ASEAN: A Prime Example of Regionalism in Southeast Asia

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ASEAN: A Prime Example of Regionalism in Southeast Asia

Katja Weber

The purpose of this paper is to shed some light on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to create a basis for comparisons with other examples of regionalism such as the European Union, NAFTA, the African Union, or Mercosur, to name but a few. To facilitate this task, I divided the paper into the following nine subheadings:

1.) Historical Background
2.) Rationale for Regionalism/Integration, Main Developments and Expansion
3.) Legal Framework
4.) Institutions/Decision-Making
5.) Economy
6.) Security
7.) External Relations
8.) Theories
9.) Setbacks and Prospects

Historical Background

Since, as Frank Frost (1990: 2) explains, “geographic characteristics of the area discouraged regular contact and communication, the ancient kingdoms of Southeast Asia developed largely in isolation from each other.” Yet, easy access by sea left the region vulnerable to interference by external powers and thus, by the nineteenth century, Southeast Asians became victims of European colonialism. During World War II, Japan expelled the Western colonial powers from the region and subjected it to a brutal occupation.

Following World War II, the Southeast Asian countries gradually gained independence from their colonizers, but only to become part of the Cold War struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union, and “a battleground in the conflict between China and the Soviet Union” (Narine 2002: 10). The perception of external threat, therefore, was an essential component in the
promotion of regionalism in Southeast Asia, along-side concerns regarding intra-regional predators and internal communist insurgencies.

Given the great uncertainty surrounding the behavior of the USSR and China in the aftermath of the Second World War, the US took a first step to promote regionalism in Southeast Asia. In 1954, together with France, Great Britain, New Zealand, Australia, the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan, the US founded the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) to prevent communism from gaining ground in the region. However since, “[u]nlike NATO, SEATO had no independent mechanism for obtaining intelligence or deploying military forces, [its] … potential for collective action was necessarily limited.” SEATO held annual joint military exercises and engaged in consultation, but suffered from a lack of “credibility” and therefore was disbanded in 1977. Another attempt at promoting regional order was made by the South Korean president Park Chung-hee with the creation of the Asian Pacific Council (ASPAC) in 1966, but this grouping of anti-communist states disintegrated in 1972.

The next two efforts to establish order were made exclusively by Southeast Asian countries, without any outside help. In 1961 Malaya, the Philippines and Thailand gave rise to the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA). Whereas Malaya and the Philippines preferred an arrangement with significant institutional structures, Thailand favored a much less binding commitment and eventually got its way. The ASA ran into trouble when the Philippines decided to lay claim on Sabah (territory which the British had intended to include in the proposed Federation of Malaysia). This dispute between the Philippines and what then became known as Malaysia (an amalgamation of Malaya, Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak) rendered the ASA ineffective for the following years.

MAPHILINDO (a grouping of Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia) was founded in 1963, but was weakened significantly shortly after it had come about, due to the creation of the Federation of Malaysia which neither Indonesia nor the Philippines recognized (Narine 2002: 10-12). Between 1963 and 1966, President Sukarno of Indonesia then pursued konfrontasi—a policy of confrontation and regional disruption—with Malaysia and Singapore, once the latter had been expelled from Malaysia in 1965. The idea was to destabilize Malaysia through limited military action, economic sanctions and propaganda. Konfrontasi finally ended when Sukarno was deposed by the military in 1966.

Even though both the ASA and MAPHILINDO collapsed, due to the above described internal hostilities, they were important precursors of ASEAN (Frost 1990: 4). The disputes between these countries made the need for regional cooperation abundantly clear and, ultimately, led to new discussions which on August 8, 1967, gave rise to ASEAN.

Rationale for Regionalism/Integration, Main Developments and Expansion

By founding ASEAN, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines hoped to accomplish three main objectives. First, they sought to reduce tensions and competition among themselves, i.e., Southeast Asia’s non-communist states. Second, they hoped that by promoting domestic socio-economic development, it would be easier for them to tackle internal communist challenges and/or deal with externally sponsored communist insurgencies. Third, they sought to reduce the regional military influence of external actors by expressly stating that foreign military bases in the region should be temporary (Narine 2002: 13). Since most of the ASEAN states are still “deeply engaged in the process of state-building….their most important concern is to maintain and promote their rights and security as sovereign states” (ibid. p. 3). Or, put differently, when it comes to ranking norms, sovereignty wins out over all others.

Mindful not to provoke other countries in the region, like Vietnam, but also unable to see eye-to-eye on security matters, and lacking the military means to bring about a credible security apparatus, the ASEAN members carefully spelled out in the Bangkok Declaration that their main goals shall be: “to accelerate the economic growth, social progress, and cultural development in
the region through joint endeavours in the spirit of equality and partnership...[and] to promote regional peace and stability.”

But, much like in the case of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), “security concerns and political purposes were never far from the ASEAN founders’ intentions.”

As the Corregidor Affair in 1968 proves, ASEAN was off to a rough start. Allegations that the Philippines were using the island to train Muslim insurgents to infiltrate Sabah led to a diplomatic row between Malaysia and the Philippines and, eventually, to the cancellation of ASEAN meetings. Only when changes in their external environment (Britain’s announcement that it would accelerate its withdrawal from Southeast Asia; Nixon’s claim that the US would limit its involvement in Southeast Asia; the intensification of the Sino-Soviet conflict; the spread of war from Vietnam to Laos and Cambodia) drove home the need for renewed cooperation, did Malaysia and the Philippines resume normal relations in December 1969 (Narine 2002: 19).

Recognizing that it would be difficult to attain domestic stability and socio-economic development as long as external powers would be able to intervene in their affairs, on November 26-27, 1971, the foreign ministers of ASEAN met in Kuala Lumpur and signed a Declaration of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in Southeast Asia. The purpose of this political statement of intent was to neutralize Southeast Asia and the signatories envisioned a two-pronged strategy to get there. First, the Southeast Asian states should support non-aggression principles and respect each others’ sovereignty and territorial integrity. And, secondly, the major powers (the US, the USSR, and China) should guarantee Southeast Asia’s neutrality and assure that the region would not become an area of conflict between them.

The collapse of anticommunist regimes in South Vietnam and Cambodia in 1975 hit home the need for economic development to counter the internal appeal of communism in ASEAN countries. To improve ASEAN’s internal stability, the ASEAN heads of state met in Bali in February 1976 and reached two crucial agreements, the Declaration of ASEAN Concord and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC). Whereas the former, largely, defined areas of economic cooperation (with respect to basic commodities; large-scale industrial projects; intraregional trade liberalization; joint approaches to world economic problems) and suggested annual summits of ASEAN’s economic ministers, the latter focused on security issues obliging the member states to settle their disputes peacefully through consultation. TAC, as Narine (2002: 23) explains, served as ASEAN’s “code of conduct,” spelling out its fundamental principles which will be examined in more detail below, and as a non-aggression pact.

Although, as can be seen with Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia (then known as Kampuchea) from 1978 to 1990, at times, there was a significant degree of cohesion among the ASEAN member states, different threat perceptions repeatedly led to different policy prescriptions, making it difficult for the organization to speak with one voice. More important still, systemic constraints made it virtually impossible for ASEAN to control its regional security environment as it saw fit. While the great powers placed limits on what ASEAN could accomplish, it is important to understand that, “without the diplomatic and military support of the United States and...China, ASEAN would not have been able to oppose Vietnam” (Narine 2002: 59). ASEAN, thus decided to introduce resolutions at the UN General Assembly in which it “called for a durable and comprehensive political settlement in Cambodia” and for which it received consistent support from the international community.” Finally, on 23 October 1991, the Paris Conference on Cambodia produced the Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict.

To mention but one further security provision, at the Bangkok Summit in December 1995 the leaders of the ASEAN countries signed the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ). With this treaty, which came into force on 27 March 1997, the signatories declared their determination to “take concrete action which will contribute to the progress towards general and complete disarmament of nuclear weapons, and to the promotion of international peace and security.”
Thus, over time, ASEAN spelled out various principles, norms and rules that were to guide the conduct of its members, i.e., it increased its substance. Before taking a closer look at the organization’s legal framework, institutions, and decision-making procedures, however, another development that occurred simultaneously deserves mention, namely ASEAN’s expansion.

As discussed above, ASEAN started out with five founding members: Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines. Brunei was added in 1984. For political, economic and security reasons ASEAN then brought the mainland Southeast Asian states on board (Vietnam joined ASEAN in 1995; Myanmar and Laos in 1997; and Cambodia in 1999), thinking that it should seize the window of opportunity which the end of the Cold War had opened. The members hoped that an ASEAN of ten countries would have a more substantial voice in international economic and security discussions, that the organization would be in a better position to compete with great powers in the region like China, Japan, and India, that it would have greater economic appeal, and be in a better position to promote peace and stability (Narine 2002: 113).

The latest round of enlargement not only increased the member-state population from 340 million people to more than 500 million, but it also made an already heterogeneous grouping of states—in terms of size differences, ethnic diversity, level of development and wealth—e ven more so. This suggests that, with even more diverse economic and political views, consensus may be even harder to reach. Now that ASEAN includes communist governments (Vietnam and Laos) and an authoritarian military regime (Myanmar) alongside liberal democracies, it may have to be even more informal to accommodate the views of the new members. In fact, as Henderson (1999: 13) explains, it now is not uncommon that “[i]mpetus for change among some original ASEAN countries is countered by the conservatism of new ones.”

Another problem is the uncertainty regarding Vietnam’s future behavior. Will it resume its traditional role and compete with Thailand? Will it challenge Indonesia’s aspirations as regional leader? Not to speak of Myanmar which, presently, exposes ASEAN to a variety of security threats in the form of refugee flows, cross-border incursions, drug production, and AIDS (Narine 2002: 113-116).

Legal Framework

ASEAN consists of a series of basic documents that make up its legal framework. First, in the Bangkok Declaration of 1967 the founding members spelled out the aims and purposes of the organization (see above). The Kuala Lumpur Declaration of 27 November 1971 then established a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality in Southeast Asia, free from any interference by outside powers. On February 24, 1976 in Bali the Declaration of ASEAN Concord was signed to “expand ASEAN cooperation in the economic, social, cultural and political fields.” During the same meeting the ASEAN members once more discussed the purpose, but also principles, of the organization and codified them in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC).

TAC in Chapter I, Article 2 defines ASEAN’s fundamental principles as:

- mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and national identity of all nations; the right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion; non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful manner; renunciation of the threat or use of force; and effective cooperation among themselves.

Among legal commitments sovereign equality is paramount and therefore members’ rights as sovereign states need to be respected at all times. In the event that conflict should occur, TAC stresses in Chapter IV, it needs to be resolved in a non-confrontational way.
Other legally-binding basic documents deal with economic cooperation (Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff [CEPT] Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area, Singapore, 28 January 1992; Protocol to Amend the Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation, Bangkok, 15 December 1995), security issues (Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, Bangkok, 15 December 1995; Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea 2002), and the future of regional cooperation (ASEAN Vision 2020 [1997]).

Institutions/Decision-Making

When ASEAN was founded, the Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM) of ASEAN foreign ministers was the main decision-making body. The ASEAN Standing Committee (ASC) was in charge of daily affairs. In addition, ASEAN National Secretariats were created and became part of the Foreign Ministries of the ASEAN states. Even though ASEAN produced hundreds of recommendations during its early period, few were ever implemented (Narine 2002: 16).

Following the Bali Summit in 1976 ASEAN was restructured. The organization now held occasional Heads of Government meetings, but AMM remained the de facto governing body. After 1976, Economic Ministers’ Meetings were introduced which, over time, became the most important decision-making arena in the economic realm. Moreover, ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences (ASEAN-PMC) with ASEAN dialogue partners were institutionalized, and Senior Officials Meetings (SOM) held to facilitate political dialogue. A central ASEAN Secretariat was also created along with several functional committees.

The Singapore Summit of 1992 brought additional changes to ASEAN’s basic organizational structure. The heads of government would meet every three years now and schedule informal get-togethers in the interim, as needed. The ASEAN Secretary General was given ministerial status, and the Secretariat was revamped and would also including one deputy secretary-general, four bureau directors, eleven assistant directors, and eight senior officers (Narine 2002: 101).

As a result of the steadily increasing number of issues to be discussed at any given time, ASEAN Heads of State and Government meet annually now in ASEAN summits (the organization’s highest decision-making body). Each of these summits is preceded by a Joint Ministerial Meeting of the foreign and economic ministers. The ASEAN Standing Committee (ASC), chaired by the foreign minister of the country that holds the chairmanship, coordinates the work of ASEAN in between the annual ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM). And, the ASEAN Secretariat has to “initiate, advise, coordinate, and implement ASEAN activities.” Moreover, in 2003, ASEAN leaders vowed to establish an ASEAN Community consisting of three main pillars: an ASEAN Security Community, an ASEAN Economic Community, and an ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community.

Thus, as it stands today, “ASEAN (with its enhanced secretariat, regularized summits, as well as more regular informal heads of government meetings, its varied ministerial and official level meetings, and dialogues with extra-regional states...),” in the mind of Henderson (1999: 24), “can lay claim to being the most extensively institutionalized (but not supra-nationalized) regional association besides the European Union.” But, due to its unwillingness to sacrifice sovereignty, ASEAN has retained a clear preference for informal mechanisms over legalistic institutions. In fact, it outright rejects any form of supra-national decision-making and, if need be, is prepared to settle for lowest common denominator decisions.

What sets the organization apart from many other regional institutions is its own process of decision-making, typically referred to as the “ASEAN Way.” Based on the Malay cultural practices of musjawarah and mufukat, the idea is to reach agreement via consultation and
consensus, respectively (Narine 2002: 31). Should there be obstacles in the way that may prevent cooperation in a particular issue area, ASEAN members should be willing to move issues aside and proceed with consultation in another area. By holding its members to a specific code of conduct, the organization seeks to contain problems and, over time, build a regional consciousness, if not regional identity. It is also noteworthy that the principle of sovereign equality prevents a state from holding a legitimate claim to leadership. Indonesia which, on account of its size and large population, clearly is interested in a leadership position, has to settle for what Henderson (1999: 17) characterizes as “leading from behind.”

Economy

A 1969 UN study suggested ASEAN members should bring about some kind of economic union to take advantage of economies of scale at the regional level. Progress in economic cooperation has been slow, however, due to a number of problems. First, ASEAN trade is mostly oriented toward the global market, i.e., ASEAN members have extensive economic links with industrialized countries, but there is little intra-ASEAN trade. As Frost (1990: 10) explains, “historically, four out of five of the original ASEAN members developed as suppliers of primary products and industrial raw materials for world markets. The fifth, Singapore, developed as a service centre for the British Empire in the Far East and as a centre for trade in commodities from nearby states. In the mid-1960s, ... Singapore developed rapidly into a manufacturing and financial centre.” Second, ASEAN members hold different attitudes toward international trade. Whereas Singapore and Brunei are open and outward looking, Indonesia has traditionally been highly protectionist, and in Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines, open and protected sectors co-exist (Frost 1990: 11). Third, “ASEAN’s efforts to foster intraregional economic cooperation were stymied both by a lack of complementarity and by outright competition between most of its members” (Narine 2002: 27).

To promote greater economic cooperation, in 1976, ASEAN members signed the Declaration of ASEAN Concord. One year later, ASEAN introduced preferential trading arrangements (PTAs). But even though tariffs were reduced for ASEAN products, they remained high enough to stifle significant trade. “By 1990, despite listing almost 16,000 products, the PTA covered less than 1 percent of intra-ASEAN trade” (Narine 2002: 28). In addition to creating PTAs, ASEAN has experimented with the ASEAN Industrial Project (AIP), ASEAN Industrial Complementation (AIC), and ASEAN Industrial Joint Venture (AIJV) schemes to promote industrial cooperation, but with very mixed results (Chatterjee 1990: 68-70). Thus, during the Cold War, ASEAN as an economic institution was clearly a failure or, at best, of limited economic significance. The fact that its members were largely oriented outward with respect to trade, and, for the most part, were unable to reach agreement on what economic policies to pursue, severely undermined the effectiveness of the organization. And yet, there was a silver lining in ASEAN’s ability to mitigate disputes which enhanced regional stability and, ultimately, led to a better investment climate.

Given China’s emergence as a major competitor for foreign direct investment, at the 1991 ASEAN Economic Ministers’ Meeting, Thailand proposed ASEAN create an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) for manufactures, to be established within fifteen years. Officially launched in January 1992, AFTA called for the “reduction of tariffs on all intra-ASEAN trade in manufactures, processed agricultural products, and capital goods to a 0-5 percent range within fifteen years, starting in 1993” (Narine 2002: 127). Due to an increasingly rapid rate of competition, AFTA’s completion date was moved up from 2008 to 2003. “As of 1 January 2005, tariffs on almost 99 percent of the products in the Inclusion List of the ASEAN-6 (Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) have been reduced to no more than 5 percent. More than 60 percent of these products have zero tariffs. The average
tariff for ASEAN-6 has been brought down from more than 12 percent when AFTA started to 2 percent today.” Later agreements, known as “AFTA plus,” sought to harmonize customs and product standards (Henderson 1999: 22).

To move toward an ASEAN Economic Community (as outlined in ASEAN Vision 2020), ASEAN seeks to “institute new mechanisms and measures to strengthen the implementation of its existing economic initiatives including the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) and ASEAN Investment Area (AIA); to accelerate regional integration...[like] air travel...electronics, fisheries...tourism,” etc. ASEAN countries have also agreed to create a dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) designed to address all disputes arising from intra-ASEAN economic cooperation. Ultimately, the goal is “to create a stable, prosperous and highly competitive ASEAN economic region in which there is a free flow of goods, services, investment and a freer flow of capital, equitable economic development and reduced poverty and socio-economic disparities in the year 2020.”

Yet, despite these recent moves toward greater integration, the fact that the level of intra-trade relations remains low (compared to external trade) clearly diminishes the significance of ASEAN as an economic actor. “For most of the 1990s,” Narine (2002: 132) explains, “intra-ASEAN trade hovered around 20 percent of total ASEAN trade.” By contrast, about 40% of NAFTA trade takes place between member states; and EU intra-regional trade is about 70% (ibid 133).

There has also been some monetary coordination. In 1972, the Special Committee of ASEAN Central Banks and Monetary Authorities was created to promote regional financial cooperation. Following the Bali Summit of 1976, ASEAN created the Committee on Finance and Banking (COFAB). Five years later, in June 1981, the ASEAN Finance Corporation (AFC) started operating, providing equity capital and loans to ASEAN projects. Due to the small scale of the operation (total assets of $121 million in 1985), as Chatterjee (1990: 71-4) makes clear, AFC’s performance was modest.

Much like discussed above for the economic realm, “divergent economic policies and different levels of development...prevent [ASEAN] from taking a coherent and coordinated position on regional financial reform” (Narine 2002: 161). As will be seen below, during the early stages of the Asian financial crisis, Japan proposed the creation of an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF); but strong opposition by the US and the IMF were enough to kill the proposal. Renewed discussions regarding an Asian financial institution are now taking place in ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN plus Japan, South Korea and China), but for such an institution to have any chance of succeeding, the Asian countries would first have to overcome their many tensions. Nevertheless, two ideas are currently being discussed: an AMF as an Asian arm of the IMF, or an AMF that would replace the IMF in Asia. But, since leading an AMF could bring Japan into conflict with the US, or further exacerbate the rivalry between China and Japan, prospects for an Asian financial institution are dim at the moment.

Security

Although security considerations played a crucial role in the founding of ASEAN it refused to present itself as security bloc. Instead, via ZOPFAN, ASEAN pursued an isolationist foreign policy and the Philippines and Thailand relied predominately on their bilateral alliances with the US to protect themselves against external threats. In the late 1980s and 1990s, numerous bilateral military arrangements between ASEAN members also began to flourish and they engaged in joint military exercises (Narine 2002: 71). At the same time, an arms buildup took place to be able to deal with unresolved disputes. For instance, during the 1990s, disputes occurred over fishing and illegal Thai immigrants to Malaysia. Moreover, Indonesia and Malaysia engaged in a dispute over the islands of Ligitan and Sipidan, and there were ethnic tensions between Singapore and Malaysia (Narine 2002: 73).
In addition to facing intra-regional challenges, in the post-Cold War era, ASEAN countries are confronted with new transnational challenges (terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, energy security, maritime security, etc.), greater uncertainty regarding the behavior of the Great Powers in the region, and the fear of US isolationism. These changed circumstances necessitated a reassessment of existing security provisions and made clear that ASEAN needed to be adapted. Since, in this post-Cold War environment in which shifts in the regional balance of power are externally driven, ASEAN can no longer insulate the region from outside influence, it needs to find new ways to constrain others through dialogue and consultation (Acharya, 2003: 149). And that is precisely what ASEAN did with the issuance of the Manila Declaration.

Fearing conflict with China over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea (which are of both strategic and economic value), in 1992, the organization sought to diffuse a volatile situation by calling for a peaceful settlement of disputes in the region. As point 5 of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea states: “The Parties undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability including, among others, refraining from action of inhabiting the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features and to handle their differences in a constructive manner.”

As will be seen below, ASEAN also decided to expand its focus by giving rise to a new multilateral arrangement—the ASEAN Regional Forum—to deal with external as well as internal threats. But it is important to understand that, as long as the close military dependence on the Western powers remains, “no ASEAN country sees regional military cooperation as a substitute for security links with external powers” (Acharya 2003: 119), merely as an additional safety device meant to reduce the region’s dependence on the West over time.

A regional security conference was first mentioned by Gorbachev in 1986. The idea was then picked up by Australian foreign minister, Gareth Evans, who proposed a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia (CSCA) modeled after the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). ASEAN members initially rejected this idea but were open to using ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences for further security discussions (Narine 2002: 103). Clear from the outset was that ASEAN sought to use its own model of cooperative security as a framework for promoting peace in the post-Cold War environment. “Its underlying goal,” as Leifner (1996: 19) put it, “was to create the conditions for a stable…distribution of power among the three major Asia-Pacific states—China, Japan and the United States—that would benefit regional order.” After careful deliberations the Twenty-Sixth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and Post Ministerial Conference, in July 1993, agreed to create the ASEAN Regional Forum.

The inaugural meeting of the ARF was held one year later in Bangkok on 25 July 1994. From its outset its founders conceptualized the organization as the principal forum for security cooperation in the region. Comprised of 27 countries, the ARF is based on ASEAN-style diplomacy (non-interference in the internal affairs of states, non-use of force, pacific settlement of disputes, consensus decision making, a preference for non-binding and non-legalistic approaches) and displays minimal institutionalization.

The “ARF’s highest level [of interaction] is the annual foreign minister’s meeting, always chaired by the ASEAN country occupying the rotating chairmanship” (Simon 2008: 279). This meeting is supported by an annual Senior Officers Meeting (SOM). Members of the ARF, additionally, have agreed to set up two structures to help the ARF-SOM Chairman: an Inter-Sessional Support Group (ISG) on Confidence Building “to address…a dialogue on security perceptions and defence policy papers,” and Inter-Sessional Meetings (ISMs) “to deal with cooperative activities, including peacekeeping and search-and-rescue coordination” (Leifner 1996: 42). These groups are supplemented by specialists who meet in Track II meetings like the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) founded in 1993 or the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) founded in 1994. Or, put differently, the ASEAN Regional Forum engages in both “first track” (official) and “second track” (unofficial) diplomacy.
The former typically entails discussions by Foreign Ministers, whereas scholars, members of Think Tanks, government representatives not acting in their official capacity, as well as other individuals and organizations attend “second track” meetings on regional security issues. In their 1995 Concept Paper the ARF members envisioned a “three-stage, evolutionary approach” …moving from confidence building to preventive diplomacy and, in the long term, towards a conflict resolution capability. 

As will be discussed below, thus far, the ARF has largely made progress in the area of confidence building. Since it took the organization until 2005 to declare that it was time to move into the preventive diplomacy (PD) stage, efforts to develop PD mechanisms (which according to the ARF Concept Paper would be “a natural follow-up to confidence building measures [CBMs]), not to speak of conflict management measures, are still at an embryonic stage.

What needs to be understood from the outset is that the ARF is split between activist (Australia, Canada, US, Japan) and reluctant (China and most of ASEAN) countries. ASEAN countries reject a more formal ARF because they want to avoid taking any steps that would undermine the ASEAN way. China, similarly, rejects greater formality because it opposes interference in its domestic affairs (particularly when it comes to Taiwan and the South China Sea). Hence a “pace comfortable to all participants” needs to be found, which often undermines the effectiveness of the ARF as a regional security actor by leading to lowest common denominator decisions.

As Katsumata (2006: 194) explains, the “ARF is not designed to ‘resolve’… disputes--i.e., to reach a formal agreement, or to create a formal mechanism to regulate concerned states’ actions.” It therefore could not prevent a number of conflicts between its members such as disputes between India and Pakistan, the diplomatic row between South Korea and Japan over Dokdo/Takeshima, China’s military intimidation in the Taiwan Strait, territorial disputes regarding the Spratlys or the South China Sea, to name but a few. Rather than to settle disputes, the ARF seeks to promote lasting peace by utilizing CBMs that are to create trust among its members. Or, in other words, the ARF is about “identity-building” and its members hope that… “dialogue should lead to socialization which, in turn, will lead to the dissipation of conflicts of interests” (Garofano 1999: 78). Comprehensive engagement and political dialogue, from the ARF’s perspective, are the correct way to foster peace, not the dispatch of troops and carrier battle groups (Leifner 1996: 46). Thus for the first ten years of its existence the ARF largely held workshops with the main purpose of disseminating the “ASEAN way” (non-use of force, non-interference in domestic affairs, etc.), thereby earning the label of a “norm brewery” (Katsumata 2006: 195).

In their efforts to promote peace, the ASEAN members of the ARF seek to retain control over the organization. They do this by making sure that ASEAN states provide the venue for the ARF’s annual meetings. Moreover, they insist that intersession study groups, which are composed of two states, always include an ASEAN member. And, they mandate that the ASEAN consensus principle always prevails (Simon 2007: 22).

Although the creation of trust is still paramount, since 2005 the ARF has sought to move from the Confidence Building stage to the Preventive Diplomacy phase. As expressly stated in the Co-Chair’s Summary Report of the ARF Workshop on “Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy in Asia and Europe” (Berlin, 12-14 March 2008), the ARF is “currently in the transition phase from confidence building to preventive diplomacy.” The document explains that “[a]s mutual trust amongst ASEAN countries…and ARF participants had increased, the ARF was in a good position to advance into preventive diplomacy.” Since the time has come to translate commitment into action, Mr. Wong Chow Ming, Deputy-Director at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore, proposed to…” enhance concrete practical cooperation; streamline decision-making; strengthen [the] ARF Chair… maintain [a] ‘flexible moratorium’ on membership and enhance cooperation with Track II and external organizations.” Other steps to enhance CBMs and PD might include the improvement of communication between ARF
participants, information exchange mechanisms, and the creation of a crisis room or some other form of early warning mechanism.

Preventive diplomacy measures, as envisioned by the ARF, can be taken before a crisis and/or during its onset. Pre-crisis measures include information exchanges on military exercises and weapons purchases; greater transparency via Defense White Papers; institution-building for consultation and exchange of personnel; norm-building; early warning systems to detect the build-up of military forces, natural disasters, refugee movements, famine, etc. PD measures at the onset of a crisis, on the other hand, consist of fact finding; goodwill missions by envoys to express concern about a particular situation; mediation or the good offices of a third party to restore order.

From September 4-7, 2007, for instance, an ARF Disaster Relief Desk-top Exercise was held in Darwin to develop an initial structure for ARF Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for Disaster Relief and Humanitarian Assistance. This was followed one month later by an ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Disaster Relief in Helsinki where recommendations were made regarding the development of strategies and a procedure for enhanced inter-governmental cooperation in this area. Specifically, ARF members discussed the improvement of military-to-military and civilian-military coordination, including joint training and better information sharing in the pre-deployment and actual response phases. The meeting also stressed that the ARF data base should complement existing UN mechanisms.

The ARF conducted a further Desktop Exercise on Disaster Relief in Jakarta, 1-2 May 2008, and pronounced it an important milestone in the organization’s move from confidence building mechanisms to preventive diplomacy. At the same time, however, the Co-Chair’s Summary Report of the ARF Desktop Exercise emphasized that the ARF Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Standard Operating Procedures (HADR SOP) must acknowledge the primacy of sovereignty and therefore are non-binding, that is, external assistance shall only be provided with the consent of the affected country.

In the area of energy security the ARF has also taken steps recently to promote greater cooperation and prevent conflict. During their 2nd Seminar on Energy Security 15-17 April 2008 in Singapore ARF members, first of all, defined what security in this area means to them. In their summary statement they made clear that they prefer a broad view that “includes not only energy diversification…, but also energy diplomacy, energy conservation, infrastructural challenges, environmental protection, and the development of alternative and renewable sources of energy.” Moreover, they noted that greater regional cooperation would be essential to assure the security of transit routes, and recommended several concrete steps to enhance energy security such as “information exchange and assistance on best practices; scenario planning exercises; and enhanced cooperation regarding the development and investment in new infrastructure” (ibid.).

This past year there have also been signs that the ARF may soon be ready to set itself more ambitious goals and consider undertaking preventive actions in addition to preventive diplomacy. During its 2nd Peacekeeping Experts’ Meeting in Singapore 4-6 March 2008, the organization discussed the possibility of future participation in peacekeeping operations and called for “enhanced quality in training, the right equipment and the necessary political will.” The Japanese government, moreover, offered cooperation with peacekeeping training centers in the Asian region. Those countries not ready to contribute forces, it was noted, could aid in other ways by providing health and medical services, military advisers and combat service support forces (ibid.). Additionally, it was suggested that “future meetings could look at an integrated or comprehensive mission concept”…and consider “holding a peacekeeping planning exercise/activity in the future” (ibid. p.8).

The ARF, moreover, has made some progress regarding counter-terrorism. The organization recognizes that terrorism “constitutes a grave threat to stability, peace and security in the Asia-Pacific and beyond” and thus, repeatedly, has called upon its members to become parties to int’l conventions and protocols relating to terrorism. During the Sixth ASEAN Regional Forum
Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime in Semarang, Indonesia, 21-22 February 2008, for example, the need for cooperation in the area of counter-terrorism among regional organizations like ASEAN, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and the ARF was stressed to ensure maximum synergies and avoid duplication. Participants also “supported in principle” the proposal by the Republic of Korea to “explore practical and concrete ways” to implement previous ARF recommendations in “fighting cyber attack and terrorist misuse of cyber space.” The meeting, moreover, discussed strategies to counter transnational crime, improve boundary control, and better deal with cross border crime through close cooperation between the authorities and the public. Finally, the meeting addressed measures like bilateral agreements, intelligence exchanges, information sharing, law enforcement cooperation, and mutual legal assistance to fight transnational crime more effectively.

Since the “prime model for the ARF is ASEAN’s own distinctive, political approach to regional security problems,” as Leifer (1996: 3) aptly put it, “conspicuously absent from the ARF is any robust provision for addressing the use of force in conflict and conflict resolution.” Military intervention, peace-making, peace-enforcement or any other military instruments are clearly outside the purview of the ARF which consciously elects to rely exclusively on political and economic means. This lack of “teeth,” according to Leifner (1996: 53), renders the ARF an “imperfect diplomatic instrument for achieving regional security goals.”

The lack of measures to compel others to engage in certain types of behavior may make the ARF imperfect, but does it also make it ineffective? “Despite being labeled a ‘talk shop,’” Acharya (2003: 332) points out that the ARF “fulfills the expected function of institutions in lowering transaction costs, providing information and preventing cheating.” The ARF clearly has promoted regional stability via the creation of CBMs and numerous venues for the exchange of ideas and building of trust. Japan, for instance, views the organization as a “vehicle for enhancing [the] overall diplomatic climate between regional countries and as an important element of its policy of engagement with China and North Korea” (Yuzawa 2007: 177). The Japanese know that many of their neighbors are still distrustful and the ARF provides a welcome setting for reassurances. Similarly, as China’s military and economic power grows, it increasingly has an interest in signaling its peaceful intentions and interacting with its neighbors in a multilateral institutional setting. And even though China, when it first joined the ARF, was concerned that the US and Japan might gang up on it, it quickly concluded that staying out was too risky and therefore not an option (ibid. 32).

Much like Acharya (2003: 170) has found in the case of ASEAN, it can be argued that “persisting bilateral tensions, territorial disputes, [and] militarization” also undermine the ARF’s effectiveness as a viable regional security provider. What one continues to see is a gradual, piecemeal approach to cooperation where the norm of non-interference, the consensus principle, the lack of institutionalization, and the absence of interoperability constrain policy options, and where undesirable behavior by a member, for the most part, still goes unpunished.

To enhance security in the region, and assure that countries like Japan and the US will not lose interest in the ARF, “tangible progress” has to be made, particularly with respect to the non-interference principle (Yusawa 2007: 170, and 2006: 804). So long as states have either asked for or consented to intervention by the ARF, Japan for instance thinks, the organization should be allowed to play a role in intrastate conflict. In such cases, as long as preventive diplomacy measures were to be authorized by the states involved, their use would neither violate state sovereignty nor the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of others (Yuzawa 2006: 790). Put differently, activist ARF members like Australia, the US, Canada, and Japan think it is important to depart from the rules that characterize the “ASEAN Way” in order for the organization to develop more meaningful PD mechanisms. Even at that, in the eyes of Yuzawa (2006: 786), such a departure “would only be a prerequisite, not a solution.”
The ARF also needs to rethink the consensus principle which often gets in the way of joint agreements. This obstacle, according to Simon (2007: 25), could be dealt with if ARF members were willing to adopt an ASEAN procedure known as the “ASEAN Minus X” understanding. The latter essentially allows for a “coalition of the willing,” and thus, makes it possible to progress in situations where not everyone is able/willing to move at the same speed. Since inclusivity can hinder progress, it sometimes may be better to seek cooperation among a smaller number of players to reach agreement rather than trying to get everyone on board (Garofano 1999: 84). Such a move, however, can be expected to be rejected by more reluctant ARF members like China and most of ASEAN.

Additionally, there is a need for greater institutionalization. Since an early warning system, for example, requires a mechanism to collect data, either a permanent secretariat or something like a Regional Risk Reduction Center will have to be put in place to make concrete progress in this area (Yuzawa 2006: 801). At the same time, even though some ASEAN members and China have been hesitant to give greater powers to the ARF Chair, it seems to make sense to create a triumvirate—comprised of present, immediate past and prospective chairmen (Tay with Talib 1997: 264)—as found in the EU Commission to assure some continuity and promote institutional learning.

Further undermining the ARF’s effectiveness is the absence of interoperability and, to date, pretty much an unwillingness or inability to set up effective arrangements to cope with transnational challenges (Simon 2007: 30). As discussed above, there has been significant progress with respect to confidence-building measures, but much fewer tangible results can be seen in the area of PD.

But, as alluded to above, the real Achilles heel of the ARF is its lack of enforcement mechanisms or sanctions. As is, the organization has no way to punish members who choose not to comply with its norms and rules. In the case of North Korea, for instance, ARF members so far have done no more than express their concern over the DPRK’s failure to meet the requirements for a declaration of its nuclear programs and repeatedly called for progress in the Six-Party talks. Similarly, during the recent unrest in Myanmar, ARF members essentially did no more than voice their concern and urge the government to promote peaceful change and reconciliation. To become more effective in situations like the ones described above, the organization would have to develop contingency-planning against any members within the grouping, come up with formal and/or informal dispute settlement mechanisms, or try to resolve conflicts via compromise (Garofano 1999: 84-89).

Given the history of the region, East Asians are sensitive to infringements on their sovereignty and, rather than to curtail their freedom of action, prefer to begin by building mutual trust, respect, and tolerance through regular talks and then graduate to more ambitious goals. “[C]onfidence-building measures, preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution,” according to Lee (1997: 262), are the bottom line, and multilateral institutions, by “redefin[ing] identities and acceptable standards of behavior” (Katzenstein and Okawara 2004: 120), and promoting greater transparency, are a good way of getting there.

External Relations

In addition to the ARF, ASEAN holds annual summit meetings with China, Japan, and South Korea in the ASEAN Plus Three framework. ASEAN is also engaged in trade relations with the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, but insists on remaining an independent body within APEC, and that APEC decisions remain non-binding and will not impinge on the sovereignty of ASEAN members (Narine 2002: 124). Unlike the US, which expects tangible economic benefits, Asian countries view APEC as a regional confidence building measure, largely put in place to promote trust (ibid 125).
Most ASEAN members, furthermore, participate in the East Asia-Latin America Forum (EALAF) and, due to ASEAN's reputation as an economic powerhouse, in 1996, it managed to engage the European Union in the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM)--“the main multilateral channel for communication between Asia and Europe [which seeks to] strengthen interaction and mutual understanding between the two regions through dialogue.” But, as Henderson (1999: 74) points out, enlargement “has limited ASEAN’s manoeuvrability in its relations with key Western partners, and diluted its identity in ASEM and APEC.”

Theories

On the one hand, there are intergovernmentalists like Leifner (1989) who view ASEAN as an instrument of the member states. As rational actors, we are told, these states conduct cost/benefit analyses and pursue their self-interest rather than common interests. ASEAN states remain in charge of the integration process and cooperation is possible only when it serves their interest. Member states stand in the way of regional integration when it does not serve their needs. Thus, as long as ASEAN provides real benefits without interfering with sovereignty requirements, it is in members’ interest to support the organization. What we see is states responding rationally to changes in their economic and security environment. When interests converge, integration proceeds.

On the other hand, constructivists like Acharya (2001) argue that it makes more sense to take a sociological approach to explain Southeast Asian regionalism. According to him, norms, values and practices have socialized ASEAN members into adopting a shared regional identity, and have become part of their self-identities. So it is a sense of “we-feeling” that explains regional cooperation, rather than cost/benefit calculations.

Since things are seldom that black and white, I agree with Narine (2002: 1) that, in the case of ASEAN, the “truth lies between these polar positions.” Rationality and identity, material and social factors are clearly interwoven, and focusing on only one set of variables would leave us with an underspecified, incomplete explanation. Or, put differently, to understand, for instance, which effect identities have on institutions and actors’ interests, an amalgamation of rational choice and sociological approaches --what Hemmer and Katzenstein (2002: 599) refer to as “analytical eclecticism”--appears to be a necessity.

Setbacks and Prospects

ASEAN has clearly been an important source of peace and stability in Southeast Asia. Its greatest achievement to date, arguably, may have been its united stand over the problem of Kampuchea where it “condemned military intervention and focused on creating international diplomatic pressure for Vietnam to withdraw from Kampuchea (Tan 2000: 345).

The organization, however, also suffered its share of setbacks. Of the many problems ASEAN confronted over the decades, three will be briefly mentioned below, namely, the Asian economic crisis, regional haze, and the political upheaval in East Timor.

Due in large part to investor panic and poor regulatory regimes, particularly with respect to banking, in May 1997, Asia experienced a severe economic crisis that lasted for almost 2 years. Like other regional organizations, ASEAN was helpless. Divergent strategic perspectives, quickly, caused its members to abandon any sense of regionalism and to seek their own solutions. In doing so they “shattered [the organization’s] credibility as a regional leader and an economic regime” (Narine 2002: 139).
During the 1990s, the region also suffered from haze brought about by large forest fires in Indonesia that resulted from improper logging techniques. As neighboring countries were disappearing in heavy smoke, ASEAN’s environmental ministers agreed to cooperate to prevent such fires in the future and to learn how to deal with them more effectively on a regional basis. ASEAN’s norm of non-interference in the domestic affairs of others, however, made finding a solution to the problem difficult. Since Indonesia was unwilling to put regional interests ahead of its ruling elites’ economic interests, ASEAN’s hands were tied and it could do no more than to monitor the fires and lend a hand in trying to put them out. Prevention, had to be left up to the individual governments.

The norm of non-interference rendered ASEAN equally powerless during the conflict in East Timor which dates back to 1975 when Indonesia invaded East Timor. Almost one third of East Timor’s population died under Indonesian occupation and it took the former until 1999 to gain independence from the latter. The vote for independence, in turn, led to killings by militias, prompting the UN to establish a peacekeeping force in the country (Narine 2002: 172). Meanwhile, ASEAN continued to support Indonesia’s control of East Timor, fearful of other separatist movements in other ASEAN states. As so many times in the past, the organization was divided over which policies to pursue. While Myanmar opposed any external intervention, Vietnam disapproved of the role played by the UN. Thailand and the Philippines were most willing to change the principle of nonintervention and therefore made the largest contributions to the UN operation (Narine 2002: 174). In the end, ASEAN decided to defend Indonesia’s territorial integrity declaring that “a united, democratic and economically prosperous Indonesia is basic to the maintenance of regional security.”

What these examples hit home is that ASEAN is about state-building and the protection of sovereignty which matters so greatly to its members because they are “institutionally weak.” Since “[t]heir political legitimacy is usually under threat from within their own borders,” Narine (2002: 193) explains, ASEAN members seek to “forge common national identities out of …divergent parts. …Their focus on constructing national identities helps to explain the primacy of sovereignty within ASEAN” (ibid. 199).

Yet, without the willingness on the part of its members to modify the principle of non-interference and allow the organization to become more interventionary, ASEAN risks losing credibility internationally, and is likely to lose its appeal to at least some of its members (Henderson 1999: 76). Aware of this predicament, since the mid-1990s, ASEAN has given a fair amount of thought to how best to improve its effectiveness. In 1995, for instance, ASEAN members agreed that a “consensus minus” principle could be used for economic decision-making, where ASEAN could take positions without a consensus, provided the interests of hesitant countries would not be affected (Henderson 1999: 48). A couple of years later, Anwar Ibrahim, Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, proposed “constructive intervention.” This entails “closer cooperation between advanced and less-advanced ASEAN members to promote regional development but not uninvited intervention in the internal affairs of member states” (Narine 2002: 168). Affected states would have to invite ASEAN’s involvement and intervention would be political and economic, not military.

The following year, Thailand’s foreign minister, Surin Pitsuwan, advanced the concept of “flexible engagement.” It “involves publicly commenting on and collectively discussing fellow members’ domestic policies when these have either regional implications or adversely affect the disposition of other ASEAN members” (ibid.). But all other ASEAN members, except for the Philippines, were opposed to the idea, fearing it would lead to mistrust and renew tensions. Instead, at the July 1998 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, agreement was reached to practice “enhanced interaction.” This would make it acceptable for individual ASEAN states to comment on their neighbors’ domestic activities if those activities affected regional concerns, but ASEAN itself would not intervene (ibid.).
For the time being it seems likely that, "while mutual interests will keep ASEAN together, fissiparous tendencies will strain its seams" (Broinowski 1990: 241). Although, when compared to the EU, ASEAN is light years away in terms of degree of integration, there is no denying that it has been a success story in its own right. Trust has grown among members and the organization has managed to promote stability and economic growth over the course of more than four decades.
Bibliography


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1 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/time/lw/88315.htm
2 http://www.aseansec.org/1212.htm; p.1
Members of the ARF are the ten ASEAN member states, ten ASEAN Dialogue Partners (Australia, Canada, China, the EU, India, Japan, New Zealand, ROK, Russia and the US), one ASEAN observer (Papua New Guinea), as well as the DPRK, Mongolia, Pakistan, East Timor, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka (Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government). For a discussion of three further venues for multilateral security dialogue—ASEAN +3, the Shangri La Dialogue, and the East Asia Summit—see Bisley 2007/08: 355-57. Co-Chair’s Summary Report of the ARF Workshop on “Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy in Asia and Europe” (Berlin, 12-14 March 2008), p. 1.

See the Co-Chair’s Summary Report of the Seventh ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting of Disaster Relief Helsinki, 11-12 October 2007, p. 1 http://www.aseanregionalforum.org/PublicLibrary/ARFChairmansStatementsandReports/tabid/66/Default.aspx

Co-Chair’s Summary Report of the 2nd ARF Peacekeeping Experts’ Meeting in Singapore 4-6 March 2008, p. 4; http://www.aseanregionalforum.org/PublicLibrary/ARFChairmansStatementsandReports/tabid/66/Default.aspx


Also see Yuzawa 2006: 800; and Simon 2007: ix.

APEC is a “cooperative, multilateral economic and trade forum. It is the only international intergovernmental grouping in the world committed to reducing barriers to trade and investment without requiring its members to enter into legally binding obligations. APEC achieves its goals by promoting dialogue and arriving at decisions on a consensus basis, giving equal weight to the views of all members. APEC's 21 Member Economies are Australia; Brunei Darussalam; Canada; Chile; People's Republic of China; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Japan; Republic of Korea; Malaysia; Mexico; New Zealand; Papua New Guinea; Peru; The Republic of the Philippines; The Russian Federation; Singapore; Chinese Taipei; Thailand; United States of America; Viet Nam.” (http://www.apec.org/apec/about_apec/how_apec_operates.html)

ASEM currently consist of the 27 members of the EU, the 13 members of ASEAN Plus Three, plus India, Mongolia, and Pakistan.

See Moravcsik (1998) who makes this argument to explain European integration.