The Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series

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These monographic papers analyze ongoing developments within the European Union as well as recent trends which influence the EU’s relationship with the rest of the world. Broad themes include, but are not limited to:

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- The Euro zone crisis
- Immigration and cultural challenges
- Security threats and responses
- The EU’s neighbor policy
- The EU and Latin America
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These topics form part of the pressing agenda of the EU and represent the multifaceted and complex nature of the European integration process. These papers also seek to highlight the internal and external dynamics which influence the workings of the EU and its relationship with the rest the world.

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Abstract

Prior research on citizen support for European integration does not consider how individuals’ evaluations of European nationalities are associated with support. This paper fills this gap by developing a political cohesion model based on social identity theory. I claim that the probability of supporting integration increases with greater levels of trust in fellow Europeans, which assumes to reflect their positive images. Also, trust in eastern European Union nationalities has the highest impact on the probability for support, followed by trust in the southern nationalities, and then northern nationalities due to the eastern and southern nationalities relatively lower economic development. Controlling for various factors, the ordered logistic regression analysis of the European Election Study (2004) data support these claims.

Introduction

The ideas and practice of European unification is an example of political community building. Jean Monnet and others in the pan-European movement held a vision that is reflected in the preamble to the Treaty of Rome: integration is a project establishing a polity with a common political structure. My central argument is that support for integration is associated with the formation of a European political community. The foundation of this community is the development of positive images among fellow Europeans because such images broaden in-group membership. However images of individuals with a northerner, southerner, or eastern European identity will have varying effects on support for European unification. Early thoughts regarding European integration promoted an idealism of uniting a people by establishing a community of Europeans. However, this goal is also pragmatic because it can facilitate positive-sum transactions.

The current sovereign debt and financial crises have placed strains on the evolving trans-European community. Various EU nationalities question the wisdom of economically assisting struggling economies on the one hand, and those nationalities who receive economic assistance have voiced significant opposition over the conditions of the assistance on the other hand. Adding to this tension is a clear geographic, cultural, economic difference among those giving assistance and those receiving it. It therefore becomes important to explain how the images individuals have of their fellow Europeans impacts their support for the mechanism (i.e. integration) that brings them together. Having a political community promotes a significant degree of support for components of the political system, such as institutions and politicians (Easton 1965: 189). Deutsch refers to a political community as a “people who have learned to communicate with each other and to understand each other well beyond the mere interchange of

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goods and service” (1953: 61). A political community, therefore, is a cohesive set of individuals who have developed a social-psychological attachment with one another through greater communication and understanding. What has often been referred to as a “we feeling” (Deutsch et al 1957: 36) has also been captured in other, more general, renditions of community (Taylor 1972; Harrison 1974). Interpersonal trust is a foundation of community because it facilitates collaboration within a common structure.

This paper empirically supports the theoretical connection between the level of trans-European political cohesion and support for integration. The proposed model will detail the association between varying trust for individuals form various parts of European (north/south/east) and public support for integration. The remaining sections will detail the importance of in-group membership for an individual’s motivation to support integration. I test the hypotheses using ordered logistic regression analysis using data from the European Election Study (2004) data that includes a representative sample from individuals in 24 EU members-states.

Self-interest, trust, and cooperation

Easton’s (1965; 1975) theoretical work views public support as being either specific (also known as utilitarian support) or diffuse. Individuals provide utilitarian support when the state provides acceptable outputs (which can be economic or non-economic gains for the individual); in so doing, the state maintains the system through citizen support (Easton 1965: 157). The research regarding utilitarian support of European integration builds on the conceptualization of self-interest, which has long been the cornerstone of understanding political decisions (Olson 1965). Researchers point out that motivations for utilitarian support arise from evaluations of the European Union’s ability to provide benefits and minimize any negative effects, including the changing role of EU institutions as integration evolves (Anderson and Reichert 1996). Feld and Wildgen’s (1976) work shows a connection between support levels in the four core countries of the European Economic Community (EEC) to that of welfare increases in the early years of integration. The attempt at explaining support continued with Handley (1981) who descriptively notes that the economic downturns of the 1970s dramatically lowered support levels for the EEC. Eichenberg and Dalton’s (1993) refined the testing of this argument by looking at the various material influences on support levels with similar results. Others have also built upon this method of analysis with analogous findings (Anderson and Kaltenthaler 1996; Duch and Taylor 1997). Moreover, others have taken a more direct approach and predicted the probability of their support given the individual’s socio-economic position in the economy and the expected effects of market integration (Anderson 1991; Gabel and Palmer 1995; Anderson and Reichert 1996; Gabel and Whitten 1997; Gabel 1998).

Other individual motivations, while being self-interest in nature, are not necessary economic. The founders of European integration were driven by the memories of catastrophic wars and hoped that regional integration would be a vehicle for a permanent peace (Deutsch et al 1957; Haas 1958; Etzioni 1965; Mitrany 1966). Europeans also supported integration, in its early years, in part for its promise to prevent war (Hewstone 1986). However, with the passing
memory of war and the end of the Cold War, physical security is not as strong a factor in supporting integration as it once was (Gabel 1998). Other benefits include a more effective form of governance that is lacking at the national level due to underdeveloped welfare benefits and high levels of corruption (Sánchez-Cuenca 2000).

These studies provide insights into utilitarian support levels, but answer only a narrow range of questions and provide, at best, short-term explanations. Business cycles and other factors that influence self-interest motivations help to explain utilitarian support, but these variables do not explain how psychological factors, such as in-group/out-group dynamics, would also influence support. Such dynamics would explain how Europeans’ views on fellow nationalities in the EU relate to utilitarian support and can serve as a more stable explanation because it relies on deep-seated perceptions.

Diffuse support is a “a reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effect of which they see as damaging to their wants” (Easton 1965: 273; 1975: 444). Easton goes on to say that such support “is an attachment to a political object for its own sake, it constitutes a store of political good will. As such, it taps deep political sentiments and is not easily depleted through disappointment with outputs” (Easton 1965: 274). What “an attachment” refers to is not quite clear. Easton does mention that it is associated to a “sense of community” (1965: 325) but this concept also lacks specificity by leaving its definition as “the degree of solidarity” (1965: 184). In the simplest formulation, diffuse support occurs after a period of time when specific support is present (Easton 1965). Diffuse support enters the picture when the political system has a “communal ideology” that promotes a common interest (Easton 1965: 333). However, common interest is not entirely separate from self-interest. It is possible for a collection of individuals to have similar interests; however the summation of these interests does not necessarily define a common interest. Common interests arise from a coordination of similar self-interests and lead to collaboration. This collaboration is more likely at higher rates of political cohesion, as measured by trust in others. Common interest develops because there is a “sense of community” where individuals strongly identify with one another (Easton 1965: 326).

Developing explanations for supporting integration by understanding the role of common interests are not new. One of the more cited sets of work in this area is the postmaterialist argument. Inglehart (1971; 1977a; 1977b) states that Europeans were socialized in an environment of high rates of economic growth. As a result individuals in the post-war era developed a different set of values (different from prior generations) that are amiable toward the prospects of regional integration. These individuals personally identify with supranational institutions and thereby give the process their support. However, Janssen (1991) and Gabel (1998) dispute this claim with empirical evidence. Their research finds little evidence for the relationship between postmaterialism and support for integration. In fact, the little evidence that does exist indicates that postmaterialists are less likely to support integration. However, the problem is not in the value of the postmaterialist explanation, but in how it was trying to explain public support for integration. Postmaterialism cannot tell us how postmaterialists or materialists reach their opinions (Rochon 1998). In fact, it may be possible for both value sets to favor
regional integration but for different reasons. Materialists could be in favor if they believe that regional integration will provide material and physical security. One can assume that postmaterialists would be in favor if they believe that it is a means to solve trans-national problems (e.g. clean air, water, etc.).

A political cohesion model for EU support

Research that looks at common interest motivations for individual support for integration has mainly focused on the factors that would impede the formation of the political community. They echo the claim by Dahl (1989) that an attachment allows for easier rule because it adds legitimacy to those that govern by the governed. McLaren (2002) demonstrates that hostility towards other cultures effects attitudes towards the European Union. Carey (2002) also demonstrates that a strong national attachment lowers the probability that an individual will support regional integration. In addition, Van Kersbergen (2000) explains support for the EU by examining the role integration has in forming primary national allegiances. These researchers demonstrate that these types of attitudes pose a problem in developing a European identity and thereby lower the chances of supporting the EU. In developing a political cohesion model of public support, I focus attention on individuals’ direct evaluations of members of the trans-European society. Support for integration can be partially explained by individuals’ perceptions that integration is a group effort and as such is susceptible collective action problems. Support improves with higher levels of cohesion because transnational social cohesion lowers the barriers to collective action that are needed to solve problems facing Europeans.

Political cohesion is closely associated with establishment of a common identity. Through a common identity, individuals can rationalize that individual problems are actually collective problems and that societies need to forge links, by way of integration, if they are to be solved. A common European identity is not necessarily associated with a foundational mythos, ethnic affiliation (Obradovic 1996), common language, or shared customs (Smith 1992), or any characteristic that we usually associate with national identities (Zetterholm 1994; Cederman 1996; McKay 1996). However, it does have a similarity with national identities in that it is “imagined” and develops through the construction of a society (Anderson 1991). This notion of “imagined” speaks to the malleable nature of identity and is therefore a construction or adaptation to new political and/or economic realities rather than from biological or common blood rationalities. In its construction, individuals make choices as to who can and cannot belong to a specific identity. In fact, individuals may also choose to belong or not to belong given the characteristics of those who already claim the identity. I will demonstrate that in-group/out-group identity (who is and is not a member of group) is important in the social-psychological dynamics within and among such groups in a political community.

The construction of a European identity has been associated with a common belief in liberal-democratic values (Moravcsik 1993; Beetham and Lord 1998), which have been codified in the legal formation of European citizenship. However, the average EU citizen may not have this level of sophisticated understanding of identity given that they are not well informed
Piaget (1965) stated that building attachments to groups is part of normal human behavior. These attachments promote cohesion among group members and are associated with the social-psychological phenomena of in-group bias and subjective images. Individuals become members of the in-group because the group fulfills some need (Terhune 1964; Winter 1973; Stogdill 1974; McClelland 1975; Bass 1981). At the level of national identity, individuals form attachment because they see the nation as the embodiment of what is important (DeLamater et al. 1969). Also individuals will interact with individuals who are members of another group if the other group’s members share some commonality with in-group members (Brewer 1968). The members of both groups are more trusting of each other and thereby facilitating cooperation among members. One often cited definition of trust is “the probability of getting preferred outcomes without the group doing anything to bring them about” (Gamson 1968:54). That is, group members will not need to monitor each other because there is confidence that interests are aligned. In other words, one will not take advantage of the other because everyone has the interest to effectively cooperate. Putnam (1993) shows, in the Italian cases, that the level of trust one has for others produces effective institutional performance because of the higher probability of obtaining cooperation. It lowers the costs of association because of the perception that individuals will not cheat or defect. In paraphrasing Wintrobe (1995: 46), trust yields a stream of future returns on exchanges that would not otherwise take place because trust makes behavior predictable and stable. Therefore, individuals may develop overlapping group memberships or an integrated identity when trust is present. When trust is not present, overlapping memberships do not occur and group status becomes exclusive.

How is political cohesion, as measured by trust levels, associated with support for European unification? Why would the heterogeneity along a north-south-east dimension partially explain the variation of these two types of support? Social identity theory provides a good framework in getting answers to these questions, namely the two phenomena of in-group bias and out-group bias. In-group bias is a social condition in which individuals tend to favor members of their in-group versus others who are not members (the out-group members) (Tajfel 1978). In early psychological experiments individuals tended to give more rewards and side with other members of their group because of their affiliation. These biases occurred even when test subjects were only recently informed that they belong to a particular group and had never met nor interacted with other in-group members (Tajfel 1978; Turner 1978; Brewer 1979; Tajfel 1982; Brewer 1981; Brewer and Kramer 1985; Messick and Mackie 1989).

The cause of this bias, as put forth by Tajfel (1981; 1982), is due to positive evaluations individuals have for members of their group. They join and are identified by such groups because, as stated above, the group symbolizes a set of values. By associating with similar-valued individuals, self-esteem improves because values are reinforced. This self-esteem further improves when individuals make favorable comparisons between the in-group and out-group. Not only are they part of a subjectively valued group, the in-group is also subjectively judged as better than the other out-groups. Therefore, by tying an individual’s social identity to the importance of the in-
group, group maintenance or cooperation for group survival becomes important. To this end, individuals will tend to give favorable biases to fellow group members.

Out-group bias, however, is a social condition in which individuals tend to favor members of out-groups instead of members of their own in-group. Out-group bias occurs when the two groups under observation are self-determined to be of differing social status (Tajfel 1978; Tajfel and Turner 1986). Individuals from the lower status group have negative evaluations of members of their group when compared to the higher status out-group. The negative evaluations stem simply from their lower status position and are tied to their self-esteem. The relative evaluations lead members of the lower status group to have positive evaluations of higher status members and thereby extend favoritism to them. This phenomenon occurs when the lower status group feels that the higher status group is legitimately in their position and that the status hierarchy is stable (neither group will change their status) (Turner 1978). However, the members of the higher status group will continue to exhibit in-group biases because they have positive evaluations of their members and negative evaluations of the members from the out-group. Again this stems simply from the differing social status of the groups (Turner 1978).

Since cohesiveness is a function of in-group evaluations associated with identity, it is important to revisit the possible phenomenon of overlapping in-groups. This is important in the context of integration because the formation of a European identity is not theorized to replace national identities but to coexist with them (Deutsch et al. 1957). This is where the concept of image becomes important. Kelman (1965: 24) states that image:

…refers to the organized representation of an object in an individual’s cognitive system. The core of an image is the perceived character of the object to which it refers – the individual’s conception of what this object is like. Image is an inferred construct, however, rather than a mere designation of the way the object is phenomenally experienced.

Scott, more succinctly, defines “…an image of a nation (or of any other object) constitutes the totality of attributes that a person recognizes (or imagines) when he contemplates that nation” (1965: 72). In addition, such images are subjective (Kelman 1965: 27). Individuals can use images of other groups to formulate likes and dislikes for and positive or negative stereotypes of out-groups (Druckman et al. 1974; Hewstone 1986; Druckman 1994). A positive image therefore develops the likelihood that multiple identities form as members of in-groups view the values of out-group members as similar and therefore compatible. Groups can, by this mechanism, tie themselves together in a unifying identity, in one extreme, much like individuals do with one another in forming group attachments. Recall that individuals tend to form groups, in part, because of emotional importance to the group’s symbolic values. If a subset of such values is present in other groups, then a broader identity will form without necessarily dissolving prior identities. The individuals in the broader group (one that includes two or more in-groups) can now operate with similar cohesiveness as the individual in-groups. However if such values are not present then the in-group and out-group biases will manifest leading to a lack of cohesiveness.
In the context of Europe, individuals support integration when they have a positive image of other EU nationalities. This positive image may result from evaluations of similarity on a number of issues and thus an individual will tend to view other nationalities as more in line with the ingroup versus an exclusive out-group identity. While Europeans may see some difference in tastes, such as food, music, art, etc., such differences would only limit the possibility of replacing the national identities with a European one. Where there are similarities, a cohesive political community can develop. Subjectively perceived dissimilar values would produce less trust and lowers the probability of supporting integration.

Since the 2004 EU expansion, individuals can subjectively perceive differences along a north-south-east divide. Delhey (2007) demonstrates that underlying the geographic divide are stark differences in economic development and cultural characteristics. Images of southern nationalities as lesser developed economically due to holding dissimilar values are prevalent in the minds of some. The eastern countries’ economic development is also low and also coupled with views regarding the legacies of communist rule and less experience with democracy. The resulting image of a more economically developed north can point to significant differences among the peoples of Europe. The issue of development is an important aspect because the level of economic development is perceived as an outcome of commonalities specific to the northern, southern, and eastern sub-regions. The cultural factor that influences social-psychological perceptions may well have its roots in the Protestant reformation. This, along with the 30 Years War and the resulting Treaty of Westphalia, established national cultures along a Catholic-Protestant divide. The eastern expansion also introduced a wave of entries that had unique cultural features not only due to religion, but also perceived cultural differences associated with their communist eras.

While the religious roots of development can be debated and refuted, the idea of a cultural explanation for development may linger in the mind of the average European. Niedermayer (1995) has already observed that there is a variation in trust among the first twelve EU nationalities. On average, northern nationalities were given more trust than southerners. But what is not clear from his research is the distribution of trust level across northern and southern respondents. Also, this research does not link trust levels to support, but does make a case for looking at trust in community building. Delhey (2007) demonstrated that trust among EU nationalities does vary along geographic divides and that this variation of trust does have implications to the social cohesion of Europe. I propose to take the empirical work a step further by linking variation in trust among the EU nationalities to general support for integration.

Using the logic of social identity theory in the context of EU, I propose to test the following hypotheses. First, there is a positive association between the overall level of trust for fellow EU nationalities and support for integration. This trust is assumed to reflect the positive image of the European nationalities in the mind of the respondent. Positive images reflect group overlaps and the associated biases. Second, there would be a larger impact of trust in eastern nationalities, followed by trust in southern nationalities. It is hypothesized that trust in northern nationalities will have a positive impact on support for integration, but not as large as trust in easterners and southerners. Given the lower economic development of the eastern and southern nationalities, they would comprise the lower status groups. This lower status would promote biases against them and
wishing to exclude them from the broader European in-group. Therefore to support integration, individuals will need to trust them before they enter into a collaborative relationship.

Data description and testing procedures

The public opinion data come from *European Election Study* (2004). As with most studies using secondary data, great efforts were taken to optimize the operationalization of the variables by following the suggestions made by Kiecolt and Nathan (1985). I use a weighted variable so that no national population will be over or under represented in the data because all tests are at the individual level. This variable also adjusts for any over or under representation of socio-economic groups.

OLS regression techniques are not permissible because the dependent variable is ordinal. Applying OLS techniques will produce inefficient coefficients that may lead to type one and two errors. The appropriate technique is to employ ordered regression models, specifically, an ordered logit model (Long 1997). Each model will be evaluated based upon its significance of explanation. The evaluations of the coefficients will be solely based on their statistical significance and direction of signs. The independent variables will then be judged based upon their contribution to predicting the probabilities of the dependent variable’s values.

**Dependent variable**

The dependent variable is support for European integration. The survey question asks:

*Some say European unification should be pushed further. Others say it already has gone too far. What is your opinion? Please indicate your views using a 10-point-scale. On this scale, 1 means unification 'has already gone too far' and 10 means it 'should be pushed further'. What number on this scale best describes your position?*

Higher values indicate a greater support for the progress towards unification. One can interpret the lower values (<5) as less support, the mid-range (~5) a satisfaction with the status quo, and higher values as support for increasing integration.

**Independent variables**

The following are the explanatory variables, each of which measures the respondents’ trust in fellow EU nationalities. The operationalization of the trust variable is through a series of questions asking the respondents to gauge their trust in other EU nationalities:

*Now I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in people from various countries. Can you please tell me for each, whether you have a lot of trust of them or not very much trust.*
The respondents go through and assign a level of trust to each EU nationality. The values were recoded so that 1=“have a lot of trust of them” and 0=“not very much trust.” A confirmatory factor analysis will demonstrate if the individual trust variables do in fact group along a north-south-east division.

**Control variables**

The analysis requires the use of control variables so that the results are understood in the light of some prevailing hypotheses.

**Institutional Trust.** Political trust is closely related to regime legitimacy (Zmerli and Hooge 2011) and can be operationalized as trust in governmental institutions (Marien 2011). I therefore control for trust in two EU institutions that would be on the minds of the average EU citizen: the European Parliament and European Commission. The survey measures trust in these two institutions by using the following question:

*Please tell me on a score of 1-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 1 means that you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust.*

One other political institution that the respondents are asked to evaluate is their home government. Support for integration can be negatively associated with trust in the respondent’s government (Sánchez-Cuenca 2000). If respondents strongly trust their home governments, supporting European integration can be a risky trade-off.

**Democratic Satisfaction.** The democratic deficit is a widely talked about problem in EU politics (McCormick 1999; Schmitter 2000). Like trust in one’s home government, satisfaction with democracy in the respondents’ is negatively associated with support for integration (Sánchez-Cuenca 2000). The following question captures the degree to which individuals are satisfied with democracy in their country:

*On the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [c.]?*

1. Very satisfied
2. Fairly satisfied
3. Not very satisfied
4. Not at all satisfied.

The values were recoded so that higher values indicate higher levels of satisfaction.

**Ideology.** Prior research demonstrates the negative association nationalism has on both identity formation and support (McLaren 2002; Carey 2003). One method to measure this possible effect is through left-right self-evaluations. The respondents were asked to place themselves on a left-right continuum. The range is one to ten with ten being the most extreme rightist ideology. I hypothesize that the higher values of this variable will be negatively associated with support for integration for reasons given in McLaren (2002) and Carey (2003).

**Education.** To measure this variable, I use a standard question which attempts to standardize educational achievement across Europe: *How old were you when you stopped full-
Individuals who are still studying are recoded into their appropriate age group based on their response to the question requesting their age. Although they have not completed their studies, this method captures the height of their educational status at the time survey.

**Income.** Respondents were asked to provide the “total wages and salaries per month of all members of this household; all pensions and social insurance benefits; child allowances and any other income like rents etc.” The survey researchers categorized the responses into “quintiles of income.” No specific hypothesis is developed here with regard to this variable’s contribution to explaining support for integration.

**Age.** Respondents were asked to list the year of their birth. I subtracted the response from 2004 in order to achieve the age at the time of the survey.

**Geographic Effects.** Geographic dummies are included in each of the models. These dummy variables control for effects that are specific to the countries’ region: north, south, or east. I omit the dummy variable representing the east in each regression.

**Explaining support for the EU**

The overall results of the analysis show that political cohesion is an important factor in explaining support for the EU. The first step is to determine if the trust variables measured the latent dimensions described in the theoretical section. I hypothesized that trust in the EU nationalities measures political cohesiveness. This trust is thought to be divided along a north-south-east dimension. Table one displays the results of the principle component factor analysis (varimax rotation). The analysis produced three factors, as hypothesized. Trust in the eastern nationalities loaded into the first factor, followed by trust in the northern nationalities, and then trust in the eastern nationalities. The weakest factor loading number among the trust in the northern nationalities variables is “trust in British” (0.375) but value is higher than the 0.300 threshold for inclusion and will therefore not be omitted from the scale (DeVellis 1991; Acock 2013). “Trust in the French” is strongly loaded into the southern nationalities factor. This indicates that the latent trust factor is religious/cultural in nature. I calculated three new variables (trust in northern, southern, and eastern nationalities) based on the factor loadings. The reliability alphas for the three scales range from 0.807 to 0.915 indicating very good reliability for the latent variable (DeVellis 1991).

In order to assess the scales’ validities, I conducted a confirmatory factor analysis using the maximum likelihood method. The analysis assumes that trust in northern, southern, and eastern nationalities accounts for how individuals responded the specific trust in nationalities questions. The results will confirm that one latent variable, along with the components’ error variance, will explain the covariance of the individual components (Acock 2013). Table two displays the confirmatory factor analysis goodness of fit results. The three regional trust scales have a $\chi^2$ that is highly significant (p=0.000). The comparative fit index (CFI) for each factor is above 0.900 indicating a very strong fit with the data. For example, the trust in southern nationalities scale does 97.6% better than the null hypothesis that assumes the individual items are all unrelated to
each other. The root mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA) is quite good for the trust in southern nationalities, but less than ideal for the other two scales. The RMSEA adjusts for the number of items included scale because more items, by chance, can produce a better fit. Ideally, the value should be less than 0.08 (Acock 2013). The standardized root mean squared residual (SRMR) examines how close the models are in reproducing the average correlations. The values for each scale are below the recommended values of 0.08 (Acock 2013). Overall, the confirmatory factor analysis indicates that the individual trust variables do measure the theorized three latent variables.
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<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>0.318</td>
<td><strong>0.624</strong></td>
<td>0.218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austrians</td>
<td>0.243</td>
<td><strong>0.598</strong></td>
<td>0.207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td><strong>0.533</strong></td>
<td>0.430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>0.191</td>
<td><strong>0.375</strong></td>
<td>0.299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality</td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>RMSEA</td>
<td>CFI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italians</td>
<td>0.228</td>
<td>0.214</td>
<td>0.718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>0.375</td>
<td>0.637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spaniards</td>
<td>0.201</td>
<td>0.338</td>
<td>0.623</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>0.315</td>
<td>0.369</td>
<td>0.557</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greeks</td>
<td>0.430</td>
<td>0.269</td>
<td>0.511</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( \chi^2 (276) = 1.2 \times 10^5; p < .000 \)

Trust in northern nationalities reliability \( \alpha = 0.889 \)

Trust in southern nationalities reliability \( \alpha = 0.807 \)

Trust in eastern nationalities reliability \( \alpha = 0.915 \)

Note: *European Election Study 2004*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trust Scale</th>
<th>( \chi^2 )</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>RMSEA</th>
<th>CFI</th>
<th>SRMR</th>
<th>ρ reliability</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trust in Northern Nationalities</td>
<td>6301.4***</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>0.129</td>
<td>0.900</td>
<td>0.067</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trust in Southern Nationalities</td>
<td>659.6***</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td>0.976</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.744</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trust in Eastern Nationalities</td>
<td>6846.1***</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0.151</td>
<td>0.904</td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td>0.908</td>
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Notes: ***p \leq .001; N=8,539; European Election Study 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 2</th>
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<tr>
<td>Trust variables</td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>S. E.</td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>S. E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in all EU nationalities</td>
<td>0.306***</td>
<td>0.025</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Trust in northern nationalities</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.076***</td>
<td>0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in southern nationalities</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.158***</td>
<td>0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in eastern nationalities</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.265***</td>
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### Control variables

<table>
<thead>
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<th>LHS</th>
<th></th>
<th>RHS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trust in the European Parliament</td>
<td>0.105***</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.106***</td>
<td>0.015</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trust in respondents’ government</td>
<td>-0.037***</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>-0.037***</td>
<td>0.010</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trust in the European Commission</td>
<td>0.168***</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.167***</td>
<td>0.015</td>
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<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with democracy in respondents’ country</td>
<td>0.182***</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.176***</td>
<td>0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left/Right self-placement</td>
<td>-0.036***</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>-0.030***</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern country dummy</td>
<td>-0.695***</td>
<td>0.082</td>
<td>-0.589***</td>
<td>0.084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern country dummy</td>
<td>-0.295***</td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td>-0.221**</td>
<td>0.078</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Demographic variables

<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
<th>LHS</th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.003***</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.003***</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.003*</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.003*</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[
\tau_1 = -1.05 \\
\tau_2 = -0.592 \\
\tau_3 = -0.065 \\
\tau_4 = 0.335 \\
\tau_5 = 1.35 \\
\tau_6 = 1.78 \\
\tau_7 = 2.35 \\
\tau_8 = 3.04 \\
\tau_9 = 3.34
\]

\[\chi^2\text{ (degrees of freedom)} = 1068.65 \ (11)*** \quad 1098.98 \ (13)***\]
Table three presents the first results of the ordered logit regression. Model one tests the relationship between trust for all EU nationalities and support. The trust for all EU nationalities variable is a simple mean of the individual trust components. The sign of the coefficient is positive and significant, indicating that the more an individual trusts members of other EU nationalities, the higher levels of support. This result holds even while controlling for the other variables. Figure one illustrates the marginal percentage change for each value of support for European integration. While holding the control values at their means, support for integration increases steadily as the trust for all EU nationalities goes from its minimum to its maximum value. If we aggregate the dependent variables’ response values of six or greater together, respondents are about 24.5 percentage points more likely to support integration as we move from the lowest to the highest level of trust in fellow EU nationalities.
The second model in table two substitutes the trust in all EU nationalities variable with those that measure trust in the northern, southern, and eastern nationalities. The results fall along expected lines. All three variables are positive and have high levels of statistical significance. The coefficient for the trust in eastern nationalities variable is the largest, followed by the southern variable. Trust in northern nationalities has the smallest coefficient. Figure two plots the marginal percentage point change as the various regional trust variables increase from their minimum to their maximum values. The largest percentage point change in support for European integration is with the trust in eastern nationalities variable, followed by trust in southerners, and then northerners. As the trust in eastern nationalities variable goes from its minimum to its maximum value, support for integration increases by 27.2 percentage points. The increase for trust in southerners is 24.6, while the increase for trust in northerners is only 10.2.
Figure three plots the probabilities at varying levels of the nationalities trust variables. Each bar represents a different combination of trust levels for each category of nationalities trust. The first bar (blue) is the predicted probability for each level of support when trust in northerners, southerners, and easterners are at their highest levels. The likelihood that an individual will have the highest level of support (a value of 10) is 32.2% and a mid-level support (a value of 5) is 13.0%. When the level of trust in northerners is at its highest value and trust for easterners and southerners are their lowest values (red bar), mid-level support is at 24.0% and high level of support is at 5.0%. A high level of southern trust and low levels of trust in northerners and easterners (green bar) predicts a 24.9% likelihood at the mid-level and 8.8% at the highest level. The highest values of eastern trust and low levels of trust in northerners and southerners produces likelihoods of 24.4% and 10.2%, respectively. Therefore, the greatest differentiation among the three nationalities trust variables is in the higher end of the support values.

The impact of each trust scale is further illustrated in figure four. I aggregated the upper range of the support variable (values 6-10) and re-estimated the predicted probabilities for varying levels of trust. When trust in northerners, southerners, and easterners are at their highest level, there is a 77.7% chance that an individual will support furthering integration. When trust in northern nationalities is high, and trust in southerners and easterners are low, there is a 27.7% chance that an individual will support furthering integration. When southern trust is high, but northern and eastern trust is low, there is a 41.5% chance of supporting the furthering of integration. Finally, when trust in easterners is high, but trust in northerners and southerners is low, there is a 45.3% chance of support for furthering integration. In total, the results indicate the greater importance of trusting eastern nationalities when predicting the probabilities of individual support for European integration.

Figure 4. Probability of Supporting European Integration by Trust Level
Conclusion

The political cohesion model can be an aid in explaining the probabilities for supporting European integration. Greater levels of trust among individuals are significantly associated with higher probabilities of supporting integration. Given the lower level of economic development and differing cultures among the southern and eastern countries, individuals that trust these nationalities are more likely to see the common interests involved in building a united Europe. In short, the north-south-east demarcation is significant for Europeans when supporting integration.

Two important items must be considered with regard to these results. Neither of these items would necessarily put into question the results found in this paper, but are important enough to consider. First, given that the survey used in this analysis is old, we would need to obtain up-to-date data that indicates that the association between trust among Europeans and support has not changed. However, there is nothing in the model’s logic that makes the arguments any less salient today.

Second, the survey was taken at the time Europe has expanded further eastward. This fact may not necessarily add complexity to model. The findings of the trust variables may be an artifact of the current expansion and less to do with economic development or cultural differences. This may be the case, but a look at the trust in southern nationalities variable puts this in doubt. The southern trust scale included two of the original members of the EU. If time of entry were to be the underlying factor, then we should see trust in the French and Italians load together along with the older members. Also, trust in the British factored into the northern grouping, even though it joined later. These points leads to the conclusion that heterogeneous economic development and culture are the key factors in understanding why trust in eastern nationalities is more important.

References:

Acock, Alan C. 2013. Discovering Structural Equation Modeling Using Stata. College Station, TX: Stata Press.


Endnotes:

\(^i\) Individuals from Malta were not included in this survey. Bulgarian and Romanian respondents were also not included because these countries where not yet EU members.

\(^ii\) The utilitarian support approach also stems from the endogenous political economy literature, which approaches the study of integration through a rational framework. It is closely related to other works that explain the behavior of domestic forces by looking at group motivations and their impact on national government decision (Downs 1957; Gamson 1961; Ames 1987; Levi 1988; Geddes 1994; Haggard and Kaufman 1995). The primary motivation of the political elite is either to remain in power or to allow a particular political party to remain in power. Therefore the politician will form coalitions among societal groups for this end. The wishes of the domestic forces need to be satisfied before the next turn in the election cycle occurs. Endogenous economic theory applies this logic to nation-state policy formulation regarding the global economy. Individuals form coalitions depending on their role in the economy (Stopler and Samuelson 1941). Such roles are economic factors (Rogowski 1989), economic sectors (Gourevitch 1986), or sectors that have specific assets (Frieden 1991). Each group will make their economic cost-benefit calculations and support foreign economic policies on this basis.

\(^iii\) See Baker, Dalton, and Hildebrandt (1981) for the evidence of this process in the case of post-war Germany.

\(^iv\) While Greece is neither Catholic nor Protestant, it will be grouped together with the former.

\(^v\) “The data utilized in this publication were originally collected by the 2004 European Election Study research group. This study has been made possible by various grants. Neither the original collectors of the data nor their sponsors bear any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations published here. The data are available from the homepage of the European Election Study (www.europeanelectionstudies.net) and from the Archive Department of GESIS (the former Central Archive for Empirical Social Research (ZA) at the University of Cologne – www.gesis.org), Germany.”

\(^vi\) The nature of the hypotheses requires an individual level analysis. While some researchers believe that aggregation of individual level responses to opinion surveys remove random “noise” from the measurements (Page and Shapiro 1992; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995), research shows that the error associated with individual level variation may be systemic (Duch, Palmer, and Anderson 2000). Therefore aggregating the data would not remove any associated “noise,” but instead may harm the robustness of potential results due to a lower number of observations.

\(^vii\) Every attempt was made to include controls for alternative explanations. The survey did not ask questions associated with operationalizing postmaterialist values and cognitive mobilization (Inglehart 1977b; 1990), so these variables were not included.

\(^viii\) McLaren (2002) and Carey (2003) used survey questions that directly measured nationalism. I use the left-right self-evaluations as a proxy given that the survey used in this paper does not have direct measures.