The Lisbon Treaty and the Emergence of Third Generation Regional Integration

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The Lisbon Treaty and the Emergence of Third Generation Regional Integration

Dr Luk Van Langenhove♦
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Introduction

European integration can be regarded as the most advanced and successful regional integration experience accomplished so far.¹ Among the numerous integration schemes that have mushroomed in Europe since the end of World War II, the European Union (EU) has emerged as a unique process and as a prototype of what can be defined as a “third-generation” of regionalism.² In this view, the EU has developed beyond a mainly economic integration process (first generation regionalism), to a deeply institutionalised and politicised union, competent at various degrees in an all-encompassing spectrum of internal policies (second generation or “new regionalism”). In this process of widening/deepening of policies, structures and membership, the EU has become a global actor present in the international fora where once only states operated (third generation).

When ratified, the 2007 Lisbon Treaty promises to represent an additional episode of this incremental integrative process, through which the EU is progressively becoming a global actor. Following the last 2004 and 2007 enlargements that have brought the membership to 27, the Treaty carries with it a considerable amount of structural reforms that are supposed to make the Union more efficient, and more democratic. Among these reforms is a new mechanism of qualified majority voting, a clearer distinction in the division of competencies, an expansion of codecision, which becomes the ordinary decision making procedure, and the end of the formal pillar structure, as well as an enhanced role for national parliaments, especially in safeguarding the principle of subsidiarity. Especially in external relations, some major innovations would be introduced such as the legal personality for the EU, the new President of the European Council and the High Representative and Vice President of the Commission, assisted by an External Action Service. This article explores the implications of these new institutional developments for the emergence of the EU as a “third generation regional organization”, i.e. becoming a fully-fledged actor in international relations, engaging proactively and in a unitary way with other regions and at the multilateral level.

To tackle this key issue, this paper is divided in two parts. The first part will look at the typology of three-generational regionalism and at how the EU fits into this scheme. The second part, focuses on the challenges for the EU’s foreign policy and looks at the external implications

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² Luk Van Langenhove and Ana-Cristina Costea, (2007) “The EU as a Global Actor and the Emergence of ‘Third Generation’ Regionalism”, in Paolo Foradori, Paolo Rosa and Riccardo Scartezzini (Eds), Managing a Multilevel Foreign Policy – the EU in International Affairs, Lexington Books, USA
of the Lisbon treaty and, particularly, on its possible impact on the EU’s actorness in the UN. By
doing so, the paper hopes also to shed some further light on the interrelation and possible
synergies between regionalism studies and European studies in understanding the EU as an
international actor. It will be argued that the Lisbon Treaty could constitute an institutional
opportunity for the EU to develop into a more coherent and visible player on the international
stage. This opportunity, however, is limited by the UN structure itself - which is still impervious
to regional organisations - and by the ambiguities in the EU’s member states strategies and
motivations. These ambiguities in turn, preserve the originality of the EU a new type of global
actor, different from a state.

1. Three-generation regionalism and the European Union

The study of the phenomenon of regionalism has been intrinsically linked to the study of the
process of European integration following World War II. As a regional scheme, the European
Communities and then the European Union represent an advanced example of institutionalised
regionalism. At the same time, European integration as a project, has been pictured as a clear
political success in terms of achieving prosperity and stability in a given territory where war and
violence was the rule. This led to the partial identification of the process of regionalism with the
European experience in two ways. On the one hand, it was implied that the global process of
regionalism had to take Europe as a model and as an outcome. On the other hand, regionalism in
itself came to be considered a political project, and regional integration around the world was
viewed as a desirable and “good” outcome to complement and support global governance.3

This view has now been widely criticised both academically and politically. Academically,
as Hurrell puts it, “the most important ‘lesson’ of Europe is that there are so few good grounds for
believing that Europe is the future of other regions”.4 In other words, the specific circumstances
and factors that characterised the emergence of the European integration experience can hardly be
found in other parts of the world.5 And in fact every regionalism is somewhat different from the
other, ranging from highly institutionalised schemes such as the EU, to instances of soft
regionalism as seen, for example in South East Asia with ASEAN. Politically, regionalism has
been criticised as a Eurocentric project, which risks undermining the wider multilateral system, in
particular concerning trade liberalisation and the WTO. What is clear is that regionalism is
becoming more and more a new and additional layer in the governance of globalisation both at
the micro, intra-state level, and at the macro, inter-state level.6

Generations of Regionalism

In an attempt to clarify the problem of comparing the different existing forms of regional
integration, the typology of the three-generations of regional integration can serve as a useful tool
to go beyond the traditional chronological and qualitative dichotomy between old and new
regionalism.7

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3 For a discussion see, Louise Fawcett (2005), “Regionalism from an Historical Perspective”, in Global Politics of
Regionalism: Theory and Practice, Mary Farrell, Bjorn Hettne and Luk Van Langenhove (eds.) Pluto Press, London
72.
5 Smith, lists among these circumstances: the functionalist (economy first) strategy, the democratic political systems
of the participating states, the strong security concerns (Germany, USSR), the benevolence of the US and the security
umbrella offered by NATO, ibid, p. 71
6 Luk Van Langenhove, (2007) “Globalisation and the Rise of Neo-Westphalian World Order of States and
Regions”, in Conference proceedings: Globalisation Challenges and New Trends of Governance, University of
Economics, Prague
7 Van Langenhove and Costea (2007),op. cit., p. 64
The argument typifies regionalism in three main ideal-typical cohorts or generations, through which we can distinguish the different schemes according to the aspect of state governance around which they are primarily built. (i) The operation of a state territory as a ‘single’ market with a related economic policy; (ii) the governance of public goods and the control over resources and power and (iii) the external sovereignty that allows to be an ‘actor’ in international relations. Each cohort is driven by a specific objective or télos - the ideal end-point of integration in that aspect of governance - and materialises in a concrete development process that will not necessarily reach its culmination. Importantly, the three generations coexist and influence each other, often within the same organisation. Each regional scheme and organisation follows its own integration trajectory and can remain insulated within one dimension of governance or, alternatively, spill-over and cumulate the characteristics from the other generations/cohorts of regional integration.

The development of each specific regional scheme can, thus, also be benchmarked in relation to the three téloi of complete integration. Per each cohort, the development will depend on the level of comprehensiveness (in terms of competencies), capacity (in terms of tools), cohesiveness (in terms of identity) and autonomy (from the national level). In theory, a complete and simultaneous integration in all three governance domain would result in the creation of a new supranational polity.

More specifically, the first generation of regional integration is characterised by mainly economic integration leading to experiences such as free trade agreements, custom unions, or common markets. These schemes are characterised mainly by “negative integration” - a process of removing the barriers to the free flow of economic factors - and by the widening of the membership included in the process. Actual transfer or pooling of sovereignty, though, can occur, as in the case of custom unions, where a common external tariff is put in place, as well as in monetary unions. The télos of first generation integration is thus the creation of a new single market that comprises the old national markets of each of the participating states.8

Second-generation regionalism describes regional schemes where the focus of cooperation is not purely economic but concerns mainly the political sphere, including regulation, redistribution or security. Regional schemes of this second generation proliferated across all continents, particularly following the end of the Cold War in a complex process that was then labelled with the all-encompassing notion of “new regionalism”. As it is much narrower than “new regionalism”, the concept of “second-generation” is quite pregnant and more useful for comparison. The télos of “second-generation” schemes is to establish a common approach towards what is usually referred to as ‘internal affairs’: this includes infrastructure, energy and environment policy, but also security policy, social policy, health, employment, research, etc. Also here, the level of integration can vary from superficial political dialogue and coordination, to actual binding regulation and common policies. Further, the process of policy expansion can be accompanied by a process of democratisation of the supranational level, through the creation of parliamentary assemblies, the concentration of interest representation and other instances of input legitimacy and participation.

In the specific EU case, political (second-generation) cooperation and “positive integration” emerged as a consequence - for instance through functional “spill over” - of the previous negative integration (first-generation), which was failing to achieve a functioning common market. As a broader concept, however, second-generation regionalism can also be an original project not stemming from an economic integration dynamic or anticipating economic integration. Finally, second-generation regionalism, is conceptually introspective, focussing at managing problems that are internal to the regional area. This is not to say that this regionalism is cut off from the outside world. On the contrary, both first and second-generation regionalisms are in many ways responses to the wider globalisation process and to the problems and challenges that derive from

it. Furthermore, these types of regionalisms have a presence and impact on the wider international context. On the one hand, they can be seen as favouring or hindering global multilateralism, on the other hand, by their mere existence they contribute, to a general process of “contagion” of regionalism around the world. Finally, their full accomplishment as internal dynamics creates pressure for external action. e.g. a custom union calls for a common trade policy or a strong common policy on environment will have to be promoted globally.

As the first two cohorts of regional schemes don’t exist in a geopolitical vacuum, external action towards the outside world is the most specific characteristic of “Third-generation” regionalism. In this case, the télos is a complete unified foreign policy together with the ambition to operate as one actor on the international scene and thus also outside its own territory. This implies the willingness and capacity to deal at the regional level of governance with “out of area” challenges. Regional organisations, then, develop a strong sense of identity (cohesiveness) and assume an ever more confident external profile (actorness) in interacting with third states, with other regions, and within multilateral institutions. A strong institutionalisation distinguishes “third-generation” regional integration from a mere alliance of countries or a “coalition of the willing”, which are both schemes that can be rather active externally. The organisation tends to become autonomous or at least distinguishable from its members and develops its own identity, interests and institutions across a wide range of issues, not circumscribed within a single policy area (comprehensiveness).

In sum, these three cohorts of regional integration typify different characteristics and different téloi of complete integration. In the real world, however, a clear distinction is much more difficult. Numerous dynamics such as functional and political spill-over across policies or between the internal and external dimensions of policies can facilitate the accumulation and overlap of the various generations of regionalism in one region or on one regional organization; beyond the initial project of the member states. The case of the European Union is emblematic of this accumulation, which makes to European Union a fully-fledged first-generation regional scheme (e.g. internal market and monetary union); a partly accomplished second-generation regional polity (e.g. shared or exclusive competences on almost all policy areas and a developing supranational democratic structure); and an emerging third-generation regional actor (almost autonomous in economic external relations, and increasingly active in the political and security domain). The next pages will focus specifically on the third generation dimension and on how the conceptual approach can be applied to the study of the European Union.

**Third-generation regionalism as a political objective**

As compared with the first two cohorts/generations of regionalism, the concept of “third-generation” is more a normative political project than a mere description of reality. The European Union is a developed prototype in this sense: no other regional scheme has the same degree of comprehensiveness, cohesiveness, capacity and autonomy. No other organisation, with the exclusion of NATO has the same ambition to deploy ‘out of area’ operations. However, the EU is by no means unique in this trend towards an enhanced role of regional groups in global

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10 Fawcett (2005), op.cit. p. 21

11 Van Langenhove and Costea (2007), op.cit. p. 78

governance. Van Langenhove and Costea specify three key features that are specific to the third-generation organisation: first, the institutional environment providing the capacity to have an external action; second, the political willingness to be proactive in engaging in bilateral relations with states and, especially, in inter-regionalism with other regions, and; third, the engagement within the multilateral system, particularly the UN. The first characteristic is related to the structure of a third-generation organisation and will be analysed further below. The second two features, instead, relate to the goals of such organisations, which tend to pursue inter-regionalism on the one hand, and multilateralism on the other.

Promoting inter-regionalism

Among the objectives of the EU as a foreign policy actor, that of promoting regional cooperation in its relations with third countries is the one most EU-specific, as it is linked to its very nature. The EC started dealing with third countries by grouping them in regions since the 60s when it launched its preferential policy towards the African countries, then ACP. Since then the EU has promoted regionalism both in its economic and political relations, in Africa, Asia, Latin America, North Africa and the Gulf, in the Balkans and more recently in the Black Sea region. Smith identified various reasons for this predilection for regionalism, as an objective and as an approach: the independent external demand coming from new regional groupings to have a relationship with the EU; the belief, coming from experience, that regional integration can bring stability and growth; the recognition that neighbouring countries are interdependent; the pragmatic simplification of external strategies (the sheer number of states in the multilateral system now, makes it impossible for each one to have separate relationships with everyone else); finally, the competition for economic influence with other actors, e.g. the US in Latin America and Asia. One can also identify a pro-integration agenda promoted opportunistically by some member states and EU institutions, particularly the Commission. Overall, though, much of this tendency has been purely instinctive and, as a consequence, not always completely rational. Smith defines it as a form of narcissism, while others see it as a search for affinity, and ultimately for identity and legitimacy in constructing a new post-Westphalian order based on inter-regionalism.

The “value” of regional integration would seem an instance of Europe’s “normative power.” However, there are three important pitfalls with this regionalist inclination. First, “mechanical iso-morphism”: the EU’s tendency to impose regional integration, just by establishing copycat institutions and routines and losing sight of the functional policy need. This can undermine the legitimacy and the general support for regionalism. Second, “strategic schizophrenia”: the tendency, which is increasingly perceivable now, of somewhat inconsistently

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13 Regional organisations that have expressed the ambition to become active internationally are proliferation, also at the UN. See, for instance, the high-level meetings with regional organisations held regularly by the UN Secretary General and by the UN Security Council.
15 Smith, op.cit., p.69
16 See for all the Commission’s “Communication on EC support for regional economic integration in developing countries”, COM (95)219, 16 June 1995. At the time of writing the Commission was holding an online open consultation with development stakeholders in view of a new Communication on regional integration in the ACP region, closed on 9 May 2008.
17 Smith, op.cit., p.83
juxtaposing region-to-region dialogue with bilateral relations with so-called “strategic partners”, such as Brazil, that are also deeply involved in regional groupings. Third, “disguised Eurocentrism”: is third-generation regionalism an exclusively Europe-driven endeavour? If so, is the EU really serious about creating a “European world order” made of interacting regions?21 This last question is linked to a second objective, which is crucial to third-generation regionalism: the relationship with the multilateral system. In the EU this relationship is subsumed in the concept of “effective multilateralism”.

Promoting multilateralism

The term “effective multilateralism” was introduced as a strategic objective of the Union in the European Security Strategy.22 Simply put, it refers to the alleged propensity of the EU to work through and for multilateral institutions (including the WTO, the UN, NATO and other regional organisations) and, at the same time, its commitment to contribute to the reform of the multilateral structure in view of making it more effective and more legitimate. There is no doubt that the concept served mostly an identity objective of reasserting unity of purpose, following the “unilateralist turn” of the United States and the subsequent crisis of CFSP over the war in Iraq.23 Beyond the rhetoric, two aspects have to be taken into account. On the one hand, the EU has indeed increased its substantial cooperation with the UN, both strategically and operationally on all issues, and particularly in the field of security.24 Militarily, for instance, the EU has equipped itself with the Battle Groups, designed specifically for operations under UN mandate. The UN has also welcomed this process, as it needs regional organisations, and particularly the EU to share the burden of global governance.25 However a generally positive assessment is nuanced by two considerations. Firstly, the EU does not fit perfectly in the vision of the UN Charter of regional arrangements as “Chapter VIII” organisations, as it has a global ambition that goes beyond Europe (typical of third-generation regionalism).26 This can produce an overt clash in the long run within the current set up and calls for an active participation and a coherent strategy in the reform of the multilateral system. Yet, secondly, the EU has maintained a visible division over the central issue of the reform of the multilateral system, and particularly of the UN Security Council (UNSC). The African Union for instance, has been much more open in promoting a new regional approach to the reform. This internal EU division reveals the still uncertain stance of some member states towards the meaning of effective multilateralism, and towards the role of the EU and its states within it. Thus although there is a certain tendency towards promoting a “world of

21 Hettne, (2005), op.cit.
22 Council of the European Union (2003), “European Security Strategy”, pp 9-10. Importantly, promoting relations with regional organisations is considered part of the effort to strengthen global governance under the heading of “effective multilateralism”.
24 See in particular the 2003 UN-EU Joint Declaration on Crisis Management.
26 Kennedy Graham and Tania Felicio (2006), “Regional Security and Global Governance: A study of interaction between Regional Agencies and the UN Security Council - With a proposal for a Regional-Global security mechanism”, VUB Press, Brussels. See also the Statement on behalf of the European Union, by H.E. Mr. Erkki Tuomioja, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Seventh High-Level Meeting between the United Nations and Regional and other Intergovernmental Organisations, New York 22/9/2006: “The EU supports the development of the co-operation between the United Nations and relevant regional organisations as a way to strengthen effective multilateralism. However, we strongly advocate a pragmatic and action-oriented approach, both for the EU-UN cooperation and for the broader context of cooperation between the UN and regional and other organisations.”
regions”, an authentic political commitment is still lacking on how to translate it in the multilateral structure.

In what follows, focus will be on the structural aspects of the EU as a third-generation organisation and, in particular, on the plausible impact of the Lisbon Treaty in making the EU increasingly comprehensive, capable, cohesive and active externally.

2. Reforming the EU as a global actor

The two main challenges for CFSP

The idea of continuous reform has always been enshrined in the elusive project of a European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and, before that, in European Political Cooperation. Integration in this field is so crucial to national sovereignty that it immediately raised questions such as: is the EU acquiring a state-like foreign policy? How can one conceptualise the EU as a foreign policy actor? What is the impact of the specificities and sui generis nature of the EU’s political system on the EU’s external relations?

Academic discussion focussed on two main dilemmas: (1) the different models of the EU on the civilian/military power spectrum and (2) the torn EU’s foreign policy profile between intergovernmental and supranational tendencies. This theoretical debate reflected, however, the very practical consciousness of the limitations of the EU foreign policy’s capabilities and political clout, as well as of the related failures in policy terms, particularly in the Balkans. This, in turn, led to identifying two major shortcomings to be addresses in order to transform the EU from an affluent payer into an influent player. These were the lack of military power and the insufficient institutional coherence, which makes it difficult to concentrate political authority towards common policies. Before focusing on how the Lisbon Treaty tackles the institutional problems, a first brief look at the problem of military power.

Since the 1998 Franco-British agreement in Saint-Malo, important and relatively quick steps were taken to set up a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), designed to grant more autonomy to the EU from the US in the use of force and the capacity to carry out even robust missions in the field of peace and security. These efforts were not seriously undercut by the 2003 crisis over the second US intervention in Iraq. In fact, by deploying its first autonomous mission in Congo in 2003, the EU immediately made it clear that it was committed to engaging in ‘out of area’ interventions, in order to assert its image as a global actor. Since the end of the nineties, therefore, the EU transformed itself from an authentically “civilian power” into what as been defined a “civilising power” or as a “military power in the making.” This build-up has been tangible in terms of capabilities, institutional structures in Brussels and operations. All this though, has been done while attempting not to sacrifice the positive image and the soft power of attraction of the EU as a new type of “post-modern” global actor. Therefore, the EU has tried to combine traditional foreign policy goals and tools with more far-sighted and comprehensive “structural” foreign policies: designed not only for states but also to have a deeper influence on the structure of the societies of the recipient countries and on the very nature of international relations. In this sense, the first pillar external relations, including

development policy, humanitarian aid, trade, enlargement and the neighbourhood policy (ENP) play a crucial role.

The quite impressive development of ESDP, however, has been undermined by the much less fructiferous attempts to tackle the second, institutional, shortcoming of EU foreign policy. This has led some commentators to speak about a defence policy, without a truly “common” foreign policy, although there have been considerable steps forward since the late nineties.\(^{32}\) The main institutional problems can be summarised in the multilevel and multi-pillar structure of the EU, leading to incoherence and lack of leadership; as well as in the resilience of the unanimity rule in the Council of Ministers on CFSP matters, leading to lack of strategy and paralysis. Unlike for the problem of the deficit of military force, these two institutional shortcomings were accentuated by enlargement. This promised to increase the complexity of the EU system, the diversity between member states and the time needed to take decisions. As a consequence, since the beginning of the convention on the future of Europe in 2002, it was widely accepted among academics as well as policy-makers that some far-reaching reforms had to be agreed particularly in the domain of foreign policy. What, however, remained highly disputed was whether the reforms had to enhance supranationalism and “communitarise” CFSP, or whether its intergovernmental character should be maintained.

This debate reflected the deeply rooted visions on the future of the EU as a political system, including its further development as a “second-generation” regional scheme. Interestingly though, this division did not dent the actual pragmatic perception of the need to increase the overall efficiency of the foreign policy mechanisms. In fact, even following the rejection of the referenda on the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 in France and the Netherlands, some of the agreed changes were experimented in practice, e.g. the double-hatting of some head of delegations. Furthermore, the EU undoubtedly increased its external activity in the period of crisis or “reflection” in an effort to “act itself into being.”\(^{33}\) All this shows the broad support for reform in external relations present in the member states, including in the public opinion.\(^{34}\)

The implications of the Lisbon Treaty

The EU cumulates features of all three generations/cohorts of regionalism, in terms of economic, political and external sovereignty. The Lisbon Treaty\(^{35}\) touches on all three dimension, especially, the second and third, pertaining to internal political integration and external actorness. Overall, most of the institutional reforms contained in the 2005 Constitutional Treaty were substantially preserved. Analyses done on that compromise showed a limited but tangible deepening of integration in terms of second-generation regionalism. Some important innovations were agreed, such as: the new mechanism for qualified majority voting (QMV); the general expansion of QMV and co-decision to most policy areas; a clearer distinction in the division of competencies; an increased role for the European Parliament and the Court of Justice; the end of the formal pillar structure as well as an enhanced role for national parliaments, especially in safeguarding the principle of subsidiarity.\(^{36}\) What went lost in the 2005-2007 period, were mainly symbols and state-like labels such as the words “Constitution” and “Minister of Foreign Affairs.” A major difference was in the process adopted for adopting the text, where the participative and inclusive

\(^{32}\) Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan (2008), op. cit.

\(^{33}\) This term is borrowed from Gilson, in Soderbaum, Stalgren and Van Langenhove (2005), op.cit, p. 373

\(^{34}\) European Commission, “Standard Eurobarometer 68 / Autumn 2007 - TNS Opinion & Social”, December 2007. 67 percent of EU citizens think that defence and foreign policy should be made jointly within the EU, p.28


approach of the 2002-2003 Convention on the Future of Europe and of the referenda, was sacrificed to the more traditional closed-door diplomatic style of the IGC and of parliamentary ratification.37

This paper, however, focuses on the third-generation perspective and so on the contribution that the reform could bring to the EU’s external actorness. The major changes introduced in external relations are the following. A new High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (art. 18 and 27 TEU), who will also be the Vice President of the Commission for external relations (HR/VP); the end of the rotating presidency (and “troika”) in external representation, with a permanent and full-time President of the European Council, representing the EU abroad at the level of heads of states (art. 15 TEU); the end of the pillar structure and of the EC/EU distinction, although CFSP will maintain its specific procedures, e.g. unanimity (art.31 TEU); the legal personality conferred to the EU (art. 47 TEU); a European External Action Service (EEAS) supporting the HR/VP (art.27 TEU); the possibility for “Permanent Structured Cooperation” in the field of defence policy, which would allow states willing and able to meet certain standards to move forward in military cooperation and integration (art.42 TEU); a mutual assistance clause for defence (art. 28.A.7) and a solidarity clause for the reaction against terrorist attacks and disasters (art.188R TFEU); A new legal basis for the ENP (art.8 TEU) was also introduced. To these one should add a considerable expansion in the internal policies and competencies (second-generation dimension) that have an impact on external relations, such as energy policy (Title XXI TFEU), environment/climate change (Title XX TFEU).

These innovations attempt to tackle some of the problems outlined above. The new double-hatted HR/VP linking first and second pillar competences should improve the problem of institutional (between the Council and the Commission) and of horizontal incoherence (between policies).38 Further, he or she would contribute to the easing of the leadership deficit, and together with the president of the European Council, the provision on legal personality, and the end of the troika structure, should simplify EU external representation. Overall, the innovation is considerable and there are some expectations towards the possible impact, particularly in terms of visibility.39 As the Convention had already noted, a unified figure dealing with CFSP would definitely “improve the visibility, clarity and continuity of the Union on the global stage”.40

On the other hand, vertical incoherence (between the member state and EU level) is likely to remain a fatal characteristic of EU foreign policy making, due to the unanimity in the Council and to the intergovernmental approach. This is true particularly for big member states, who want to maintain an independent foreign policy and international role and resist the convergence of foreign policy preferences. In this sense, the EU will remain a polity very different from a state. This ambiguity reflects the eternal overarching division between intergovernmental and federal strategies. The result is an indisputably incremental process of integration, where the equilibrium lies somewhat in the middle between the call for effectiveness on the one hand, and the maintenance of a strong member state participation on the other.41

The EU reform and the UN

37 For a discussion see Cindy Skach (2005), “We the People? Constitutionalising the European Union”, JCMS 2005 Volume 43. Number 1. pp. 149–70
41 This is the fusion argument. See, Wolfgang Wessels (2005), op. cit., p. 14
A place of its own in the analysis is the impact of the Lisbon Treaty on the EU profile in the UN. As was shown above, inter-regionalism and enhanced presence and actorness in the multilateral system are crucial aspects in locating the EU as a third-generation regional organisation. As stated by article 21 of the TEU, following the Lisbon Treaty:

“The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global organisations [...] It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations.”

An EU Seat in the Security Council?
The UN, therefore, represents an important stage to assess the credibility of the EU as a foreign policy actor. And within this context, it is relevant to discuss the issue of the “EU seat” in the UNSC. This “EU seat” problem has been at the centre of CFSP development, as it constitutes one of the most noticeable points of friction between intergovernmental and supranational thinking on the future of the EU integration.\(^{42}\) Considerations on the opportunity of establishing an EU seat were already part of the IGC on a Political Union that prepared the Maastricht Treaty.\(^{43}\) Subsequently, during the 2002-2003 Convention on the Future of Europe, the issue of the representation of the EU at the UN was debated extensively in the working group VIII on external action and III on legal personality.\(^{44}\) The concept of a European seat was finally turned down both for legal (only states can be members of the UNSC) and political considerations (e.g. opposition of France and the UK, but also doubts on whether one seat in the UNSC would be better than the current many seats). The discussion was further complicated by the problem of the reform of the Security Council and by the bid of Germany to obtain a national permanent seat, which divided the EU.\(^{45}\) It was agreed that it was more realistic in the short-term to only moderately enhance the capability of the EU to speak with a single voice in the UNSC, without reforming drastically the provisions of article 19 TEU, which regulate this delicate issue.

Of course, the most important institutional element to be agreed upon as a precondition for an EU seat (without taking into account here the complexities of the global arena of UN reform), is some kind of qualified majority voting (QMV) in CFSP. This was ruled out in the Lisbon treaty as in the Constitutional Treaty and is unlikely to re-present itself in the coming years. In general, the different type of “double majority” QMV introduced by the Lisbon Treaty will not apply to CFSP, a part in limited and largely irrelevant occasions, such as when a detailed and unanimous political decision has already been taken at the European Council level. Without such a development and the substantial “communitarisation” of EU foreign policy, an EU seat would be damaging, as it would only conduce to lame positions presented in the UNSC or constant abstention. Although the achievement of common positions on matters of war and peace happens increasingly more often within the EU, a fracture such as that on Iraq in 2002-2003 could still occur in the present institutional setting.

\(^{42}\) The European Parliament supports this solution, at least in the long term. See the Resolution of the European Parliament on the Reform of the United Nations, PE 357.491\:\: 16 June 2005 (Rapporteur Armin Laschet). But also the Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero Waldner and High Representative for the CFSP Javier Solana have expressed similar opinion though less openly.


\(^{45}\) Daniele Marchesi (2008), op. cit.
Legal Personality

Certainly, a (small) part of the arguments used against the EU seat was undercut by the legal personality for the EU, finally granted by the Lisbon Treaty.\textsuperscript{46} Resisted for years by France and the UK, this provision could have in the long-term a beneficial effect for the EU in the UN and not only in the UNSC. The EU, in fact, can now as such assume obligations and sign treaties with the UN. The innovation will not have all its effects until the UN reforms itself to accept the full membership of regional organizations. Yet, there is no question that, at least in principle, this is a major step forward from a legal and institutional point of view.\textsuperscript{47} In turn, the EU personality could lead to major developments in various UN bodies, and notably in the General Assembly. Here the EU will have to apply for an enhanced observer status, as the simple succession to the EC would relegate it to speaking at the end of every debate, after all the member states.\textsuperscript{48} The Lisbon treaty in fact, also eliminates the rotating presidency, which has constituted until now an easy way for the EU to present common positions through the mouthpiece of an actual UN member.

Concerning the UNSC, since neither the new permanent president of the European Council, nor the double-hatted HR/VP will be representing a member state, they will have to speak following art 39 of UNSC provisional rules procedure (observers and other parties), while until now the EU presidency was able to speak following art 37 (for member states). This should not constitute in itself a big hurdle, as long as the HR/VP is supported/invited by the member states. Art 39 could even constitute an advantage in terms of visibility/identity, as the EU would speak behind its own nameplate instead than a member state’s one.

\section*{Coordination on the Security Council}

Looking at the innovations introduced with the reformulation of article 19 (now article 34), it is impossible not to recognise the very limited will amongst key member states, to improve EU coordination and representation in the UNSC. The article now states:

\begin{quote}
“Member States which are also members of the United Nations Security Council will concert and keep the other Member States and the High Representative fully informed. Member States which are members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their functions, defend the positions and the interests of the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter.”
\end{quote}

The previous distinction between non-permanent and permanent members has disappeared. Though in the European context this change of formulation is supposed to re-establish the equality among the EU member states serving in the UNSC, it does not have any effect on the prerogatives of France and UK as veto holders in the UN framework. Fassbender minimizes both the raison d’être and the implications of this amendment. This view is supported by the preservation of art.19’s last sentence that prioritizes the UN responsibilities over EU membership.\textsuperscript{49} Nevertheless, even this minor change in the formulation is a further acknowledgement of a gradual evolution from the initial national perspective and testifies of the great pressure to enhance the European dimension of this article both during the Convention and the IGCs.

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{46} New article 47 TEU
\textsuperscript{48} Politically, though, applying for enhanced status could have a domino effect on other regional organisations with observer status in the General Assembly
\end{footnotes}
**The High Representative**

The most important change for EU foreign policy comes clearly from the establishment of the double-hatted HR/VP. At the UN, this innovation was long-awaited to tackle the problem of the dispersive representation of the EU. This is currently voiced, by the troika (e.g. meetings with third countries or the UN Secretariat), by the Commission for EC exclusive competences, by the Presidency for mixed competences, and by the member states, who often resonate or specify a common position. The HR/VP could give the EU a single voice in New York and in the UNSC, especially in combination with the new provision of article 34.3 third paragraph that states:

> *When the Union has defined a position on a subject which is on the United Nations Security Council agenda, those Member States which sit on the Security Council shall request that the High Representative be invited to present the Union’s position.*

The insertion of this provision should not create too much enthusiasm. It is the codification of an already established practice of inviting the High Representative Javier Solana to the UNSC open meetings to express CFSP common positions. In short, the presence of the HR/VP or of his/her representative in the Security Council will continue to be dependent on the good will and invitation of the member states. Obviously, when such a common position has been agreed by unanimity among the capitals and in Brussels, the EU members in the UNSC are by definition bound to it. To change the quality of EU coordination in the UNSC the role of the HR/VP should be also enhanced in the ascending phase of the decision making process, in the closed-door meetings, at least to allow him/her to be well informed of the situation.

**Personalities and Practice and the External Action Service**

In sum, there is some evidence, that the provisions of the Lisbon treaty, if ratified, would establish some incremental improvements in the institutional context of the EU presence at the UN. Some innovations do open institutional opportunities that could be taken if the political will emerges. The HR/VP would be equipped with the necessary status and tools to play a role in the current configuration, if the member states support (or at least avoid boycotting!) him or her. To go into speculation, the HR/VP could also play a role in case the idea of an EU seat or other more conservative proposals, such as that to include a representative of the EU institutions in one of the national delegation in the Security Council, see the light. So far, though, this innovation has been vetoed by the two EU permanent members, who have an interest in limiting the EU presence in order to retain their autonomy in the UNSC.

Yet, if the member states grip is still firm on the single provisions contained in the treaty, less strong is their control on the day-to-day implementation. In this sense, personalities and practice will play a crucial role in determining the actual impact of the structural reforms agreed in Lisbon.

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50 In particular see new art. 18 and 27 TEU


52 In this context, the position of the UK is also informed by the public opinion’s scepticism towards the EU and towards the Reform treaty in particular. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office, for instance, included in its website, the idea that the Lisbon treaty would lead it to eventually relinquish its permanent seat in the UNSC as one of the “myths” on the new treaty. See FCO website: [http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/ Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1184758750520](http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1184758750520)

53 Aware of this risk, the UK pushed for the inclusion of declarations 13 and 14 annexed to the final act of the intergovernmental conference adopting the Treaty of Lisbon, that try to limit the potential of the new provisions, particularly in the UNSC. Drieskens et al. op.cit, p.425.
Concerning the first factor, the choice of the person who will serve in the position of HR/VP will be extremely important in determining from the start, the ambition, the independence and the scope of action of this new institution. In fact, the Treaty has not solved the tensions between the intergovernmental and supranational poles, which are so typical of the EU. In a way, it has just transferred them on the head of one person. As an institutional agent, the HR/VP will have to be loyal both to the Commission and to the member states, via the Council. He/she will have huge responsibilities and duties and will have to prioritise his or her resources and time, leading to potential clashes between its two principals. In this sense, the prestige, background and authority of the HR/VP and how he or she will get along with the President of the Commission and the President of the European Council will be critical. This is particularly true for the first period of the mandate, which will constitute the political precedent to the following years.

The institutional struggle over the configuration of the External Action Service (EAS) provides an example of the current uncertainty and of the importance of the first years of implementation and practice. This will be a first test to the equilibrium struck by the text. The service is to include elements of the Commission staff, of the Council Secretariat and seconded staff from the member states. However, the final dimension of the service, its overall autonomy and the actual proportion of the various component parts, are under negotiation. According to the Treaty, the final deal will have to be rubberstamped by all the member states, the council secretariat and the European commission. Also the European Parliament wants to have a strong word. The conflict between effectiveness and member states participation is particularly prominent here so, even after the formal agreement, the tension on day-to-day practice will persist.

Overall though, the EAS has the potential to “lubricate” the EU external relations machinery, including in New York. Having single EU delegations around the world, with a coherent political guidance from unified desks in Brussels and incorporating Member States preferences and expertise will rationalize and streamline the external and diplomatic action of the EU. Eventually, this could increase its capacity to concentrate authority strategically (and perhaps financially) and could improve coherence at all levels, including vertically, between member states and the EU.

Conclusions

While recognising the uniqueness of the EU, the three-generation typology offers a useful conceptual framework to compare and assess its development as a regional integration scheme among others. First (economic sovereignty), second (internal sovereignty) and third (external sovereignty) generation features all coexist and cumulate within the EU as in other organisations, but are not equally developed. Economically, full integration in Europe is almost accomplished. In turn, from a more political perspective much remains to be done, both internally and externally, although the EU certainly represents the most advanced example of supranational polity. This paper has focused on the third, external dimension of regional integration, looking at the foreign policy goals of the EU (inter-regionalism and multilateralism), and at the development of its institutional structure in foreign policy, particularly with the Lisbon Treaty.

In conclusion, the EU continues to develop into a new type of global actor: different from a state and in equilibrium between intergovernmental and supranational/federal pressures. It is somewhat misleading to “measure its success” against mystified images of world super-power. Although, military force continues to be a major factor in a world still inhabited by modern

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54 For discussion see The European Policy Centre (2007) “The EU Foreign Service: how to build a more effective common policy”, EPC report, November, Brussels

Westphalian logics and even pre-modern (non-state or failed states) actors, the EU is largely preserving its post-modern character. This is not a bad thing. Comprehensive and structural foreign policy seems a more suitable strategy to tackle today's global challenges, which are largely non-military: global warming, sustainable development, energy security, migration, terrorism.

The Lisbon Treaty has recognised these challenges as new objectives to be dealt with both at the regional and multilateral level. Thus, as it fosters regional cooperation and integration around the world, the EU promotes a new “European world order”, in which regional actors contribute to sharing the burden of the UN in global governance. In this sense, the EU is becoming a fully-fledged third-generation regional organisation: comprehensive in scope, capable in means, with a cohesive identity and the willingness to act externally.

Beyond the rhetoric however, a lot is still lacking in order to meet these high expectations. While the EU has done a lot to shift away from being an exclusively civilian power, becoming increasingly willing and able to use force, its internal structural contradictions are still preventing it from setting up a truly common foreign policy. The Lisbon Treaty will have some implications in terms of increased coherence and improved visibility, including within the United Nations. However, it will leave unsolved most of the key dilemmas between federal and intergovernmental strategies and between effectiveness and member states control. This ambiguity will continue to hamper the capacity of Europe to concentrate authority and power in its foreign policy. The lesson is that, although there is functional pressure towards regionalism around the world, the first condition for the formation of a “world of regions” is still the willingness of sovereign states to genuinely embark in integration.

56 Robert Cooper (2003), op. cit.
57 Hettne (2005) op.cit.