Spain: foreign relations and policy

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1.0. Introduction: paradoxes, contradictions, accomplishments

The subject of the position of Spain in the world (through history, recent times, and today) has been described by scholars and casual observers by a combination of qualifiers. It is considered paradoxical, unique and influential, riddled with isolation and ambition, resulting in frustration and success. In any event, Spain’s record in modern times has to be considered as below its potential in historical terms, geographical position, culture and world presence through migration and the results of the empire. In any way, Spain deserves to be included among one of about twenty five countries that, for one reason or another, play a role in the overall current global panorama.  

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Today, for example, Spain is ranked between the 8th and the 12th world economic power, it has been customarily invited to participate in the group of 20, and it is the third tourist destination of the planet, as well as the second recipient of immigrants. Spanish is the second-second language of the globe, its contemporary painters and singers are famous worldwide, its sport stars have obtained impressive recent triumphs, and its diplomats and international officers have occupied important positions such as President the International Olympic Committee, UNESCO, and key institutions of the EU (Parliament, Court, High Representative). While official development figures in Latin American shows Spain to be number one donor and Spanish investment has led the EU and surpassed U.S. activity in some parts of Latin American, Spanish troops are present in a dozen of international security and peace keeping missions, as well as in war dangerous scenarios.

While in comparative historical terms Spaniards today live (in a greater number) by far much better than in past decades and centuries, Spain also suffers of poor business productivity. It is in the middle of an economic crisis and financial danger, including default, following the steps of Greece. Unemployment is around 20% (40% for youths). Citizen insecurity and organized international crime are common. On top of that, Basque ETA terrorism is the only remain of that scourge in the EU. Spain has been the victim of the worst Al Qaeda terrorist attack, only second to September 11.

School performance is at the bottom of the EU levels, no Spanish university is among the top world 200, and their graduates are opting for emigration. The building bubble has been terminated, the Spanish population is graying in unbearable numbers, the welfare state is on the verge of collapsing, and people are losing confidence in the political system, a well-earned impeccable democracy after centuries of authoritarian and dictatorial regimes.

In sum, Spain has become a “normal” western country, coping with contemporary challenges and problems, well-inserted in the European Union and world-wide networks. Its foreign policy and international relations networks are reflecting all this.

In general terms, it can be said that Spain’s position in Europe and the world has oscillated from an impressive state apparatus enjoying for a couple of centuries an enviable world imperial power (1500s and 1600s) to a long time (since the late 1700s) of isolation, leading to a recent rich period of solid presence and influence (after the rebirth of democracy in 1976). This status is still perceptible today, with the limitations imposed by internal and external circumstances, not considered as chronic and threatening for returning Spain to a position of irrelevancy. There are too many factors in today’s world and in the internal fabric of Spain that will contribute to the successful recovery of the economy and the solving of the domestic problems. It is with this panorama in mind than an analysis of the position of Spain in Europe and the world will be offered in the following pages.

2.1. Historical review: an empire returning home

In spite of its physical centrality in a regular western mapamundi, with the Atlantic showcased in the middle, the reality is that the geography of Spain does not help in the fostering
domestic of communications and does not invite in building links with the rest of Europe and the world. Natural deep water harbors are few and small, its rivers are not navigable, mountainous blocs cover the country separated by the Pyrenees from its closest neighbor beyond the peninsula that shares with Portugal. For centuries, all kinds of peoples visited, populated, conquered and civilized the land, contributing to forge a special brand of ethnic entity, not much different than the rest of Europe, a mix of Mediterranean and Celtic texture, maintaining certain peculiarities. Since the completion of the “Reconquest“ from the long eight-century Muslim domination in 1492, Spain became trapped in extirpating all signs of different cultures, making one religion and language, centralism, and authoritarian policies the norm.

But in any event, Spain is, after all, a European nation by traditions and law, philosophy and literature, language diversity and cultural features. This apparently unnecessary statement needs to be fully considered in any study of Spanish foreign policy and relations. This reality is attributed to a combination of factors and assumptions and perceptions (domestic and foreign). On the one hand, Spain, besides having consolidated its official status as a state in the Westphalia tradition much earlier than most of the existing entities of Europe, it was for a long time a world-wide empire with presence in all continents, from the Philippines to North Africa, from the vicinity of Canada to the South Pole.

For over a “Golden Century”, the sun never set in its dominions, as the unofficial motto read. In spite of the wrong credit given to Ferdinand Magellan (killed in mid trip), the first sailor to circumnavigate the world was his deputy in a Spanish crown, Juan Sebastián Elcano. Half of Europe was at one point ruled by the vision of Spanish Hapsburgs (most specially Charles V and Philip II), heirs of Castile’s Queen Isabella and Aragon-Catalonia’s King Ferdinand. The royal couple completed the mission of crafting an empire via a personal partnership, keeping their respective kingdoms officially intact, but prone to compete and disagree, resisting full unification. Regional rivalries and civil wars became the norm, leaving a legacy until contemporary times.

Columbus sailed, by mistake, to America at the service of Castile, paid by Spanish bankers, in ships populated by Spanish visionaries, to be followed by conquistadors who traversed the continent for glory and for gold. It is ironic that the mineral riches extracted by American natives enslaved by Spanish colonial officials were used to finance the European wars that the Spanish monarchs needed in order to anchor the imperial presence in the old continent.

In any event, the fact is that most of today’s Latin America became populated initially by Spanish agents and later by masses of immigrants that made the footprint of Spain permanent. It is in great part for this reason that the official Spanish national day is the 12th of October, an anomaly in western nations that have chosen the date of independence or the change of regime to commemorate the birth or consolidation of a given national identity. Spain, therefore, became a country of America by choice and fate, but remained a European entity by history and geographical necessity.

At the end of the 1700s Spain fell into a long period of isolation and international irrelevancy. After liberating itself of the occupation by Napoleonic France, Spain did not participate in the post-Vienna European network. In turn, it entangled itself in internal struggles derived from past dynastical inadequacies and claims regarding which branch of the European
monarchies should rule the country. Meanwhile, the old formidable overseas empire vanished in the first decades of the 1800s. Less than a century later, in 1898 the United States, the new world power, suddenly reminded Spain of its weakness and the real nature of its remaining colonial presence in the Caribbean and the Far East. Ironically, this defeat produced an introspective enrichment of the intellectual circles. The Generation of '98 began to seek for answers on the reasons for the Spanish decline, proposing ways to correct the course of history and define a new national identity.

As a result of the loss of the control over Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines, the Spanish monarchy was pressed by the resentful military, which blamed the politicians for the defeat, and changed scenarios of attention, concentrating on North Africa, making Morocco the object of desire. King Alfonso XIII was unable to cope with the unstable political forces of the 1920s in a dangerous ideological setting of Europe between the two big European conflicts and the rise of extreme ideologies. As a recourse, he then allowed General Miguel Primo de Rivera to take charge as de-facto dictator (1923-1930). Domestic errors and political pressures forced the monarch to resign in 1931.

The Second Spanish Republic (1931-1936) was established, ending in disaster as a victim of the rebellion staged by General Francisco Franco, leading to the Spanish Civil War of 1936-39. This internal conflict was in essence a dress rehearsal for World War II. As a victor of the Spanish War thanks in large part to the help of military assistance of Hitler’s Germany and Mussolini’s Italy, with a hands-off policy of Western democracies, Franco then decided to side with the Axis sending a full infantry division to the Russian front. When the Nazi regime collapsed, the democratic West punished the Spanish regime with isolation and banning for joining the new international structures, especially the United Nations. Spain again became an international pariah. An exception to the world-wide opposition to Franco was the Argentine government of Juan Perón, who provided food support.

Meanwhile, Franco stressed that the real enemy was communism, a message that attracted the favor of the United States, ready to stop the Soviets in Europe. The United States then decided to normalize relations with Spain in the 50s. Truman provided U.S. $ 62.5 million for aid, while supported a UN resolution lifting the boycott. The period of isolation ended. In 1953 Franco signed a Concordat with the Vatican and the alliance with the United States. During the first ten years of the Pact of Madrid, the United States gave Spain US$1.5 billion in aid. In 1955, the UN approved Spain's membership. The honeymoon between the two countries climaxed when President Eisenhower visited Madrid in 1959.

It is then, at the same time rather paradoxical and logical sense, that one of the most widely quoted commentaries of the position of Spain in the world was crafted by Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset in the 1920s: “Spain is the problem and Europe is the solution”. While a nostalgic feeling for America still survived, the obsessive need to be a standard and normal European country became the centerpiece of the Spanish agenda. However, this aim (in economic and strategic terms), which was shared by intellectuals and well-intentioned political leaders, had to wait to be fully implemented until the end of the long Franco dictatorship.
In contrast with the U.S. favor, Spain’s European neighbors were not inclined to accept Franco in NATO and the EC. In spite of the signing of a Trade Preference Treaty in 1970, the fundamental political issue of the incompatibility of the regime continued to bloc membership in the Community. The EC was then perceived by Spanish democrats as a solution for the ending of the regime, in a remake of the Ortega’s admonition. The regime helped in preparing Spanish economy through hard measures for an eventual agreement. The Spanish citizens and the business community, with the exception of certain sectors that feared competition against tariff protection, favoured that goal and endorsed Felipe González aggressive policy to obtain admission at any cost. Critics then pointed out that the political agenda weakened the government’s bargaining position, side-lining the possibility of negotiations. At any rate, accession is one of the most important political, economic and social successes in the history of the country.

2.2. Anchored in Europe

After the demise of the Franco regime, Spain saw that its world position was rather weakly anchored. In one of the Europe-wide conclaves that would lead to the establishment of the Conference for Security in Europe, Spanish diplomats realized that the only two European states that did not belong to any of the military or deeply economic networks were Spain… and the Vatican. This situation had to be drastically corrected. A frantic agenda then dominated the efforts of the Spanish government. A sort of practical example of a Spanish saying seemed to preside over the movements of Madrid: “apuntarse a todo” [sign up for everything]. Than meant that at an initial stage of Spanish democratic rebirth Spain even insisted in belonging to the Movement of Non-Aligned countries. This was oddity while for decades the country was attached to the security and defense strategy of the United States through the military agreements for the use of the air and naval bases.

In any event the international record of belonging was impressive. Spain ratified the UN Declaration of Human Rights and became a member of the Council of Europe in 1977, joined NATO in 1981, and acceded to the European Community in 1986. International mediation was recognized by the celebration of the Middle East Peace Conference held in Madrid in 1991 and the foundation of the Mediterranean process in 1995, a project that has left as a legacy of the work of Spanish diplomacy the establishment of the General Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean in Barcelona.

The record of Spain’s membership in the European Union has proven to be truly impressive.2 As briefly expressed above, during the second part of the Franco regime Spain tried

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to cope with requirements that were politically impossible to meet. When Spain became a member of the EC, numerous experts and scholars were ready to join the effort and strengthen the resources available in Spanish universities and publishing networks. Simultaneously, the best and the brightest of Spain’s governmental cadres joined the expanded institutions, taking on positions of responsibility in decision-making bodies. Spain, in sum, “was not different.” as a redrafting of a popular tourism slogan crafted by the Franco regime would say. It was a European country like any other that was returning to its natural home after a long exile. In the background of successful EU Spanish presidencies, prominent Spaniards had chaired the EU institutions. When the process of drafting the Constitutional Treaty was announced, Spain embraced the mission, rather than regarding it as a standard duty.

Spain, in turn, received considerable benefits through funds of regional policies, development aid, and financing of infrastructure. From an index of 60 percent of the European median in 1986, today Spain’s income is in the range of 105 percent, with some regions surpassing 125 percent. From being a country that was a net receiver of aid, Spain is today a net payer, with traditional funds vanishing, resulting in the considerable alarm of public works officers struggling in the middle of the current crisis. The year 2010 was to be remembered in the European Union (EU) circles of governmental Spain as a milestone. During the first semester, from January to June 2010, Spain held the rotating presidency. On June 12, Spain celebrated the 25th anniversary of its adhesion (along with Portugal) to the European integration experiment, by signing the treaty, effectively


Viñas, “Las políticas”.

accessing to the European Community (EC) on January 1, 1986. While all of this was happening, the new Reform Treaty (“of Lisbon”) was implemented as a substitute for the failed constitutional text. These spectacular events unraveled in the middle of one of the worst economic crises of the world, with considerable impact on the evolution of the EU and, most especially, Spain.

Spain had made the effort of rescuing the lost Constitution. The government considered several options and scenarios; each implied risks and opportunities in the rescuing of the spirit of the original text. More than anything else, Spain wanted to show the same loyal commitment as performed since 1986. From all angles of analysis, the balance of this obsession has been positive.

The successive PSOE governments from 1982 to 1996 distinguished themselves in building fruitful alliances with the influential European partners, specially the Franco-German duo. In 1996, when the Popular Party, led by José María Aznar, won the elections, Spain’s European commitment was in essence maintained. Spain was early in the lead of the constitutional project. However, as a result of the events of September 11, the government had decided to change its loyalty for a Euro-Atlantic alternative. Madrid elected to join the so-called “new Europe,” disdainful of the “old Europe,” following the terminology coined the U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Spain voted with the United States and Britain to support the UN Security Council resolution backing Bush’s policies, in contrast with EU fellow members of the Council, France and Germany. Aznar also tried to obtain the votes of Latin American countries (Mexico and Chile), with the result of offending them and making Spain-Latin American relations difficult.

Within the EU, Spain’s position shifted from unconditional siding with deepening the process of integration to a more intergovernmental stance. Under the pretense of defending national interests in the re-structuring of voting systems, the Spanish government started to be perceived as a hard bargainer. In the words of Aznar, Spanish needed not be considered as a “simpático” member, but a serious one. Simultaneously, what in a way was an important ingredient in Spanish influence in the EU during the Socialist administrations, using variances of “soft” power ceased to play a role. In a European Union that began to be different with the two successive enlargements of the “neutrals” and the formerly under the Soviet domination, Spain lost part of the leverage. This was reflected by the ending of nominations to important positions in the EU institutions, leaving only Javier Solana as isolated example of Spanish imprint as Secretary General of NATO and High Representative for the European Common Foreign and Security Policy. Lack of energy of the new Socialist administration of Zapatero from 2004 has led to a series of failures in obtaining important assignments for Spanish politicians and diplomats. The latest of these fiascos was the nomination of former foreign minister Miguel Angel Moratinos as Director of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), who was beaten by a split vote of EU members, an anomaly in coordinated EU actions.

The change of government in 2004 turned the setting to the traditional way of priming Europe, but the EU itself had changed in profile and attitude.\(^7\) When the PSOE came back to

\(^7\)For a sample of analysis on the change of Spanish attitude from the policy of the Partido Popular to the performance of the PSOE when elected, see: Joaquín Roy. “Spain's Return to "Old Europe": Background and
power in 2004, the government wanted to send a clear message of unconditional loyalty and efficient leadership in European integration. First, the new government decided to be the first of the group of Member States that submitted the ratification process of the Constitutional Treaty to a public referendum. 76.73 percent of the participating voters (42.3 percent of the actual electorate) said “yes,” setting the pace for the rest to emulate.

However, Spain’s recent path through the EU labyrinth offers a perceptive oscillation. On one hand, the enthusiasm with which the successive administrations, starting with Felipe González in 1982, approached the process of European integration, priming the supranational path should be noted. On the other hand, this pattern would subtly contrast with the fractious ambivalence expressed at times by the government of José María Aznar (1996-2004), more inclined towards an intergovernmental approach, especially during his second term from 2000 to 2004 supported by an absolute majority\(^8\). In part because of his support for the adventure taken by U.S. President George W. Bush in Iraq, Aznar led the inclination of the “New Europe” towards a neo-Atlanticism, damaging the deepening of the EU.

Nonetheless, the Spanish government, the academic community, and the media exerted an impressive influence in making the role of Spain in the Convention process a model of participation. The government (and the representatives of the Popular Party, delegated by Madrid) actively participated in the elaboration of the text of the Constitution.\(^9\) However, in the last stages of the proceedings of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) that took on the task given by the Convention, the government of Spain led by Aznar left the process in a frozen state when it refused to accept the new double majority voting system that modified the lineup that had been in effect since the Treaty of Nice.\(^10\)

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3.0. Regional and global relations

3.1. Complying with a standard traditional definition of foreign policy, general political and diplomatic relations of a country is a prerogative of its executive branch, although the protagonism exercise by other branches (especially the legislative) has made the task of managing external relations rather diffuse.

The monopoly of governing foreign policy resides mainly in the office of the President of Government (Prime Minister), delegated to its external unit, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation. This is the branch of the General State Administration which, under government control, is responsible for the an array of functions, among them the planning, directing, carrying out and evaluating the foreign policy of the State, coordinating Spain’s relations with other countries and with international organizations, executing the policy for international cooperation and development, protecting Spanish citizens abroad and designing immigration policies. In carrying out these functions, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation is assisted by four Secretaries of State and one Sub-secretary, as well as by the General Department of Foreign Communication, the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation (AECI) and the Cervantes Institute, dedicated to the promotion of culture and language teaching.

However, Spain’s foreign relations are not a monopoly of concrete branches of the executive power. Congress has a major role in approving foreign policy. NGOs, civil society, media, and private companies have engaged in this collective endeavor. Above all, the more than symbolic role played by King Juan Carlos I should be recognized by his prestige in world scenarios, most especially Latin America. In this framework, the world is divided into some major regions, each one with different degrees of priorities for Spain, as a result of history, geopolitics and pressing issues.

3.2. The neighborhood

Relations with the rest of Europe and the United States have monopolized the attention of the successive Spanish governments since the rebirth of democracy. However, this does not mean that Spain has forgotten other parts of the world. The abandonment of the isolation syndrome gave way to an ambitious policy of “normalization” of international links, beginning with the closest three neighbors. Spain, for example, can show a successful record of excellent relations with France and Portugal. The fact that both Iberian countries acceded jointly to the EU was a sign of synchronization of existing economic and political relations. Long gone were the times of resentment against France because of imperial competition, which in recent years were limited to the resistance of certain French interests to Spanish EU membership for economic reasons.

A source of concern for the Spanish government at all times, Franco-Spanish bilateral cooperation has been excellent in the joint fight against Basque ETA terrorism. An anomaly in the evolution of decolonization, the issue of Gibraltar has been systematically avoided to become a serious obstacle for UK-Spain cooperation. While it remains a sensitive topic, not only in terms of sovereignty but also because of the use of the rock for money laundering and contraband, London and Madrid can be considered as very close allies in multiple scenarios.

A standard description of Spain’s geographical location, taught to school pupils since times immemorial, include a classic scenario. “Spain –the lesson says—limits to the north with France, to the east and south with the Mediterranean Sea… and to the west with Portugal.” Seldom there was an explicit reference to the UK colony of Gibraltar. Morocco was not
considered as a “neighbor” in the strict sense. Strategic, social and economic arguments dictate that Morocco is actually the most important of the neighbors in terms of difficulties in reaching trade agreements, migration, and consistent claims of sovereignty.

3.3. France

Enemy in long periods of history and an ally in convenient exceptions, France ceased to be part of the worries of successive Spanish regimes and governments of all forms since the Napoleonic times. The impressive Pyrenees border has supported this mutually beneficial civilized coexistence. Trade and investments have substituted dynastic and political ambitions in both countries. Spanish membership in the EU has, with few exceptions, ended animosity and envy. Attractiveness of Spanish exotic culture for the French has meshed with Spanish fascination for France’s culinary distinction. In recent times since the rebirth of democracy, for example, the goal of the Spanish governments have been in adhering to the joint strategy of Germany and France in acting within the European Union. Both countries are among the most important sources of investments, destinations of Spanish exports and origin of tourism. Only trade confrontations over competition of Spanish products have sometimes (just before Spanish EU membership, and more recently as a result of the economic crisis) made the Madrid-Paris relationship uncomfortable. Conservative and Socialist French Governments have interacted very well with the Spanish right and left in power. As mentioned above, the sensitive issue of refuge taken by ETA terrorists in France has been resolved by the decisive cooperation given by Paris in curtailing terrorists activities in French and detaining suspects of criminal acts, devoid of the old fashioned independentist cover.

3.4. Portugal

The two Iberian countries, Spain and Portugal, share geography, history, similar languages, social and religious developments, a romantic nostalgia for imperial colonial hegemonies, and a sense of loyal cooperation in a common European destiny. Ironically, while Spain has been sold as model for political transitions in other parts of the world, Portugal boasts of the precedent over Spain of getting rid of autocratic regimes. The Portuguese peacefully toppled (by the “Carnation revolution”) the remains of the Oliveira Salazar (the oldest fascist-leaning dictatorship in Europe) in April of 1974. This feat took well over one year before the end of the Spanish Franco regime.

Paradoxically, part of this coexistence devoid of animosity or wars (a common denominator in Europe’s violent history) has been the fact that both nations have evolved since the Middle Ages (Portugal is the oldest European nation-state) with a respectful mutual disdain. Not even the accidental fact that Portugal was part of Spain for some decades due to a dynastic cause (Phillip II) has been a source of Portuguese anti-imperialist feelings. The only remain of Portuguese resent is the small city Olivenza (Spanish)/Olivença (Portuguese) a disputed section
of the border between the two countries, which claim it *de jure*, but it is administered *de facto* by Spain since 1801.

Happy with forging historical alliances with other European powers (especially Britain), Portugal has lived a peaceful evolution that has led to a mutually economic relationship in which Spain has been the leader capturing large sectors of trade and industry, without causing notable Portuguese resentment. It is considered as an unavoidable phenomenon, only questioned by small economic sectors and a part of the Portuguese intellectuals. As in the case of France-Spain political relations, Portuguese socialists and conservatives have had excellent rapport with ideologically diverse Spanish leaders. The two countries are so intertwined that Nobel Prize winner Jose Saramago once suggested in a seminal article that Portugal’s future was to become a Spanish autonomy. In recent times, a fraction of the right wing parties have used the Spanish economic hegemony to capture votes, with dubious results. Still, with inter-state land communications not at the level of expressways and railways in Spain, the current financial crisis has caused the termination of the plans for a high speed train line between Madrid and Lisbon.  

3.5. Gibraltar

The return of Gibraltar to Spain’s sovereignty has remained a foreign policy goal for all Spanish rulers since the Treaty of Utrecht that gave control to the British in 1713. Franco closed the frontier between Spain and Gibraltar in 1969. Democratic governments engaged in calmer but persistent negotiations with London. Spain's membership in NATO added obstacles because Spain claimed Gibraltar to be a NATO naval base, something denied by the British government. The most delicate issue is sovereignty, but the 30,000 residents oppose to become Spanish citizens. As an alternative for the continuation of the colonial status, innovative joint sovereignty has been suggested as well as a variance of regional autonomy under the 1978 Spanish Constitution might be a long-term solution.

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3.6. Morocco

To the south, Morocco has continued to be a leading priority in Spanish policy for reasons not only of high migration levels converting Spain in the main destination of Moroccan workers and stepping stone of Sub-Saharan illegal immigrants. An important concern is the highly sensitive issue of the existing Spanish cities, Ceuta and Melilla, which territory is claimed by Morocco. A remain of the old Spanish protectorate and historical presence, the two cities are a permanent part of the bilateral agenda, but both governments are committed not to cross the dangerous line of confrontation, as it happened in 1957 when Moroccan irregulars back by the Moroccan army force Spain to leave the small enclave of Sidi Ifni and when in the last days of the Franco dictatorship in 1975 the Moroccan authorities staged a “green” march towards the Spanish Western Sahara and forced the partition of the territory between Mauritania and Morocco. Eventually, Morocco ended up occupying all the territory, making it a source of autonomous native aims of independence and claims by neighboring Algeria.

Morocco has maintained that the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla were integral parts of the national sovereign territory. The two North African towns and their offshore islands had belonged to the Spanish crown for centuries. Both were administered as integral parts of Spain and had predominantly Spanish populations. Therefore, Spain insisted that they remain Spanish. When Spain joined the EC in 1986, Ceuta and Melilla were considered Spanish cities and European territory. The two cities claimed to be candidates for financial assistance from the EC's Regional Development Fund. Spain also hoped that membership in NATO, while providing no security guarantee to Ceuta and Melilla, might make Morocco's King Hassan II less likely to move against territory belonging to a NATO member. However, Spanish demands for the return of Gibraltar have consistently added fuel for Moroccan ambitions.
4.0. The Western Hemisphere

4.1. The United States: sleeping with the hegemon

Spain’s relations with the United States offer a contrast between the norm of the usual contemporary diplomatic declarations and the historical record. While officials consistently claim that the two countries have been steady allies, the evidence shows that Spain and the United States have been acting very often on different sides, distanced from each other, indifferent and at times at war with each other. The exceptions to this norm have been the heralded help bestowed by Spain to the United States struggle for independence and the steady alliance since the signing of the treaties between Franco and Eisenhower.

History shows that the main reason for Spain to back the independence of the United States was to harass the British Empire as a competitor for the control of the Americas. Instead of a reward for this help, the United States aimed at Spain when it issued the Monroe declaration in 1823, threatening European powers to return to control the western hemisphere territories that were colonies in the past (most of South and central America). Spain, in turn, took advantage of weakness of the United States engaged in domestic difficulties (Civil War included) and briefly returned along France to Mexico, staged naval skirmishes in Peru and Chile, and accepted a return of sovereignty from the Dominican Republic. A direct serious war confrontation between Spain and the United States took place in 1898 when as a consequence of the Cuban independence struggle Washington sent an ultimatum and then defeated the Spanish navy and army in Santiago de Cuba and Manila, occupying also Puerto Rico.

A series of non-engagements took place during the first part of the Twentieth Century. It began with the contrast of the United States involvement in World War I with Spain’s neutrality. After the war, when Spain became an effective member of the Society of Nations, ironically the United States Senate refused to sign the treaty crafted by Woodrow Wilson. Officially neutral in World War II, the Franco regime, victor of the Spanish Civil, sent an army division to help Hitler in the invasion of Russia, as a reward for the help received during the bloody domestic struggle. The emotions of the American public were stirred profoundly by the outbreak of the Civil War in Spain. Approximately 3,000 United States citizens volunteered to serve in the Spanish Republican Army, although the U.S. government remained neutral.

Following the Nationalist victory, much of public opinion in the United States condemned the Franco’s regime as a fascist dictatorship. But the United States government participated in various Allied agreements with Spain, aimed at ensuring that Franco would not permit the Iberian Peninsula to be used by Adolf Hitler against Allied forces.

The United States and the European allies banned Spain from the foundation of the United Nations. But the realities of the Cold War turned the fortune of the Franco regime, providing the offer of the military agreements that guaranteed the survival of the Spanish regime giving the United States a foothold in a crucial European territory in the strategic bombing struggle with the Soviet Union.

The 1953 Pact of Madrid between Spain and the United States provided for mutual defense as well as for United States military aid, and it brought to an end Spain's postwar isolation. It did not end anti-Americanism in Spain, however. Francoist leaders resented having to accept what they considered to be insufficient military supplies in return for basic rights. They also protested against U.S. restrictions for the use of equipment in defending Spain's North African territories in 1957. This anti-American sentiment was bipartisan. Francoists resented the United States for its democratic form of government, while the opposition perceived Washington
as the primary supporter of the Franco regime and therefore as a major obstacle to the democratization of Spain.

Following the death of Franco in 1975, the United States welcomed the liberalization of the Spanish regime under King Juan Carlos and sought to bring Spain further into Western military arrangements. In 1976 the bilateral Agreement between Spain and the United States was transformed into a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. In addition to renewing U.S. base rights in return for United States military and economic aid, this treaty formed a United States-Spanish Council intended to serve as a bridge to eventual Spanish membership in NATO.

During the early years of democratic rule, the government's focus was on consolidating the parliamentary system. Foreign policy issues received less attention. However, disagreement persisted between the governing UCD and the Socialist opposition over Spain's relations with NATO and with the United States. When Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo replaced Adolfo Suárez as Prime Minister in 1981, he made vigorous efforts to gain approval for Spanish membership in NATO, and shortly after this was accomplished a new executive agreement on the use of bases in Spain was signed with the United States in July 1982. This agreement was one of a series of renewals of the basic 1953 security arrangement, providing for United States use of strategic naval and air bases on Spanish soil in exchange for United States military and economic assistance.

Many Spaniards still resented the presence of these bases in Spain, recalling the widely publicized photograph of United States president Dwight D. Eisenhower, throwing his arms around Franco when the first agreement on the bases was signed. There were occasional popular protests against these reminders of United States support for the dictatorship, including a demonstration during U.S. president Ronald Reagan's 1985 visit to Spain.

The Socialists had consistently advocated a more neutralist, independent role for Spain. When they came to power in October 1982, Gonzalez pledged a close examination of the defense and cooperation agreements with the United States. A reduction in the United States military presence in Spain was one of the stipulations contained in the referendum, held in 1986, on continued NATO membership, as mentioned below. In keeping with this, the prime minister announced in December 1987 that the United States would have to remove its seventy-two F-16 fighter-bombers from Spanish bases by mid-1991. Spain also informed the United States in November that the bilateral defense agreement, which opinion polls indicated was rejected overwhelmingly by the Spanish population, would not be renewed. Nevertheless, in January 1988 Spain and the United States did reach agreement in principle on a new base agreement to last eight years. The new military arrangements called for a marked reduction of the United States presence in Spain and terminated the United States military and economic aid that had been tied to the defense treaty. 

4.3. Latin America: between the colonial legacy and the future

Spain has maintained a “special relationship” with its former colonies in the Americas. To a large extent, the Spanish strategy has framed its diplomatic activities within a concept

12 For the latest and possibly most complete account of the relationship between Spain and the United States in the context of the rebirth of Spanish democracy, see: Charles Powell, El amigo Americano: España y Estados Unidos: de la dictadura a la democracia. (Madrid: Galaxia Gutember, 2011).

13 For a selection of studies on Spain’s relations with Latin America see: Celestino del Arenal, (coord.) España y América Latina 200 años después de la Independencia. Valoración y perspectivas. (Madrid, Real Instituto Elcano,
exemplified by the establishment of the Ibero-American Community. Admitted as a modernized version of the traditional Hispanidad, it is based on the links between the Iberian Peninsula (Portugal included) and Central and South America, as well as parts of the Caribbean (Cuba and Dominican Republic) through language, commerce, history and culture. In this setting, Spain has insisted in sharing its experience of the political transition from dictatorship to democracy, respecting the different ideologically-supported regimes and opting for a by-regional approach inspiring the overall programs of the European Union, with emphasis on regional integration, poverty reductions, respect for human rights and political consolidation. In recent years, however, the Spanish government, as well as the EU, has been testing a more bilateral approach, priming some countries over others.

The background of this evolution shows that after the rebirth of democracy Spain decided to strengthen its influence in Latin America. Gone were the days of the empire. In the initial decades of independence, Spain was blamed for the lack of progress in the new republics as a legacy of colonial rule. The result was a general disdain for Spain’s values. However, the war of 1898 and the humiliation suffered under the United States changed the perception of the Latin American elites. The United States was seen as the new menace. Spain and Latin America became closer, but still trade and diplomatic relations remained limited.

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During the Franco regime, Spain converted the Latin American scene as the target for its “foreign policy of substitution”. Unable to exert influence in Europe due to the dictatorial nature of its regime, navigating with limitations in the Arab and Middle region, absent in Asia, the Latin American subcontinent provided an avenue to enjoy international respectability. The regime even kept close relations with Marxist Cuba under Castro, rejecting to accept the terms of the U.S. embargo. After the Franco regime disappeared, the rebirth of democracy coincided with the evolution of certain democratic consolidation in Latin America. Spain then began to act more aggressively in the continent under the leadership of Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez, backed by the prestigious diplomatic role of King Juan Carlos I, widely admired in Latin America.

When the Socialists came to power in 1982 Latin America became even more important for Spanish interests, a move that was backed by generous development aid programs, especially when Spain propelled EU’s newly organized Latin American policy by promoting peace, democracy and regional integration, most especially in Central America, riddled by internal confrontations. While the United States government was skeptical about this novel European involvement with time Washington welcome the supporting fields where U.S. backing was lagging. The balance of this involvement was very positive, lasting into the rest of the century. The role played by the two Spanish commissioners in Brussels, Abel Matutes and Manuel Marín, who held the portfolios of relations with the region, determined the anchoring of the Latin America area in the attention of the EU.

During the Aznar's two executive terms (1996-2000 and 2000-2004), Spanish relations with some Latin-American countries (Mexico, Venezuela and Cuba, especially) became tense for different reasons, but were exceptionally good with others like Colombia the Dominican Republic and most of the Central American republics. With Zapatero's victory in the 2004 general elections the scenario was changed. Relations with Venezuela got better, a move that was not well taken in Washington. Brazil and Chile were substantially strengthened, most specifically as part of ambitious investment in sensitive and profitable areas such as communications, banking and transportation.

In recent years, friction has developed with Argentina, due to disagreements over Spanish investments and the populist measures taken by the administrations of Hector Kirchner and his wife and successor Cristina. With Chile, relations were excellent with the coalition (“Concertación”) formed by the Christian Democrats and the Socialists, and have continued to be excellent with conservative president Piñera. Same can be said with Uruguay, Perú and most especially Colombia, a country that has enjoyed attention of the Zapatero government at the same level as the one given by Aznar. Certain tensions have developed with by the ALBA countries led by Venezuela’s Chávez, because of the populist measures or postures that have threatened Spanish investments. The indigenous anti-imperialist attitude of Evo Morales in Bolivia has affected the legal security of Spanish firms.

In the Caribbean, the Dominican Republic has been for decades a model of cooperation, investment and recipient of funds. In fact, Spain was the main actor for the accession of Haiti’s neighbor to the ACP network, with the result of an impressive volume of development aid provided by the EU. In Central America, all democratic governments have backed the social and economic development programs, have contributed with funds and military assistance to peace-making and peace-keeping programs under EU or UN frameworks, and have generously support democratic consolidation.

A special chapter of Spain’s foreign policy should be dedicated to Cuba. The Spanish link with the former colony needs to be considered as a very special relationship. Within the EU framework, Spain has been the leader of important and unusual moves towards the Castro regime. On the record of keeping close diplomatic, social and economic relations, in spite of
political changes in both countries, Spain took the early initiative of opposing U.S. decisions curtailing trade (Helm-Burton Act) and at the same time sponsored EU measures conditioning cooperation (Common Position). However, under the governments of Aznar and the Socialists, Spain has been supporting and leading the policy of "constructive engagement", in tune with general EU attitudes maintaining the lines of communication open.15

5.1. The rest of the world

In recent years, Spain has expanded its rather limited historical presence in Sub-Saharan region. For obvious reasons, Madrid has maintained an interest in its only former colony of Equatorial Guinea. In spite of the harsh dictatorial nature of the regime and at times the harassment of the government, Spain has maintained a large air program, along a steady flow of investment and trade operations. Close relations with countries like Senegal, Mauritania and Mali have helped in controlling the illegal immigration to the Canary Islands.

East from Morocco, Spain is considered as a solid partner in political mediation in the Middle East, with no disagreements with very different regimes in the zone, with the exception of the late recognition of the state of Israel and the steady support of Palestinian claims. The Arab countries have been are a strategic priority for Spain because of oil and gas sources. Several Arab countries are important investors in Spain. When the Iraq war exploded, the Spanish government led by Prime Minister José María Aznar sent troops to join the US-led coalition, but after the defeat of his party in the election of 2004, the new president, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero abruptly withdrew the small military unit, causing a major upset in the Bush administration. In contrast, Spain has participated in the Afghanistan operation since its inception, maintaining a steady number of soldiers, a hundred of them have been killed in action and by terrorist attacks.

As a latecomer in the Far East, in spite of the early colonial presence (the Philippines), Spain has been trying to expand its historically modest relations with East Asian nations. The People’s Republic of China and Japan are the main countries of interest in the region. Thailand and Indonesia have been the main allies in the important ASEAN group. As many other European states, Spain has expanded trade and investment in South Korea and Malaysia, and even in Vietnam. Lately, India has become a central point of activity for Spanish firms and diplomatic activity. Relations with Australia and New Zealand have been cordial and profitable.

6.0. Global presence

Worldwide, some sectors of foreign relations have become a priority of the Spanish agenda, in a combination of examples of “hard power” and a special brand of “soft power”. Defense and military matters have combined with economics, trade and development assistance. All these

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sectorial activities have to be taken into account in the context of membership in the European Union.

6.1. NATO

As mentioned earlier, during the first years of the Spanish political transition there was an almost unanimous backing for Spain's accession to the EC. However, that consensus was not that clear with respect to NATO. As was the case during the last decades of the Franco regime, Spain's geographical position made it a valuable partner for the alliance. Advocates for membership thought that geographical position to be an advantage for Spain because the country's strategic location could make it an obvious target in any major conflict unless it had allied support. They also maintained that integration into NATO would guarantee the badly needed modernization of Spain's armed services in addition to the securing of adequate national defense. A corollary hope was that NATO membership would reorient the focus of army leaders away from reactionary preoccupations and toward defense of the West. To immunize resentful military after the attempted coup of 1981 remained in the background. Alleged pre-condition for EU membership was part of the equation.

However, several Spanish parties, particularly the Socialists and the Communists, did not agree that full membership would benefit the country's defense and foreign policy aims. They thought it would raise the level of tension between the world power blocs and would make Spain a more likely target in any future conflict with the Soviet Union. Opponents of NATO membership accused that NATO would be of no assistance in areas of primary worry for Spain: Ceuta and Melilla, located in North Africa, outside the geographic zone of application of the NATO Treaty. They also maintained that NATO would be of no benefit to Spain to recover Gibraltar, because it could be assumed that NATO members would support Britain. Resentment of the United States as the principal supporter of the Franco regime was another factor influencing those who opposed Spain's entry into NATO.

Although Suárez had announced Spain's intention of applying for NATO membership, his Union of the Democratic Center (UCD) government remained openly divided. After Suárez resigned in 1981, his successor, Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, prioritized this point. In his view, Spain's entry into NATO would speed up negotiations for integration into the EC. In December 1981, the Spanish Congress approved membership, over the opposition of a large leftist sector. The left protested that NATO membership had been pushed through Parliament violating a prior consensus. The Socialists organized an aggressive negative campaign, and the PSOE leader, González, made the NATO issue a major feature of his electoral program in 1982, promising a popular referendum on withdrawal. However, González later had second thoughts, and he found reasons to delay the referendum and finally he advocated a positive vote for limited membership. With 60 percent of participation, 52.6 percent of the voters supported Spain's continued membership, while 39.8 percent opposed it. The following year, in a move seen as emphasizing the European aspect of the defense system, González applied for Spanish membership in the Western European Union (WEU). In 1988, Spain and Portugal were formally invited to join the organization.

6.2. Defense and military international cooperation.
As outlined above, since the end of the active Spanish military activity in Europe and the defeat in the Americas as result of the anticolonial struggle, the Spanish armed forces had been absent in all the major conflicts of the last century (with the exception of the brief intervention in Russia). Spanish soldiers were only used in the North of Africa and as internal order force to support the Franco regime. With the normalization of the Spanish army after becoming a member of NATO, the Spanish military (fully professional once the draft was terminated) have intervened in an array of peace-making and peace-keeping missions, as well as in the training of the armed forces of countries in need of democratic order and political consolidation. In June 2011 Spain approved the Spanish Security Strategy (EES) and created a Spanish Security Council, succeeding the traditional National Defense Council, translating a shift to a wider sense of security, not limited to military matters.\textsuperscript{16} Internal and external securities are meshed. While, the UN is considered as a permanent framework of Spanish actions, NATO is an obligatory mission, although its future is rather confusing, the EU needs to be considered as a permanent point of reference. This strategy is in perfect tune with other EU nations, especially the UK and France.\textsuperscript{17}

In the last two decades more than 100,000 soldiers have served in more than fifty scenarios in four continents, most especially in the former Yugoslavia, the Middle East, and Central America. 40,000 of them have been in Bosnia, making the mission a success story in this modality. Today Spanish troops still serve in the EUFOR-Althea operation in Bosnia, are an integral part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, have been inserted in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and in the European Union’s Atlanta operation to fight piracy off the coast of Somalia, and in the mission of training the security of this country. The total number of troops is over 3,500.

However, all Spanish military operations are in danger of suffering a decrease in effectiveness because of the economic crisis. An additional measure included in the drastic cuts in government spending as a result of the demands of the EU is the abandonment of large investments in weapons systems. Alternatives include the reselling of some of the important arms to other countries of regions.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{16}For a complete text and analysis, see CIDOB, “The Spanish Security Strategy (EES). Everyone's responsibility” (Barcelona 2011) http://www.cidob.org/en/publications/monographs/monographs/the_spanish_security_strategy_ees_everyone_s_responsibility


\textsuperscript{18} Ignacio Fuente Cobo,“La cooperación militar española en los países iberoamericanos” (Madrid: Centro Superior de la Defensa, 2007).
6.3. Impact of EU membership on the economy

During the first two decades of Spain's membership in the EU the arrangement was extremely economically beneficial. Spain became the 8th largest economy in the world. Prosperity lasted until 2007. Growth was spectacularly fast. During the first decade of membership in the EU the average yearly growth rose to from 3 percent to nearly 5 percent, a record in the countries of the OECD. Major construction in infrastructure led to the lowering of the unemployment rate from 18 percent to 10 percent. Within the EU Spain’s GDP rose from 8 percent to 9.7 percent. In comparative terms, data shows that the overall economic indexes expanded by 64.6 percent in the first twenty years of EU membership, while the rest averaged an increase of 47.9 percent. Incomes in Spain rose from 71 percent of the EU-15 average to more than 90 percent in 2006. Inflation descended to only one point above the countries of the euro zone. Public spending increased from 25% of the GDP existing in 1978 to 40 percent in 2006. During the first years of the new century, Spain created more than 50 percent of the new jobs.

In sectors, growth was also impressive: the major road system expanded from 2,000 kilometers in 1985 to 10,000 kilometers in 2002, resulting in a more effective domestic communication, open to the world. Spain now has the largest high speed train network in the world, only second to China. The tourism industry was one of the beneficiaries of growth: 12 percent of GDP in 2006, providing 10 percent of employment, making Spain the second world tourist destination. From a country of emigration, it received multitudes of foreign workers, of all origins, mostly from North Africa and Latin America. Spanish multinational companies expanded around the world, most specially in Latin America.

But then, the strength of the euro, a European integration success, provoked a reduction of interest rates, propelling growth to unsustainable levels without the necessary infrastructure reform. A sudden rise of prices and wages caused a large external deficit and an increase in the external debt, which was necessary to level the external unbalance. The 2008 world crisis and the explosion of the building bubble hit hard the country. In May of 2010 the Government wrongly admitted that Spain was also under the impact of the global problems and took drastic measures under the pressure of the EU, the United States and the IMF. The aim was to avoid the fate of Greece to salvage the welfare state system and maintenance of the euro, and of the EU itself, a primary preoccupation of Spain and the Brussels. 19

In sum, continuous prosperity for Spain is over and its future within the EU’s economy is uncertain. However, if corrective measures are applied in a wise and effective way Spain’s economy can successfully survive. The fabric of the country and the human and natural resources are a guarantee for that goal. The EU and the West can barely afford a failed Spain. The commitment of Germany and France and all the rest of the euro zone countries is a guarantee for the success of the euro as a political project. All involved entities (private and

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public) have the capacity to learn from mistakes. The citizens at large understand the need to apply the serious measures undertaken.

Even in the current times of crisis, some economic sectors seem brighter than others. One is the tourist industry. Even during the time before the rebirth of Spanish democracy, tourism has been a major source of the economy, making the sector a crucial one for the country’s stability. Spain (52.68 million) has been ranked as No 3 tourism power in the world, only surpassed in absolute figures by the France (76.80 million) and the United States (59.75 million), although more recent China (55.67 million) has captured spot no. 3. This privilege position of Spain seems to be enriched in recent times: during the first semester of 2011, Spain received 32.3 million international tourists.  

6.4. Trade and investment

Spain has experienced a considerable increase in its export activity in the past decade. It is worth noting that this activity did pick up particularly after 2002, the year when the euro was fully introduced, physically and nominally (see Graph 1). In spite of this, the economic crisis that has affected the world has brutally impacted Spain. In 2010 Spain’s export activity dropped to levels which were even lower than those reported at the beginning of the new century. However, recent trends and data show that the export sector experienced a considerable increased during the first part of 2011. This fact produced for the first time in years a surplus in foreign trade. The predominance of the European Union countries as a destination of Spanish exports is further dramatized by the fact that 33 percent of Spanish exports go to France, Italy and the United Kingdom.

Graph 1. Spain’s Export Activity

The import activity of Spain has been very moderate during the same decade. It actually increased during the expansionary phase of the business cycle and peak in 2008 (see Graph 2). Afterwards, the activity has suffered a significant drop which is in line with the current economic slowdown.

20 Source: Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade.
Spanish foreign investment has been very impressive during the past decade (see Graph 3). It is significant to note that the majority of these investments have taken place within the European Union. One explanation for this preference is the fact that Spain can take advantage of the common market. The facility of transferring of capital is in Spain’s favor. Similarly, the foreign investment trend has coincided with the business cycle trend; thus, there was a sudden drop after 2007. However, the declining in overall foreign investment fortunately turned since 2009, when Spain increased its foreign investment levels again. Still, it should be noted that foreign investments in the U.S. and Latin America is not as important as it is in the EU. However, investments in Latin America proportionally increased, making Spain the number 1 investor in some countries of the Southern Cone, ahead of the rest of Europe and the United States.  

6.5. International Cooperation and Development aid.

Spain is a leader in the field of development cooperation, targeting poverty and hunger in the world, as an integral part of its foreign policy. Programs encompass not only a strategy to increase income and the ability to acquire goods, but including rights, opportunities and abilities of the people in need. The defense of human rights, environmental conservation, gender equality and respect for cultural diversity are also integral part of the policy, which enjoys a broad consensus not only in the governmental and congressional circles but also in the realm of the autonomous communities, local entities, and the civilian population at large though active NGO’s funded by public and private sources.

The global Spanish action is coordinated by the 2009-2010 Master Plan for Cooperation, a framework document that lines up the objectives, criteria, and priorities for cooperative development. This plan, executed in close coordination with international agencies, aims at greater policy consistency and improved Official Aid to Development (OAD) management policy. Spain is committed to double the aid contribution, with the ultimate aim of reaching the prescribed volume of 0.7 percent of the Gross Domestic Product. The Millennium Declaration developed by the United Nations is a point of reference.

There is also a commitment to include at least 20 percent of the bilateral GDP to support basic social services (education and health) while strengthening the commitment to the Developing Countries, which will receive at least 20 percent of the Official Aid to Development. Latin America and the Mediterranean are to be the main areas of attention, but Sub-Saharan Africa has recently become the target of special care. In fact, Spanish public opinion primes support for Africa over the traditional assistance to Latin America.

A review of Spain’s development assistance over the last two decades reveals that the policy emphasis has oscillated between the Popular Party’s preference for inserting aid in the context of Spanish investments and the priority given by the Socialists for programs emphasizing social issues. It remains to be seen what the PP policy could be in the event of an electoral

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Graph 3.
Spain’s Foreign Investment

![Graph showing foreign investment trends]
victory in the Fall of 2011. In any event, both strategies suffer the impact of the financial crisis and the reduction of government budgets.

7.0. Closing

7.1. Evaluation.

A customary general review of Spain’s foreign policy since the recovery of democracy claims to have been rather stable. As seen above, only some concrete exceptions (the initial disagreement over membership in NATO) are part of the official record. However, closer analysis reveals that Spain’s foreign balance has had several important inconsistencies, caused by major reversals in the internal political framework. The fact is that a crucial chapter of foreign policy performed by premier José María Aznar was the backbone of the electoral victory of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero in 2004 and his double mandate. The terrorist attacks in Madrid of March 11, 2004, were provoked as a retaliation by Al Qaeda for the intervention of Spanish armed forces in Iraq and the close symbiosis of Aznar with Bush. The major reason for the defeat of the PP in the election of a few days later was generated by the faulty handling of the crisis, accusing ETA terrorists of the attack. The fact remains that the foreign dimension played a major role in the change of government and stayed evident in the first term of the Zapatero mandate (2004-2008), surviving until what in the summer of 2011 appeared to be the exhaustion of the PSOE governmental control, with the calling for new elections.

The alternative PSOE foreign strategy was composed of innovative measures and decisions, among them the design of the “Alliance of Civilizations” (under the full backing of the UN), in contrast with Bush’s “war on terror”. At the same time, the government announced an increase of aid volume to reach the desired 0.7% GDP, as set in the UN Millennium Declaration Goals. Moreover, Zapatero joined the conservative-social democratic alliance formed by the Franco-German axis, in opposition to Aznar’s positioning with the US-UK band. On top of that, a new defense policy favored European security identity, downsizing the preeminence of NATO and links with the United States.

The composed panorama of these ingredients favored an activity in multilateral circles, preferably the UN and the EU, with special attention to global governance, multilateralism and international law. The PP opposition found this policy as weak for negotiations and inadequate to defend the interests of the country and to identify correctly the realities of the world scenarios facing terrorism. In sum, both defended their points of view as reflecting national interest requiring a consensus, impossible to obtain. Experts attribute this frustration to the omnipresent aim of presence of the consensus since the rebirth of democracy, as way to legitimize an overall democratic policy.

However, a closer analysis found major shortcomings in the results of this general policy and the impact of the application of the ideology behind the programs that were executed. On paper, Spain’s policies match the normative values of the EU. However, implementation is not an easy operation when confronting specific national interests and constraints. Domestic policies and plans do not meet at all times with the practical external actions.

It is a fact that during the Zapatero’s administration the priorities of his government prioritized basic individual (equality) and social rights (welfare and immigrant conditions). The
foreign record, however, shows that the same passion has not been quite applied. Some areas (poverty, water availability) were stressed while others (same sex marriage and abortion) were de-emphasized, most especially in the specific scene of Latin America. Conditionality in aid delivering was not at the top of the agenda. Same can be said for the implementation of asylum policies, showing a cautious Spanish attitude.

This profile is rather obvious in the content of the Plan Director\textsuperscript{22}, were the key words are tame “good governance” and “institutional strengthening”. The situation revealed by the explosion of the Arab crisis has shown an array of contrasting and sometimes embarrassing Spanish policies dealing with autocratic regimes in North Africa and the Middle East. Same can be said for the relations with the three last Spanish colonies (Cuba, Morocco and Equatorial Guinea). Experts point out the lack of coordination in aid policies and the absence of clear reporting documentation on the progress of the expected results of Spanish actions, most especially considering the lessons of the country’s past authoritarian legacy. In part this paradoxical behavior can be attributed to the Zapatero’s government opposition for the policies of U.S. president George Bush overstressing the fight against international terrorism. An additional factor is that Spain has been affected by the same double standards and hypocrisy that have been the norm of many EU and developed world countries. In sum, Spain has strengthened its European and Western status by incorporating ambivalent foreign policy political agendas.\textsuperscript{23}

7.2. Globalization Position

Without the traditional limitations of measurement of relative and absolute power (economic, political or military) of countries, there are other methods of evaluating the position of certain states in the wide context of globalization. The Indice Elcano de Presencia Global (IEPG) is a new tool developed by the prestigious Madrid think tank. It profiles the foreign projection of a given country in the economic, military, scientific, social and cultural fields. Population trends and development aid are also considered. Had power arguments are supplemented by factors of soft power. The index does not reflect how powerful or influential is a given state, but what its international positioning actually is. After selecting 54 countries that rank ahead of the rest, evidence shows that all 42 with larger GDP are present, as well as all G-20 member countries. The ranking then shows that the United States is logically the country with the largest world presence. Germany, France, the United Kingdom, China and Japan following. Spain occupies spot no. 9.

The ranking reveals that some countries are apparently less positioned in the world than their actual geopolitical and economic influence –they are boxing above their global position. This is the case of BRICS India (No. 18), Brazil (No. 25), South Africa (No. 35. In contrast,

\textsuperscript{22} Plan Director de la Cooperación Española 2009-2012, and Plan Anual de Cooperación Internacional (PACI 2010).

some others are better positioned (Canada, No. 10; Italy, No. 8), but they do not have similar influence or power— they are boxing below their potential. This is the case of Spain. While Spain does not ambition to be a regional power (as some countries with lower global positioning), it has the potential of projection in other non-European regions, such as Latin America. The Spanish language is a world asset, not limited to Europe.

In sum, the improvement of Spain in this global positioning dimension is rather impressive. At the end of the ‘80s Spain did not have multinational companies, any troops abroad, little immigration, poor sports hegemony, with very small development cooperation activities. Today Spain has a notable presence in multilateral forums and is very active in bilateral linkages. However, a word of caution is needed. While it is true that the global presence is consolidated, there is the risk of boxing below its level. Photo opportunities may not be enough for exercising influence and make a lasting impact.\(^\text{24}\)

7.3. Conclusion

The relatively positive situation of Spain’s in today’s international scene, making the country a suitable partner for alliances and compromises, shows that single disputes with other countries are rare and simply are the remain of historical factors that seem to be very difficult to drastically correct. With the exception of very few time occasions, they have not been the cause for drastic disagreements, although confrontations happened.

As a conclusion, a central question remains: are Spain’s foreign policy and global relations in tune with the overall international behavior of the European Union and its most important member states? The answer is, in general terms, a solid “yes”. Only minor corrections can be detected in certain concrete scenarios and peripheral issues. These make Spain a “different” country. The dimensions of Spain’s foreign policy that could be considered as peculiar in the EU setting are only a reflection of specific “special relationships” that reflect the lasting impact of history or are a sign of geographical constraints. These special dimensions would not make the country today an uncomfortable candidate for membership in the European Union, as they were not in 1986 when the actual accession took place.

In fact, the Spanish specificities today make them complementary to the overall minimal EU “foreign policy”. Where the EU as a whole can’t reach, Spain can contribute towards the collective success. Vice versa, in the scenarios and issues where Spain does not have the capacity, membership in the EU enables the Spanish government to have a saying. The practical example of the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) is a proof this thesis. Spain can offer the intensive network of diplomatic and development aid in place in Latin America, where it can mediate in crisis. The same can be said, in a smaller capacity, in the Middle East and North Africa.

Taking into account the current world circumstances, a careful assessment needs to accept that Zapatero’s policies were in part designed and executed to redress the actions taken by

Aznar, who in turn reversed the consensus that had existed during the Felipe González administrations. The PP leader opted for following Bush’s agenda based on hard power. Judging the Aznar period as an exception in recent Spanish history, Zapatero elected to recover a space for Spain in the EU and world scene inspired by the effectiveness of soft power. However, this strategy was cemented on rather optimistic terms does not take into serious consideration that the coming years should present similar positive economic conditions as the ones existing in 1994-2008. (Pereira). In realistic terms, Spain will have to accept the standing fact that while the EU is in trouble and decisions are harder due to the inter-governmental trend, still some members have a decisive saying. Called “axis” or “triumvirates” the reality is that Madrid has to accept to follow guidelines from Berlin or Paris, or both. And that may be in the best interest of Spain, although reluctantly.

Any reasonable script will also require a serious consensus forged again between the PP (ready to take power) and the PSOE (exhausted of suffering the consequences of the economic crisis, or worse, in opposition) (Pereira). This uncertain picture will develop in a global scene that may be very different than the currently existing. The EU (and that is already a fact not a prediction) may not be same as the one facing today’s economic and social challenges. New powers are rising and making the leadership of the United States questionable. Spain will have to choose wisely, balancing its own national interests and values.