (maybe = p) such that—in the same experience—you seem to intuit that q, and you seem to be intellectually aware of the chunk of reality that makes q true.⁶
- (6) Intuition experiences fit into your stream of consciousness like experiential molecules; they are constituted by your other experiences, such as your imaginings and conscious thoughts.⁷

I have argued for theses (4) through (6) elsewhere; here they must remain assumptions.⁸

⁵ Cf. (Bealer 1998, 2000, and 2002) and (Huemer 2001, 2008). For arguments in favor of the opposing view see: (Williamson 2004, 2005, and 2007) and (Earlenbaugh and Molyneux 2009).

⁶ This view—though not my way of putting it—was more common among earlier writers on intuition. In (Chudnoff 2011), I give reasons for attributing it to Descartes, Husserl, Russell, and Gödel. I would add John Balguy and Richard Price to the list of historical proponents; see their works excerpted in (Raphael 1969).

⁷ Cf. (Husserl 1975, 2001), (Parsons 1980, 2007), and (Tieszen 1989, 2005). I believe Husserl was the first to defend this view. It was common ground among those in the phenomenological tradition; see, for example, (Lévinas 1995).

It is worth considering an illustrative example, however.

Take a simple mathematical proposition: the product of two negative numbers is a positive number. It is possible to intuit that it is true. But not every way of becoming convinced that it is true counts as intuiting that it is true.

Most students learn it in school. Their mathematics instructor gives them rules for calculating with integers and one of these rules is that a negative times a negative is a positive. These students know by testimony, not intuition. Their grasp is mechanical.

Some instructors present additional motivation. I've heard, for example, that some teachers try to motivate the rule by analogy with grammatical negation: just as not-not-p is logically equivalent to p so $(-1)(-1) = -(-1) = 1$. This might give some students a sense of understanding, but this sense is surely illusory.


Other instructors might give an argument. Suppose the distributive law— $a(b + c) = ab + ac$ —which holds for natural numbers also holds for integers. Then $(-1)(-1)$ must be 1. For, by the distributive law, $-1(-1 + 1) = (-1)(-1) + (-1)(1)$, so that $0 = (-1)(-1) - 1$, and it follows that $1 = (-1)(-1)$. This little argument is illuminating in its own way. But following it does not make the claim that $(-1)(-1) = 1$ evident in a way that calls for comparison with *seeing* something to be true. One strike against it is that it doesn't make clear why the distributive law should hold for integers.

Later in life you might confront a more rigorous proof. In a foundations of mathematics course, your instructor might define the integers in terms of the natural numbers and operations on the integers in terms of operations on the

⁸ See (Chudnoff 2010, 2011, forthcoming, and ms).

natural numbers. From these definitions it can be proved that the distributive law holds for integers, and that $(-1)(-1) = 1$. This is all well and good, but it is a matter of proof, not intuition.

To intuit that the product of two negative numbers is a positive number you must reflect more carefully on the nature of multiplication. What is multiplication? Multiplication of real numbers shows that it is not just repeated addition, as multiplication of natural numbers might suggest. And multiplication of complex numbers shows that it is not just scaling, as multiplication of real numbers might suggest. It is a scaling and rotation.



Multiplying a number on the real line by i rotates it by 90° , yielding a number on the imaginary line. Multiplying a number on the real line by -1 rotates it by 180° (since $-1 = i^2$), yielding a number on the real line, which is a reflection of it about the origin. So $(-1)(-1) = 1$. And in general a negative times a negative is a positive.

The contrast between this way of becoming convinced that the product of two negative numbers is positive with the others should be marked. I take it to be a good example of intuition. There are simpler examples. But this one seems to me to be telling in important ways.

It suggests a few negative points. For example, it suggests that intuitions are not necessarily spontaneous judgments. Few spontaneously judge that the product of two negative numbers is positive. This proposition becomes evident only after reflection.⁹ Further, it suggests that intuitions are not necessarily based solely on understanding, or concept possession. School children possess the concept of multiplication. But they are not in a position to intuit that the product of two negative numbers is positive. Intuiting this requires insight into the nature of multiplication that isn't available to just anyone who can entertain thoughts about multiplication.¹⁰

The example also lends support to theses (4) through (6). Here I will just say something about (5) and (6). A natural way to characterize what distinguishes the last, intuitive way of becoming convinced that a negative times a negative is a positive is this. In this case, you are not compelled by authority or argument to believe that a negative times a negative is a positive; nor do you just find yourself mysteriously tempted to believe this proposition. Rather, the proposition is made to seem true to you by your apparent insight into the chunk of mathematical reality that makes it true, namely the rotational aspect of multiplication. This is why I say

⁹ The importance of reflection to intuition is something Audi has emphasized; see (Audi 1997, 2005).

¹⁰ One might defend the idea that intuition is based on understanding by appealing to Peacocke's view of implicit conceptions, arguing that school children implicitly represent that multiplication by -1 is rotation by 180° in the complex plane. See (Peacocke 2004, 2007). Alternatively, one might defend the idea by arguing that it does not require that your intuition that p only make explicit information you already possess implicitly in virtue of being able to entertain the thought that p. (Bealer 1998a, 1998b, and 1999) and (Sosa 2007, 2009), for example, defend understanding-based theories of intuition that are not clearly committed to this requirement. So the issue is complicated. I hope to take it up in further work.

that intuitions have presentational phenomenology. Consider, further, three plausible observations about this intuition experience. First, it isn't separable from your reflections on—i.e. your thoughts and imaginings directed toward—multiplication. A genie couldn't insert this experience into just any stream of consciousness. Second, the way to attend to it in introspection is to focus on a difference in your reflections, not to look for something that stands beside them in your stream of consciousness. Third, it inherits some of its phenomenal character from your reflections. For example, it—unlike some other intuition experiences—possesses some visual phenomenology. Why? Plausibly, because it inherits it from your visualization of the complex plane. These three observations seem to me best accounted for by the view that intuition experiences are constituted by other experiences, such as thoughts and imaginings.

2. Immediate Justifiers, Inferential Justifiers, and Evidence

According to some philosophers, some intuitions immediately justify beliefs. Such intuitions can play what I will call the *immediate justifier role*.

Take, for example, your intuition that the product of two negative numbers is positive. You have no reason to reject this claim or distrust your intuition. So, plausibly, your intuition immediately justifies you in believing that the product of two negative numbers is positive.¹¹ Suppose you take it at face value. You thereby

¹¹ One might argue that the justification isn't immediate, since it depends on your having justification for believing other propositions, for example that $-1 = i^2$. It is important, however, to distinguish a few different situations: (A) you can't have

form the immediately justified belief that the product of two negative numbers is positive. Your intuition has played the immediate justifier role.

We can separate out the justifying, basing, and explanatory aspects of this role.

Justifying Aspect: Your intuition that p justifies you in believing that p

Explanatory Aspect: When taken at face value, your intuition that p leads to your having the belief that p .

Basing Aspect: If you form the belief that p by taking your intuition that p at face value, then your intuition that p makes your belief that p justified

According to some philosophers, no intuitions immediately justify beliefs. At most they contribute to bits of reasoning that justify beliefs. Brad Hooker describes, but does not endorse, such a view:

Consider some intuitively attractive moral belief that is well informed and carefully considered but does not connect with our other intuitively

your intuition unless you have justification for believing $-1 = i^2$; (B) your intuition can't justify believing that $(-1)(-1) = 1$ unless it also justifies believing that $-1 = i^2$; (C) Your intuition can't justify believing that $(-1)(-1) = 1$ unless there is some other justifier that also contributes to justifying you in believing that $(-1)(-1) = 1$. (A) and (B) are compatible with your intuition immediately justifying your belief; (C) is not. The example seems to me to be an instance of (A) or (B), not (C).

attractive moral beliefs. For coherentists, this carefully considered intuitively attractive moral belief is unjustified.

On the other hand, coherentists who are devotees of the reflective equilibrium method admit that a moral theory's according with this same intuitively attractive (i.e. non-inferential) moral belief can serve as an argument in favor of the moral theory.¹²

I will call the role for intuitions that Hooker describes the *inferential justifier role*.

Once again, we can separate out its three aspects.

Justifying Aspect: Your intuition that p partly justifies you in believing that q (maybe = p); it requires supplementation by justification for other propositions.

Explanatory Aspect: When its content is taken as a premise in an appropriate inference, your intuition that p partly leads to your having the belief that q (maybe = p).

Basing Aspect: If you form the belief that q (maybe = p) by taking the content of your intuition that p as a premise in an appropriate inference, then your

¹² (Hooker 2002), pg 162 in (Stratton-Lake 2002).

intuition that p is part of what makes your belief that q (maybe $= p$) justified; it requires supplementation by justification for other propositions.

The immediate justifier and inferential justifier roles are not mutually exclusive. Though coherentists of the sort Hooker describes think that intuitions only play the inferential justifier, not the immediate justifier role, it is perfectly consistent to think that intuitions play both.

In my view they do play both, but the immediate justifier role is primary in the following sense. If an intuition plays the inferential justifier role it does so in virtue of playing the immediate justifier role. Suppose, for example, you intuit that the product of two negative numbers is positive. From this and your background knowledge that the product of a negative number and a positive number is negative you infer that the product of three negative numbers is negative. Why is it that your intuition is part of what makes your belief in this conclusion justified? On the face of it, it is because it is the whole of what makes your belief in one of the premises from which you inferred the conclusion justified.

This raises the question: in virtue of what does an intuition play the immediate justifier role, when it does so? There are a number of options one might pursue. Two initial ideas are:

Reliabilism: if an intuition plays the immediate justifier role, it does so in virtue of being a reliable indicator of the truth of its content.¹³

Phenomenalism: if an intuition plays the immediate justifier role, it does so in virtue of having a certain phenomenology with respect to its content.¹⁴

I call these initial ideas, since they require and have received further elaboration. My own view is that Phenomenalism is the preferable starting point, and that it requires one simple elaboration: the relevant phenomenology is presentational phenomenology, as characterized in section 1. Whether this is the correct view will not make a difference to the rest of my discussion, so I will not take up its defense here.

So far I have framed my discussion in terms of justification. Much recent work on intuition, however, is framed in terms of evidence. I will conclude this section with a few remarks on the topic of intuitions as evidence.

On one way of thinking about evidence, there isn't much to say since "evidence" is just a terminological variant of "justifier." That is:

Your evidence consists of whatever epistemically justifies, or epistemically contributes to justifying, you in having certain beliefs.

¹³ Cf. (Bealer 1998a, 1998b, 1999), (Goldman 2007), (Peacocke 2004), and (Sosa 2007, 2009).

¹⁴ Cf. (Huemer 2008).

If this is how we think of evidence, then insofar as we agree that intuitions play the immediate justifier role and the inferential justifier role, we should agree that intuitions are evidence.

But there is another way of thinking about evidence, on which the relationship between intuitions and evidence can seem less clear. We might put it like this:

Your evidence consists of the considerations that epistemically count in favor of your having certain beliefs.¹⁵

If this is how we think of evidence, then insofar as we use “intuition” to pick out a kind of experience, we should agree that intuitions are not evidence, since experiences are not considerations.

Suppose we adopt this second way of thinking about evidence and we use “intuition” to pick out a kind of experience. Given that your intuitions are not themselves your evidence, how do the intuitions that you have stand with respect to your evidence? Say you intuit that p. Plausibly, the following are consequences:

- Your evidence includes the consideration that p
- Your evidence includes the consideration that you have had the intuition that p

¹⁵ I leave open the ontological status of considerations—e.g. whether they are facts or propositions—and the question of which considerations epistemically count in favor of your having certain beliefs—e.g. whether they must be known.

Suppose that this is all that follows about your evidence. Then it appears that there is a problem. What evidence do you have for believing that *p*? The consideration that *p* is question-begging.¹⁶ The consideration that you have had the intuition that *p* is about your own psychology, and, one might worry, even if it lends some support to believing *p*, the support it lends is very slight.¹⁷

I don't think this is much of a problem. Suppose you don't have very good evidence for believing that *p*—the considerations available to you are either question-begging or psychological. Still you might be justified in believing that *p* to a very high degree. The reason why is that even if your intuition is not itself evidence, and its occurrence does not ensure that you have good evidence for believing that *p*, still, it is a justifier, and it might justify you in believing that *p* to a very high degree. The moral is that epistemic rationality cannot be understood wholly in terms of evidence, if evidence is understood in the second way distinguished above. If it strikes you as incongruous to say that you might have a high degree of justification for believing that *p*, though only slight evidence for believing that *p*, then that just militates in favor of understanding evidence along the lines of the first way distinguished above.

3. Intuition in Action

¹⁶ Cf. (Glüer 2009) on this issue as it comes up in thinking about the relationship between perceptual experiences and reasons for belief.

¹⁷ Cf. (Goldman 2007), (Earlenbaugh and Molyneux 2009a, 2009b), (Williamson 2007), (Ichikawa this volume), (Cath ms).

Consider the following two arguments.

Argument A

(A1) Connie and Cyndi are a cone and a cylinder with the same base and height.

(A2) Therefore, Cyndi encloses a greater volume than Connie.

Argument B

(B1) Connie and Cyndi are a cone and a cylinder with the same base and height.

(B2) Therefore, Cyndi encloses three times the volume of Connie.

Imagine Smith. Smith doesn't have any particular mathematical expertise. But suppose he has justification for believing (A1)—someone tells him it is so, or he measures it himself, or whatever. From (A1) he infers (A2). Plausibly, he now also has justification for believing (A2). Suppose, on the other hand, he has justification for believing (B1)—we're just relabeling (A1). From (B1) he infers (B2). Is it plausible in this case to say that he has justification for believing (B2)? I think not. Why?

On the face of it, it is because he can appreciate that (A2) follows from (A1), but he cannot appreciate that (B2) follows from (B1). It might take him a moment to appreciate that (A2) follows from (A1), but it is certainly within his capabilities. It is difficult to imagine him appreciating in a similar way that (B2) follows from (B1), however. To do this, he would have to appreciate the exact equation for the volume of a cone. And that is surely beyond his limited capabilities.

One worry derives from an observation Harman made in distinguishing rules of inference from rules of implication.¹⁸ Consider arbitrary p and q such that Smith appreciates that p implies q . Smith's appreciation fails to determine in which direction justification is transmitted. In some cases, for example when p is (A1) and q is (A2), justification is transmitted from p to q . In other cases, for example when p is the Naïve Comprehension Axiom and q is a contradiction, justification is transmitted from $\neg q$ to $\neg p$. (A1) does not just imply (A2); it also gives Smith a reason to believe (A2). The Naïve Comprehension Axiom implies a contradiction; but it does not give Smith a reason to believe that contradiction. What Smith must appreciate, then, is not just what implies what, but what is a reason for what. So we should revise our initial idea: it is because Smith can appreciate that (A1) gives him a reason to believe (A2)—more briefly: (A1) *supports* (A2)—that Smith has justification for believing (A2).

Suppose, then, Smith appreciates that (A1) supports (A2) and it is because of this appreciation that he is able to gain justification for believing (A2) by inferring it from (A1). A historically popular idea—among rationalists—is that this appreciation

¹⁸ See (Harman 1986).

I've been highlighting consists in having an intuition.¹⁹ That is, what allows Smith to transmit justification from (A1) to (A2) by inference is Smith's intuition that (A1) supports (A2). Here are two considerations in favor of this view. First, the subject matter of the claim that (A1) supports (A2) is similar to the subject matter of typical claims that intuition justifies—e.g. the claim that a negative times a negative is a positive. It could be that there are two distinct ways of ascertaining such non-empirical claims, but this view is *prima facie* unattractive and should be avoided if possible. Second, experiences of the sort that make the claim that (A1) supports (A2) evident are similar to typical intuition experiences—e.g. the intuition that a negative times a negative is a positive. Specifically, they possess the characteristics of intuition listed in section 1: they are *sui generis*, presentational, and constituted by reflections, i.e. thoughts and imaginings.

Let us assume that intuitions play the role of making certain inferences justification-transmitting. This is a rational role for intuitions to play, and it is distinct from the two described in section 2. Taking Smith's case to be a typical example from which we can make the obvious generalizations, note two differences:

- The property Smith's intuition confers is being justification-transmitting, not being justified.²⁰
- The thing on which Smith's intuition confers this property is a mental event—an inference—not a mental attitude, such as a belief.

¹⁹ See, for example, Descartes' *Rules* in (Descartes 1985), Ewing's "Reason and Intuition" in (Ewing 1968), (Pollock 1974), and (Bonjour 1998).

²⁰ One might use the term "justification" for this property; what is important is to distinguish it from the property reasonable beliefs have.

These observations suggest that Smith's intuition is playing a role distinct from the immediate justifier role or the inferential justifier role.²¹ This can be made even more compelling by considering the role's explanatory aspect.²²

Suppose the only explanatory role Smith's intuition plays is either the one immediate justifiers play or the one inferential justifiers play. Then we'd have:

- Smith might take his intuition that (A1) supports (A2) at face value and thereby form the belief that (A1) supports (A2).
- Smith might take the content of his intuition that (A1) supports (A2) as a premise in an inference and thereby form a belief that q (maybe = the belief that (A1) supports (A2)).

But neither of these explanatory roles is plausibly the one that Smith's intuition needs to play in this case. The first is obviously inadequate, since it leads to Smith's believing that (A1) supports (A2), not Smith's believing (A2), by inference from (A1).

The second might seem OK, for it could be that the belief that q mentioned in it is indeed the belief that (A2) is true. Notice, however, that we are in the vicinity of a Carrollian regress. For suppose—in accordance with the idea that Smith's intuition

²¹ This isn't to say that it doesn't also play one of these other roles. Plausibly, it does: Smith's intuition justifies him in believing that (A2) follows from (A1), also that (A1) supports, i.e. gives him a reason to believe, (A2).

²² The following discussion is heavily indebted to (Boghossian 2008). I do not follow Boghossian in drawing a skeptical conclusion about the role of intuition in inference. I explain why I resist his skeptical conclusion in section 5 below.

plays the explanatory role characteristic of inferential justifiers—the claim (A1) supports (A2) is among the premises Smith might take into account in his reasoning. What this means is that instead of inferring (A2) from (A1), Smith infers (A2) from (A1) and the claim that (A1) supports (A2). This is a new argument:

Argument A*

(A1) Connie and Cyndi are a cone and a cylinder with the same base and height.

(A*) (A1) supports thinking that: Cyndi encloses a greater volume than Connie.

(A2) Therefore, Cyndi encloses a greater volume than Connie.

But what makes the inference from (A1) and (A*) to (A2) justification-transmitting? Either it is another of Smith's intuitions—that (A2) is supported by (A1) and (A*)—or not. Suppose it is another of Smith's intuitions. Then we are off on a Carrollian regress. Suppose, however, it is not another of Smith's intuitions. Then it is unclear why Smith's intuitions should play any role in making his inferences justification-transmitting. For if it is something else that makes the inference from (A1) and (A*) to (A2) justification-transmitting, why shouldn't whatever that is also be what makes the inference from (A1) to (A2) justification-transmitting? I haven't ruled out the possibility of a view according to which it is an intuition that makes inferring in accordance with Argument A justification-transmitting and something else that

makes inferring in accordance with Argument A* justification-transmitting, but such a view seems awkward to me, and worth avoiding if possible.

There is reason to think, then, that the role Smith's intuition plays in making his inference from (A1) to (A2) justification-transmitting differs from the immediate justifier and inferential justifier roles. Here is how we might characterize its three aspects:

Justifying Aspect: Smith's intuition that (A1) supports (A2) makes inferring (A2) from (A1) justification-transmitting for Smith.

Explanatory Aspect: When acted on, Smith's intuition that (A1) supports (A2) leads to his inferring (A2) from (A1).

Basing Aspect: If Smith acts on his intuition that (A1) supports (A2) and thereby infers (A2) from (A1), then Smith's intuition that (A1) supports (A2) makes Smith's inference of (A2) from (A1) justification-transmitting.

The idea is that inferences are mental actions, and in at least some cases, such as Smith's, their proper performance—i.e. their being performed in a way that transmits justification—is owed to their being performed in response to an intuition.

A quibble, then two objections. The quibble: in my original formulation of the Connecting Principle, which connects the justifying, explanatory, and basing aspects

of a rational role, it ranged over experiences and attitudes—not actions. It is easy enough, however, to formulate it so that it ranges over experiences, attitudes, and actions:

Connecting Principle: For subject S, experience E, and attitude/action A, if E justifies S in (per)forming A, then S can (per)form A in response to E, and if S does (per)form A in response to E, then E makes S's attitude/action A justified.

One thing to take note of is this. In formulating the principle, I've used the notion of justification. But, as we have just seen, sometimes the property an experience confers on an action is not that of being justified. For example, the property Smith's intuition confers on his inference is that of being justification-transmitting. So in the formulation of the Connecting Principle, "justifies" and "justified" should be thought as variables, just as "S," "E," and "A" are.

One objection to the view that justification-transmitting inferences are mental actions performed by acting on an appropriate intuition is that inferences are not really mental actions. Suppose Smith sneezes, infers, and turns the lights on. There are three events—a sneezing, an inferring, and a turning the lights on—and Smith is the agent of each of them in the sense that it is he that sneezes, infers, and turns the lights on. Smith's sneezing is not rationally assessable; his inferring and his turning the lights on are. Something else is true of Smith's turning the lights on: he turned the lights on intentionally; turning the lights on is something he tried, and

succeeded, in doing. Some philosophers think that the same can be said of Smith's inferring.²³ Other philosophers deny this; they argue that at most Smith can intentionally bring it about that he infers, say by intentionally reciting the steps in an argument.²⁴ If there is room for controversy about whether inferences are mental actions, it is located at this point. It is not clear to me what to say about the matter. There is no need to settle it, however. The following are true of Smith's inference: it is a mental event; he is the agent of it, just as he is the agent of his sneezing; it is rationally assessable, unlike his sneezing. Events of this sort form a natural group that includes in addition to inferences, decisions and judgments. Let's call them mental actions. Whether some of them are also *intentional* mental actions is an issue we can set aside.

Another objection to the view I have set out is that it misrepresents the structure of the epistemic basing relation. Smith infers (A2) from (A1). I've suggested that this inference is based on his intuition that (A1) supports (A2). But, one might protest, Smith's belief that (A2) is true is based on his belief that (A1) is true, not on his intuition that (A1) supports (A2). I agree. It is important to distinguish between the basis of Smith's inference—the mental action—and the basis of Smith's belief that (A2) is true—the attitude formed by the mental action. On the view I am suggesting, Smith's inference has the property of being justification-transmitting because it is based on an appropriate intuition, and

²³ See (Burge 1998), (Peacocke 2008), (Gibbons 2009).

²⁴ See (Strawson 2003). (Mele 2009) does not discuss inference in particular, but he develops a position toward mental action in general that is similar to Strawson's.

Smith's belief that (A2) is true has the property of being justified because it is based, via Smith's inference, on Smith's belief that (A1) is true.

The foregoing suggests that intuition does not just supply inputs to theoretical reasoning; it also guides theoretical reasoning. Call this the *theoretical action-guiding role*.

It is natural to wonder whether intuition can play a similar role in guiding practical reasoning—whether it can play a *practical action-guiding role*. Consider the following scenarios:

Case A

Smith sees one last almond croissant in the local bakery. He knows that he promised his wife that he'd pick one up if there were any left. He recognizes that this gives him a reason to buy the croissant. So he does.

Case B

Smith sees one last almond croissant in the local bakery. He knows that he promised his wife that he'd pick one up if there were any left. He fails to recognize that this gives him a reason to buy the croissant. He buys it anyway.

In both cases Smith acts—he buys the croissant. In both cases there is a reason for Smith to act in the way that he does—namely, the fact that he made a promise to his wife. In Case A, Smith acts for this reason. In Case B, he does not. What makes the difference? Plausibly, two things:

- In Case A—but not in Case B—Smith recognizes that his promise gives him a reason to buy the croissant.
- In Case A—but not in Case B—Smith acts in light of his recognition that his promise gives him a reason to buy the croissant.

Note: in Case A the reason why Smith acted was that he made a promise to his wife; but what made it the case that this is the reason why Smith acted is that Smith acted in light of his recognition that his promise does give him a reason to buy the croissant. Just as we need to distinguish

(i) the basis for Smith's belief that (A2) is true—namely his belief that (A1) is true—from

(ii) what makes this basing relation obtain—namely Smith's inference—and

(iii) its, that is (ii)'s, basis—namely Smith's intuition that (A1) supports (A2)—so we need to distinguish

(iv) the reason Smith buys the croissant—namely the promise he made to his wife—from

(v) what makes this acting-for-a-reason relation obtain—namely Smith’s acting in light of his recognition that his promise does give him a reason—and

(vi) its, that is (v)’s, basis—namely Smith’s recognition that his promise does give him a reason.

Suppose, then, in Case A Smith recognizes that his promise gives him a reason to buy the croissant, and it is because of this recognition that he is able to buy the croissant for this reason. A historically popular idea—among rationalists—is that this recognition I’ve been highlighting consists in having an intuition.²⁵ That is, what enables Smith to buy the croissant for a reason, namely that he promised, is Smith’s intuition that this promise gives him a reason to buy the croissant. The same two considerations that favored the view that appreciating the strength of an argument consists in having an intuition also favor the view that recognizing a reason for action consists in having an intuition. First, claims about reasons are non-empirical. Second, the experiences in which such claims become evidence have the

²⁵ Balguy and Price subscribed to this idea, though they preferred to talk about “fitting the circumstances” rather than “reason”; see their works excerpted in (Raphael 1969). See also (Sidgwick 1981), (Ross 2003), (Scanlon 1998), and (Crisp 2008).

characteristics of intuition—they are *sui generis*, presentational, and constituted by thoughts and imaginings.

We might characterize the rational role of Smith's intuition that his promise gives him a reason to buy the croissant as follows:

Justifying Aspect: Smith's intuition that his promise gives him a reason to buy the croissant makes buying the croissant a potential case of acting-for-a-reason for Smith, the reason being that he promised.

Explanatory Aspect: When acted on, Smith's intuition that his promise gives him a reason to buy the croissant leads to him buying the croissant for a reason, the reason being that he promised.

Basing Aspect: If Smith acts on his intuition that his promise gives him a reason to buy the croissant, then Smith's intuition makes his buying the croissant a case of acting-for-a-reason, the reason being that he promised.

The phrase "a potential case of acting-for-a-reason" is not ideal. The property it introduces is supposed to parallel the property of being justification-transmitting. The idea is that in at least some cases, such as Smith's, an action's being done for a reason is owed to its being done in response to an intuition. One difference between the theoretical action-guiding role and the practical action-guiding role is this. In the theoretical action-guiding role we can distinguish the action performed in response

to the intuition—an inference—and its result—a belief. But in the practical action-guiding role we cannot: the action Smith performs in response to his intuition just is buying the croissant; there is no further resulting state or action. There is a further fact, namely the fact that this action was done for a reason, and it is this that Smith's intuition helps make obtain.

Arguments similar to the ones used to distinguish the theoretical action-guiding role from the immediate justifier and inferential justifier roles can be used to distinguish the practical action-guiding role from them as well. We need not take up that exercise here, however.

I've been arguing that there are rational roles intuitions play—theoretical and practical action-guiding roles—that should not be assimilated to the rational roles discussed in section 2—immediate and inferential justifier roles. This generates a theoretical burden. In section 2, I suggested that intuitions can play the immediate and inferential justifier roles in virtue of their presentational phenomenology. If intuitions play other rational roles, then there must be something about them in virtue of which they can do so. In the next section I take up the question of what that is.

4. What Is An Intuition That It Can Be Acted On?

The 18th century moral sense theorist, Francis Hutcheson, skeptically asked his rationalist contemporaries “What is this *conformity of actions to reason*?”²⁶ John Balguy answered:

...[the] question amounts plainly to this: what does a *reasonable* creature propose in *acting reasonably*? Or what is it that induces his *will* to take council of his *understanding*? As if this were not the very essence of a rational action!²⁷

The question I will pursue in this section—what is it in virtue of which an intuition can play an action-guiding rational role?—is modeled on Hutcheson’s. The answer I will propose is modeled on Balguy’s.

The view that I will defend is this:

Intuitions play action-guiding rational roles in virtue of playing justifying rational roles.

Even though action-guiding roles are distinct from justifying roles, it can be, and I am inclined to think that it is, true that what explains why intuitions can play action-guiding roles is that they play justifying roles. Consider Smith. In virtue of what does his intuition that his promise gives him a reason to buy the croissant play an action-

²⁶ (Raphael 1969), pg 361.

²⁷ (Raphael 1969), pg 455.

guiding role? The answer, in my view, is that it is because his intuition justifies him in believing that his promise gives him a reason to buy the croissant.

The main reason for this view derives from Balguy's observation. Here is how I would put it: it lies in the nature of rationality that insofar as a person is rational she will act in accordance with what she has justification for believing her reasons for action are.²⁸ This suggests that if intuitions justify beliefs about reasons for action, they are thereby suited to play action-guiding rational roles. I am assuming that intuitions do justify beliefs about reasons for action—in virtue of their presentational phenomenology. So they are suited to play action-guiding rational roles. And, on the face of it, their suitability derives from the very fact that they justify beliefs about reasons for action.

Now I will consider some worries.

First, given the three aspects of the practical action-guiding rational role, my view of what explains why intuitions can play that role has three potentially objectionable consequences:

- (1) If your intuition justifies you in believing that p is a reason to Φ , then p is available to you as a reason to Φ —i.e. Φ -ing is a potential case of acting-for-a-reason for you, the reason being that p .
- (2) If your intuition justifies you in believing that p is a reason to Φ , then you can Φ in response to this intuition.

²⁸ Cf. (Korsgaard 1986), (Scanlon 1998), pgs 33 – 34.

(3) If you Φ in response to an intuition that justifies you in believing that p is a reason to Φ , then you Φ for a reason, namely that p .

One worry about (1) and (3) is that your intuition might be misleading. Suppose p is no reason to Φ , but you have an intuition that justifies you in believing that it is.

Then we might want to deny that p is available to you as a reason to Φ , and we might want to deny that if you Φ in response to this experience, then you Φ for a reason, namely p . This worry is easily circumvented. We can replace (1) and (3) with the following:

(1*) If your intuition justifies you in believing that p is a reason to Φ , then p is available to you as a consideration in light of which to Φ —i.e. Φ -ing is a potential case of acting-in-light-of-a-consideration for you, the consideration being that p .

(3*) If you Φ in response to an intuition that justifies you in believing that p is a reason to Φ , then you Φ in light of a consideration, namely that p .

So even if your intuition justifying you in believing that p is a reason to Φ is misleading and does not really present you with any reason to Φ , it might play a role in guiding your action that parallels the role it plays when it is not misleading.

Of the three consequences (2) is the most likely to raise worries. It is worth distinguishing (2) from the various forms of internalism that have been discussed in

the meta-ethical literature. The closest form of internalism is what Darwall has called “perceptual internalism”:

(PI) “It is impossible for a person to know directly or perceive the truth of a normative proposition without being moved.”²⁹

There are three differences between (2) and (PI). First, (PI) is about all normative propositions; (2) is restricted to normative propositions about reasons. Second, (PI) is about a factive mental state of knowing directly or perceiving the truth; (2) is about a non-factive mental state of having an intuition experience. Third, (PI) gives a condition that necessitates being moved to action; (2) gives a condition that can explain one’s being moved to action when one is moved, but that does not necessitate that one is moved.

Still, (2) is not off the hook. A Humean might argue against it as follows. If you can Φ in response to a mental state, then this state must include some desires. Intuitions do not include desires. Therefore you cannot Φ in response to an intuition. It follows that even if your intuition justifies you in believing that p is a reason to Φ , you cannot Φ in response to it; so (2) is false.³⁰

There isn’t space to address fully the Humean argument against (2). I will make three points. First, if intuition experiences are constituted by other mental states, then they might very well involve desires, for some of the states that

²⁹ (Darwall et al 1997), pg 308.

³⁰ Cf. Hume’s Treatise II.III.iii—pgs 479 ff. in (Raphael 1969).

constitute them might be of an affective nature. This is not an idea I will pursue here, but it does seem to me worth pursuing.³¹ If it could be made to work, then one might use it as a basis for arguing that moral rationalism and moral sentimentalism are not mutually exclusive positions. For now, however, I will assume that intuitions do not involve desires. Second, if Balguy's observation is correct *and* intuitions do justify beliefs about reasons for action, then the first premise of the argument—that if you can Φ in response to a mental state, then this state must include some desires—is mistaken. Third, Hume himself didn't argue against Balguy's observation. What he rejected was the view that intuitions do justify beliefs about reasons for action. He didn't reject this view because he thought that their presentational phenomenology was not enough to make them justifiers, or because he thought they were unreliable. He rejected this view because he thought that intuitions don't even *represent* reasons for action. That is, he thought that intuitions must either represent matters of fact or relations of ideas, but he didn't include the relation of a consideration being a reason for an action among the candidate relations of ideas. But this just seems like bad phenomenology: introspection reveals that we do have intuitions that represent reasons for action.

A second objection to the view that intuitions play action-guiding roles in virtue of playing justifying roles is that it renders intuitions dispensable as guides to action. In section 3 I argued at length that intuitions play action-guiding roles that cannot be assimilated to their justifying roles. But, one might wonder now, what was the point? Suppose intuitions *could* play action-guiding roles in virtue of justifying

³¹ I find the discussion in (Little 1995) congenial.

beliefs about reasons for action. Then they *needn't*, since all guidance might derive from the beliefs so justified. All intuitions need to do is justify beliefs, and then these beliefs guide our theoretical and practical reasoning.

Two initial points. First, note it simply does not follow from the claim that intuitions guide action in virtue of justifying beliefs about reasons for action that beliefs about reasons for action can themselves guide action. Humean's could very well be right about the motivational inefficacy of belief. While I think there is something to this idea, I will not take it on as a commitment. Second, one might concede that intuitions are dispensable as guides to action, but still think they do in fact guide action, and so think it is worth shedding light on the matter. It is not as if every worthy object of investigation must be indispensable. That said, let's see if intuitions really are dispensable as guides to action.

What I will argue is that between the two—beliefs and intuitions—beliefs are more dispensable than intuitions as guides to action. First, if beliefs about reasons for action play justifying and basing roles, their ability to do so depends on their being justified by intuitions. The plausibility of (1) and (3) from above depends on Balguy's observation about the nature of rationality. Recall how I formulated that observation: it lies in the nature of rationality that insofar as a person is rational she will act in accordance with what she has justification for believing her reasons for action are. Compare it to an alternative: it lies in the nature of rationality that insofar as a person is rational she will act in accordance with what she believes her reasons for action are. We should be less confident in this claim. It might be that practical *consistency* requires acting in accordance with what you believe your

reasons for action are. But suppose these beliefs are unjustified. Then insofar as you are rational, you should give them up, not act in accordance with them. So it seems that if beliefs play an action-guiding role, this depends on their being justified by intuitions. Second, if intuitions about reasons for action play justifying, explanatory, and basing roles, their ability to do so does not depend on their leading to beliefs. You can act in light of the justification you have for believing that you have a reason to act without forming the belief that you have that reason to act. In fact, this is likely the norm. Beliefs are mental states with a certain degree of permanency. Most of our actions have little significance beyond the moment of their occurrence. It would be silly to form standing beliefs about what reasons you have for all the actions you perform in life. So it seems that if intuitions play an action-guiding role, their doing so does not depend on their leading to beliefs. I conclude that beliefs are more dispensable than intuitions as guides to action.

5. Broader Significance

I will conclude by briefly commenting on what significance the foregoing might have for two philosophical debates—one about the viability of moral intuitionism, and one about the epistemology of inference.

Here I am interested in epistemological moral intuitionism, which I will take to consist in the following thesis about how we can know what is morally right, or morally wrong:

(EMI) You can know that Φ -ing is morally right, or morally wrong, by intuiting that Φ -ing is morally right, or morally wrong.

One might challenge (EMI) by developing a general skeptical argument against intuition. One might challenge (EMI) by developing a general anti-realist argument against moral facts. I set these challenges aside. I am concerned with a challenge to (EMI) based on considerations about motivation.³²

Here is how one might put it:

- (1) If (EMI) is true, then having an intuition that Φ -ing is morally right, or morally wrong, can itself motivate you to Φ , or refrain from Φ -ing.
- (2) But having an intuition that Φ -ing is morally right, or morally wrong, cannot itself motivate you to Φ , or refrain from Φ -ing.
- (3) So (EMI) is not true.

Let us concede (1). Let us also note that what I argued in sections 3 and 4 leaves (2) open. If what I argued there is correct, then some intuitions—namely intuitions about reasons for belief and action—can themselves motivate you to act, but that is compatible with the claim that intuitions about what is morally right, or morally wrong, cannot themselves motivate you to act, or refrain from acting.

³² Cf. (Darwall 2002) in (Stratton-Lake 2002).

What the proponent of (EMI) should do is argue that there is a connection between intuiting what is morally right, or morally wrong, and intuiting what you have reason to do.³³ Suppose, for example, that the following is true:

(*) Having an intuition that Φ -ing is morally right, or morally wrong—one that is sufficient to put you in a position to know that Φ -ing is morally right, or morally wrong—includes having an intuition about reasons for Φ -ing, or against Φ -ing.

If (*) is true, then—given what I argued in the previous sections—(2) is false. There is no way to defend (*) in any detail here. I will mention two points in favor of it.

First, being morally right and being morally wrong are properties that actions possess in virtue of their other properties. That is, their instantiation by an action is always grounded in other features of that action. On the face of it, those features of an action that ground its moral rightness or moral wrongness also count as reasons in favor of, or against, doing it. This is a form of what Darwall calls

“morality/reasons internalism.”³⁴ Second, one of the features of intuition is its presentational phenomenology. Recall what it took to intuit that the product of two

³³ The view I will describe belongs to a larger family of views that try to defend a form of motivational internalism on the basis of moral rationalism. For other recent views of this sort see, for example, (Wallace 2005) and (Van Roojen 2010).

³⁴ Here is his characterization: “If S morally ought to do A, then necessarily there is reason for S to do A consisting either in the fact that S morally ought so to act, or in considerations that ground that fact.” (Darwall et al 1997), pg 308. I am relying on the second disjunct in the consequent—the idea that the considerations that ground the fact that S morally ought to do A are reasons for S to do A.

negative numbers is positive. An intuition that this is so includes some awareness of the grounds in virtue of which it is so. If intuitions of moral rightness or moral wrongness are like this and moral rightness and moral wrongness are grounded in features that give reasons for or against an action, then there is some plausibility to (*), especially since (*) is only about intuitions that suffice to put you in a position to know what is morally right, or morally wrong.

What about the amoralist?³⁵ In my view the amoralist can make sincere moral judgments and can coherently ask “why be moral?” And the explanation for why he can do these things is that he lacks moral perception. That is, like school children who are able to think about multiplication but unable to intuit that the product of two negative numbers is positive, the amoralist can think about morality, though he is unable to intuit what is morally right, or morally wrong.

Let’s turn to the epistemology of inference. The view that I will consider is inferential internalism. Here is how Boghossian puts it:

(Simple Inferential Internalism): A deductive inference performed by S is warrant-transferring just in case (a) S is justified in believing its premises, (b) S's justification for believing its premises is suitably independent of his justification for believing the conclusion, and (c) S is able to know by

³⁵ (Brink 1989) argues that certain forms of internalism—about the internality of motivation to moral judgment, and the internality of reasons for action to moral fact—fall prey to the possibility of the amoralist and the coherence of his question “why be moral?” See also (Svavarsdottir 1999).

reflection alone that his premises provide him with a good reason for believing the conclusion.³⁶

According to Boghossian, inferential internalism leads to a vicious regress. Here is his argument. Consider some arbitrary inference from some premises—(1) and (2)—to a conclusion (3), where the argument from (1) and (2) to (3) instantiates the argument-form *modus ponens*—MPP. Boghossian writes:

According to Simple Inferential Internalism, this inference will be justified only if I am able justifiably to believe that my premises provide me with a good reason for drawing the conclusion. But it is very hard to see, once again, how my putatively justified judgment that my premises entail my conclusion could bear on my entitlement to draw the conclusion in anything other than inferential form, thus:

- (iv) This particular inference from (1) and (2) to (3) is valid.
- (v) If an inference is valid, then anyone who is justified in believing its premises and knows of its validity is justified in inferring its conclusion.

Therefore,

³⁶ (Boghossian 2003), page 268 in the reprint in (Boghossian 2008).

(vi) Anyone who is justified in believing the premises of this inference is justified in believing its conclusion.

(vii) I am justified in believing the premises (1) and (2).

Therefore,

(viii) I am justified in inferring (3).

Even if we conceded, then, that we have rational insight into the validity of specific inferences, we do not escape the threat of circularity that afflicts the internalist account. Once again, an ability to infer justifiably according to MPP is presupposed.³⁷

In the argument (iv) is the content of my intuitive appreciation that (1) and (2) support (3). The crucial question for Boghossian is how this intuition “could bear on my entitlement to draw the conclusion.” That is: how does this intuition rationally guide my inference?

If intuitions only play justifying roles, then there are two options. I might take my intuition at face value and thereby form a belief with the content of (iv). But believing (iv) is not believing (3). Or I might take the content of my intuition—(iv)—as a premise in some further bit of reasoning, for example the reasoning represented by (v) – (viii). But in this case I am making another inference, and so by

³⁷ (Boghossian 2003), pg 274 in the reprint in (Boghossian 2008).

Simple Inferential Internalism, must have justification for believing its premises—(iv) – (vii)—support its conclusion—(viii)—and so land myself in a regress.

Suppose, however, intuitions play action-guiding roles. Then what happens is I act on my intuition that (1) and (2) support (3), and thereby make an inference that transmits justification from (1) and (2) to (3). We can ignore (v) – (viii), and so avoid the regress.

One might worry that this reply on behalf of the inferential internalist fails to address Boghossian's concerns. He wants an explanation of how my intuition rationally guides my inference, and what I have said, it seems, is that it just does: I make the inference by acting on my intuition. This is not quite right. First, my reply depends on two substantive claims: inferences are mental actions, and intuitions can rationally guide actions. So I've placed the issue Boghossian is concerned with in the broader context of rational guidance of actions. Second, I haven't simply stipulated that intuitions can rationally guide actions. I've also taken up the explanatory question of what it is in virtue of which they can do so. That was the concern of section 4. So it seems to me that the previous sections do allow us to make some progress on meeting Boghossian's regress challenge to inferential internalism. Of course, it could be that inferential internalism is mistaken on other grounds. My aim hasn't been to show that inferential internalism is true, just to show that it need not lead to a vicious regress.

Bibliography

- Armstrong, David M. 1968. *A Materialist Theory of the Mind*. Routledge.
- Audi, R. 1997. *Moral knowledge and ethical character*. Oxford University Press, USA.
- . 2005. *The good in the right: A theory of intuition and intrinsic value*.
Princeton UP.
- Bealer, George. 1998a. A Theory of Concepts and Concept Possession. In *Concepts*.
- Bealer, George. 1998b. Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy. In *Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry*.
- . 1999. "A Theory of the A Priori." *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 81 (1): 1-30.
- Boghossian, P. 2003. "Blind Reasoning." *Aristotelian Society: Supplementary Volume*:
225-248.
- . 2008. *Content and Justification: Philosophical Papers*. Oxford University
Press, USA.
- BonJour, Laurence. 1998. *In Defense of Pure Reason: A Rationalist Account of A Priori Justification*. Cambridge University Press.
- Burge, T. 1998. "Reason and the first person." *Knowing our own minds*: 243–270.
- Cath, Yuri. Ms. Evidence and Intuition.
- Chudnoff, Elijah. 2010. The nature of intuitive justification." *Philosophical Studies*
- . 2011. "What Intuitions Are Like." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*"
- . Forthcoming a. "Intuitive Knowledge." *Philosophical Studies*
- . Forthcoming b. "Presentational Phenomenology." In *Consciousness and Subjectivity*. Protosociology.
- . Ms. Awareness of Abstract Objects.

- Crane, Tim. 2005. The problem of perception. In *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N Zalta.
- Crisp, Roger. 2008. *Reasons and the Good*. Oxford University Press, USA.
- Darwall, S. 1997. "Reasons, motives, and the demands of morality." In *Moral Discourse and Practice*. Darwall, Gibbard, & Railton (eds.): 305–312.
- . 2002. "Ethical Intuitionism and the Motivation Problem." *Ethical Intuitionism: Re-evaluations*.
- Darwall, SL, A. Gibbard, and P. A Railton. 1997. *Moral discourse and practice: Some philosophical approaches*. Oxford University Press.
- DePaul, Michael, and William Ramsey. 1998. *Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Descartes, Rene. 1985. *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Volume 1*. Cambridge University Press.
- Dreier, James. 2006. *Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory*. Wiley-Blackwell.
- Earlenbaugh, J., and B. Molyneux. 2009a. "Intuitions are inclinations to believe." *Philosophical studies* 145 (1): 89–109.
- . 2009b. "If Intuitions Must Be Evidential then Philosophy is in Big Trouble." *Studia Philosophica Estonica* 2: 35-53.
- Evans, Gareth. 1982. *The Varieties of Reference*. Oxford University Press.
- Ewing, A. C. 1968. *Non-linguistic philosophy*. London: Routledge.
- Foster, John A. 2000. *The Nature of Perception*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Gibbons, John. 2009. Reason in Action. In *Mental Actions*. OUP.

- Glüer, K. 2009. "In defence of a doxastic account of experience." *Mind & Language* 24 (3): 297–327.
- Gödel, Kurt. 2001. *Collected Works: Volume III: Unpublished Essays and Lectures (Collected Works (Oxford))*. Oxford University Press, USA, May 31.
- Goldman, Alvin I. 2007. "Philosophical intuitions: Their target, their source, and their epistemic status." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 74 (1): 1-26.
- Harman, Gilbert. 1986. *Change in View*. MIT Press.
- Hooker, B. 2002. "Intuitions and moral theorizing." *Ethical Intuitionism: Re-evaluations*.
- Huemer, Michael. 2001. *Skepticism and the Veil of Perception (Studies in Epistemology and Cognitive Theory)*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., July 17.
- . *Ethical intuitionism*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Husserl, Edmund. 1975. *Experience and Judgment*. 1st ed. Northwestern University Press.
- . 2001. *Logical Investigations, Vol. 2*. New edition. Routledge.
- Ichikawa, Jonathan. This volume. Who Needs Intuitions? In *Intuition*.
- Jackson, F. 1977. *Perception: A representative theory*. CUP Archive.
- Johnston, M. 2006. "Better than Mere Knowledge? The Function of Sensory." *Perceptual experience*: 260.
- Korsgaard, Christine. 1986. "Skepticism About Practical Reason." Reprinted in *Moral Discourse and Practice*.

- Lévinas, Emmanuel. 1995. *The theory of intuition in Husserl's phenomenology*.
Northwestern University Press.
- Liao, S. Matthew. 2007. "A defense of intuitions." *Philosophical Studies* 140 (2): 247-262. doi:10.1007/s11098-007-9140-x.
- Little, M. O. 1995. "Seeing and caring: The role of affect in feminist moral epistemology." *Hypatia* 10 (3): 117–137.
- McDowell, J. 1982. Criteria, defeasibility, and knowledge. In *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 68:455–79.
- Mele, Al. 2009. Mental Action: A Case Study. In *Mental Actions*. OUP.
- O'Brien, Lucy, and Matthew Soteriou. 2009. *Mental Actions*. Oxford University Press, USA.
- O'Shaughnessy, Brian. 2003. *Consciousness and the World*. Oxford University Press.
- Parsons, Charles. 1980. Mathematical Intuition. In *Philosophy of Mathematics*.
Oxford: OUP.
- . 2007. *Mathematical Thought and Its Objects*. Cambridge University Press.
- Peacocke, Christopher. 1983. *Sense and Content: Experience, Thought, and Their Relations*. Oxford University Press.
- . 2003. *The Realm of Reason*. Oxford University Press, USA.
- . 2008. *Truly understood*. Oxford University Press.
- Pollock, John. 1974. *Knowledge and Justification*. Princeton UP.
- Pust, Joel. 2000. *Intuitions as Evidence*. 1st ed. Routledge.
- Raphael, D. D. 1969. *British Moralists 1650–1800, 2 vols*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Ross, David. 2003. *The Right and the Good*. 2nd ed. Oxford University Press, USA.

- Scanlon, T. M. 1998. *What We Owe to Each Other*. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Searle, John R. 1983. *Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind*. Cambridge University Press.
- Sidgwick, Henry. 1981. *Methods of Ethics*. 7th ed. Hackett Pub Co Inc.
- Smith, Q. 2009. *Epistemology: New Essays*. Oxford University Press, USA, January 15.
- Sosa, Ernest. 2009. *A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume I*. Oxford University Press, USA.
- . 2007. "Intuitions: Their Nature and Epistemic Efficacy." *Grazer Philosophische Studien: Internationale Zeitschrift für Analytische Philosophie*: 51-67.
- Stratton-Lake, P. 2002. *Ethical intuitionism: Re-evaluations*. Oxford University Press, USA.
- Strawson, G. 2008. *Real Materialism: and Other Essays*. Oxford University Press, USA, July 15.
- Strawson, PF. 2008. *Freedom and resentment and other essays*. Taylor & Francis.
- Sturgeon, Scott. 2000. *Matters of mind*. Routledge.
- Svavarsdottir, Sigrun. 1999. "Moral cognitivism and motivation." *Philosophical Review* 108 (2): 161-219.
- Tieszen, R. 2005. *Phenomenology, Logic, and the Philosophy of Mathematics*. Cambridge University Press.
- Tieszen, RL. 1989. *Mathematical intuition*. Springer.
- Villanueva 1998. *Concepts*. Ridgeview Publishing.

Wallace, R. J. 2006. Moral motivation. In *Contemporary debates in moral theory*, 182–196.

Williamson, T. 2004. “Philosophical ‘Intuitions’ and Scepticism about Judgement.” *Dialectica* 58 (1): 109–153.

———. 2008. *The Philosophy of Philosophy*. Wiley-Blackwell.

Wright, C., BC Smith, and C. Macdonald. 2000. *Knowing our own Minds*. Oxford University Press, USA.