The CFSP in synergetic theorising: Explaining the CFSP via a multi-causal and multi-level analytical model

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The CFSP in synergetic theorising: Explaining the CFSP via a multi-causal and multi-level analytical model

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Abstract

Usually, theoretical approaches and/or analytical models used in the study of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) are build on ‘uni-causal influences’ and on just one ‘level of analysis’. No doubt, such perspectives are parsimonious and elegant in their character. However, they exclude important elements in the CFSP’s existence and development. By doing so, they are narrow in their analytical scope. The conclusion is that the CFSP is a complex object of analysis, requiring complex analytical models.

This paper offers a new, multi-causal and multi-level framework based on three integration theories each for one relevant level of analysis. The model, so goes the argument, can account for significant factors that influence the institutional development of the CFSP. By this example, complex analytical frameworks, as the paper argues, are necessary both in order to better manage the examinations of complex subject matters and in order to fully explain their institutional developments.

Key words: European integration, International relations, European Integration theories, synergetic theorising, analytical model, Common Foreign and Security Policy institutions

Introduction

The body of the Common, Foreign and Security Policy’s (CFSP) ‘acquis académique’ as well as its ‘acquis institutionnel’ is impressive. Major contemporary scholars approach CFSP theoretical analyses from very different directions. This appears to hold true both in the ‘conceptualisations of European foreign policy’ [EFP], and in the types of explanatory analysis contained in these studies’ (Carlsnaes 2004: 15). Hence, could novel synthesising approaches have the potential to remedy this problem?

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His recent position was Head of Office of COPURA in Brussels (2007). Other positions include those at the federal secretariat of the European Movement Germany in Berlin (2000-2001), as Deputy Chief Editor for the Polish “Political Affairs Quarterly” (1999-2002), Lecturer at the Department of Political Science and Public Management of the University of Southern Denmark in Odense, Denmark (2002-2004), and as Visiting Researcher at the Department of Politics, International Relations and European Studies at Loughborough University in United Kingdom (2003).

A systematic and thorough presentation of the state of the art in the field of EI studies is provided by Rosamond (2000) and by Wiener and Diez (2004), and for IR by Viotti and Kauppi (1993), Baylis and S. Smith (1999) and Burchill et. al (2001).
Researching this possibility and applying it to foreign policy cooperation in the European Union (EU) can be an interesting but challenging task because EU foreign policy today is a ‘complex mixture and interplay of many elements’ (Mahncke 2004: 27). This complexity may give rise to problems for uni-causal integration theories that are often used in studies of the CFSP or of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

Although EU member states have traditionally and collectively decided constitutional issues of the CFSP in successive presidencies and Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs), different theories concentrated on different actors and on different levels of analysis. Indeed, the ongoing institutionalisation and institutional built-up of foreign policy management in the EU (Peterson 1995, 2001) have been due to the history-making decisions taken by member states. This continues to be the main empirical focus in the studies of the CFSP.

By focusing on this main actor, this text offers a new, multi-causal and multi-level framework based on three integration theories for each relevant level of analysis. The model proposed here accounts for significant factors which influence the institutional development of the CFSP. This text argues that complex analytical frameworks are necessary both to manage examinations of complex subject matters and also to fully explain their institutional developments.

After identifying three main integration theories as prominent examples of uni-causality, this text offers a way to transcend them. It then identifies dimensions for a synergetic CFSP analysis and proceeds from dimensions to analytical sequences, thereby highlighting the complementarity of selected integration theories. Subsequently, the chosen theories are placed in analytical sequences of the model in order to systematically develop model-based expectations for the CFSP development. Finally, and based on this new synergy, some hypothetical expectations are formulated.

The CFSP in three integration theories: examples of uni-causality

What theories are relevant to research on the CFSP? This depends largely on the research question asked. A plethora of different EI and IR theories have been related to this field of study, of which three are briefly assessed here.

To limit the assessment to three integration theories, they must be ‘in accordance’ with the main research question, i.e. they have to be able to give theoretical answers to the question of why the CFSP institutional development progresses and must address change in CFSP cooperation. In other words, a theory needs to be able to account for dynamic alterations about what has happened in foreign policy integration in the EC/EU over time. Additionally, such a theory must be able to propose independent variable(s) to account for such dynamics in the CFSP.

Certainly not all existing integration theories would score well on the above criteria. There are theories and approaches that can explain and predict the progressive development of the CFSP, while others are less suitable for that purpose. The main difference between them is that either they predict integration and argue that there is a possibility for an incremental process, or that such a possibility is not conceivable. In the latter case, one would speak of predicting and explaining absence rather than presence of integration.3

2 For an overview about EI and IR theories, see footnote 1. Additional interesting overviews are provided by Jackson and Sørensen (2003) and Burchill et al. (2001).

3 In the light of the above, not all theories are equally appropriate. For example, the Multi Level Governance approach, while suitable for studying the complexity of ‘EU foreign policy’, is much less capable of explaining the constitutional changes in the CFSP. The MLG approach would have difficulties explaining why the member states took these or other constitutional decisions in the CFSP. The key critique addressed towards the MLG approach is that it can only be applied to analyse multi-level policy structures at a point when they exist. The emergence of these structures, in this case the CFSP, lies beyond the MLG approach.
In relation to the individual theories, the modified neorealist theory (MNR) – with its basic assumptions which are derived from the classical neorealist research agenda – is first as the closest to the main actors analysed. Nevertheless, the MNR only focuses on international (external) stimuli, and can therefore only single out the structure of the international relations and the existing security pressures as variables. As some scholars argued, the CFSP was baptised by fire (Ginsberg 2001), which indicates a clear instance of security pressures.

While the above is true, it is a shortcut in explaining the ESDP since such an argument ignores both the European and the domestic level of analysis. Briefly, the MNR only places its argument on the international level of analysis and therefore fails to include the European and the states’ (domestic) level (see table 1). Given this limitation, how could one expect a full explanation of the CFSP institutional development, if these important dimensions are ignored? Thus, the MNR application is a clear instance of uni-causal analysis.

Concerning the neofunctionalist (NF) elements, notwithstanding the difficulties with the spill-over mechanism, neofunctionalism has been a dynamic approach that tried to explain the change in the ongoing development of integration. Since spill-over today touches upon ‘high politics’ as well, the neofunctionalist pressures that exist within the European system can also be analysed. However, neofunctionalism normally works in relation to supranational actors. Therefore, it would need an operationalisation for a synergetic CFSP model. Thus, unlike the tenets of classical neofunctionalism, the main actors responsible for channelling those forces into the final form of the CFSP are the EU member states and not the Commission and/or the European Parliament. As Mahncke posits,

> one could simply cite the neo-functionalist logic of ‘spill-over’ as a reason for CFSP’s coming into being. Accordingly, The CFSP would have developed almost automatically, as ‘spill-over’ from other developments. Integration in trade and increasing interdependence in a multitude of other areas, including numerous aspects of foreign policy, would have made a common foreign and security policy all but inevitable. However, this view would practically attribute member states the role of bystanders, which eventually has not been the case (Mahncke 2004: 39).

This is why the NF variables need to be adapted adequately with the EU member states as the main actors. The focus on the EU member states as the primary addressees of the neofunctionalist pressures at the European level provide here an access to study the NF-based pressures. Despite such an operationalisation, the problem of the level of analysis persists here since NF bases its argument only on the European level of analysis and therefore ignores the other two relevant dimensions (see table 1). Again, when two relevant levels of analysis are not included, how can one expect a full explanation of the CFSP development? This is why NF is another example of uni-causal CFSP examination.

Table 1: Theories and their levels of analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theory/approach</th>
<th>Actors focused on</th>
<th>Level of analysis</th>
<th>Missing level of analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MNR</td>
<td>member states</td>
<td>international</td>
<td>domestic, European</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NF</td>
<td>European institutions</td>
<td>European</td>
<td>domestic, international</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LI</td>
<td>member states</td>
<td>domestic, European</td>
<td>international</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the author
A similar argument can also be used with regard to liberal intergovernmentalism (LI). Although it primarily applies to states as the main actors, and this does not pose any problem for a synergetic analysis, as it only focuses on them. It is interesting that Moravcsik also concedes neo-‘functional incentives for institutionalization’ (Moravcsik 1993: 517). Concerning the level of analysis, LI poses its analysis on the domestic and European level, and thus the international level is also ignored. A similar question could thus be asked about why a liberal intergovernmentalist explanation of the CFSP could be complete, if one relevant level of analysis is excluded (see table 1)? Hence, LI could also be assessed as uni-causal in its character.

A clear overall implication seems to be that the selected individual theories conduct their respective analyses on different levels of analysis, but none of them on all levels at once, and hence their arguments and explanations cannot be complete. Given this short analysis, the main implication resulting from this logic is that any uni-causal, one-level-theory-approach, is doomed to be insufficient due to the large number of levels in the analysis of the CFSP. This points to the potential and the ‘viability’/‘vitality’ of synergetic analytical models, which may move this study field from single-approach explanations to fuller/complete synergetic explanations, especially in cases when the object of analysis so requires. Hence, the necessity of a complementary, synergetic procedure with respect to an explanation of the dynamics of the CSFP institutional development is apparent.4

Following the CFSP’s dimensional perspectives (see next section), frameworks of a synergetic nature, which fulfill minimal scientific requirements and are able to grasp and analyse the overall dynamics of the CFSP’s institutional development, seem feasible and increasingly in demand. This is due to the ‘synergibility’ of theories, as they ‘toutes contiennent des ressources qui sont exploitables selon les questions que soulève la recherche empirique’ (Lequesne 1998: 104). At least, it should remain desirable for the CFSP scholars to meet this challenge and to strive for more systematic, and more complex, theoretical frameworks with the objective to better understand and explain what the complex processes in the foreign policy cooperation in the EU induce.5

To approach the construction of one such synergetic model, the next sections specify the dimensions that need to be considered for a fuller CFSP explanation, and bring them together into a single analytical model. Moreover, an attempt is undertaken to explain why the selected theories are complementary and how they fit into the identified dimensions.

**Beyond uni-causality: identifying dimensions for synergetic CFSP analysis**

Any analytical model that aspires to explain a complex subject matter such as the development of the CFSP institutions must not ignore the various forces at work. It should also operate along the decision-making process and along the causal flow. For the former, the international forces, mainly in the form of changes in international structure and/or in security situations and pressures, clearly influence (positively or negatively) the CFSP development. Integration pressures, however, are not only systemic. They can also be regional, e.g. European. For example, specific European security problems may have an impact on CFSP development as well.

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4 Some other scholars also conducted pioneer work in this direction, though not with regard to integration dynamics (for example Gehring 1995, Giering 1997, or Wolf 1997), or suggested that explanations of integration need several EI theories (Laursen 1993). There also seems to be identity-based explanations of the CFSP which, as some constructivists claim, when examining this object of analysis, the ‘the CFSP might […] be better understood in terms of identity creation’ (Tomra 2003: 738) and not as a function of international or functional pressures. On the latter, see especially Tomra and Christiansen (2004) and Jørgensen (2004a), and generally on constructivism, see Aalberts and Munster van (2003), Adler (1997), Dessler (1999), Haas (2001), Risse (2004), Wendt (1999), Wilga (2001) or Zehfuss (1997).

5 Some academic input to synergetic undertakings provided Easton’s system theory (1965). By seeking to integrate integration theories, also Giering proposed an interesting research direction on this subject (see Giering 1997).
Neither the international nor the European factors however automatically translate into the CFSP’s institutional built-up. Rather, the latter is always the subject of negotiations between the heads of governments of EU member states. Thus, the ultimate CFSP institutional morphology is also contingent upon the domestic specificities of the negotiating parties, and upon their negotiating powers.

All in all, whereas the first two forces – at the international and European level – are responsible for creating the pressures to which the EU member states are exposed, i.e. they are the engines in developing the CFSP, the latter – the negotiations – represent a sort of ‘filter’ for the political decisions about what is necessary, and what is not, on the EU level. This in turn depends on the domestically defined interests and positions of the EU member states. Briefly, the former is considered as a necessary condition and the latter as a sufficient condition for the CFSP development.

Given this constellation, an analytical model of synergetic nature shall account for the ‘forces’ and the ‘filter’ at the same time. Such a model must thus be eclectic in that it has to combine all dimensions, which cover and control for different forces at work. Hence, it represents at the theoretical level an attempt to link ‘explanatory concepts into a meaningful framework [which...] is not yet in evidence, [although] the field has the potential to move in that direction’ (Ginsberg 1999: 450).

Building a synergetic framework should consider two additional arguments. First, the integration theories do not ‘respect’ the distinction between external and internal integration factors in the sense that they define the former as dominant, and ignore the latter or vice versa. At the same time, however, scholars somehow instinctively agree that both are relevant in the overall European integration process (M. E. Smith 2003, Jørgensen 1999, Sjursen 2003: 1), not only in the case of EFP. Following this general argument, it seems necessary – if not ontologically pertinent – to construct a more synergetic analytical model that adequately accounts for both the external and the internal dimension.

Secondly, although the academic world appears divided into competing theoretical traditions, in the real world, real actors are exposed to various forces simultaneously, and (have to) combine various logics in their actions. This fact demands, as Risse argues, that future models and ‘theories of European integration should strive to integrate the various logics of social action and resulting propositions about human behaviours in order to figure out in which ways they complement each other’ (Risse 2004: 175).

Relating the above thoughts to CFSP studies, it appears pertinent to argue that the causes for the CFSP institutional built-up permanently oscillate between (1) the national foreign policies and the CFSP, in the interplay between (2) the CFSP and the international system, between (3) the international system and the national foreign policies and, finally, and between (4) the international system and the European system as a whole. Here, the first set of interaction, that between national policies and the CFSP, is probably particularly interesting as the member states are the ultimate decision makers in this policy area. However, the second and third dimensions operate as inputs for change, and the fourth constitutes an addition. In this way, a synergetic analytical model has to combine at least the three first dimensions, and shall structure any eclectic analysis in this study field. These dimensional perspectives are illustrated in figure 1.

Following this dimensional logic, the examination would begin with the international system and its relevant elements. That would allow for the examination of when, and how changes in the international dimension influence EU member states in their decisions to develop the CFSP. The most suitable theory for this purpose would be the modified neorealist approach (MNR), because it suggests that it is the structural causes, as in classical neorealism, and security

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6 The latter may be classified as an addition for it has only a minor effect on the constitutional changes in the CFSP. One could search solely for input of some EU level actors (e.g. the CFSP High Representative) exercised on the member states or from a feedback effect. The latter perspective is widely developed in the Europeanisation literature (see for example Sjursen 2000, Tonra 2001, Torreblanca 2001).
pressures from the international level, that are the main forces behind state behaviour. If the CFSP were to evolve, then these two elements must be transformed into specific political action in EU member states. However, as the simple existence of these two elements may not always be sufficient for any conceivable change in the CFSP, it would arguably be correct to assume that the modified neorealist theory would not in itself explain the specific final shape and current form of the CFSP which member states have agreed upon, such as during the time period from the Amsterdam Treaty to the 2003/4 IGC.

Figure 1: The CFSP and dimensional perspectives

Source: Adapted from Jørgensen (2004: 34, see also Jørgensen 1999: 90)

Following the overall argument in this paper, if the analysis remains exclusively based on the MNR, two relevant analytical dimensions would be ignored and excluded from the analysis. Additionally, given that the outcomes in the CFSP are more than just classical alliance-like cooperation, the internal (European) dimension would need to be included. Here, the neofunctionalist approach would fit well because the CFSP’s considerable growth in scope and institutions over the last two decades (i.e. since the SEA) to a large extent and without much empirical analysis of the causes, would confirm one’s expectation from a neofunctionalist prediction, i.e. that the EU foreign policy would go beyond\(^7\) the point of pure intergovernmentalism.\(^8\) Thus, possibly not only the specific international but also European forces, which may partly result from the latter, may have contributed to the evolution of the EU foreign policy institutions. Contrary to uni-causal approaches, a synergetic model would not exclude this dimension.

\(^7\) To provide but one example here, one could reiterate Vawrick’s queries: why did one observe an intensification of the relationship between the EU and the WEU? Why were the WEU institutions eventually subsumed by the EU? Perhaps the spillover mechanism was at work (Vawrick 1998: 18/Fn 2).

\(^8\) On different forms of intergovernmentalism and their analytical implications for the EU foreign policy, see Jørgensen (1999).
According to the dimensional model, the international and European forces need to be complemented by domestic and European negotiations rounds, in which the EU member states ultimately decide upon the final the CFSP institutional morphology. Since this logic invariably follows the respective domestic debates on the subject matter, this dimension can be well served by an analysis based upon LI. Regardless of the degree to which the EU member states may be exposed to structural and agency-based causes at the international and European level, they are – to different degrees – hesitant or even opposed to any move in pooling power in this ‘high politics’ area. Since these are the key actors involved in constructing the CFSP at the European level, they ultimately decide about the institutional ‘physiognomy’ of the CFSP in successive IGCs. This consideration would be a focal point in the dimensional model, irrespective of theoretical perspective taken for the constructed synergetic model.

From single analytical dimensions to synergetic analytical sequences

One of the ambitions of this paper is to present a viable combination of different theoretical approaches. Assuming that the CFSP explanation is optimised by combining them, the selected theories thus need to be framed within a single synergetic analytical model that fits into a coherent and complementary theoretical design. The positive trade-off of such a design seems to be that a combination of theories is probably more suitable for the complementary explanation of the CFSP’s institutional development than individual approaches (Sandholtz 1996: 405, 427; Peterson 1995).

The question of complementarity of theories in the literature is nebulous. Some attempts have been undertaken to make theories of European integration complementary. Even in the EU foreign policy field, a number of scholars suggested that synergies may be necessary (Koenig-Archibugi 2004: 168, Sedelmeier 2003: 21, Carlsneas 2004: 12-15). Although the overall academic environment is based on theoretical competition – and this competition inevitably pertains also to CFSP studies – synergies and complementarities between theories are possible.

Given the above, an obvious question is what makes the selected theories, commonly understood as rather competing, complementary? Two arguments seem appropriate. First, as already hinted, different theories focus ontologically on different elements and just by doing so, their respective explanations are based only on the chosen element(s). For example, external factors or international structure are studied by realist approaches, or typically internal factors are examined with neofunctionalist or intergovernmental approaches. Combining the selected theories, and constructing a synergetic model allows for a balanced consideration of both ontological foci, which do not exclude, but complement one another.

Second, transforming the simple, above-mentioned, dimensions into successive analytical sequences and along the causal flow may make the complementarity between the selected theories even more clear. Its transformed sequential nature allows taking stock of factors external to, and inherent within, the CFSP institutional building, one after another in a systematic way. In this respect, some scholars reflected on such a possibility. Concerning the EPC and then the CFSP, M. E. Smith argued that

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10 For example, M. E. Smith (2003) considered different forces as being concomitantly responsible for member states’ efforts to create and further ‘engineer’ the CFSP. M. E. Smith pointed to a ‘combination of exogenous and endogenous factors [which have] further encouraged the institutionalisation of these efforts at the EU level’ (M. E. Smith 2003: 3). Furthermore, as he continued, ‘the EU adapts to pressures for institutional change for insights into the prospects for reform in this domain’ (ibid.).
this policy domain can be understood in terms of a sequential process of institutional development involving intergovernmental, transgovernmental, and supranational elements […]. [Hereby,] exogenous forces, such as enlargements, typically provide only a window of opportunity for debate over institutional change; they do not determine the specific outcome. [Similarly,] endogenous processes within the EU foreign policy structures (chiefly learning-by-doing and imitation) generally provide the range of possible options. Reforms [thus] tend to reflect a balance between pragmatic operational concerns and enduring ideological/legal debates within the EU (M. E. Smith 2003: 3).

As figure 2 illustrates, the first sequence relates to factors such as changes in the international structure and alterations of security pressures to which the EU member states are exposed. The chain of causality runs here from the international level to the EU member states. This is represented by arrow number 1. Arrow number 2 represents the endogenous factors present within the EU system itself. Here, the causal link is formed from the European forces to the national foreign policies. This is where the policies of the EU member states towards the CFSP and its institutions are influenced by the European system. Hereby, national debates are instigated, as neofunctionalism suggests, by the general neofunctionalist forces which are present within the institutions. And finally, arrow number 3 characterises the ways in which the specific international and European forces, which are domestically ‘digested’ and then defined by the foreign policies of the individual member states, are eventually translated into the final institutional morphology of the CFSP via continuous European negotiations. This mechanism comes full circle with the decisions taken in IGCs and national ratification processes.

*Figure 2: The CFSP analytical model and its sequences*

*Source: Wilga 2007: 128*

Having identified the relevant dimensions and levels in the synergetic analytical model, one needs to fill its sequences with theoretical substance necessary for uncovering the specific causal forces in the individual sequences. Hence, independent variables of theories need to be filtered
out. Although theories have already been selected, their individual theoretical potentials have not yet been explored. This task is undertaken in the next section.

**EI theories and their turf-ground sequences**

First sequence: MNR and international dynamics

Following the arrows from Figure 2, the first move (arrow 1) in the analytical model consists of the reflections based upon the MNR. This theoretical approach draws upon the first-cut neorealist theory of European integration developed by Wivel (2000, 2001). Although belonging to the realist tradition, one of the basic MNR claims is modified. It seeks to show that both the character of international anarchy and the intensity of security pressures can vary in a region, and that this can contribute to integration (or to disintegration) in the given region. The parameter explaining this variation is the probability - and not the sheer possibility - of conflict, as classical neo-realists assume. Accordingly then, if the probability of conflict is lower in a given region, the state(s) in question are less concerned with its (their) short-term security needs.

As more than an international regime, an international alliance, or a conventional case of multilateral cooperation from the 1970s to the 1980s (Pijpers 1990, 1991), the CFSP institutions can be analysed with the MNR in the first sequence of the model. Important for this theory is the fact that the security needs depend upon the structure of the international system and the geographical location of the state(s) at hand, both the one exposed to the conflict and the one causing it. Based on these elements, the MNR offers insights into states behaviour depending on the probability of conflict and the level of instability. As Wivel assumes, regional economic and then political integration occurs only among states that face a low probability of conflict with each other, i.e. are placed in a zone of peace as opposed to a zone of conflict (see table 2).

![Table 2: Probability of conflict and probability of integration](image)

**Table 2: Probability of conflict and probability of integration**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zone</th>
<th>Probability of conflict</th>
<th>Probability of integration</th>
<th>Likely outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zone of conflict</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>fragmentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zone of peace</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>integration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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11 The term ‘modified realist version’ (MNR) has been introduced by Anders Wivel and used in his study of European integration (Wivel 2000). For a more extensive discussion on, and for more on the understanding of, different versions of realism, see Wivel (2000: 105-146).

12 This is the main dividing line between different realist branches. See especially Brooks (1997).

13 As international regime theories would suggest, such form of cooperation could only be assumed as ‘sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations’ (Krasner 1982: 2).

14 The modified version of neorealism finds its origins already in the Munich school of realism – known as ‘synoptischer Realismus’ (Kindermann 1985, 1991) as well as in the debates among the neorealists themselves (Brooks 1997). It was also used in studies of the German foreign policy conducted by scholars from the so called ‘Tübinger Gruppe’. For the latter, see in particular Rittberger (2001).

15 This links the global and the regional level to each other (Wivel 2002).
In the absence of a danger to their security concerns, states try to enhance their power by focusing on long-term economic achievements. As a first step toward integration, their participation in integration projects is ‘rational because the free-trade arrangements reduce transaction costs, enhance the possibility of taking advantage of economies of scale and reduce the risk of monopolization and thereby enhance the economic strength and welfare of the participants’ (Wivel 2000: 152). This in turn enhances their security, their relative power and finally their possibilities to collectively defend themselves when confronted with external security threats, which may arise outside in zones of conflict at a later point in time. This reasoning forms the link between the probability of conflict outside a zone of peace and the possibility of cooperation in foreign policy between states within the same zone of peace.

The latter reasoning is further contingent upon the structure of the international system. For simplicity’s sake one can make a tripartite distinction between ‘multipolarity’ (no power), ‘bipolarity’ (two great powers), and ‘unipolarity’ (a single superpower). For the analysis of the CFSP, bipolarity is more important since Europe and the institutional beginnings of the CFSP in the form of the EPC fell into this type of polarity. Later, especially after the end of the Cold War, the CFSP’s existence may be viewed as operating within either unipolarity or multiplicity, with different effects on integration (see table 3).

### Table 3: Polarity’s impact and effect on regional integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Polarity</th>
<th>Multipolarity</th>
<th>Bipolarity</th>
<th>Unipolarity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Impact</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>very high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect</td>
<td>non-integration</td>
<td>integration</td>
<td>integration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The argument here is that bipolarity produces economic integration between states in the same geographical region (for example in Europe), because their security interests are secondary due to the efforts of the big powers. With lowered concerns about security, states may concentrate on other instruments to increase their power by seeking to enhance their integration, as well as in political (foreign policy) matters.

In a unipolar or multipolar world order, the dynamics are less clear than those in bipolarity. For example, it might happen that eventually the remaining superpower is balanced by a group of states. As some scholars point out, it is only a matter of time before a new form of bipolar system emerges (Layne 1993). However, a more important feature of this form of international structure is that increasing instability outside a zone of peace may induce the states within the peace zone to cooperate more intensively without necessarily re-storing a bipolar system.

Second sequence: NF and European dynamics

NF’s contribution could consist of assisting an analysis of the CSFP in the second move of the model (arrow 2). The sources of national preference formation are neither exclusively international, as the previous sequence suggests, nor exclusively domestic. They may also be

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16 While the explanations can be several, the most often cited are (1) the exhaustion of hegemony; (2) overextension of the superpower, or (3) differential growth rates of states (see Wivel 2000: 164-68, 2001: 9-12).
regional. The EU might have a causal effect on how the preferences of member states are formed. Although NF finds its origins among non-state-centric approaches and thus draws upon functionalism and IR liberal elements, neofunctionalists have claimed repeatedly in their works that integration is about functionally organised societies coming closer together. According to their nature, their needs may produce integration demands, which through a negotiation-based (political) ‘spillover’ would, as neofunctionalists argued, affect more and more sectors in the integration process, including foreign policy.

Due to problems with spillover, NF founders declared their theory obsolete in the 1970s (Haas 1975). However, other scholars such as Lindberg and Scheingold (1970), Mutimer (1989), Tranholm-Mikkelsen (1991) or Corbey (1995), added several improvements to this theory. With them, improved neofunctionalism provided interesting ideas e.g. about the growing scope of the CFSP, and its expanding institutional machinery. In particular, there is a tendency for economic and social decisions to spill over into the realm of the ‘political’, due to the indirect penetration of the political by the “purely” economic […] decisions (which almost always acquire) political significance in the minds of the participants (Haas 1986: 152).

In the above context foreign and security policy may also be relevant, especially because it may help ensure collective European profits and protect it from external instabilities of diverse nature. For this to be effective, further political integration would have to continue, and go beyond simple common trade and common monetary policy. The most appropriate instrument for accomplishing this objective is foreign policy, since it can best impact on the external environment in a manner conducive to the single market and the common currency.

If the latter is true, then one could speculate about the level of politicisation resulting from internal debates on this issue, as well as on the influence of such politicisation on the CFSP institution-building, in particular in the time of the existence of the CFSP institutions. Here, for example, the problem of inconsistency between the economic and political aspects of foreign relations has frequently played a role in those debates (Schmalz 1998, Wessel 2000). Linked to the first sequence, in cases where the economic integration is advanced and the probability of external conflict arises, the parties participating in foreign policy integration project would probably prefer to respond to such instabilities in a concerted action via common institutions. Modified neorealism does not spell out this condition. It refers only to the changes in the international structures as a motor for action.

Coming back to the politicisation level, it can be characterised by a cumulative tendency in which national actors get involved over time in more and more policy areas, and as a consequence find themselves ‘gradually embroiled in ever more salient and controversial areas of policymaking’ (Schmitter 1969: 166). In exploring this process, Schmitter defined politicisation as ‘a process whereby the contentiousness of joint decision-making goes up, [leading] to a

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17 This is confirmed by the literature on Europeanisation. See for example Sjursen (2000), Tonra (2001) or Torreblanca (2001).
18 Functionalism – the forerunner of neofunctionalism – does not directly apply to integration but is still interesting in many ways (see Mitrany 1946, 1948, 1975). For more on both functionalism and its ‘neo-’ version, see Zellentin (1992).
19 For this point, see Mattli (1999a). For a broader discussion on ‘integration demand’ and ‘supply’, see also Mattli (1999b).
20 Spillover forces can also have a damaging effect on integration. They can exist in the form of a ‘spill-back’, a ‘retrench’ (Busch 1996) or as, what Jäger and Lange (2001: 115f) call, ‘desintegrative Spillover’.
21 Despite these theoretical necessities, neofunctionalism, as some recent studies have demonstrated, still holds (see Stone and Sandholtz 1997, Sandholtz and Stone 1998, 1999).
22 Examples abound here: ‘Wider Europe’, ‘Barcelona process’, ‘Northern dimension’, common strategies towards Russia or towards Ukraine, etc.
widening of the audience or clientele interested and active in integration [and to] a manifest redefinition of mutual objectives’ (ibid.: 166, emphasis in original). Possibly, the clearest case of politicisation occurs during a shift from formally economic to manifestly political goals by a collective recognition that ‘the original objectives have been attained, surpassed, or made irrelevant and that new ones involving an upward shift in either scope or level of commitment are operative’ (ibid.). And here it can eventually come to the expansion of scope and level. This process has been existent in the CFSP for years (say, from Maastricht to the 2003/4 IGC), and obviously is still affecting the institutional built-up of the CFSP (Wilga 2007: chapter 9).

The same process can also be reinforced by externalisation and demand side. As another neofunctionalist argued, ‘whatever the original intentions, as integration proceeds member states will be increasingly forced to hammer out a collective external position vis-à-vis third parties because the further integration proceeds, the more third parties will react to it, either by support or by hostility’ (Nye 1994: 298). It is one of the most important neofunctional hypotheses concerning external relations and foreign policy. Once some states begin an integration project in whatever area, the ‘participants will find themselves compelled—regardless of their original intentions—to adopt common policies vis-à-vis nonparticipant third countries’ (Schmitter 1969: 165) and common institutions.23

Following this neofunctionalist logic, one could expect that ‘[g]iven a minimal threshold of initial commitment and joint policymaking, regional actors, for a variety of voluntary and involuntary motives, will find themselves engaged in the elaboration of a common foreign and security policy where none existed previously’ (Schmitter 1969: 165). This may even be more the case when instability outside the EU grows. In such situations, various external actors may demand the EU to give assistance, in whatever terms, or internal actors may ask for improvements in EFP institutions in order to meet the external challenges and the external demands. However, it may also happen that external demand will lead to a deadlock.

Third sequence: LI and domestic and European debates

For the third move (arrow 3), the developed model uses the LI. As Wivel admits, the MNR ‘turn[s] the blind eye to the intra-regional dynamics’ (Wivel 2000: 358), thereby neglecting the fact that within Europe there are also states. And the international system (even though of single source - anarchy) has diverging effects on different EU member states (Koenig-Archipugi 2004). Since the EU does not have exclusive competence in foreign policy, the EU member states cannot react as a single unit.

Given the variation in reacting to the external pressures – be it international conflicts, terrorist attacks or others – the EU member states have different interests in proceeding on the path to integrating their national foreign policies, which cannot be properly explained by realism (Koenig-Archipugi 2004, M. E. Smith 2004: 20-21). These differences and interests are cumulatively translated into the institutional built-up of the CFSP. Clearly, although EU member states react to different international events in the way they find appropriate and conform to their respective national interests,24 this does not automatically mean that the outcome is the smallest common denominator. What is true, however, is that whatever the institutional outcome, this occurs – as LI suggests – according to the logic of asymmetric interdependence.

This ‘simple logic of “asymmetrical interdependence”’—those who benefit the most from a policy must sacrifice the most on the margin—is the most profound factor shaping the negotiations’ (Moravcsik and Vachudova 2002: 3, see also Moravcsik and Vachudova 2003).

23 Indeed, as Haas observed, the member states of the Six ‘were obliged to work out a common economic and commercial policy toward the United States, Latin America and Africa earlier than planned in order to be able to present a common front in GATT’ (Haas 1986: 163).

24 This may concern many policy areas and many different foreign policy issues. A different but interesting perspective than the negotiation-based liberal intergovernmentalism offers the ‘adaptation approach’ (Petersen 1998).
Therefore, in order to account for the final shape of the CFSP – the latter being a subject of continuous negotiations between the EU member states – this logic must be integrated into the analytical model.

In a reversed order, as figure 3 shows, LI is ultimately about institutional choice. It is about what the EU member states decide in IGCs or on other occasions in the Council of Ministers. This institutional-choice stage is an outcome of the first two stages. On the first LI stage, EU member states are more occupied with their interests at the domestic level. These internal, sometimes polarised, debates take place ‘at home’ between opposition and government in power. These positions on specific CFSP issues are negotiated later at the European level. Already at this point the respective positions are results of concerns expressed by the governments in power about different international and European questions. Different issues – each having causal effects – such as anarchy, security pressures, as well as the specific European considerations, already play a role at this stage (Wilga 2003: 26, Wilga 2006: 343).

**Figure 3: Liberal intergovernmentalist framework**

1. National preferences of major governments concerning THE CFSP creation and development

2. Bargained outcomes between major EU member states’ governments

3. Choice of institutional shape for the CFSP based on bargained outcomes

*Source: Compiled by the author*

Once the governments in power take positions at the national level, the second stage, i.e. the European negotiations, begins. This does not mean that the domestic political phase is over, though. The debates may well continue despite the positions taken. Nonetheless, those decisions become the subject of negotiations at the EU level despite the possible ongoing domestic debates. At this stage, the negotiations depend upon two factors, i.e. the power capabilities of the respective EU member states and the asymmetrical interdependence of the negotiating parties.

Obviously, any decision enlarging the institutional built-up of the CFSP is more likely, the more member states are favourable to such an option during the bargaining game at the EU level. And obviously, if there is no majority of states in favour of creating new CFSP institutions, then one would expect at this stage to see different constellations of pro-CFSP states using – in unison or in isolation – diverse negotiation strategies, such as side payments and package deals, to ensure the decision about creating new CFSP institutions.
Preparing for empirical analysis: model-based expectations for the CFSP development

Having identified theoretical content for all three analytical moves, empirical examination would need some model-based expectations. Beginning with the MNR, the simplest hypothesis could be: the stronger the security pressures on the CFSP institutions, the more pressure would be placed on the EU member states to react to them. Possibly, as a result EU member states would collectively respond to the security pressures either by using available conflict prevention instruments or, *a posteriori*, by creating new, or by improving the existing, EU (collective security) institutional arrangements. Thus the MNR would predict that the probability of closer foreign policy cooperation in the EC/EU would increase with decreasing probability of conflict in the EU, and increasing probability of conflict outside the EU.

Concerning the type of anarchy, which is the MNR’s second identified variable, one could argue that the change from bipolarity into unipolarity would increase the pressure on the EU to improve their common foreign policy institutions, i.e. the EPC. At that time, not only a change of international structure occurred, but also the instabilities in Europe significantly increased. If having an impact at all, one could expect some form of additional institutional arrangements in order to meet the external challenges. Thus, upgrading the EPC institutions to the CFSP can be seen as a form of collective policy to obstruct the shift from long- to short-term security concerns.

As to the second sequence in the model, two independent variables were identified. Relating to the NF process ‘whereby members of an integration scheme – agreed on some collective goals for a variety of motives but [were] unequally satisfied with [the] (…) attainment of these goals – [they would] attempt to resolve their dissatisfaction either by resorting to collaboration in another, related sector (expanding the scope of mutual commitment) or by intensifying their commitment to the original sector (increasing the level of mutual commitment) or both’ (Schmitter 1969: 162). Accordingly, as there was rather little change in level but much more (increase) in the scope of the CFSP, these changes may exactly have resulted from increasing dissatisfaction of some EU member states about the common foreign policy institutions. Evidence would thus be needed that some member states were dissatisfied with the EPC, and then the CFSP as a foreign policy instrument. Additionally, one would have to find evidence for politicisation processes, serving the expansion of the CFSP’s institutional basis. Equally, the externalisation and demand may have been intensified or reduced by the pressure for institutional improvements in the CFSP, especially where third actors demanded CFSP performance.

Given the above, the NF independent variables would assume that the probability of closer foreign policy cooperation, i.e. the CFSP institutional evolution, would increase with a growing level of dissatisfaction, and later politicisation caused by emerging or existing security pressures and with a high, or at least a medium level, of externalisation effect and conducive of demand.

Taking the reflections based upon LI, one would need to consider the domestic debates and positions of the major EU member states on specific EPC/CFSP institutional problems. Second, one would have to assess the respective negotiation powers in light of asymmetric interdependence during the ongoing controversies among the EU member states. Thus, the more intensive such issues are discussed in the domestic arena, the probability increases that they are discussed at the EU level. At that state, the more states are in favour of changes in the CFSP institutional structures, the more probable it also becomes to force them through at the European level in IGCs. To be more precise, at the first stage of LI logic, one would need to find evidence for willingness among the EU member states to improve foreign policy institutions defined explicitly in the national preferences of at least two of the largest member states, although sometimes already one can be sufficient.25 It would however be more realistic to assume that a

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25 Although not in relation to foreign policy areas, Laursen showed (1993: 233) that even though two large EU member states were opposed to some relevant propositions during the Maastricht Treaty negotiations, the decisions have been taken anyway. In Laursen’s own words, ‘why [was] co-decision for the parliament [decided upon] if two of the three were opposed? Why more cohesion money, if two of the three were opposed? And why, in the end, did the
positive decision of three large states would secure changes in the CFSP, especially when large EU member states use their bargaining powers to push through decisions conducive to strengthening their common foreign policy institutions, or to block any initiative leading to its damage.

**Table 4. Theories and expectations concerning the CFSP development**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Necessary condition</th>
<th>Necessary condition</th>
<th>Sufficient condition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MNR</td>
<td>NF</td>
<td>LI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes in international structure (polarity type: PT), existing security pressures (SP), uncertainties and instabilities endangering integration</td>
<td>Spillover-based dissatisfaction and politicisation (DP) in THE CFSP, externalisation and demand side (EDS) from involved actors</td>
<td>Relative agreement among the large EU members in domestic debates (DD), side payments to opposing states in European negotiations (EN)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Compiled by the author

On the basis of the above theoretical considerations (see table 4), the overall, synergetic, expectation concerning the CFSP development could be as follows: the CFSP institutions evolve as a result of pressures caused by the given PT and SP, by existent DP and EDS, and sufficient DD, producing national positions and the EN taking place and eventually leading to changes in the CFSP in the period under investigation.

**Concluding remarks**

This short text had a twofold task. First, it was to develop an argument for a more synergetic approach to the CFSP studies as the field characterised by a multitude of uni-causal analyses, which may seem insufficient to analyse the complexity of the object of study. Second, the text offered a new synergetic – multi-causal and multi-level – CFSP analytical model.

To achieve this, the paper proceeded in several steps. It first identified three integration theories to study the CFSP. Arguing that these EI theories are examples of uni-causality, the paper went beyond uni-causality, thereby identifying dimensions for a synergetic CFSP analysis. It was followed by a second step, i.e. from static CFSP dimensions to dynamic CFSP analytical sequences. The paper also argued for complementarity of the selected EI theories, and developed a number of model-based expectations.

The model is based upon elements of three integration theories, namely (1) modified neorealism, (2) neofunctionalism and (3) liberal intergovernmentalism. By juxtaposing those theories in sequences, the new model uses the respective theoretical advantages and facilitates argumentation for a synergetic analysis.

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[Maastricht] Treaty include new competences in the area of consumer protection, if two of the three were opposed’ (ibid.: 232).
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