Deceit, diversity, or mobilization?
Intra-ethnic diversity and changing patterns in Florida’s Hispanic Vote

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Abstract

What explains President Bush’s increased vote in the State of Florida in the 2004 election? A common perception is that implementation of electronic voting machines and a surge in GOP registration increased Bush’s vote margins relative to the 2000 election. In this paper we offer an alternative explanation: massive Puerto Rican immigration combined with successful Republican mobilization of this group explains about 14% of the increase in Bush’s margin of victory—approximately 50,000 votes. Scholars’ failure to account for intra-ethnic diversity, by employing a “panethnic” approach that treats Latinos as having identical political preferences, leads scholars to overlook the important role of Hispanic subconstituencies in the 2004 election.

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“As goes Florida, so goes the nation.” (Senator Hillary Clinton, 2008)

In recent years Florida, along with Ohio and Pennsylvania, has been a crucial presidential election swing state as only once since 1964 has the candidate losing Florida won the White House. In 2004, however, George W. Bush comfortably won Florida, garnering 53% of the vote, a dramatic 381,000 vote increase over the 537 votes he won by in 2000. This surprising result set scholars and pundits alike searching for explanations for Bush’s expanded margin of victory.²
Several explanations were offered. One of the most common arguments made was that Bush’s victory was attributable to GOP voter registration drives that were more successful than those of the Democrats. This conjecture proved incorrect, however, as the GOP registered only 4,086 more voters between 2000 and 2004. Even more prominently, Bush’s increased margin of victory was attributed to fraud owing to the implementation of electronic voting machines (e.g., Hout, Mangles, Carlson, & Best, 2004a, 2004b). This argument was widely publicized by print and television media worldwide. In this paper, we offer an alternative explanation based on demographic change and party mobilization. In particular, we argue that scholars’ failure to consider the differing preferences among Florida’s Hispanics led to mistaken inferences about the primary source of Bush’s improved victory margin.

We begin our assessment of competing explanations for Bush’s increased vote margin by explaining why failing to account for intra-ethnic diversity may lead to mistaken inferences in cases like the 2004 election (e.g., Dennis, Medoff, & Gagnier, 1998). This approach is often inappropriate, and especially so in diverse states like Florida, because individuals who are classified as belonging to the same racial or ethnic group often disagree.4 We then show that accounting for intra-ethnic differences between Cuban Americans and Puerto Ricans raises doubts about electronic voting based explanations for Bush’s increased vote. Instead, our data show that treating Hispanics as a monolith leads one to overlook a more compelling explanation for Bush’s 6% point win. Owing to massive immigration by Puerto Ricans into Florida, by 2004 the Cuban American and Puerto Rican electorates were roughly equal in size and comprised over 81% of Florida’s Hispanic electorate, up from about 60% in 2000.5 Our results suggest that Republican efforts to target and mobilize these new Puerto Rican voters were extremely successful leading to a substantial increase in votes for President Bush.

1. Panethnic and intra-ethnic diversity

The panethnic approach to race and ethnicity assumes that members of a racial or ethnic group share political attitudes and patterns of behavior. Panethnicity is commonly assumed because group identities are socially constructed (Schmidt, Barvosa-Carter, & Torres, 2000), and consequently, racial and ethnic minorities are seen and treated as the same by the majority (Calderón, 1992; Espiritu, 1992; Garcia, 2003; Giménez, 1992; Kaufmann, 2003; Schmidt et al., 2000).6 The panethnic approach also follows from the fact that members of racial and ethnic minority groups have some degree of shared culture and heritage, which can lead to the development of shared political views (Garcia, 2003; Schmidt et al., 2000; Skerry, 1997).7 Moreover, panethnic identities are sometimes created and embraced by racial and ethnic minorities themselves (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1986). For example, racial and ethnic minorities sometimes use panethnic identities instrumentally in response to political and economic threats (Calderón, 1992; Okamoto, 2003; Padilla, 1985).

While members of a given racial or ethnic minority group may look at the political world in the same way under some circumstances, racial and ethnic groups are not monolithic. This is especially the case for Hispanics who, despite cultural similarities, have roots in more than 19 countries of origin located in Central America, South America, the Caribbean, and Western Europe. Each of these countries has a distinct history and culture (de la Garza, Louis
Moreover, individuals that are classified as Latinos are more likely to identify with their country of origin than as a “Latino” or “Hispanic” (DeSipio et al., 1992; DeSipio, 1996; Jones-Correa and Leal, 1996; Kaufmann, 2003). Along with ethnic and cultural differences, the individuals that are grouped together as Latinos are also racially and economically diverse (Calderón, 1992; Giménez, 1992; Kaufmann, 2003).

The various forms of within-group heterogeneity manifest themselves through diverse opinions and behaviors that stem from a diverse set of latent identities. This is especially the case when it comes to Latinos. For instance, Hispanics are typically seen as a solidly Democratic voting group (Greenberg, 2004; Kaufmann, 2004). Citizens of Cuban descent, however, tend to support Republican candidates (de la Garza, 2004; Moreno & Warren, 1992, 1996; Salter & Mings, 1972). This difference is largely the result of the distinct history of Cuba and unique experience of Cuban immigrants. Cuban Americans who fled the Communist regime of Fidel Castro tend to be more supportive of the Republican Party because Republicans have been more staunchly anti-communist, traditionally favored tougher treatment of Castro, and because many Cuban Americans blame John F. Kennedy for the mishandling of the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion (e.g., Johnson, 2004).

2. Panethnicity and electronic voting

What explains George Bush’s 380,978 vote increase in Florida in the 2004 election? In the aftermath of the 2004 presidential election, a group of sociologists conducted a widely-publicized study of electronic voting in Florida and Ohio that implied that about 25% of Bush’s increased Florida vote was due to fraud (Hout et al., 2004a, 2004b). Neither state used electronic voting machines in the hotly contested 2000 race, but a number of counties in both states adopted them by 2004. Using a regression analysis of the change in vote share captured by President Bush between 2000 and 2004, the Berkeley team concluded that Bush gained a significant number of votes in the fifteen Florida counties that used electronic voting machines. Hout and colleagues estimated that the use of electronic voting “...may have awarded 130,000 excess votes or more to President George W. Bush in Florida.” (Hout et al., 2004b).

We offer an alternative explanation for much of Bush’s increased margin of victory: a huge influx of about 170,000 Puerto Ricans to Florida between 2000 and 2004, combined with substantially improved Republican mobilization efforts focusing on central Florida where these new Puerto Ricans reside, substantially enhanced Bush’s vote totals. Failure to account for the conflicting preferences and campaign strategies designed to appeal to specific subgroups of Hispanics, namely Puerto Ricans and Cuban Americans, leads one to reconsider our understanding of the 2004 election.

To evaluate whether accounting for intra-ethnic diversity might alter our conclusions about Bush’s margin of victory, we begin by replicating the Berkeley group’s analysis using their county-level data from Florida. We then break apart their Latino variable to account for Cuban Americans and Puerto Ricans. Doing so allows us to compare the results obtained using both the panethnic and intra-ethnic approaches.

The dependent variable of interest is the difference in the share of the vote George Bush received in each county in Florida between 2000 and 2004. The independent variables are
political and socio-economic factors. Bush 2000 is the percent of the vote gained by Bush in the 2000 election, and provides a baseline level of support for the President. A second transformed version of this variable is also included by squaring Bush 2000. This term serves to capture potential nonlinear effects in the relationship between vote change and Bush support. General support for the Republican Party is measured as the percent of citizens that voted for Bob Dole in 1996 (Republican). Turnout Change assesses how shifts in the size of the electorate may have affected change in the Bush vote. The number of voters that voted in 2004 (Size) accounts for differences in county population. A binary variable called Electronic Voting accounts for whether or not a county used electronic voting machines. Interactions between Bush 2000 and Electronic Voting, and between Bush’s vote squared and Electronic Voting account for the conditional effects of electronic voting. Finally, the percent of each county whose residents are Hispanic and the median Income in each county are the two socioeconomic control variables included in the model.

In order to account for intra-ethnic diversity in this analysis we need to identify politically relevant subgroups within Florida’s Hispanic community. Cuban Americans and Puerto Ricans stand out because, contrary to Hispanics in other most other states, these subgroups have conflicting political preferences. Few groups support Republicans as staunchly as do Cuban Americans, while Puerto Ricans are generally among the most ardently Democratic supporters of all Hispanic groups.10

The preferences of Cuban Americans and Puerto Ricans are also of interest because they are the dominant Hispanic groups in the state. Cuban Americans and Puerto Ricans constitute nearly half of all Hispanics who live in Florida, and more importantly for our study, in 2004 Cuban Americans and Puerto Ricans comprised 81% of the Hispanic electorate. Unlike other states in which Mexican Americans, for example, are more numerous, the remaining 19% of Florida’s Hispanic electorate is made up of citizens from over a dozen other countries.11 The discrepancy occurs because other Hispanics in Florida are more recent immigrants to the United States and are much less likely to be eligible to vote. In contrast, Puerto Ricans of legal age are eligible to vote immediately upon becoming residents. Consequently, all of the 170,000 Puerto Ricans of legal age who immigrated into Florida between 2000 and 2004 were immediately eligible to vote (Goodnough, 2004). For their part, Cuban Americans are among the oldest immigrant groups in the state, and are thus more likely than other Hispanic groups to have become citizens and achieved the higher levels of socio-economic status indicative of citizens who participate at high rates.12

Demographics alone cannot explain Bush’s increased vote totals, however, as Puerto Ricans are usually thought to be part of a solidly Democratic voting bloc. Instead, we offer the party mobilization hypothesis, that the strategies implemented by the presidential campaigns during the 2004 election were highly effective. Both parties targeted Latinos not traditionally included in their core constituency. The Bush campaign made concerted appeals to moderate Puerto Ricans in central Florida, where their support was seen as central to Jeb Bush’s gubernatorial victory in 2002 (Campo Flores, 2004). The Puerto Rican community was seen as “up for grabs” partly because of the huge influx of Puerto Ricans to central Florida since the 2000 election. These new immigrants were thought to have less well-formed ties to the major parties (Goodnough, 2004), making them less uniformly supportive of the Democratic Party than older Puerto Rican immigrants. Moreover, Republicans targeted Puerto Ricans on
the basis of their Catholicism and their social conservatism. The Bush Administration also attempted to firm up support among Cuban Americans by tightening the travel ban and trade embargo in July of 2004. While this action was fiercely controversial in South Florida, it was exceptionally popular among older Cubans who are disproportionately eligible to vote and turn out at much higher rates compared to more recent immigrants (e.g., Corral, 2003). Finally, research shows that the Bush campaign outspent the Kerry campaign in Hispanic advertising in each of the three key media markets (i.e., Tampa, Orlando and Miami) by about 3-1 (Stanley, 2004).13

For their part, the Democrats rallied to increase support for John Kerry in the Latino community, especially among Cuban Americans.14 In 2004, the Democrats made a significant effort to improve turnout among Latinos by funding a new 527 organization called the New Democratic Network. This organization was started with the express purpose of demonstrating to Latinos why they should vote Democratic, and was represented at press events by prominent Latinos such as the City of Hialeah’s popular Cuban American mayor, Raul Martinez. The Kerry campaign also made overtures to the Cuban American vote by locating an office in Miami’s Little Havana district directly across the street from Versailles restaurant, the political epicenter of Cuban politics in South Florida. Kerry also promised to enact a more moderate Cuba policy by opposing the Bush Administration’s July 2004 crack down on Cuban travel, a decision that has made it more difficult for Cuban Americans to visit their relatives and send them remittances. Kerry’s opposition to Bush’s Cuba policy was summed up in a poster that read, “Bush divide la familia Cubana”—Bush divides Cuban families. This theme was also targeted at Cuban Americans through television advertising (Campo Flores, 2004).

In order to account for the distinct preferences of these Latino subgroups we include two additional variables in the analysis. The percentage of a county’s residents who are Puerto Rican or Cuban American account both for differing preferences based on country of origin as well as the parties’ attempts to disproportionately mobilize these subgroups. Recall that the dependent variable in this analysis is the change in the Bush vote between 2000 and 2004. Consequently, we expect the Puerto Rican variable to be positively signed to reflect an increase in Bush’s vote share as a consequence of the targeting by the GOP and the Bush campaign. Similarly, we expect the Cuban American variable to be negatively signed to reflect the Kerry campaigns’ outreach attempts.

3. Intra-ethnic diversity explains away voting fraud

Since intra-ethnic diversity exists in the Florida Latino community, a panethnic approach to race and ethnicity may have biased the analysis of electronic voting in at least two ways. First, the failure to account for substantial differences in opinion between sub-groups of Latinos means the model is incomplete and does not account for plausible alternative explanations. Second, by combining potentially distinct influences on the vote into one variable, the authors introduce measurement error that can bias coefficients in unknown directions (Greene, 2002).

We test this proposition in Table 1. The results of our replication of the electronic voting analysis are seen in the first column of the table. They are identical to those of the Berkeley study, and show a large and significant effect for electronic voting. The second column of
Table 1 examines what happens to these findings after accounting for Puerto Ricans and Cubans separately but including all the variables in the first model. This simple alteration of the analysis leads to a striking change in the results. Once the Hispanic subgroups are accounted for in the analysis, none of the electronic voting variables are significant. Otherwise stated, the evidence of voter fraud disappears once we account for intra-ethnic diversity. In addition, the explanatory power of the model increases by over 10% (the adjusted $R^2$ increased from 0.45 to 0.50). Consequently, accounting for subgroups leads to a model that better explains the data. Intra-ethnic diversity seems to explain away claims of vote fraud.

4. Shifts in the Hispanic Vote and party mobilization

Does Puerto Rican immigration explain some of Bush’s increased margin of victory? Our analysis in Table 1 shows that a 1% increase in the proportion of Cuban Americans in a county corresponds to three-tenths of a point decrease in the change in Bush’s vote between 2000 and 2004. In contrast, a 1% increase in a county’s Puerto Rican population corresponds to about a one-quarter of 1% increase in Bush’s vote in 2004. Otherwise stated, our results imply that Bush did worse in 2004 than in 2000 in counties with large numbers of Cuban Americans, and better in counties with large numbers of Puerto Ricans.

These results are consistent with reports that in 2004 the political parties attempted to mobilize Latino subconstituencies that were outside of their traditional core of supporters. The findings contradict the conventional wisdom, however, which holds that Puerto Ricans typically support the Democratic Party and Cuban Americans support the Republican Party. Did these long-standing trends reverse themselves in the 2004 election? The data presented in Table 1...
do not allow us to disentangle the relative impact of the parties’ mobilization efforts from the effect of national origin. All too typically for studies seeking to parse intra-ethnic differences, survey data allowing us to address this question do not exist.\(^{17}\) Fortunately, however, additional demographic data allow us to examine this question.

To address this question, we employ census data from 2000 to augment the elections data in order to perform a slightly different analysis of the 2000 and 2004 elections (Table 2) (US Census Bureau, 2000, 2003). In this analysis the dependent variable is the number of votes Bush received in each county in each of the two elections (Bush Vote).\(^{18}\) To account for differences in the number of votes cast across counties we control for the total Population in each county in 2000. We also account for the influence of county partisanship by including the number of votes Bob Dole received in the 1996 election (Republican). Failure to control for the partisan voting patterns of a county might lead us to conflate the influence of the Hispanic subgroups with a county’s political preferences. We also account for election-specific effects on the vote with a binary variable called Year (scored 1 for 2004 and 0 for 2000 election). In order to assess the effect of national origin, we include the number of Puerto Ricans and Cuban Americans in each county in 2000. The effects of party mobilization can then be gauged by creating interaction terms between Year and Puerto Rican and Year and Cuban American.

The results in Table 2 suggest that both traditional Latino voting patterns and party mobilization efforts mattered in the 2004 election. If national origin affects vote choice, then as the number of Puerto Ricans in a county increases Bush’s vote should decline. Conversely, as the number of Cuban Americans in a county increases, so too should Bush’s vote. The results in Table 2 show that Cuban American and Puerto Rican are both significant and correctly signed, suggesting that national origin did influence Bush’s vote. In 2000, all other factors equal, for every 100 additional Puerto Ricans in a county, Bush received about 19 fewer votes than he would have among the public at large (i.e., among non-Puerto Ricans). Conversely, for every additional 100 Cuban Americans in a given county, Bush gained about four votes.\(^{19}\)

If the mobilization efforts of the parties were effective, the relationship between the percentage of Puerto Ricans in a given county and Bush’s vote share in that county should be larger in 2004 than in 2000. We also hypothesize that the relationship between Bush’s vote and the
proportion of Cuban Americans in a given county should be smaller in 2004 than in 2000.20 This is in fact what we find. The Puerto Rican $\times$ Year coefficient is positive and highly significant, suggesting that the GOP made inroads in the Puerto Rican community in 2004. Similarly, the interaction between Cuban American $\times$ Year is negative and significant, suggesting that portions of the Cuban American community shifted their votes from the Republicans to the Democrats between 2000 and 2004.21 More specifically, these mobilization effects seem to have caused the relationship between national origin and the vote to have switched directions in 2004. All other factors equal, in 2004 Bush gained about 68 votes for every additional 100 Puerto Ricans in a county and lost about two votes for every additional 100 Cuban Americans.

To further illustrate the substantive significance of these findings, we can extrapolate from these results to roughly estimate the net increase in Bush’s vote margin attributable to the demographic shift and the Republican Party’s successful targeting of Puerto Ricans. Among the approximately 170,000 new Puerto Rican voters, Bush would have received approximately 115,000 votes for an increased victory margin of about 54,000 votes constituting 14% of his increased margin of victory. Consequently, these results support the party mobilization hypothesis.22

While our data provide strong evidence of a party mobilization effect in the 2004 election, however, we also note one alternative explanation for our finding that Democrats made inroads among Cuban American voters. Bush’s support among Cuban Americans in 2004 may have dropped slightly because his vote share in 2000 was extraordinarily high (83%) owing, primarily, to the Elian Gonzalez affair, as well as President Clinton’s support for relaxing the Cuban trade embargo (Reddy, 2000). Despite Gore’s split with the Clinton Administration on the Elian Gonzalez issue, Cuban Americans still attributed dissatisfaction over the policy to Gore.23 Thus, the 2000 election may be an example of a “ceiling effect” of support that a Republican candidate can expect from Cuban American voters in Florida. Anecdotal evidence suggests the Bush campaign may have recognized this limitation, as they outspent the Kerry Campaign $1.45 million to $198,000 in Hispanic advertising in the Miami-Dade County media market (Segal, 2006). The party mobilization hypothesis and ceiling effect arguments suggest the same results: slightly decreased support for Bush among Cuban Americans in 2004. Unfortunately, we are unable to distinguish among them.

5. Discussion and conclusion

President Bush’s 2004 victory in Florida, a crucial swing state, is not well explained by either a surge in Republican voting registration, or by widespread electronic voting fraud. Instead, some of the victory margin seems to be explained by changing demographics and party mobilization. Our analysis shows that ignoring well-documented diversity within Florida’s Latino community leads one to mistakenly conclude that electronic voting machines were responsible for much of President Bush’s victory margin in the 2004 election. While news stories relaying the results of the voting fraud study appeared across the globe, and the academic community has already rejected the notion that electronic voter fraud occurred in Florida, the impact of ethnic diversity and improved Republican mobilization of Puerto Ricans has been overlooked.
Scholars’ failure to account for intra-ethnic diversity not only leads to mistaken explanations for Bush’s improved vote share, but obscures our understanding of political party mobilization effects surrounding the 2004 election. Specifically, differences between Cuban Americans and Puerto Ricans in Florida mattered because Republicans more effectively mobilized new Puerto Rican residents while Democrats made slight inroads with Cuban Americans.

While our results give us insight into the study of race, ethnicity, and electoral politics, we acknowledge the limitations of our analysis. In particular, we note that our analysis is based on aggregate data from counties in the State of Florida. Owing to the small number of counties, we are unable to account for a variety of alternative explanations, many of which are likely to have had some influence on the vote. If our interpretations of these data are accurate, we should find supporting evidence in individual-level exit poll data from the 2000 and 2004 elections. Unfortunately, but appropriately given the subject of this paper, these polls do not allow us to examine this question because they overlook intra-ethnic differences.

Consequently, this paper serves as yet another reminder of the importance of developing measures of participation that allow for assessment of inter-ethnic differences. Historically, doing so has been difficult because few data sources allow researchers to break racial and ethnic groups into more specific categories. In neither election were enough Latino voters surveyed to generate reliable inferences about the preferences of the sub-groups within the Latino community. For example, in 2000 Cuban Americans made up less than 2% of the Voter News Service Florida exit poll sample despite comprising about 7% of voters in the state. The only exception was a 2004 exit poll conducted specifically on the Latino community by the William C. Velazquez Institute which found that Bush received 71% of the Cuban American vote in Florida in 2004 (Velazquez Institute, 2004), which is consistent with the eleven-point swing in support for the Democrats among Cuban Americans reported in the media (Smith, 2004). Moreover, in neither 2000 nor 2004 did the Voter News Service (or its scion NEP) even attempt to identify Puerto Rican voters.

In conclusion, these results serve as a warning for Democratic strategists, suggesting that they should not take Florida’s Puerto Rican voters for granted. Given the fact that Florida’s Puerto Ricans tend to be more conservative compared to those living in other states like New York (March, 2008), the Democrats need to be especially attentive to this subconstituency.

Notes
2. One columnist, for example, wrote “George W. Bush’s vote tallies, especially in the key state of Florida, are so stunning that they border on the unbelievable” (Perry, 2004).
3. We acknowledge the debate over which term is most appropriate: “Latino” or “Hispanic” (Hero, 1992). However, following the lead of de la Garza (2004) we use these terms interchangeably.
4. While the importance of intra-ethnic differences are widely recognized by race and ethnicity scholars, non-specialist scholars commonly rely on catch-all ethnic and racial classifications (e.g., de la Garza, 2004). For example, we used the JSTOR search engine to count the number of articles published in the American Political Science Review, the
American Journal of Political Science, and the Journal of Politics between the years 2000 and 2002 that mention the words “Black”, “African-American”, “Hispanic”, or “Latino”. Of the 461 articles published, 33% mention a racial or ethnic group. Of these articles that mention a racial or ethnic group, 87% are not specifically about race or ethnicity.


6. For example, the 1982 amendment to the 1965 Voting Rights Act led states to create majority–minority congressional districts based on the premise that the members of a minority group have similar political views.

7. Racial and ethnic minorities in the United States tend to support the Democratic Party over the Republican Party (de la Garza, 2004; Smith and Seltzer, 1992; Tam, 1995). This is largely the case because in the aftermath of the 1960s partisan dealignment, the Democratic Party has been seen as the party of civil rights. Moreover, minorities tend to be less prosperous and more reliant on the state for support. Cuban Americans and Nicaraguan Americans are the most prominent exceptions.

8. For example, Cuban immigrants are far more likely to say that they are “Cuban American” than to identify themselves as a “Latino” or “Hispanic.”

9. While we successfully replicated all of their results, this paper builds on the full model of the Bush vote as reported in Table 2 model 2 in Hout et al. (2004a). We build on this result because it serves as the basis for their substantive conclusions about electronic voting fraud in Florida.

10. However, Puerto Ricans in Florida tend to be more conservative than those in other states (March 2008).

11. According to the 2004 US Census American Community Survey, November Voting Supplement as calculated by the proportion of Hispanics who report that they were registered to vote.


13. Much of this spending, particularly in Tampa and Orlando was offset by Democratic 527 groups, like the New Democratic Network, but such expenditures are less likely to be effective because they both spent on general messages about the parties and they are not allowed to directly endorse Senator Kerry.

14. Support from Cuban Americans was seen as essential to Clinton’s 1996 victory in Florida in which he is reported to have received about 40% of the Cuban vote. That showing was contrasted by Gore’s poor showing among Cubans in 2000 in the wake of the Elian Gonzalez affair where Gore received about 17% of the Cuban vote.

15. Nonetheless, the differences are robust across a range of alternative specifications.

16. The electronic voting variable misses significance at conventional standards dropping from \( p \leq .007 \) in model 1 to \( p \leq .059 \) in model 2, an 857% decrease in our confidence that this coefficient is not 0. Substantively, the size of the coefficient also drops substantially, about 25%.

17. Moreover, the accuracy of existing polling data examining Latino behavior has been called into question (e.g., Leal et al., 2005).
18. One limitation of these analyses is that data allowing for estimation of change in Puerto Rican and Cuban American’s between 2000 and 2004 are unavailable as Census data via the American Community Study are available only for the 17 most populous of Florida’s 67 counties. Importantly, however, survey data validates our results. The Latino National Study shows that Bush obtained 56% of the Puerto Rican vote in Florida in 2004. While figures from 2000 are not available for Puerto Ricans, this figure is much higher than commonly expected, as the national Latino Bush vote in 2000 is estimated at 40%. Similarly, Bush obtained 73.8% of the vote among Cuban Americans in 2004, down from 83% in 2000. Otherwise stated, Bush’s vote total was slightly depressed among Cubans in 2004, as our results in Table 2 predict.

19. We ran a full suite of regression diagnostics which suggest that our results are quite robust. While we find no evidence of collinearity, heteroskedasticity is indicated by a significant coefficient on the Breusch Pagan (Cook-Weisberg) test. Hence, we re-estimated the results using White’s corrected (robust) standard errors. All variables remain highly significant across estimations. Finally, the results are quite robust to the influence of particular observations as dropping the largest outlier (Orange County 2004), increases the strength of our findings as both the Puerto Rican and Cuban American variables remain highly significant and correctly signed.

20. Of course, these analyses assume that the campaigns were effective enough in their targeting and strategy for us to detect the effects.

21. Specifically, the coefficient on Puerto Rican is significantly smaller than the coefficient on the interaction between Puerto Rican and Year \( (p < .01, F = 41.71) \). The coefficients on Cuban and Year are also significantly different \( (p < .01, F = 8.45) \).

22. One limitation of these analyses is that allowing for estimation of change in Puerto Rican and Cuban American’s by county between 2000 and 2004 are unavailable as Census data via the American Community Survey are available only for the 17 most populous of Florida’s 67 counties are available. Importantly, survey data validates these shifts as the 2006 Latino National Survey shows that 59.2% of Florida’s Puerto Ricans supported Bush in 2006 consistent with the estimates presented above.

23. At no other time in the 2000 election was this antipathy towards Gore clearer than when the Democratic Cuban American Mayor of Miami-Dade County, Alex Penelas, chose to go on vacation rather than campaign with Al Gore during the last two weeks of the election \( (\text{DeFede, 2000}) \). Gore would later call Penelas “the single most treacherous and dishonest person” he dealt with during the 2000 campaign \( (\text{Associated Press 2004}) \).

24. For example, the 2004 American National Election Study contains responses from only 54 Mexican Americans, 16 Puerto Ricans and 4 Cuban Americans.

25. Leal et al. \( (2005) \) argue that this problem affects attempts to identify the preferences of the Latino community as whole in 2004.

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