From Normative Power to Great Power Politics: Change in the European Union’s Foreign Policy Identity

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From Normative Power to Great Power Politics: 
Change in the European Union’s Foreign Policy Identity

Francesco Ortoleva

Introduction and Research Question

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, one of the most significant developments in international relations is the important and growing role of the European Union (EU) as a global player in contemporary world politics. But what exactly is that role, how does the EU manage its relations with the external world and what identity does the EU wish to present to that world? In other words, what is the foreign policy identity of the EU? These are questions that analysts and scholars have grappled with since the formal creation of the EU at Maastricht in 1991 (Treaty on European Union).

The EU has worked very carefully to foster a specific type of international identity. It is generally seen and theorized as a leader in the promotion of international peace and humanitarian issues. The EU presents itself as a normative force in world politics. It has customarily placed overriding emphasis on international law, democracy, human rights, international institutions, and multilateralism in its foreign policy, while eschewing a foreign policy based on traditional national interests and material gain. The EU has, in fact, explicitly and formally announced these normative goals for its foreign policymaking in the second pillar of the Treaty on European Union, more commonly known as the CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy). But in a world that has become markedly more perilous since September 11, 2001, many Europeans consider U.S. unilateralism as dangerous as the putative terrorist activity it is attempting to halt. As a result, are we seeing the foreign policy identity of the EU begin to change? Does the EU see itself as a possible balance against the primacy of the United States? In other words, does the EU show signs of transforming to a more traditional foreign policy orientation; one based on traditional great power politics and geared towards ensuring the most basic of state interests: survival, security and power? This paper will investigate this transforming foreign policy identity of the EU by seeking to answer the following questions: If the EU’s foreign policy identity is indeed changing, then how is it changing, what is it becoming, and most importantly, what is causing it to change? I will argue that the EU’s foreign policy identity is changing from a normative power to an identity based more closely on a great power politics model; and that the influence of epistemic communities or knowledge based networks is a primary catalyst for this change.

Much has been written in recent years about the EU as an international actor. In fact, the main approaches to EU foreign policy can be classified into three groups according to how they conceptualize the EU as an international actor: the EU as a state (H. Smith, 2002; K. Smith, 2003), which looks at the EU thorough a state-centric framework of analysis; the EU as a unique actor or sui generis (Krahmann, 2003; M. Smith, 2004), which theorizes the EU as having

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different (non-state) motivations and interests as a result of its supranational construct; and a middle ground that merges the other two approaches, privileging neither the EU as a state conceptualization nor the EU as a unique actor, but incorporating both approaches in a foreign policy analysis hybridization (White; 2001; Tonra and Christiansen, 2004; and Carlsnaes, Sjursen, and White, 2004).

While these approaches analyze the EU as an international actor, few look at it from the standpoint of foreign policy identity. In other words, what sort of international presence does the EU envision for itself and wish to portray to the external world. Many assume that the EU, particularly when it is seen as a unique supranational entity, is a normative power (Manners, 2002). Little, until recently, has been written that challenges this conceptualization. However, in the spring of 2006, the Journal of European Public Policy published a special issue that looked at this very question¹. In this special issue, some of the most important scholars in the field of European foreign policy (EFP) debated the role of the EU in the international arena. A preponderance of the scholarly conversation reiterated the normative power role that the EU itself has promoted since Maastricht. But a few scholars have begun to question whether the EU identity as a normative power has begun to erode (Manner, 2006; Sjursen, 2006). Recent policy papers on security and defense have shown indications that Europe is seriously becoming more active as a player in international security and, consequently, considering a more traditional and militarized international identity. Some scholars, including Ian Manners who first theorized a normative Europe construct in his seminal 2002 article, have even begun to talk of a burgeoning industrial-defense complex emerging in Brussels, which may be important in influencing the EU to change to a more traditional foreign policy orientation (Manners, 2006; Hyde-Pierce, 2006).

What has been virtually neglected has been the growing influence of the transnational networks of knowledge-based experts in foreign policy (Krahmann, 2003). The literature has often referred to these knowledge-based networks as epistemic communities (Haas, 1992). Many of these Brussels based epistemic communities have become quite vocal in their call for the EU to pursue a more traditional power politics model of foreign policy in order to balance U.S. dominance and secure Europe against the current ubiquitous threats. This paper seeks to begin a discussion, all be cursorily, on the influence of these epistemic communities and thereby add to the conversation that the EU’s foreign policy identity is being transformed to a model based on great power politics. I will do so by arguing the following thesis: The influence of European epistemic communities has affected change in the foreign policy identity of the European Union, transforming it from one that is based on normative power to one that is based on traditional great power politics.

This paper will begin with a review of the extant literature on EU foreign policy². This literature review will start with a general review of some of the seminal works in the field of EU foreign policy studies. This will give us a clear perspective of where the scholarship on EU foreign policy has gone, what the theoretical arguments have been, and what this paper’s research might contribute to the subfield of EU foreign policy studies and to the field of EU studies in general. The literature review will then shift focus to the current work being done on EU foreign policy identity. After the literature review, the paper will then focus in on the current theoretical approach to Europe’s international identity, with a focus on whether Europe is a normative or civilian power. I then shall move to the question of how the EU’s foreign policy identity is changing and what evidence can we gather to corroborate that claim. Again, it is my contention that the EU foreign policy identity is transforming from one based on normative power to one

² Much of the literature often refers to EU foreign policy as “European foreign policy” or EFP. For reasons of clarity, I will refer to this subject as EU foreign policy except in instances where I am quoting a specific scholar who uses that particular term.
based great power politics. Finally, and key to my future research, I will investigate the influence of both Brussels-based and national epistemic communities on this foreign policy transformation.

On a cautionary note, the reader must bear in mind that this paper is not the finished product of rigorous and completed research; it is rather a scholarly exploration into a possibly productive future research endeavor. Therefore, this paper’s intent is to begin a discourse that challenges the current theorizing on the EU’s international identity by looking at some of the important outputs and influences on EU foreign policy making. It, therefore, does not claim to be a completed research project but rather an inquisitive commencement.

**Literature Review**

Before we investigate the changing identity of the EU’s foreign policy, a review of some contemporary European foreign policy literature is necessary. What is immediately evident in any cursory look at the study of EU foreign policy is a lack of a coherent approach. Because of this incoherence, a simple typology of theoretical approaches might prove helpful. The works reviewed here will be classified into three groups according to how they conceptualize the EU as an international actor: the EU as a state, the EU as a unique actor, and a middle ground that merges various approaches with Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). This is done because how an analyst envisions the EU as an actor will, in most cases, determine their theoretical framework. For instance, if an analyst sees the EU as an international organization, that analyst might be predisposed to an intergovernmentalist framework of analysis.3

In terms of the EU as a state, the work of Hazel Smith (2002) and Karen Smith (2003) are important. In her book, *European Union Foreign Policy: What it is and What it Does*, Hazel Smith asks a rhetorical question “Does the European Union have a foreign policy?” Her answer is unequivocal: the EU does indeed have a foreign policy, and it is much the same as that of the nation-state” (Smith, 2002: 7). She outlines six arguments for disposing of current objections to the very idea of an EU foreign policy. These objections are grouped into two main categories, pertaining to either structural and/or institutional deficiencies, on the one hand, or to the capacity of the EU to pursue a foreign policy of its own, on the other hand (Smith, 2002: 1). All six of these recognized objections – that the EU is not a sovereign entity, that it is a subordinate actor to its member states, that it lacks a centralized decision-making as well as military capacity, that it is not very effective in international crisis-management, and the so-called ‘capability-expectation gap’ argument – are quickly dismissed by Smith, leading her to conclude that “the EU does indeed have a foreign policy and that it can be analysed in pretty much the same way as we can analyze that of any nation-state” (Smith, 2002:1).

Smith has no problems with the idea that the EU has a foreign policy much like that any other state actor. Her argument is clear on this point: “Foreign policy is the capacity to make and implement policies aboard which promote the domestic values, interests and policies of the actor in question”, and since, in her view the EU does possess all of these attributes, it behaves as a state and, therefore, has a foreign policy (Smith, 2002: 7). It can be characterized thus due to “its developed philosophy based on liberal capitalist democracy, and its panoply of domestic competencies and policies on issues ranging from the common market to co-operation in policing and judicial matters” (Smith, 2002: 7-8). This view puts her at complete odds with the “sui generis” (EU as a unique actor) scholars to be reviewed below.

Smith’s analytical approach is to explicitly shun a procedural or institution path – to not equate European foreign policy with what “emanates from the procedures of the CFSP” (Smith, 2002: 8). Instead, she favors what she calls the “geo-issue-area approach”, involving foci which

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3 Although popular in the 1980s and the 1990’s (see the work of Nugent, 1994), the “EU as an international organization” approach will not be considered in this review because it has become less relevant in contemporary EU studies, particularly in European foreign policy analysis.
“engage with either the geographical reach of the Union abroad or which attempt to evaluate the various issues with which the Union has involved itself abroad” (Smith, 2002: 9). Beyond this empirically focused framework of analysis, no particular theory is advanced in this study; instead Smith notes that there are not really any “theoretical obstacles to adopting the approach that the EU has a foreign policy that it exercises throughout the world in a number of different issue areas” (Smith, 2002: 269). Smith is also quite contemptuous of what she calls the “institutionalist ghetto of European integration analysis which concentrates on procedure at the expense of substance…in defence of the idea that CFSP procedures as written in the treaties should limit the scope of inquiry into EU foreign policy” (Smith, 2002: 269-270). It is to Smith’s credit that she does give us an empirical look at the output of EU foreign policy-making system. Smith seems to understand that substance is sorely missing in much of the scholarship on European foreign policy.

Karen Smith’s book, *European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World* (2003), also follows Hazel Smith’s analytical approach by avoiding procedural or institutional analysis and focuses on issue areas. For Smith, the EU acts very much like a state in the international arena and goes about pursuing its foreign policy objective very much like a state (Smith, 2003: 195-198). What is unique and distinctive about the EU as an international actor is the interests it pursues, not how it pursues those interests. Smith is a strong proponent of the EU as a normative power. This will be discussed in more depth below.

On the opposite side, conceptually speaking, of “the EU as a state” scholars are the *sui generis* or “the EU as a unique actor” scholars. Again, these scholars and writers look at the institutions and procedures that lead to the formulation of a European foreign policy. Their concern is with process rather than the substantive output that preoccupied Hazel Smith. Two works representative of this approach are Michael E. Smith’s *Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation* (2004) and Elke Krahmann’s *Multilevel Networks in European Foreign Policy* (2003).

Michael E. Smith examines European foreign policy, specifically CFSP, in terms of its inherent nature as an example of institutionalized multilateral cooperation among sovereign, independent states. To Smith “European integration is largely an ongoing discourse about institutions: how to translate very general common values or aspirations into specific collective policies or behaviors, internal and external, through the application of norms and rules” (Smith, 2004: 9). Smith defines “EU foreign policy”, “European foreign policy (EFP)” or “foreign/security policy cooperation” (he uses these terms interchangeably) as cooperative actions “(1) undertaken on behalf of all EU states toward non-members, international bodies, or global events or issues; (2) oriented toward a specific goal; (3) made operational with physical activity, such as financing or diplomacy; and (4) undertaken in the context of CFSP discussions” (Smith, 2004: 18). The emphasis here is on institutionalized cooperation on the part of the EU member states, specifically in situations in which “states did not perceive themselves as having identical interests in a given choice situation, yet...attempted to adjust their foreign policies to accommodate each other” (Smith, 2004: 18). This type of policy coordination necessarily involves active efforts on the part of member states to achieve a common end, and is, consequently, a highly purposive and conjoined type of activity heavily dependent on institutionalized forms of cooperation.

The purpose of this book is to trace and explain the institutionalization of cooperation in Europe since the early days of the European Political Cooperation (EPC), an earlier form of CFSP pre-Maastricht. He explores how cooperation in foreign and security policy in Europe grew from a very informal, ex-legal, ad hoc system had been formally institutionalized into a legally binding policymaking process capable of producing common positions and joint actions on a wide range of global problems. Smith does this by explaining how changes in institutional context, in terms of intergovernmental, transgovernmental, and supranational procedures, affect the propensity for cooperation, and then linking processes of institutionalization to an expansion of foreign policy
cooperation among member states. This is a dynamic relationship: cooperation can encourage actors to build institutions, but institutions themselves should foster cooperative outcomes, which later influence the process of institution-building through feedback mechanisms. Smith argues that “there is a reciprocal relationship between institution-building and cooperation and that in the case of foreign policy this has meant a progressive expansion of both the institutional mechanisms and substantive outcomes of cooperation” (Smith, 2004: 239-240). This process has led to the institutionalization of a EU foreign policy capacity, embodied in the CFSP, defined in terms of both regular, substantive policy outcomes and a set of explicit aspirations or goals.

Elke Krahmann’s study continues the idea of the EU as a unique actor by again looking at how institutions and procedures, which she classifies as networks, distinguish the EU from any other actor in the contemporary international system. Krahmann favors employing a different definition of European Union foreign policy, one which pertains to the decisions and actions of core European states and their multilateral organizations which are primarily concerned with the welfare of the region (2003:3). The reason for this new conceptualization is that European foreign policy cannot, she claims, be reduced to the actions of the EU alone, nor to those of its member states, since not only are these “influenced by the United States and vice versa, but also there are key European foreign policy decisions taken and implemented by a broad range of national and multinational institutions, including the United Nations and NATO” (Krahmann, 2003: 3). As a consequence of this complex set of relationships and foreign policy decision-making processes characterized by the increasing multiplicity, diversity and interdependence of foreign policy actors, she proposes the use of a multilevel network approach to incorporate the behavior of national, transnational and international actors within the European context. In her view, this behavior can best be explained in terms of the notion of rational, utility maximizing actors attempting to influence one another’s preferences in the pursuit of European foreign policies (Krahmann, 2003: 34). For empirical evidence, she uses this approach in three case studies of European foreign policy decision-making: the first focusing on the EU’s dual-use export control agreement, the second on transatlantic community’s endorsement of the air strikes in Bosnia, and the third on the how the United Kingdom’s air-to-missile project was affected by this multilevel European foreign policy network.

Krahmann’s argument is sophisticated and well argued, but it ultimately seems incomplete. While she looks at national, transnational, and international levels of the European system, little discussion is given to the subnational level. This seems like a notable oversight considering all the attention regions and subnational identity have received recently from EU scholars. More importantly, for the scope of this paper, Smith neglects to mention the growing influence of epistemic communities in her multilevel network approach. This seems odd given her focus on the multiplicity of foreign policy actors in the EU.

The third group of our simple typology of EU foreign policy scholarship is a middle ground between the “EU as a state” and the “EU as a unique actor” conceptualizations. While this scholarship seeks to theorize EU foreign policy as not quite that of a state’s, it also recognizes that it is not completely unique or “sui generis”; it therefore may use some traditional tools or frameworks of analysis that are associated with state centric models. However, these analytical frameworks must be adapted to the particulars of the EU as an international actor, which is neither state, international organization, or completely unique. By far the most accepted framework of analysis used by EU foreign policy analysts is FPA (Foreign Policy Analysis). As we shall see in Brian White’s work, this is an FPA that is adjusted for the peculiarities of EU foreign policy or what he calls a “transformational FPA” (White, 2001). In edited works by Ben

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4 This case study is also used by Brian White (2001) in his discussion of the national foreign policies of member states and how they are affected by the EU. So a connection may exist between multilevel network theory and Europeanization, but may be simply an instance of looking at different causes but same effect (a less independent national foreign policy of an EU member state).

5 See the work of Dell’ Olio (2005), Dunkerly et al (2002), and Citrin and Sides (2004).
Tonra and Thomas Christiansen (2004) and Walter Carlsnaes, Helene Sjursen, and Brian White (2004), other theoretical approaches to EFP, including constructivist, are discussed but FPA is given the most coverage. In fact, White has a chapter in each of these edited volumes in which he argues for the application of an “adapted” FPA to the study of European foreign policy.

In his book, *Understanding European Foreign Policy* (2001), White argues that EFP is more than just the foreign policy of the EU. Unlike Hazel Smith and Michael E. Smith, who use the “EU” and “European” interchangeable, White believes EU foreign policy to be one part of three that are intertwined to make up an EFP. *Community foreign policy* (or “Pillar I” external relations), referring to the foreign policy of the European Community (EC) established by the Treaties of Rome in 1957, and which today can be said to constitute the foreign economic dimension of EFP; *Union foreign policy* which, until the Single European Act of 1986, consisted of member states in the process called European Political Cooperation (EPC), and subsequently upgraded and formalized in the second pillar form of the CSFP; and *national foreign policy*, pursued by the member states but increasingly under the institutional influence of the EU as a whole (White, 2001: 40-41). White refers to these strands or parts as foreign policy sub-systems (2001: 166). White’s main point is that “European foreign policy as a whole is conceived as an interacting foreign policy “system” but these types of policy are regarded as the “sub-systems” that constitute and possibly dominate it” (White, 2001: 24). White never gives us a formal definition, his point is that defining EFP in terms of just one or two of these sub-systems is too restrictive, since “European governance in the foreign policy field appears to take all forms and if it is to be useful for analytical purposes, the concept has to encompass the fragmented nature of agency at the European level and the variety of forms of action” implied with this three part conceptualization of EFP (White, 2001: 39). However, he does make an important point about how the distinction between these three foreign policy sub-systems tends blur as they become more interwoven over time. “Clearly, the more extensive the interrelationships between them, the more justified we are in using the label European foreign policy” (Smith, 2001: 39).

White uses an adjusted FPA as his frame work of analysis. This is composed of an interrelated set of elements consisting of actors, capabilities/instruments, context, and actions/output. The system is described as follows: “the nature of the policy process is affected by the identity of the actors involved, the issues being dealt with, the policy instruments available, and not least, the context within which policy is made….these interrelationships in turn generate the outputs from the system” (White 2001: 40).

Having established a “transformed” FPA as his epistemological guide, White proceeds to analyze the three types of European foreign policy by looking at case studies that empirically bear out his sub-system formulation. The most interesting in terms of future research possibilities is the national foreign policy case study in which he looks at the effects European foreign policymaking has had on the British national foreign policy. His argument is that national foreign policies have undergone a “Europeanization”, one that is empirically illustrated by the case of Britain. This case is important because, as White points out, “Britain is the perhaps the least appropriate member to analyse in this context, successive governments having staunchly resisted the whole process of Europeanization” since it joined the EEC in 1973 (White, 2001: 118). “To the extent that British foreign policy has been “Europeanized” despite apparently strong resistance from British governments, Europeanization can be said to be a significant process indeed in the construction of a European foreign policy” (White, 2001: 119).

Overall, White’s arguments and conclusions about how we should conceptualize EFP, through a three sub-system model; and how we theorize EFP, through the use of an adapted FPA, are convincing. This adaptation of FPA is important because it moves it from a strictly state-centric, and unitary, realist approach to one that moves beyond the state as the only actor and

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6 This is quite different from Michael E. Smith’s definition that portrays EFP as strictly pertaining to the procedures and outputs of the CFSP.
incorporates non-state actors as important determinants of foreign policymaking. This opens the door for looking at other important foreign policy inputs such as the influence of epistemic communities on foreign policymaking. White’s reconceptualization of FPA may have laid important steps in salvaging an anachronistic sub-discipline of IR and given us a strong way, epistemologically speaking, of approaching EFP.

As mentioned previously, other approaches are available to analysts and scholars of European foreign policy. In Tonra and Christiansen edited book, *Rethinking the European Union Foreign Policy* (2004), we are given a variety of approaches to study EU foreign policy that may be considered constructivist. Like White, Tonra and Christiansen expand the conceptualization of EU foreign policy to be more than the intergovernmental CFSP. It involves “the totality of the EU’s external relations, combining political, economic, humanitarian, and more recently, also military instruments at the disposal of the Union” (Tonra & Christiansen, 2004: 2). It is the study of this broader concept, going beyond traditional, exclusive focus on CFSP, that is the main purpose of this book. In particular, the book addresses three challenges that arise from the development of foreign policy in the EU over the past decade: first, it suggests ways of reconceptualizing the external relation of the European Union as foreign policy and therefore to apply concepts to the study of this area that draw on the insights of approaches from the wider field of FPA. Second, it discusses the positioning of the study of EFP in relation to the discipline of international relations, in recognition of the transformation that the European construction has undergone in the recent past. And third, it links developments in the debate about integration theory, in particular the constructivist challenge to the established rationalist and intergovernmentalist approaches, to the study of EFP (Tonra & Christiansen, 2004: 2). “Taken together, this book suggests new ways in which European Union foreign policy can be studied in the context of the significant theoretical advancements and empirical developments that occurred during the 1990s” (Tonra & Christiansen, 2004: 3). It is, however, the third challenge that is the core theme in most of the contributions in this book. The contributors wish to “rethink” EFP by using constructivism. By taking a constructivist approach, they can consider ways in which the interests, values, ideas and beliefs of actors are themselves explanatory variables. This does not necessarily exclude rationalism. In other words it might not just be about “side-payments” but it might also be about the origins, dynamics and evolution of an actor’s beliefs and interests. “EU foreign policy might also be seen not to be about rationalist calculation at all but to be understood as being all about identity creation” (Tonra & Christiansen, 2004: 8). To Tonra and Christiansen, “this post-positivist turn need not necessarily go so far as some post-structuralist approaches: those far countries of postmodernism where language is everything and there are no material constructs, only discourse” (Tonra & Christiansen, 2004: 9). It does, however, offer a fundamental challenge to rationalistic accounts with which several of the authors in this text engage. It is thus Tonra’s and Christiansen’s, along with most of the authors in this book, contention that EFP is an “ideal empirical testing ground” for what might be called a hard-core constructivist approach. This book points out nicely that EFP might be an area where first order constructivist theorizing might finally occur. The EU, with its overarching emphasis on identity, beliefs, norms, and rules, is a perfect evidentiary milieu for constructivists looking for a space to build theories.

Unlike Tonra and Christiansen’s book (2004), which is a theoretical discussion about the analysis of EU foreign policy and the possible approaches the may be employed in that pursuit, Walter Carlsnaes, Helene Sjursen, and Brian White’s *Contemporary European Foreign Policy* (2004) is an edited work about theory and issue areas. The first part of the book contains chapters by Brian White (2004) on FPA’s application to EU foreign policy and an interesting chapter by Knud Erik Jorgensen (2004) about conceptualizing EU foreign policy. Jorgensen argument in this chapter is that nature of European foreign policy has been changed in the last two decades. “The

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7 See chapter by Adrain Hyde-Price, “Interests, institutions and identities in the study of European foreign policy”.
end of the Cold War and the developments within the EU since have changed the nature of foreign policy in Europe, both with respect to the conduct of foreign policy by individual European states and by the EU itself” (Jorgensen, 2004: 32). Jorgensen concludes that in order to improve our understanding of EU foreign policy we need to refine further our conceptual framework of analysis, keeping in mind that contemporary EU foreign policy is conducted at several levels, implying that mutually constitutive features should be privileged (Jorgensen, 2004: 50). Furthermore, EU foreign policy is conducted by a number of different sets of collective actors, applying several methods of decision-making, and making policies that are more or less efficient in terms of reaching stated goals (Jorgensen, 2004: 51). In essence, Jorgensen is calling for a specifically “European” foreign policy analysis, one that helps specialist create foreign policy theories that are specific to the European condition, but, he warns us, of little applicability elsewhere. Whether that is a satisfactory state of things remains an issue for prudent consideration (Jorgensen, 2004: 51).

The second and third part of the Tonra and Christiansen book addresses analytical issue area like diplomacy, security, defense, human rights and sovereignty, and applied case studies to each of these analytical topics. One chapter of particular importance to this paper is Ulrich Sedelmeier chapter on collective identity. Sedelmeier points out that while much has been written on collective identity formation in the European Union, scholars have barely used these insights on EU foreign policy (Sedelmeier, 2004: 123). This chapter suggests that we can gain important insights into EU foreign policy from a perspective that acknowledges that the EU’s identity matters causally for foreign policy. “A focus on identity formation at the EU level allows additional factors, beyond materialist ones, to be taken into account, namely the evolving discourse about the EU’s international role and about constitutive norms at the EU level that defines a collective identity for policy makers from the member governments and EU institutions” (Sedelmeier, 2004: 136). Sedelmeier also points out that one area where such identity formation at the EU level has become particularly salient for European foreign policy since the end of the Cold War is the area of the protection of human rights and promotion of democracy.

**Normative or Civilian Power Europe?**

The contribution by Sedelmeier leads us to a discussion on the research that has arisen around this idea of EU foreign policy being driven by a normative construct. This external projection of EU identity has lead many to surmise the EU as a normative power in international relations. Whereas much attention was traditionally paid to the question of whether or not there is such a thing as EU foreign policy and if there is, how do we go about analyzing it. The current analysis now looks at how we can conceptualize this EU foreign policy. In other words, what characterizes this foreign policy (Sjursen, 2006). In this context, a number of authors have stressed the “particularity” of the EU. In developing their argument, many scholars have often built upon Francois Duchene’s (1972) idea of the EU as a “civilian power”. According to Duchene, the particularity of the EC’s (EU) international role is linked to the “nature” of the polity itself (1972, 33). For Duchene, the EC’s (EU) strength and novelty as an international actor is based on its ability to extend its own model of ensuring stability and security through economic and political rather than military means (1972, 33). Many more contemporary scholars have picked up on this idea and developed it further (Rosencrance, 1998; Whitman, 1998; Manners, 2002; Diez, 2004; Smith, 2003). What these scholars share is an interest in the normative dimension to EU foreign policy. For scholars like Ian Manners (2002), the idea of the EU as a civilian power was important but limited. “The EU and its actions in world politics demand a wider and more appropriate approach in order to reflect what its is, does and should do” (2002: 238). Manners uses the phrase “normative power Europe” in order to attempt to capture the movement away Cold War approaches to the EU (2006: 184). Based on his research into the
symbolic and normative discourses and practices of the European Community (EC)/EU during the 1980’s and 1990’s, Manners developed the “normative power Europe” approach as a response to the relative absence of normative theorizing and to promote normative approaches to the EU (2006: 184). For Manners (2002), EU foreign policy is about norm diffusion rather than promoting state-centric interests. This diffusion of norms is shaped by six factors: contagion, informational diffusion, procedural diffusion, transference, overt diffusion and the cultural filter (Manners, 2002: 244-45). In his conceptualization of EU foreign policy, Manners argues that what has been significant in these norms diffusion factors has been the relative absence of physical force in the imposition of these norms. This absence of physical force and the importance of cultural diffusion led Manners to argue that “the most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or what is says, but what it is” (Manners, 2002: 252). As Helene Sjursen, a EU foreign policy analyst, writes, “the argument in this literature tends to be that the EU is distinguished from other actors because it is not only a civilian power but also a normative, civilizing, or ethical power within the international system. (Sjursen, 2006: 170).

An important work that picks up this idea is the aforementioned work by Karen Smith (2003). Smith intends to show how the EU’s foreign policy has become one that uses norms and norm promotion in its formulation. To Smith, norms are the guiding values that determine the course of EU foreign policy. Smith argues that EU’s international identity is tied to the promotion of five foreign policy objectives: the encouragement of regional cooperation; the advancement of human right; the promotion of democracy and good governance; the prevention of violent conflicts; and the fight against international crime. This normativity in EU foreign policy makes it quite unique among other actors in the international system.

Smith’s work is important because it adds to the voices that call the EU a normative power. One critique that can be levied at Smith and other scholars who promote the idea of a normative power Europe is their neglect of change. They do not deal with the possibility that this guiding normativity or the norm diffusion identity of EU foreign policy might change due to external and internal factors.

Interestingly, it is Ian Manners, the originator of the “normative power Europe” construct that begins to question it as a valid analytical tool. In his most recent article for the Journal of European Public Policy in the spring of 2006, Manners detects a transformation of EU foreign policy identity (Manners, 2006: 189-93). In this seminal article in field of EU foreign policy analysis, Manners puts forth the idea that the continued militarization of the EU is endangering the normative power of the EU as an international actor. He proceeds to prove this by analyzing the influence of the “military industrial simplex” in Brussels and the various epistemic communities that have appeared in the EU capital. His conclusion is that the EU maybe losing its normative identity in foreign policy. Others have also recently begun to follow Manners lead (see Quille, 2004; Sjursen, 2006; Hyde-Price, 2006). It is here, in this discourse of a change in the way the EU projects itself internationally, that my argument is generated. I will now explore, in more depth this idea of a transforming EU foreign policy identity.

The European Union as a Great Power

For scholars like Manners (2006) and others, the acquisition of military means, or the EU’s ambition to acquire such means, might weaken the argument that the EU is a normative power. It could provoke a shift, making EU foreign policy more akin to that of traditional great powers. As Sjursen points out, “it raises the question about whether the EU can be considered a normative or civilian power” (2006: 171). In Manners estimation, the militarizing processes provided for by various policy instruments such as the European Security Strategy (ESS) and others, are already weakening the normative claims of the EU in a post-September 11th world characterized by the drive towards “martial potency” and the growth of a Brussels based “military –industrial
simplex” (Manners, 2006: 182). It is my contention in this paper that this is changing the personality of the EU on the international stage or, more precisely, the identity of the EU’s foreign policy to one that is more recognizable in the personality of a rising, power seeking state.

The continued militarization of the EU beyond 2003 now poses risks and consequences to the EU’s normative power in world politics (Manners, 2006). The year 2003 is a watershed year in European foreign and security policy. It marks the adoption by the EU of the European Security Strategy (ESS). This important document produced by the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) states the security goals of the EU. It is particularly salient to this paper because it is prima facie evidence of the EU’s changing international identity. This security strategy document calls for an increase in the EU’s military capability. It also indicates that the changing security environment may effectively force the EU to become more active as a world player in security. This document shows explicitly that the EU is considering changing its foreign and security identity from a normative based model or “civilian” power.

...more active in pursuing our strategic objectives. This applies to the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention at our disposal, including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities. Active policies are needed to counter the new dynamic threats. We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention (European Security Strategy 2003: 17).

As Gerard Quille, a European security specialist, argued in a recent article, “the ESS may be an important first step along the road to an EU strategic culture” (Quille, 2004: 249). Although many have disagreed about the precise direction of the road marked “strategic culture”, it is clear to Manners, Quille and others that since the end of 2003 the “EU has taken a sharp turn away from the normative path of peace towards a full spectrum of instruments for robust intervention, as the ESS suggests”(Manners, 2006:189).

These scholars who have moved way from the normative power Europe construct that Manners has originally put forth, now consider the way in which the events of September 11th, 2001 and the March 11, 2004 (Madrid Train Bombings), together with the transatlantic crises created by the invasion of Iraq, diverted the EU on a road towards militarization by “martial potency” and driven by the growth of a Brussels based military-industrial simplex (Manners, 2006: 189). Manners, in particular, focuses in on EU militarization by considering the institutional prioritization, short- and long-term military missions, the Brussels-based transnational policy and knowledge networks, the diverting of the human security agenda in Brussels, all culminating in the development of a military-industrial simplex (Manners, 2006: 189-90).

As one analyst points out “despite the widespread expectation that the civilian ESDP missions are more likely than military one’s, and that five out of six on-going European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) missions are non-military, the extent of institutional prioritization of military structures and frameworks is apparent” (Keane, 2004: 498). This prioritization includes the emphasis given to identifying and achieving military capabilities ahead of civilian capabilities, as the Capabilities Commitment Conference implicitly recognized in November 2004 when it acknowledged the “shortcomings on issues such as mission and planning support, adequate financing, the ability of the EU to deploy at short notice and procurement to be addressed urgently.” As the quote from the ESS, cited above, illustrates, “in a strategic culture

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9 See EUPM, EUPOL Proxima, EUJUST Themis, EUPOL Kinshasa, EUJUST Lex, which are example of policing, institution building or technical assistance program by the EU in places like sub-Saharan Africa.

favoring robust intervention, civilian activities appear to be useful only in as far as they are needed to counter new dynamic threats, thus subverting the normative approach” (Manners, 2006: 190).

The Influence of Epistemic Communities

What is driving this change of foreign policy identity? How has the EU started to transform from what Manners (2002) originally termed a “normative power Europe” to a growing power in which militarization and the growth of a strategic culture makes its international identity more in line with a traditional great power politics model? Manners believes that it is a growing military-industrial simplex that is driving this change. That this system or network of European defense contractors, lobbyists, the EU bureaucracy, and other actors, has driven the EU to change its direction. For Manners, the motive for this transformation is a mix of economic benefits for the indigenous defense industry and real concern that exogenous events in world politics must impel the EU to prepare itself to intervene militarily around the world. I argue that while these factors are important, the influence of the policy institutes, think tanks, the defense industry lobby, and a burgeoning network of security scholars and analysts form as a European epistemic community which may be the key to understanding this transformation of the EU’s foreign policy orientation.

A quick review of this increasingly important theoretical concept is appropriate here. Epistemic communities have become an important research focus of the more reflective IR theorists, in particular, the constructivists. Peter Haas (1992) has defined epistemic communities as a network of knowledge-based experts or groups with an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within the domain of their expertise...“they are channels thorough which new ideas circulate from societies to governments as well as from country to country” (Haas, 1992: 27). Haas has theorized that they influence state interest in four ways: Elucidating the cause and effect relationships and providing advice about the likely results of various courses of actions following a shock or crisis; shedding light on the nature of the complex inter-linkages between issues and on the chain of events that might proceed either from failure to take action or from instituting a particular policy; helping to define the self-interests of a state or factions within it; and helping to formulate policies through framing of alternatives and implications of possible actions (Haas, 1992).

Epistemic communities have been a tremendous influence in American foreign policy since the beginning of the Cold War. I argue that their European counterparts are starting to have the same influence on EU foreign and security policymaking.

One evidentiary example of the influence of these epistemic communities is the prioritization of military affairs in CFSP policymaking. The CFSP and its EC predecessor, the EPC, have always put human security at the forefront of its agenda. Human security refers to the normative aspects of foreign and security policy. In the EU, it has specifically meant people-centered freedom from fear and want (Manners, 2006 192). This would include the promotion of human and economic rights and conflict prevention through international institutions. But there are explicit indications that this idea of human security has lost its priority status. Manners (2006) points out that the Barcelona Report makes clear that the new European security doctrine (ESS) prioritizes the appropriate use of force over both freedom and human rights (192). Some critics of the EU’s rising militarization have noted that “the increasing emphasis on security issues, the fight against terrorism and concerns over weapons of mass destruction, threaten to overshadow all European foreign policy, leaving little or no room for policies geared towards human security (Van Reisen, Stocker, & Sebban, 2004:36).

Another example of the change brought about these epistemic communities is the way the EU is reconceptualizing its fighting force, the limited RRF. Jocelyn Mawdsley, a noted European

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11 For the use of epistemic communities in constructivism, see the work of Emanuel Adler (1992), Adler & Haas (1992); and Adler & Bernstein (2005)
security analyst, has closely scrutinized the way in which the limited equipment needs of the RRF (Rapid Reaction Force) have been quickly expanded into a quantitatively different arms dynamic by the activism of a Brussels-based transnational policy network, particularly those that have an intimately intertwined with various European defense industry lobbies (Mawdsley, 2004). What Mawdsley points out is the way in which the pre-2001 agreements on a RRF were rapidly altered after the 2003 military arrangements for “preventative engagement” by those who sought to gain from such a change. I would argue in the case of the EU, the Brussels-based epistemic communities are those actors who would gain from such a transformation in foreign and security policy orientation or identity. In particular, these epistemic communities see militarization as an opportunity to empower their political role, as well as achieving deeper security (Manners, 2006: 191).

So in review, the argument made by scholars like Manners (2006), Quille (2004), Sjursen (2006) and others is that the militarization of the EU called for by the passage in 2003 of the European Security Strategy is deteriorating the normative power identity of the EU. This, in turn, will lead to the EU adopting a more traditional great power politics model of foreign policy identity. I hope to contribute to this discourse by arguing that this change of foreign policy identity is being heavily influenced by the policy institutes and knowledge-based network in Brussels and in various member state capitals. These epistemic communities, motivated by political power and influence or even genuine concern for the security of the EU, have been quite successful in effecting this change of identity. While Manners (2006) and others acknowledge the influence of these knowledge and policy institutes, I wish to take the argument further by illustrating through evidence that these epistemic communities are a main driving force behind this foreign and security policy transformation. In terms of my causal argument, epistemic communities are my independent variable, while the foreign policy identity of the EU is my dependent variable. The type of empirical evidence that I wish to investigate in the near future for this causal argument is reviewed below. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to conduct a rigorous investigation of these epistemic communities in any depth, I wish to identify some of the actors and networks who may be important subjects for future research. First, I shall review some prima fascia evidence of a changing EU foreign policy identity. Then, the essay will conclude with a review of some of the key European based epistemic communities that may be important in future research.

Evidence for a Change in EU Foreign Policy Identity

To ascertain a change in foreign policy identity, we will need to look at the discourses and texts put out by the foreign policymakers of the EU. This will include official policy papers put out by institutional committees like the GAERC, speeches and communiqués by the High Representative for CFSP (HR), and policy papers and reports put out by both national and Brussels-based epistemic communities. In each of these types of texts, I will indicate where and how the author(s) are calling for a change of foreign policy identity and what sort of identity they are looking for the EU to adopt. I argue that the evidence reviewed below will bear out that the EU’s foreign policy objectives, indeed, its international interests have started to change from that of a normative power to one that reflects traditional state interest in security, relative power, and influence. The evidence will be divided by sources: institutional documents, HR speeches, and textual discourses by the epistemic community. Each will be cited and discussed individually.

12 The concept of using the RRF for preventative engagement was introduced in the European Security Strategy, 2003: 18.
Institutional Sources


These notes are summaries of the proceedings of the GAERC, which is the foreign and security policy permutation of the Council of Ministers of the European Union. This is the main foreign policymaking center of the EU. Much of the current debate on how the EU should presents itself to the world in terms of foreign policy and security occurs in these meetings. This specific meeting note is important because it contains the actual discussions by the GAERC on the European Security Strategy that was adopted by the European Council in December of 2003. The GAERC voted on whether to adopt this document as the security strategy of the EU. Many of the ministers voiced their opinion that EU should become less concerned with normative issues and more concerned with traditional foreign and security policy interests. This speaks to the central argument of this paper; that the EU’s foreign policy identity is transforming to a more traditional, power politics mode.


This is the empirical “smoking gun” for the argument that the identity of the EU foreign and security policy is transforming. This important document produced by the GAERC and endorsed by the European Council states the security goals of the EU. It is particularly salient to the present research because it is prima facie evidence of the EU’s changing international identity. This security strategy document calls for an increase in the EU’s military capability. It also explicitly indicates that the changing security environment may effectively force the EU to become more active as a world player in security. This document shows clearly that the EU is considering changing its foreign and security identity from a normative based model or “civilian” power. The quote used earlier in this paper from the ESS illustrates clearly the call for a more aggressive and militarized EU.


This particular policy report, drafted and endorsed by the European Council, is key because it is the consensus opinion of the heads of each member state. It illustrates the opinion of the member states about external relations and, as such, sets the agenda for the policy-making institutions of the EU (i.e. GAERC and the entire Council of Ministers).

This particular report deals with the issue of the EU’s expanding role as an international security actor. It is clear in the discussions of the European Council that influential member states like France and the Netherlands want the EU to present an international identity that is strong, respected, and independent (from the United States). Again, reiterating the ideas put forth in the European Security Strategy (2003), a call is made for expanded diplomatic and military capabilities. This is important because it clearly indicates which member states are pushing for a change in the EU’s international identity.
**High Representative for CFSP (Javier Solana)**


This speech by the EU High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, illustrates that while normative power is still Europe’s foreign policy identity, Solana indicates that the EU needs to continue to implement the suggestions of the 2003 European Security Strategy and ramp up its diplomatic and military capabilities. Solana talks extensively about the EU’s increasingly important role in world affairs. Although not couched in the language of great power politics, Solana does emphasize the importance of EU influence in the world and how that may be utilized in the securitization of Europe. This speech is important evidence of how some of the EU’s foreign policymaking elite have begun to conceptualize a different identity for the EU’s international role.


This speech which was given just a few weeks before the adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS) is used by Solana to prepare the public for a different type of EU vision. While the typical reference to the EU’s identity as a normative force in the world is put forth, Solana explicitly states that the EU needs to become more focused and coherent in its security policymaking. He believes that the ESS is an important step to this goal because it is a framework for Europe to be more active, more capable and more coherent. In his discussion, about capability, Solana points out that this will entail strengthening the military capabilities of the EU and using this military power to fortify its diplomatic competencies.

This speech is of utility for this paper because it clearly demonstrates that the High Representative for CFSP has bought into the further transforming of the European foreign policy and security orientation toward that of a traditional great power. It is further evidence that this orientation has changed. One important note on this speech is Solana’s acknowledgement of the role and influence of some key policy institutes (Aspen Institute in Rome, the EU Institute in Paris, and the Institute of International Affairs in Stockholm) that contributed and consulted in the formulation of the ESS. This is important primary source evidence of the influence of epistemic communities in the transformation of the EU’s foreign policy and security orientation. It is direct evidence of the inculcation of epistemic communities in the foreign and security policymaking of the EU.


Again, the High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, gives a speech about the European Security Strategy (ESS), which would be released in a month (12/13/03). Like the speech above, Solana reiterates that the ESS is an important step towards making the EU an important international actor because it is a framework for Europe to be more active, more capable and more coherent. Key in this speech is Solana’s focus on the EU’s global responsibilities. “As the EU grows to encompass twenty-five countries with some 450 million
inhabitants producing one quarter of the world’s GDP, we have a duty to assume our responsibilities on the world stage. As a global actor the Union must now face up to its responsibility for global security” (Solana, 2003).

Again, this speech will be used as prima fascia evidence of the changing nature of the way the EU envisions itself on the world stage. As Solana makes clear, the EU needs to take direct action and responsibility for the security and stability of the international system and, specifically, for its own security.

**Epistemic Communities**

Finally, we are able to scrutinize some key epistemic communities. These are Brussels / European based transnational policy institutes or think tanks that are part of the policy network. This body of sources is important because it illustrates the sort of information that these epistemic communities are inputting into the foreign policymaking network of the EU. Ian Manners (2006) has indicated that the epistemic communities listed below have had great effect on the changing foreign policy orientation of the EU. While they do not explicitly call for the EU to become and act like a traditional great power (i.e. self-interested, power-seeking, and looking to achieve relative gains vis-à-vis its rivals; all for the goal of maximizing its security), they are subtly influencing the elites and policymakers to take steps toward strengthening the power and capabilities of the EU. As Manners points out in his recent article, these epistemic communities call for the prioritization of military capabilities over civilian concerns like human security issues such as freedom from fear and want (Manners, 2006, 190). They also call for an active EU on the world stage, one that will ultimately compete with Russia, China, and even the United States. They are implicitly calling for a great power Europe.


This private, non-profit foreign policy think tank has been quite vocal in terms of calling for a more independent and capable EU as an international player. While based in Rome, it draws academics and analysts from all over Europe. It’s stated goal is to provide a forum for Europeans to air their concerns about the changing climate of international relations and security. As such, this epistemic community produces policy papers on the EU’s foreign and security policy. Many of the authors of these papers are vociferous in their call for a Europe that can rival the U.S in terms of projecting power internationally. Many of these authors argue that with the growing threat of an ever more dictatorial Russia, a unilateral United States, and a failing and dangerous Middle East, the EU needs to be prepared militarily and diplomatically to balance these threats. These types of documents are important because they are evidence of the sort of input certain European epistemic communities are having on the EU foreign and security policymaking.


This institute is supported by the EU thorough its second “pillar”- the Common Foreign and Security Policy. According to its website, this policy think tank has an autonomous status and intellectual freedom; the EUISS does not represent or defend any particular national interest. Its aim is to help create a common European security culture, to enrich the strategic debate, and systematically to promote the interests of the Union. Its main purpose is to provide forward-looking analysis for the Union’s Council and High Representative. As such it has great influence on the direction and orientation of the EU’s foreign and security policy.

This policy forum considers itself a neutral platform for European debate on security and defense issues. Yet, it is sponsored by many of the most prominent European defense industry contractors (i.e. Honeywell, Finmacchia, Thales, and others). As to be expected, the New Defence Agenda calls for a strong European presence on the international stage. In many of the documents produced by this forum, a Europe that is militarily equal to any other great power on the world stage is advocated. These documents continue to show that the EU is becoming militarily more capable to act as independent actor on the world stage and that the EU’s defense contractors are instrumental in changing this foreign and security policy orientation. Many important policy and advocacy documents are accessible in English from the NDA’s electronic archive which is available through their website.


The European Security Forum is part of the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), a Brussels based think tank that is intimately involved in the policy networks of the EU. The security forum and the discourse produced by this policy forum is generally seen as neo-conservative. They envision a Europe that is a world power, politically, economically, and militarily. In much of the discourse generated by this group, they argue that Europe has all the necessary attributes to become a great power. But what is needed in their conceptualization is a will or an identity that is markedly different from the civilian or normative power that is generally considered the EU’s international identity. Much of the textual or documentary evidence calls for the transformation of this identity or grand strategy. CEPS produces policy briefs, position papers, special reports, commentaries, and discussions by fellows, of which, most is available online through their excellent website.


This is a Brussels based lobby group that also serves as a policy forum on issues regarding the European defense and security industry. In this capacity, ASD has called for a militarily strong and independent Europe (EU). ASD employs a number of academic or policy analysts and produces various forms of texts that deal with the EU’s role in the contemporary global stage. Ian Manners has indicated that a military industrial “simplex” has begun to form in Brussels and has identified ASD as primary representative of this constituency (Manners, 2006). As such, the ASD has had an important impact on EU foreign policymaking.

This type of epistemic community is excellent evidence that confirms the growing influence and input that the defense and security industry has on the general foreign and security policy orientation of the EU. It is illustrative of the sort of great power discourse that is influencing the transformation of the EU’s international identity and orientation.

This evidence of the influence of epistemic communities is brief because of the space constraint of the current paper. Each of these policy institutes or knowledge-based networks have produced large amounts of textual evidence that further solidifies this papers main assertions. What is needed is evidence that directly links the martial, strategic, and great power discourses of these epistemic communities to the actual policymaking process of the EU. In other words, we need more direct links of the sort we saw in the speeches by Javier Solana, which literally implicate these policy institutes as the generator of the transformational process the EU is undergoing in its international identity. Further investigation is warranted to concretely establish
a causal link between the discourse of the various European epistemic communities (independent variable) and the transformation of the EU’s foreign policy identity.

**Conclusion**

Since the formation of the EU in 1991, and even in the later days of the EC, Europe has been seen and has projected itself as a normative power. It has customarily placed overriding emphasis on international law, democracy, human rights, international institutions, and multilateralism in its foreign policy, while eschewing a foreign policy based on traditional national interests and material gain. But as this paper has attempted to show, the foreign policy identity may be changing. Scholars have pointed to the passage of the European Security Strategy as evidence of a move to an EU strategic culture. Some, like Ian Manners (2006), have argued that this has basically eroded the normative power construct of the EU’s foreign policy. It has been the argument of this paper that this is transforming the EU’s foreign policy identity to one based on traditional great power politics. At the heart of this argument, is the essential influence of a burgeoning group of Brussels based or European epistemic communities in effecting this transformation of the EU’s international identity.

While the EU’s military power is continues to be comparatively negligible and its capability to project power is still minor, indications like the current ramping up of the Rapid Reaction Force’s military capabilities speak to a change to a more “martial” orientation. This change is being driven by various factors, of which, the influence of these epistemic communities is the most essential. For state’s to change interests, new ideas or policy outlooks must first be introduced. As Haas (2003) has indicated, epistemic communities are the channels through which these ideas circulate from the society to the state. Further research is needed to see if these ideas generated by the European epistemic communities have had a direct impact in the foreign policymaking of the EU and, consequently, continue to transform the EU’s identity into a twenty-first century great power.

**References**


