The new Inter-Parliamentary Conference on the CFSP/CSDP

Stelios Stavridis

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Miami – Florida European Union Center

University of Miami
2300 Campo Sano Building, 220C
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Phone: 305-284-3266
Fax: (305) 284 4406
Web: www.miami.edu/eucenter

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**Why the new Inter-Parliamentary Conference on CFSP/CSDP is a positive - yet insufficient – step forward in the Post-Lisbon Democratic Control and Legitimacy of EU Foreign Policy**

**Stelios Stavridis**
ARAID Senior Research Fellow, Research Unit on *Global Governance and the European Union*, Universidad de Zaragoza, Spain

**Abstract**

The objectives of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty (LT) include ways to improve the democratic and international images of the European Union (EU). The focus of the literature has so far focused on the overall treaty impact and on the EU’s international role. This paper considers instead its impact on the question of the democratic accountability of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including its Common Security and Defence Policy dimension (CSDP).

This paper consists of three parts: (1) The first part describes the changes the LT has made for the European Parliament (EP) in terms of its external relations. (2) The second part presents the many deficits that the EU suffers from in its foreign, security and defence policies. (3) The third part offers a preliminary analysis of the recently created Inter-Parliamentary Conference (IPC) on CFSP/CSDP, which in addition to MEPs (EP members) includes parliamentarians from the national EU parliaments.

The paper concludes that although the IPC is a positive development in trying to bridge those existing democratic gaps, it remains only a step in the right direction due to the existence of many such deficits in the foreign, security and defence policies of the EU and of its member states.

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* Stelios Stavridis (PhD in International Relations, LSE London, 1991) is now an ARAID Senior Research Fellow in the Research Unit on Global Governance and the European Uniçon, University of Zaragoza, Spain. He is also currently an Honorary Associate Research Fellow, United Nations University Institute on Globalization, Culture and Mobility (UNU-GCM) in Barcelona (July 2014-March 2015). He has also taught and researched at post-doctoral level or as visiting professor in various European universities and research centres including: King’s College London, The University of Reading (where he also held a Jean Monnet Chair and was the Director of its Centre for Euro-Mediterranean Studies), the Institut d’Études Européennes (Université Libre de Bruxelles), the European University Institute in Florence (as a Jean Monnet Fellow), ELIAMEP Athens (as a Marie Curie Fellow), UAB Barcelona, LUISS Rome, and Sciences-Po Bordeaux. His latest publication include: (with Olivier Costa and Clarissa Dri) Parliamentary Dimensions of Regionalization and Globalization (Palgrave, 2013); and (with Andrea Cofelice), “The European Parliament as an International Parliamentary Institution (IPI)”, European Foreign Affairs Review 19(2): 145-178, May 2014. A first draft of this paper was presented to the Panel on “The European Parliament as an International Actor” at the Conference on *Elections and Democracy in Europe* organized by Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB) & the Swedish Network for European Studies (SNES), held in Brussels on 7-9 April 2014.
Introduction

The 2009 Lisbon Treaty (LT) provides new means, measures and mechanisms to improve the democratic and international images of the European Union (EU) as a whole. Analysts also claim that it is the ‘Treaty of Parliaments’, because both the European Parliament (EP) and the member states national parliaments have gained powers in the EU’s processes of policy and decision-making.

As far as internal (‘EU’) democratization is concerned, the main EU changes refer to the election of the Commission President after an EP input following Euro-elections. This is happening right now (time of writing July 2014) and attracts strong interest as a result of the May 2014 EP elections. This is not however the focus of this study.

The focus of the literature that is relevant to this study has so far concerned the overall treaty impact on the EU’s international role. The verdict appeared initially to be rather positive: the Treaty now provides the EU with the means necessary for it to become a full-fledged international actor through a series of changes (Smith M. 2011; Comelli 2010; Quille 2010. See also Smith K. 2012).

However, more recent literature tends to qualify substantially those earlier assumptions of Lisbon facilitating a more efficient foreign policy system at the EU level (for an overview, see Keukeleire, Delreux 2014: 58). No doubt new powers or new institutional arrangements are by definition necessary but not sufficient means to improve a system. Practice is what matters at the end of the day. The past few years seem to have brought to light at least three ongoing weaknesses (Menon 2011) in the fields of coherence, capabilities (especially over defence issues), and political will to act. One cannot simply decide they should happen.

As noted, this paper is not however on the implications of Lisbon on the external dimension of EU integration. It focuses instead on its impact on the EP’s international role, and more specifically on the question of democratic accountability over the EU’s Common Foreign and

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1 The Lisbon Treaty (LT) (signed in 2007) came into force on 1 December 2009. The failed Constitutional Treaty that preceded it was also concluded after a long intergovernmental conference that included a large number of parliamentarians. See a literature review in Church, Phinnemore (2010).
2 On parliamentary democracy and the LT, see Barón Crespo (2012).
3 The control of national parliaments over the EU decision-making process has been enhanced through the so-called early warning mechanism and the informal Barroso Initiative (Jančić 2012; Kiiver 2011). As for the EP, its powers are increased substantially through the introduction of co-decision as the ordinary legislative procedure: the EP is now “an equal counterpart to the Council and the Commission” (Church, Phinnemore 2010: 17).
4 These changes include: (i) endowing the Union with its own legal personality which increases its visibility and impact at the international level and by implication those of the EP; (ii) upgrading the figure of the High Representative who now also acts as one of the European Commission Vice-Presidents, institutionally linking the Union’s foreign and external policies, and drawing into the international domain many, if not most, of the internal EU policies; (iii) the now permanent President of the European Council also possesses a number of prerogatives in the external representation of the EU; (iv) the establishment of a European External Action Service, which became operative on 1 December 2010 (Carta 2013; Lequesne 2013), allows for “comprehensive use [of the Union’s] diplomatic, trade, development and crisis management instruments” (Quille 2010: 56); (v) the introduction of a solidarity clause which resembles the classic mechanism of automatic collective defence (complemented with the management of natural or man-made disasters and crises) provides for solidarity among its members.
Security Policy, including its Common Security and Defence Policy dimension (respectively CFSP and CSDP\(^5\)).

This paper consists of three parts: (1) The first part very briefly describes the changes the LT has made. (2) The second part presents the many deficits that the EU suffers from in foreign, security and defence policies, at all its levels of governance in those areas. (3) The third part offers a descriptive analysis of the recently created Inter-parliamentary Conference on CFSP/CSDP, which in addition to MEPS (EP members) also includes national EU parliaments.

The paper concludes that although the IPC on CFSP/CSDP is a positive development, it remains only a step in the right direction due to the existence of other democratic deficits in the foreign, security and defence policies of the EU and its member states.

**PART 1: What changes for the European Parliament’s external role after Lisbon?**

Even though there existed formal and informal means of influence that applied to major EU trade agreements even prior to Lisbon Treaty (Woolcock 2010: 8), the LT has further strengthened the EP’s clout in the following ways. All key aspects of external trade have now come under EU exclusive competence (Woolcock 2010: 9). Therefore, there are no longer mixed agreements where EU member states and their parliaments would have a say. Moreover, all services and trade-related aspects of intellectual property now also come under EU competence, even if unanimity in some politically sensitive sectors has been preserved. Most importantly, foreign direct investment comes under EU exclusive competence (Woolcock 2010: 9-10).

The European Parliament (EP) possesses the right of consent but not that of initiative on the following international agreements concluded by the EU:

1. association agreements;
2. agreement on EU accession to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
3. agreements establishing a specific institutional framework by organizing cooperation procedures;
4. agreements with important budgetary implications for the Union;
5. agreements covering fields to which either the ordinary legislative procedure applies, or the special legislative procedure where consent by the EP is required.

In addition, the EP must be immediately and fully informed at all stages of the procedure of conclusion of international agreements.

Yet the EP prerogatives in its external relations remain rather meagre, especially in foreign policy. In CFSP/CSDP, the EP is merely “consulted” on the main aspects and the basic choices of these policies and informed of their evolution. Its formal involvement consists of receiving information, holding progress debates twice a year, putting questions to the Council, making recommendations to the Council and the High Representative, and having its views “duly taken into account”.

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\(^5\) The CSDP is the successor to the ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy).
One may therefore rightly still speak of the existence of a parliamentary deficit in the making of decisions in EU external relations (e.g. Thym 2010, Sjursen 2011).

PART 2: Democratic control and legitimacy in CFSP/CSDP: the seven democratic deficits

Any discussion about how to control democratically the EU’s CFSP/CSDP always brings about questions about its desirability and feasibility, let alone the existence of such policies. It goes now beyond doubt that there is an EU foreign, security and defence policy. What its impact is remains the real issue. The view that there exists a CFSP/CSDP does not only reflect the existence of several agreements, treaties, including the LT, but also the generally accepted view in academia nowadays that EU foreign policy represents “the sum of what the EU and its member states do in international relations” (Hill 1998: 18). Moreover, there is now a yearly edition of the European Foreign Policy Scorecard, an ECFR initiative (www.ecfr.eu), which, in its latest edition in 2014, consisted of 135 pages. The Journal of Common Market Studies has also produced for years now a section on “Europe and the Rest of the World” in its Annual Review (see Hadfield, Fiott 2014).

Thus, the real issue remains what is its actual impact. However one should not confuse results with impact as very often the foreign policy of any given state does not produce the expected results. Yet, this does not mean that the policy does not exist in the first place. Therefore, the question of control from a democratic perspective becomes crucial because the EU is a collection of democratic states and it claims to be so (there are far too many numerous treaties and declarations in this direction to be listed here).

As for the desirability, which should be a concern that precedes its feasibility, there is ample academic debate in political philosophy and in international relations theory. It can be summed up as International Democratic Theory - that has now developed in part into a large literature on Global Democracy (Held 1995; 1998; Beetham 2006) or Global Governance (Morata 2011; Stavridis, Cancela, Ponce de León, Guardatti 2011) or even Global Cosmopolitanism (Archibugi 2004; Marchetti 2006; Zürn 2000). There is also a huge literature on European-wide democracy and in particular its democratic deficit(s) (see above). What follows refer to those questions by considering the existence of no less than seven deficits (see below). Their existence does not mean that it is not possible to control democratically the CFSP/CSDP. It simply means that first deficits have to be identified and then corrected. Furthermore, the feasibility of such an exercise should not be seen as an obstacle to the desirability of doing so. On the contrary, because there are deficits they need to be bridged if only according to the theory of international democracy and the stated objectives of the EU institutions and its member states.

Three options are available to achieve the goal of multi-state democracy system (Attinà 2001):

- to control the supranational institutions by national democratic means;
- to build up specific mechanisms of democratic control at the supranational level;

6 See also Penders (1988); Bieber (1990); Stavridis (1993; 1997; 2001; 2006); Lodge (1994a; 1994b); Diedrichs (2004); Wagner (2005); Fernández Fernández (2007); Comelli (2010); Lord (2011); Peters, Wagner, Dietelhoff (2010); Wouters, Raabe (2012).

7 The literature is now vast, here is a selection: Sjostedt (1977); Wallace, Allen (1977); Wallace (1983); Schouthete (1986); Weiler, Wessels (1988); Soetendorp (1994); Regelsberger et al. (1997); Pijpers et al. (1988); Ginsberg (1989); Allen, Smith (1990); Nuttall (1992); Hill (1998); Durand, Vasconcelos (1998); Smith H. (2002); Smith K. (2003); Hill, Smith M. (2005); Stavridis, Fernández Sola (2011); Wong, Hill (2011); Telò, Ponjaert (2013); Baun, Marek (2013); Keukeleire, Delreux (2014).
- To create democratic mechanisms of the nation-state in the multi-state (multi-level and multi-nation).

The first option is the one favoured by the more intergovernmentalist-minded analysts; the second is the one tried at the EP level, and the third is a kind of transfer of national democratic mechanisms to the EU level, especially through the politicization and parliamentarization of the EU over time (socialization, Europeanization, European-wide political parties, etc.).

Another way (Angelopoulou, Stavridis 2013) to look at the same issue from a wider perspective is to consider the EU as a “compound polity” characterized by various levels and dimensions of decision and policy making (i.e centres of population, member-states, sub-national units, etc...).

There is a need to distinguish between a “horizontal” and a “vertical” interpretation of multi-level parliamentarism in the case of the EU:

- In a vertical interpretation, multi-level parliamentarism is a concept for transforming the EU into a federal state (Morgan 2005).

- An alternative idea for interpreting the meaning of multi-level parliamentarism is to employ a horizontal idea of democracy. According to this idea, the EU is not to become a quasi-federal state but would remain instead a governance regime among democracies (Müller 2011, Nicolaides 2013). Its role is not to supersede the member states’ democracies with a new layer of supranational democracy but to provide an instrument for internalizing the external effects of member states’ decisions. National parliaments remain the most important sites for democratic decision-making, with the EP collaborating with the Council and the Commission in filling the regulatory gaps that national parliaments’ functional limitations leave open. The EU’s institutional order would follow more the concept of a pluralistic democracy than that of a homogeneous democracy.

This hybrid model of democratic control (that combines federal and supranational integration characteristics together with confederal, inter-governmental ones) is actually what the IPC on CFSP/CSDP has tried to achieve (see below).

But what are the “seven” deficits? What follows offers a succinct list that will not be developed here for reasons of space (it does not deal with questions of “input” and “output” legitimacies and means of control either (see Verdun, Christiansen 2001).

But what are the “seven” deficits in CFSP/CSDP? In fact, there are “3+2+2 deficits” which are described in what follows.

The “3 deficits” refer to the wider democratic deficit in EU integration (Schmitter 2000; Verdun, Stavridis 2001) which consists of three dimensions: institutional, socio-psychological, and informational.

The first - institutional – deficit (Dehousse 1997; Verdun 1998) contains various dimensions ranging from a lack of transfer of competencies from the national to the EU level, a strengthening of executive dominance at the EU level (European Council, etc.), the power of comitology, including a regulatory system (Majone 1996). All of them lead to a relative parliamentary decline at the national level and therefore less democratic control (Chryssochou et.al. 1998).
As for the second - socio-psychological – deficit, it is mainly concerned with the absence of a European-wide demos (Chryssochoou 2001), a yet to develop common citizenry, and even a decreasing support in most EU national public opinions, especially now that there is an end to “passive consensus”, and a rise of euro-scepticism (even euro-phobia) as witnessed in the recent Euro-elections of May 2014. In addition, public support for member states remains superior at the national level to any support for European integration. There are alternative demoi with stronger democratic legitimacy to that of a possible emerging European-wide demos.

Finally, the third – informational – deficit concerns a general lack of knowledge and interest in how EU institutions work and the rather confused and confusing processes on “complex democracy” that the EU represents (Innerarity 2012).

The other “2 deficits” cover the fact that if at the EU foreign policy level there exists a large democratic deficit (because of the limited role of the EP among other things), this is further exacerbated by the pre-existence of a number of similar deficits at the national levels of EU member states’ own foreign policies. Most national parliaments have very little powers in international affairs although there is a vast variation across the 28 national parliaments in the EU.

Moreover, and this represents the other “2 deficits” which result from gaps not only in foreign policy but also in security/defence policy. In foreign policy, there exist wide deficits, especially over “secrecy”, executive-dominance, but also a lack of public interest, and also ignorance, over international affairs. In security/defence policy the gaps are even wider, especially in “hard” security issues, let alone, where applicable, nuclear policies. These two gaps provide a combined, cumulative, additional democratic gap.

As a consequence, there is not one but “7 deficits” in all8! However, as noted above, this does not mean that fatalism should prevail. Quite the contrary: as also noted above there are means to try and bridge these gaps. The IPC on CFSP/CFSDP is one possible – and desirable – step in the right direction. The paper now turns to this new framework set up in 2012.

PART 3: The Inter-Parliamentary Conference (IPC) on the CFSP and the CSDP

This section presents an overview and a preliminary evaluation of the IPC-CFSP/CSDP that was set up in September 2012 in Pafos under the Cypriot Presidency9.

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8 In fact one could add another dimension that does not represent a deficit in itself but that does have implications de facto about democratic accountability of EU military operations: that is the preeminence of some EU states, usually large(r) ones, in defence budgets: thus, in 2010, the UK, France and Germany accounted for 65% of the 27 EU national defence budgets; another five (Italy, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Poland) represented another 23%. That means 8 countries account for 88% of all defence budgets (Pitarch 2010: 98). This is particularly relevant in times of economic crisis and defence budget cuts as it is nowadays, but also with regard to the rise of other actors in the system. During the 2013 IPC Lithuania, NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen reminded EU parliamentarians that “in 2015 China’s defence budget was larger than those of the 8 EU NATO allies combined” (source: Lithuanian Presidency website). This situation may lead to competition between various national EU parliaments about issues of legitimacy and representativeness when EU military operations are engaged. For earlier discussions, see Bono (2005); Ioannides (2002). See also Klein (2009). For a wider discussion see Ku, Jacobson (2003).

9 The respective websites of the parliamentary dimensions of the Cypriot, Irish, Lithuanian and Greek presidencies, which have provided the bulk of the information included in this section, are as follows: www.cyparliament2012.eu;
In the past, the parliamentary dimension of EU foreign, security and defence policies came under the aegis not only of national parliaments but also of the EP (through its foreign affairs/AFET Committee) as well as the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (PA) and the WEU PA. When the WEU slowly began to “shut down” in the early 2000s, its Clause 5 and its PA continued to be active for a period of time but the WEU PA finally disbanded on 30 June 2011.

That created clearly a gap, especially as a result of NATO’s changing role: less focused on the defence of territorial integrity under Article 5, and more and more dealing with military interventions worldwide, but also the increasing “fascination” for the Asia-Pacific region in Washington.

As discussed above, because EU is a hybrid system, with both supranational/ federal(istic) features and intergovernmental/ confederal ones, any new system of democratic control and accountability would need the involvement of not only the EP but also the EU national parliaments.

It is important to add here that the role of national parliaments (with varying levels of accountability and control over international matters) also includes an important function that the EP does not so far perform fully: that of providing legitimacy. In this paper, the focus will be on accountability. This dimension largely explains why national parliamentarians are included in this IPC. That is to say that it is not only the fact that European security, let alone defence, is still emerging that justifies their inclusion: it is also the hybrid nature of the European integration process itself that accounts for it (see above).

The “road to the IPC” consisted of a number of meetings and other events: first, the various existing committees dealing respectively with European Union Affairs, with Foreign Affairs, and with Defence Affairs (COSAC, COFACC & CODACC) discussed various ways to move towards a new control mechanism. There also occurred a ‘European Parliamentary Week´ (i.e. MEPs and national Parliamentarians meet in Brussels to debate the European semester for economic policy coordination) which considered setting up an IPC for Economic and Financial Governance (that eventually began its work in 2013). The mimesis between the IPC under study here and the second on Economic and Financial Governance is quite clear (see Kreilinger 2013). It also means that matters of “blood and money” have come to the fore of integration.

As for the IPC on CFSP/CSDP, it was further discussed at a Conference of Speakers of EU Parliaments in Brussels on 4-5 April 2011 where an agreement for its establishment in principle was made. There followed further negotiations, and a final compromise agreement was taken at the following Conference of Speakers that took place in Warsaw on 20-21 April 2012.

To date there have been four plenary sessions of the IPC on CFSP/CSDP:

- Pafos, September 2012;
- Dublin, March 2013;
- Vilnius, September 2013;
- Athens, 3-4 April 2014.
The next session is scheduled on 6-7 November 2014 in Rome\textsuperscript{10}, under the Italian Presidency.

In addition, IPEX (the InterParliamentary EU information eXchange\textsuperscript{11}) was set up to allow for the creation of a Documents database and the facilitation of a Calendar of inter-parliamentary cooperation meetings.

As for the IPC for CFSP/CSDP Rules (as adopted in Pafos), they consist of:

- A bi-annual plenary (with possibility of extraordinary meetings) of up to 174 parliamentarians (plus observers): 16 MEPs, 6 parliamentarians from each EU national parliament (total: 162 in EU27 and 168 in EU28) and 4 each for EU candidate and European (non- EU) NATO members.
- An ad hoc review committee (AHRC).
- Languages: English and French (possible interpreting at cost of country concerned).
- The Rotating Presidency Parliament, in close cooperation with EP, is charged with organizing the IPC during its term in office.
- Its objectives are: “... Provides a framework for the exchange of information and best practices (...) shall debate matters of CFSP including CSDP (...) replaces COFACC and CODACC (...); length of interventions ... may not exceed three (3) minutes each (...) may by consensus adopt non-binding conclusions on CFSP and CSDP matters related to the agenda of the [IPC] (the conclusions do not bind national Parliaments or the European Parliament or prejudge their positions)”.
- The HR is invited to the meetings to “set out the priorities and strategies of the EU in the area of CFSP and CSDP”.
- Public meetings unless otherwise agreed, usually available online.

As for the topics discussed and the actors involved, the chairs/speakers of parliaments or committees of the Presidency country are always present and active. The following table (Table 1) presents in a telegraphic style who attended and what was discussed at the various plenary sessions to date.

**Table 1** (source: websites, author’s summary)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Invited speakers included</th>
<th>Topics and activities included</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pafos, 9-10 September 2012</td>
<td>Catherine Ashton, Cypriot Foreign Minister Erato Kozakou-Marcoullis, EU Special Representative for the Southern Mediterranean Bernardino de León, invited representatives from Middle East and North Africa including parliamentarians from Jordan and Lebanon</td>
<td>Adoption Rules of Procedure (+18 months review process)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Arab Spring; the need to enhance the democratic engagement of the EU through CFSP/CSDP thanks to parliamentarians, especially in Southern and Eastern neighbourhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dublin, 24-25 March 2013</td>
<td>Lady Ashton, and the Deputy PM, and Foreign, and Justice/ Equality/ Defence Minister (Ireland) and the Deputy Secretary-General of the European External Action Service.</td>
<td>Commencement of review procedure (including a calendar).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cypriot parliament proposal for fact-finding mission in S &amp; E neighbourhood.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 workshops: comprehensive approach on Africa and the MEPP.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{10} “Rome” does not follow the usual six-monthly gaps due to the Euro-elections and the need to appoint new leaders in the various EU posts including that of the High Representative for the CFSP and the CSDP.

\textsuperscript{11} www.ipex.eu9.
Vilnius, 4-6 September 2013  
Lady Ashton, the President and the Foreign and Defence ministers (Lithuania) and the NATO Secretary-General.  
Syria and comprehensive approach and external dimension of EU energy policy & ENP & Review of ESS and the European Defence Council and the future of IPC the AHRC.

Athens, 3-4 April 2014  
Lady Ashton, and the Foreign & Defence ministers (Greece) and the EEAS Deputy Secretary-General for Inter-institutional Affairs.  
3 Workshops on EU Maritime Security Strategy, maritime dimension of CSDP & recent developments in the Middle East & Deploying military forces under CSDP, parliamentary decision making procedures and practices.

Table 2 lists the number of parliamentarians who have participated in the IPCs to date.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>National parliamentarians</th>
<th>MEPs</th>
<th>Parliamentarians from Observers parliaments</th>
<th>Other parliamentarians</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PAFOS</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>128/132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUBLIN</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VILNIUS</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATHENS</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No one delegation had sent its maximum of 6 national parliamentarians to all events. During the first three events:
- Those who sent at least twice are Cyprus (hosts in Pafos), Germany, Greece, Lithuania (hosts in Vilnius), Poland, Portugal, Sweden, the UK, i.e. 8 parliaments out of 27/28.
- But in Vilnius there was only 1 parliamentarian from the UK.
- Spain, all 6 in Dublin, and “only” 5 other two meetings.
- Other “5s” include Belgium, Croatia, Luxembourg (twice), Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia.
- None went to Dublin from Belgium, Cyprus, or the Italian Senate.
- None from Slovakia went to Vilnius.

In Athens (April 2014), only Greece (hosts), Cyprus, Italy, Portugal and Sweden send 6 representatives each. Five parliamentarians each came from Austria, Germany, Poland, Romania and Spain. That means that only a very small number of EU parliaments have used their full allocation of parliamentary participation and that only happened 3 times out of 4, including two host countries: Cyprus, Greece, Portugal and Sweden. Therefore, and this was included from the first such Conference, there is a need for reforms to make it more efficient, if only in terms of attendance.

Proposals for IPC reforms include (there is a useful summary paper by the Greek Parliament from which the following information is taken):
• for a smoother process prior, during and after each session: such as distribution of written documents, especially by the HR or a bi-annual transfer report by the IPC presidency, an e-mailing system\textsuperscript{12}, smaller groups, Q&A, workshops – which already in place de facto-, discussion papers, participation of special guests and specialists – again, they already occur.

• Who participates: from now (16 MEPs plus 6 parliamentarians for each EU member state) to a new system based on the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE)\textsuperscript{13}?

• Languages: to add the German language?
• Adoption of conclusions: no longer consensus, QMV and quorum?
• No need for permanent presidency.
• The possibility to set up Political Groups: 6 members of at least 5 different delegations (Germany in favour, The Netherlands against).
• To set up fact-finding mission (sponsored by Croatia, Cyprus, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Spain, the UK) but this was finally withdrawn on 21 February 2014 at a meeting in Athens.

Conclusions: The wider implications of Lisbon’s new control and accountability arrangements for European and Global Governance

The long road to a common EU foreign, security and defence policies continues. No doubt, in a globalized world no single EU country, however large, can have a similar impact on the still emerging post-Cold War system as the EU as a whole. To greater EU cohesion, greater impact greater - as recent events in Libya in 2011 or in Ukraine in 2013-2014 have shown. Even though some discrepancies among EU states and institutions continue, recent events have shown some substantial progress since the low times of Iraq in 2003.

Moreover, recent research has also shown that the EP’s international role is also emerging, including on issues traditionally associated with state diplomacy such as the implementation of R2P in Libya (Stavridis, Fernández Molina 2013).

Thus, whereas the IPC on CFSP/CSDP represents an interesting development for transnational and supranational supervision of international affairs, it will be particularly relevant to study the implication of its forthcoming review procedure package. Indeed, this new system of democratic control should also show if it is actually producing what it is supposed to do.

Moreover, there should be research on how these two new IPCs on “blood” and on “money”, as stated above, fit within the EU context of “proliferating” inter-parliamentary institutions (to date there are four of them that deal respectively with ACP countries, the Euro-Mediterranean area, EU-Latin American relations, and the Eastern Neighbourhood)\textsuperscript{14}. In addition, there are vases communicants between them as for instance the March 2014 Athens Plenary session of EuroLat

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\textsuperscript{12} See also Global Centre for ICT in Parliament (2010).

\textsuperscript{13} The PACE system consists of a proportional system which ranges from 2 to 18 representatives according to the respective demographic weight of its member states (www.assembly.coe.int/nw/Home-EN.asp). For more on the PACE, see Evans, Silks (2008).

\textsuperscript{14} On ACP, see Delputte (2012; 2013); on the Mediterranean, see Stavridis (2002b), Seimenis, Makriyannis, (2005); Pace, Stavridis (2010); on Latin America see Malamud, de Sousa (2007); Stavridis, Ajenjo, (2010); Ajenjo, Stavridis (2011); Fernández Fernández (2011); and on the Eastern neighbours, see Kostanyan, Vandecasteele (2013).
showed with discussions not only on EU-Latin American relations but also on Ukraine or Syria (author’s participation).

Thus, the developing role of the IPC on CFSP/CSDP should also be analyzed through the prisms of other new international phenomena: the role of parliamentary diplomacy (Sénat 2001; Stavridis 2002a; Parliamentary Centre 2003; Eloriagga 2004; Weisglas, Boer 2007; Fiott 2011) and the proliferation of international parliamentary institutions (IPIs)\(^\text{15}\) (Cutler 2001; 2006; IPU 2005; Puig 2008; Šabič 2008a; 2008b; 2013; Kissling 2011; Cofelice 2012; Malamud, Stavridis 2011; Costa et al. 2013; UNU-CRIS 2014). Comparative research could (and should) provide useful insights and findings. Moreover, there should also be more work on how the work of parliamentarians links with civil society at large (in the case of the Meditteranean, see Lannon 2002; Pace, Stavridis, Xenakis 2004); and finally as the current Global system is one of multi-actors and multi-levels (see Grau 2011), there should also be work on how this IPC links into sub-state parliamentary activities in the world (parliamentary para-diplomacy) (Navarro 2003; Brunet et al. 2004; García Chourio 2011; Ortega Pérez 2013; Feliu 2013).

The paper concludes that although the IPC is a positive development, it remains only a step in the right direction due to the existence of numerous democratic deficits in the foreign, security and defence policies of the EU and its member states. It is a necessary but not a sufficient (or panacea for that matter) solution to a key question for the future of democratic control and legitimacy of EU foreign policy.

\(^{15}\) For the EP as an IPI, see Cofelice, Stavridis (2014).
REFERENCES


