MEDITERRANEAN REGIONAL SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: REGIONAL INTEGRATION THROUGH DEVELOPMENT AND ITS SECURITY IMPACT ON EUROMED PARTNERSHIP MEMBERS

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I. Introduction

In this paper I seek to explore a region of the world, the Mediterranean, which has been significant as a passageway for peoples and their trade and cultures through the millennia.

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However, as S. Victor Papacosma (2004, 15/6) writes (concerning in particular the Eastern Mediterranean) that
despite their proximity, the diversity of the indigenous groups contributed little to
harmony and much more to clashes among them … [and this region was characterized by] fragmented distributions of power and security systems that posed obstacles for this
major avenue of economic and naval traffic.

Today, progress has certainly been made – but much obviously needs to be done in the
regions bordering the Mediterranean to remove obstacles not only to economic traffic, but to
build bridges to traverse the cultural and political diversity between the East and the West and the
North and the South of the Mediterranean, and to substitute military clashes with peaceful socio-
economic and cultural interactions at last.

Hence I would like to examine here a modus operandi which is intended to serve as a
peaceful “bridge” not between “Them” and “Us”, or “the West” and “the Rest”, but one which
utilizes approaches, such as functionalism, which have been historically successful in integrating
neighboring countries that had an extensive history of “un-neighborly” relations, such as France
and Germany, into a system which has brought not only prosperity to, but also peace between
them, i.e. the European Union (EU) and examine its application to the Mediterranean regions in
the Euro-Med Partnership (EMP), also known as the Barcelona Process.

Huntington’s (1996, 32) ominous words regarding common divisions between countries and
cultures, such as between modern, developed countries and poor, developing countries, or the
Muslim distinction between Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb, the abode of peace and the abode of
war respectively, are the type of divisions the EU seeks to ameliorate and bridge through the
programs of the EuroMed Partnership (EMP). We also note, however, that the Dar al-Islam itself
has been undergoing what some scholars have described as more serious internal divisions (‘Main
conflict is in the East, not between East and West”, EurActiv 1/17/2007) than the schisms among
the Dar al-Harb (i.e. those between Muslim and non-Muslim regions). The EMP, by definition,
not only encompasses both Shia and Sunni populations, but of course also Jewish and Christian
member states. Beyond the religious diversity among EMP member states there is also a
significant gradient between economically richer and poorer regions in the EMP.

Nevertheless, I would disagree with Huntington that the West is moving towards a phase of
a “universal state” (Ibid. 53), at least with respect to the northern Mediterranean states versus the
Southern and Eastern states. In this paper I argue that while the goals of the EMP are, i.a.
political, trade and cultural harmonization and coordination, its purpose, with its emphasis on
diversity, is rather the maximization between cultural parameters of member countries than a
homogenization among the regions encompassing the EMP.

II. Structures for Peace, Stability and Prosperity

Emanating from meetings and negotiations started on October 30, 1991 at the Peace
Conference in Madrid the structure of the Madrid Framework for a bilateral and a multilateral
negotiating track was developed which enabled the first-ever direct talks between Israel and her
immediate Arab neighbors on November 3, 1991. These negotiations focused on key issues of
concern to the entire Middle East: water, environment, arms control, refugees and economic
development. These negotiations led to the first Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign
Ministers of the future EMP states in Barcelona in November 1995 and marked the official
starting point of the EuroMed Partnership. Its three main objectives are:

1. the definition of a common area of peace and stability through the reinforcement of
the political and security dialogue;
2. the construction of a zone of shared prosperity through an *economic and financial* partnership and the gradual establishment of a free-trade area;

3. the rapprochement between peoples through a *social, cultural and human* partnership aimed at encouraging understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil society (Horizon 2020 Bulletin 2005, 2).

The EMP constitutes the EU’s main multilateral foreign policy instrument in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Currently, the EMP comprises the twenty-seven EU member states, and ten Mediterranean Partners (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey, which is also an EU candidate country) and Libya (as observer since 1999). Malta and Cyprus, who were also original EuroMed Partners, are now EU member states.

The EMP now is the Mediterranean region-specific program of the broader European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). The ENP per se was developed in 2004 to address the strategic objectives set out in the EU’s December 2003 *European Security Strategy*. These objectives include the avoidance of emerging new dividing lines, be they economic, political or social, between the enlarged EU and its neighbors by extending to the countries neighboring the EU measures aimed at institutional and economic strengthening similar as those extended to its members internally. The ENP offers its neighbors a privileged relationship, building upon a mutual commitment to common values (e.g. democracy and human rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy principles and sustainable development). The ENP goes beyond existing relationships to offer a deeper political association and economic integration and to extend the zone of prosperity, security and peace to them (EU Commission website: ENP).

The EMPs specific mandate is based on the political, economic and culturally strategic significance of the Mediterranean region to the European Union (EU) and seeks to develop a relationship between its partners based on “comprehensive cooperation and solidarity, in keeping with the privileged nature of the links forged by neighbourhood and history” (EU Commission website 2006: Barcelona Declaration). The “three pillars” of the EMP consist of the following in greater detail and follow the dual regional (multilateral) and bilateral tracks established in the Madrid Peace Conference for the international relations among EMP members:

**A. The political and security partnership** with the aim of strengthening the political dialogue is based on “observance of essential principles of international law, and to reaffirm common objectives in matters of internal and external stability” (Ibid.). EMP partners agreed to act in accordance with the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (such as guaranteeing “the effective legitimate exercise of such rights and freedoms, including freedom of expression, freedom of association for peaceful purposes and freedom of thought, conscience and religion, both individually and together with other member of the same group, without any discrimination on grounds of race, nationality, language, religion or sex” (Ibid.) as well as other obligations under international law, including their regional and international agreements. Furthermore, they agreed to develop the rule of law and *democracy* in their political systems, while recognizing in this framework the right of each of them to choose and freely develop its own political, socio-cultural, economic and judicial system, … respect for diversity and pluralism in their societies [both with MENA AND the EU], promote tolerance between different groups in society and combat manifestations of intolerance, racism and xenophobia. … to respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination (Ibid.).

**B. In the Economic and financial partnership** aspect of the EMP the participants emphasize the importance of sustainable and balanced economic and social development with a
view toward achieving their objective of creating an area of shared prosperity and recognizing the impediment debt represents to development (e.g. by promoting an environment conducive to both internal savings as the basis for investment, and by direct foreign investment), the need to dialogue and regionally cooperate for an acceleration of socio-economic development (e.g. through the promotion and development of the private sector, upgrading the productive sector, establishing appropriate institutional and regulatory frameworks for a market economy, such as those protecting intellectual and industrial property rights and competition, those promoting mechanisms for technology transfer), the progressive establishment of a free-trade area and a substantial increase in the European Union’s financial assistance to its partners (Ibid.).

This aspect of the EMP also emphasizes the interdependence with regard to the environment which requires increased regional cooperation and coordination between existing multilateral programs. Furthermore it stresses the importance of the conservation and rational management of fish stocks in the Mediterranean Sea, including improved research into stocks, including aquaculture to re-stock the Mediterranean Sea and inland lakes. Additionally it acknowledges the pivotal role of the energy sector in the economies of EMP partners and the need to strengthen cooperation and intensify dialogue in the field of energy policies, including the appropriate framework conditions for investments in, and the activities of, energy companies (Ibid.). The supply, management and development of water resources, the modernization of agriculture and the development and improvement of infrastructure, especially in rural areas, including efficient transport systems and information technologies, were also declared priorities (Ibid.). Additionally, some of the original concerns addressed in the Madrid Peace Conference of 1991 are specifically adopted by the EMP.

The participants at the Barcelona Conference acknowledged that the creation of a free-trade area and the success of the EMP require substantially increased financial assistance through the EU and the European Investment Bank (EIB), necessitating the sound macro-economic management in terms of promoting dialogue and optimized financial cooperation among their respective economic policies (Ibid.).

C. Social, cultural and human affairs are addressed within the EMP with the aim to develop human resources and to promote understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies (Ibid.). The EMP participants recognize that the traditions of culture and civilization throughout the Mediterranean region, the dialogue between these cultures and exchanges at the human, scientific and technological levels are essential factors in bringing their peoples closer by promoting understanding between them and improving their perception of each other, including the importance of the role which mass media can play in the reciprocal recognition and understanding of cultures as a source of mutual enrichment (Ibid.). Additionally, the importance of civil society specifically, and the development of human resources overall, such as social development and education and training for young people, e.g. the familiarization with the cultural identity of each partner country, by facilitating active exchange programs between partnership states, are set goals of the EMP. The importance of these programs, beyond enabling the EU’s southern neighbors to develop a workforce with skills (i.e. increase their human capital) which enables them to improve their economic situation, is to develop civil society as a significant component of functioning democratic institutions and strengthened the rule of law.

By addressing socio-economic needs, the EMP seeks to alleviate consequences of poverty, such as higher crime and violence rates and poor health and nutrition, which can then become factors contributing to illegal migration (compare White 2006) to the northern Mediterranean countries. Beyond these socio-economic approaches, EMP states also address mechanisms for the rule of (international) law by agreeing to cooperate in the repatriation of illegal immigrants as well as cooperating in the joint fight against drug trafficking, international crime and corruption, racism, xenophobia and intolerance (Ibid.).
III. “Development as Freedom” (A. Sen)

The theory behind the multilateral/multi-approach (“3 baskets”) structure of the EMP is that political transparency and voice and socio-economic development are mutually enhancing in contributing to regional development and as a result, to stability. As an approach to operationalize my assessment of the relevance of the EMP, I will start by comparing it with the criteria which Amartya Sen, as a winner of the Economics Nobel Price, has identified as contributing to national development (for the purpose of overall human freedom). A. Sen (1999, 11) distinguishes “five distinct types of freedom, seen in an ‘instrumental’ perspective… 1. political freedoms, 2. economic facilities, 3. social opportunities, 4. transparency guarantees, and 5. protective security”, which are not only ends of development in themselves, but also principal means (Ibid.) which he views as empirically linked and strengthening each other reciprocally (Ibid., 12). Importantly, Amartya Sen points to free and sustainable individual agency, whereby “individuals can effectively shape their own destiny” (Ibid.), rather than simply being “passive recipients of the benefits of cunning development programs” (Ibid.), or of authoritarian environments, I would add.

A. Political Freedom

A. Sen refers to political freedoms as referring broadly as those under which people “determine who should govern and on what principles, and also include the possibility to scrutinize and criticize authorities, to have freedom of political expression and an uncensored press” (Sen 1999, 39).

The EMP was developed as an inherently multilateral approach in contrast to the US’s predominantly bilateral tracks of Arab-Israeli negotiations. This “invitation” by the EU “to an elite party, casting a broader and potentially more viable net around issues of common concern like the environment, shipping and communications” was critiqued by Carapico (2001, 25), whereby the functional and utilitarian integration is hoped to build confidence, and institutional structures to increase political stability among anxieties on one hand that Arabs and Turks would overrun Northern Europe and fears starting in the 1990s e.g. that the deteriorating situation in Algeria would result in Islamist radicalism spilling over into Europe. At the same time French and British colonial legacies and Italian, Spanish and Greek merchant empires were hoping to advance their special (economic) interests – as were northern European companies vying for markets - and the EU in general for petroleum in MENA. While these critiques are likely not without merit, economic development was viewed as supportive of political structures.

1. Civil Society

Balfour (2004, 3) writes that the “European Commission started [only recently] to acknowledge the degree to which the creation of a secure environment also depends on the individual human dimension”. In this context this writer encourages the approach by the EU “to strike a balance between the conception of ‘soft’ security inherence to the EMP … and the new developments in the fields of the European Security and Defence Policy and the new European Security Strategy” (Ibid., 4)

Asbach (in: preface to Huber 2005) writes that since the inception of the EMP was recognized that increased cooperation and understanding among EMP members could not be achieved without the active involvement of civil society. For this reason, NGOs such as the Heinrich Boell Stiftung, Lebanese Transparency Association, Life and Environment (Israel), Sisterhood Is Global Institute (Jordan), and the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, among many others have actively participated “to advocate interest, needs and priorities of their
constituencies to EMP decision makers” (Huber 2005, 5) in bilateral, individual and thematic meetings (Ibid., 6). While not all of these suggestions were utilized, these processes also provided opportunities to influence EU policy mechanisms for the establishment of the 2002 civil forum which in turn strengthened the participation of civil society organizations in EMP political decision making processes in member countries (Ibid., 8) and hereby augment the political multilaterality in the EMP with civil society mechanisms.

B. Economic Opportunities

A. Sen refers to economic facilities as those opportunities which individuals enjoy to “utilize economic resources for the purpose of consumption, or production or exchange. The economic entitlements that a person has will depend on the resources owned or available for use” (Sen 1999, 39).

1. Free Trade Area (FTA)

It is no surprise that, although the EU’s EMP as its premier foreign policy approach to the South- and Eastern Mediterranean attempts to present a uniform approach, northern Europe views the Mediterranean differently than southern Europe in terms of diverging or even competing commercial concerns. The economic basket of the EMP envisions a Mediterranean free trade zone by 2010 with aid from the EU through the Mediterranean Development Assistance (MEDA) Program in exchange for market reforms for a common area of peace and stability. By raising the economic conditions in MENA through economic development programs as part of the EMP, last by not least through a free trade area throughout all member states, the economic impetus leading to illegal immigration would be reduced. As of June 2005 (Escribano 2005, 1), only Israel, Jordan, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority and Tunesia had expressed an interest in progressing beyond the current Association Agreements for participating in the Single European Market, which might reflect the varying degrees of current technical harmonization capability in MENA.

Some authors, such as Carapico (2001) state that the EU’s ambitions in the Euro-Mediterranean basin and the cultivation of a special relationship further south in the Arabian Peninsula does not directly challenge US security policy in the Middle East but is comparable to US interests in the Caribbean and Latin America: “a large regional free trade zone, open to imports and foreign investment” (Ibid., 24). This represents one of the modi operandi of the economic constitutive elements identified by A. Sen as essential for development.

C. Social Opportunities

A. Sen defines this freedom as that arrangement that society makes for education, health care and so on, which influence the individual’s substantive freedom to live better. These facilities are important not only for the conduct of private lives (such as living a healthy life and avoiding preventable morbidity and premature mortality), but also for more effective participation in economic and political activities (Sen 1999, 39).

Fulvio Attina (1996) also agrees that regional cooperation can have external origins and extend not only to economic, but also to political, socio-cultural cooperation. The reciprocal efficacy of strengthening economic, political and cultural factors to achieve regional stability has also been reiterated by Turkish Foreign Minister Guel. To prevent new dividing lines within Islamic countries where internal conflicts have been raging (Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan) and to reduce internal problems within this region, pushing the mainstream towards “the extremes for
want of good governance and true civic engagement” (Ibid.) in favor of non-extremist voices to be heard, Guel (quoted in ‘Main conflict is in the East, not between East and West’, EurActiv 1/17/2007) advocates, as A. Sen does, support for the South-Eastern Mediterranean region to develop socio-economically as well as culturally in face of the violence and extremism surrounding them.

Financial Times columnist Martin Wolf (2007) pointed out in response to a speech by Ben Bernancke (2007), chairman of the US Federal Reserve, in view of the effects of globalization, that to guard against resulting polarizations in personal income which affect the poorest the most, skill-based technological changes need to be addressed, especially in developing countries. Many programs supportive of social development are carried out by private NGOs and IGOs (sub-region-wide) to address these needs identified by officials and scholars in the Euro-Mediterranean region. This would indicate that the EMP as part of its three “baskets” and their great variety of programs (detailed in the first part of this paper) are in fact designed to support socio-cultural and human development, especially in MENA (although cultural understanding is a two-way street and many programs specifically involve populations from all sides of the Mediterranean).

D. Transparency guarantees

According to A. Sen, "transparency guarantees deal with the need for openness that people can expect: the freedom to deal with one another under guarantees of disclosure and lucidity” (Sen 1999, 39). Political and economic transparency go hand in hand. Introducing measures in EMP transactions which are specifically aimed at institutional and economic strengthening, similar as those extended to EU member internally, such as building upon the mutual commitment to common values (such as democracy and human rights, rule of law and good governance), contributes to a significant developmental step in achieving one of the basic human freedoms identified by Sen, “transparency”.

E. (non-NATO) Protective Security in the Mediterranean

Protective security, according to A. Sen, “is needed to provide a social safety net for preventing the affected population from being reduced to abject misery, and in some cases even starvation and death” (Sen 1999, 40). The EU as the largest collective foreign aid donor, by definition is active in this respect in the south- and eastern Mediterranean, as in all other parts of the world. However, structural human security in an institutionalized social sense is significantly path dependent on the political system and economic strength (never mind the “modernization” of a country socio-culturally to permit this equally in authoritarian countries), as the steady stream of economic refugees from North Africa shows, who are endangering their lives in an uncertain passage to the Mediterranean’s northern shores in order to achieve protective security. This uncontrolled flux of illegal immigrants in turn, however, negatively affects the security of the northern Mediterranean, which also reinforces the “multi-level approach” envisioned by the EMP.

Another example are the consequences of gender differences in education which were widespread in MENA, making it much more difficult for a woman in this region to have access to the type of job which allows her to build up the economic resources to ensure her physical well-being without dependence on a man. The NGOs operating within the framework of the EMP have also been very helpful in gaining the local populations’ trust to assist in enabling gender equality in education on all institutional levels. Furthermore, insufficient institutional structures of an impoverished region challenge its ability to financially and medically assist their disabled or citizens too old to work any longer.

Again, while economics also play a significant role in this aspect of development, protective security is also frequently a function directly or indirectly of political problems, such as in
Palestine. Hence the EU, i.a. through the channels of the EMP, attempts to use improve the collective security of the Euro-Med region by additional mechanisms of its three-prong approach which combines political transparency, institution building and civil society enhancement with economic and social development on a multi-lateral basis, permitting countries to participate to the degree they are capable of and are able to integrate into their societies (due to the great socio-political and economic diversity among them).

1. The EMP and Collective Security

Carlos Echeverría wrote in 1999 (preface) that when the Berlin wall crumbled, the fear was expressed that the security of Europe might occur at the expense of Mediterranean security requirements. During the Cold War, a major security concern by the West with respect to MENA was to prevent the Arab-Israeli conflict to “provide opportunity for Moscow to exploit the unrest by making significant inroads in the Arab world” (Papacosma 2004, 16). As the Cold War concluded, Soviet hegemony in the Eastern Mediterranean waned (Ibid., 17). Unfortunately, claims of a new world order vanished as a new world disorder asserted itself (Ibid.). The “ongoing Arab-Israeli dispute, the Persian Gulf War, Anglo-American invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, terrorism and accompanying uncertainties over oil supplies exert a directing influence on global affairs” (Ibid., 19).

The EMP was founded partially to address this concern as the Western European Union became more and more integrated into the EU. In this context, Echeverría (1999) suggested already eight years ago, with the post-World War II history of political instability in the Middle East already well-known, but the current Iraqi regional destabilization then still unimaginable, to utilize the regional experience and confidence of the armed forces of non-European Mediterranean nations in peacekeeping operations. This would make the EU’s approach in the Mediterranean demand-driven and proactive. While military aspects are not explicitly on the agenda of the EMP, they certainly affect security on all levels and cannot be ignored in the role of the EMP as contributing to the Mediterranean security complex beyond the socio-economic development standpoint, but also an active political one, constitutive of a regional security community.

a. The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Mediterranean

European stability overall is based on several premises, i.a. economic prosperity and continued growth in its “neighborhood” as discussed above. The EU’s CFSP, which was only three years old upon the founding of the EMP, evolved parallel to it with the objectives of safeguarding the common values and fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the EU, in compliance with UN principles and those set out in the Helsinki Declaration, such as preserving the peace and strengthening the EU in international security and cooperation and developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (EU website).

There is also a marked asymmetry in security institutions between the countries of the northern and the southern Mediterranean due to the density of institutional development, much more so in the former and somewhat less in the latter (Vasconcelos 1999, 29). Other regional integration projects in MENA, such as the Arab League or the Arab Maghreb Union, did not develop a real security dimension, partially due to the stalled Middle East peace process. In this context, the EMP is by far the most significant due to its multilateral character, and its “multi-layered” dimensions (Ibid., 30).

Some scholars have accused the EMP of being an imperialist tool of the EU for an extension of territory and herewith, power. I would view the EMP rather as a model for assisting MENA to develop politically, economically and socially, in order to contribute to internal stability and not only to make the southern neighbors of the EU less likely to emigrate illegally in droves to the EU north of the Mediterranean, but also to offer the political/security,
economic/financial and socio-cultural options and tools, such as through a harmonization of practices, for the integration into some areas of the EMP of the EU’s “Four Freedoms” (goods, people, services and capital), for the mutual security-reinforcing effect they have on a peaceful coexistence in the culturally, politically and economically diverse North African and Middle Eastern “neighborhood” of the EU.

This application of EU “soft power” in countries to the south and east of the Mediterranean is more than just cultural power in Joseph Nye’s (2002, 11) terminology, but is being applied by the EU in its foreign policy mechanisms, such as the promotion of peace and human rights through the reciprocity between economics and education, which e.g. A. Sen also identified as essential for development as it relates to security. The threats which this region faces, i.a. can rest on the conviction that, irrespective of culture distance and institution difference, global trends cause dangerous effects to the countries of an area in as different fields as environment..., demography for the problem of migration and public security for the problem of organized crime and illegal trade (Attina 2004, 2).

This recognition of the problem in the Mediterranean region and the solutions which the EMP is in the process of applying to address them are very much in line with Karl Deutsch’s (1957) original approach to security communities. This theory held that high similarity of culture and institutions are essential to further political cooperation among states and to adopt common norms of conflict management and resolution (Attina 2004, 2).

However, as Attina’s earlier study (1996, 6-10) indicates, Mediterranean regional security is extraordinarily complex and can be analyzed from many other aspects, such as peace in terms of presence of liberal democracies, level of economic development, economic interdependence, common cultural framework, presence of a regional hegemon, formation of a regional balance of power, common external threat, or mutual irrelevance to wage international wars, and, finally, common satisfaction with territorial status quo, all of which can be further subdivided in terms of gradations of zones of peace, e.g. zones of negative or precarious peace, stable peace and zones of pluralistic security community. Overall he finds that the effects of the current European re-organization are in fact reflected in the diffusion of this model throughout the Mediterranean regions.

b. The EMP as a New Statecraft?

Gonzalo Escribano (2005) points out that the ENP’s (in contrast to the specific EMP) economic prescriptions overall are perceived as merely cosmetic. However, security perceptions in particular are a decisive component of Mediterranean security in North-South and South-North relations alike. In the minds of a number of European publics, political Islamism – identified with terrorism and, at its worst, confusingly identified with Islam itself – tends to replace the defunct Soviet threat as the number one enemy, potentially at its best (Vasconcelos 1999, 31).

Hence security in MENA is based partially socio-economically and partially politically (e.g. through the radicalization of Islam). While the United States, especially through NATO, contributes substantially to the security perception in the Mediterranean (at least until the current Iraq war), the EMP’s role in Mediterranean security is through deepening institutionalization (hence increasing trust among its partners through iteration and predictability) and political spillover in terms of Ernst Haas’ neo-functionalist theory. I also argue that the EMP needs to continue to focus on the increased participation of its members in the Single European Market. The EU stands for inclusion rather than exclusion and the Euro-Mediterranean region is not a zero-sum game but needs to be recognized and supported as an endeavor for cumulative growth on all shores of the Mediterranean to achieve peace and stability within and among all its members.
As we know, peace processes in the Middle East are still more hope than reality at the moment, with the extent of spillover from possible greater regional fragmentation post-Iraq yet unknown. In this institutional vacuum of other regional security cooperative institutions, such as the Arab Maghreb Union or the Arab League (Vasconcelos 1999, 30), the realization of the EMPs intent to extend beyond the EU a zone of “peace, prosperity and stability” as a tool of EU soft power, utilizing proven approaches to address regional (in-) security in the Mediterranean through step-by-step processes of harmonization are more urgent than ever.

The EU posits the security environment of the EMP in the human dimension of good governance, human rights and the rule of law (Balfour 2004, 3). While the intentions of the EMP are not only laudable but would address many of the criteria which scholars and political leaders (e.g. note the criteria for the Madrid Peace Conference) have identified as contributing to economic growth and development in general, hereby enhancing regional stability, we need to remember that the EMP is not legally binding, i.e. participation is not uniformly strong. Instead it applies concepts of “benchmarking” and “differentiation” on an individual country/case basis, “allowing countries to make progress without jeopardizing the entire regional approach” (Ibid., 4). Hence this “common model of relationship does not exclude a certain degree of differentiation among the states which are part of this model” (Flaesch-Mougin in Thiele and Kostelnik 2005, 63). This approach by the EMP varies from a purely realist one which might suggest the wealthier North keep its distance and only remain vigilant towards the Southern and Eastern regions of the Mediterranean. In fact, the EU through the EMP seeks to counteract the risks and threats from the Other, and to increase understanding between the cultures (Ortega in Batt et al. 2003, 5) in Constructivist fashion. This is to the credit of the EMP as a specialized regional exception of the ENP, which has been accused of “one size fits all” (Aldis 2005, 5) programs and approaches.

Some scholars have accused the EMP of being an imperialist tool of the EU for an extension of territory and herewith, power. I would view the EMP rather as a model for assisting the region surrounding the Mediterranean to develop politically, economically and socially, not only to make the southern neighbors of the EU less likely to emigrate illegally in droves to the EU north of the Mediterranean, but also to offer the political/security, economic/financial and socio-cultural options and tools, such as through a harmonization of practices and integration for a peaceful coexistence in the culturally, politically and economically diverse North African and Middle Eastern “neighborhood” of the EU. This “process” of the EMP is multilateral not only due to the character of its membership, but also because it is based on several international conventions, such as UN declarations, or the parallel “three baskets” of the Helsinki Declaration (1975).

2. EuroIslam?

Farid Mirbagheri (2004, 53) addresses the complex issues in harmonizing the relationship between the Muslim and Judeo-Christian world, and the specific security implications this has represented in the last years for the EU when he describes the underlying frustration in many Arab countries:

- mass unemployment, periodic invasions of neighbouring countries, lack of longterm planning, population growth, undemocratic governance and failed modernization (or too rapid a modernization, as the case may be) are some of the problems that the countries of the region have only themselves to blame. Pointing the finger in the direction of outsiders does not absolve them from responsibility.

The EMP is not interested in pointing fingers, but is instead attempting a neo-functionalist approach, leading to neo-liberal developments, possibly to a complex interdependence as an approach to peace in the Middle East. Essential to this are the attempts to keep Islam secular at least in the EU per se, while the challenge in MENA is that Islam IS the state in some cases.
Some scholars, such as Bassam Tibi (1999), have argued that the relationship of Islam to Europe can be seen as one of a century-long “Threat and Fascination” and calls for new concepts for dealing with assimilation and integration. While this addresses the countries to the north of the Mediterranean primarily, it is intended to contribute to this type of evolution also in MENA. This proposal is not intended to demand the cultural surrender of Muslims through total conformity in dealing with the north, but on the contrary should allow for cultural adaptation involving religious reforms, similar to those which Islam underwent when it was introduced to Indonesia. This vision has yet to become reality, but the civilizing influence on identity of Europe is not anti-Muslim, since the ideal of Europe is one of inclusion, but suggests a synthesis into a Euro-Islam identity for those who end up migrating from MENA to Europe in general (Ibid.). After all, Tibi states that the “European idea” is not Christian, but is secular and lies in polytheistic Hellenism (Ibid.).

3. Special Role of Turkey

The Eastern Mediterranean presents a buffer between the Middle East and the EU. Of course, once Turkey’s EU application results in successful membership, the EU will have a common border with Iraq, Syria, and Iran and anyone crossing this border into Turkey from those countries will have entered the EU and enjoys freedom of movement within the entire community (Mirbaheri 2004, 49). While this is a tremendous challenge for the EU, the opportunity for the EU would be to have a secular Islamic member state which gives its citizens the option for modernity, progress and prosperity. This fusion of moderate Islam into a Euro-Islam identity is envisioned as one bulwark against radical Islam, with societies based on law and order as well as socio-economically stable, as another approach, and shows the conceptual efficacy of the EMP approach to Mediterranean security and development – even if not all aspects have developed into maturity at this point yet. Turkey, as an EU applicant state, in addition to its current EMP membership, would be the premier area to develop this secular Euro-Islam outside of the current EU and then be able to offer it as an ideological alternative approach to other EMP members.

IV. Discussion – The EMP as a Constructivist Discourse?

Howorth (2004, 212) considers ideas as distinct from interests (though they are not necessarily opposed to them), because they have the weakest impact in the field of security and defense policy. Especially in the interest-based realist discussion of the US’s continued involvement in European security through NATO, some authors have posited the Europeans’ inability towards a coordinated security agenda (Gordon 1994). How does a new “coordinative discourse” (Schmidt 2000b; 2002, 232-4, quoted in Howorth 2004, 213), i.e. the role which the construction of ideas, epistemic communities (P. Haas 1992), advocacy coalitions (Sabatier 1998), and the interplay of inter-subjective norms, values and identities (Katzenstein 1996; Wendt 1999), and the interaction of these ideational forces with the perceptions in EMP member states?

Mirbaheri (2004, 49) states that “projections of force in international relations is … an indication of weakness before it is a reflection of power” and overwhelming military projections can be inversely related to the diplomatic influence of a country in a region (Ibid., 50). Bettina Huber (2005, 3) writes that cooperation in the EMP is based on the assumption that the deepening of neighborhood relations cannot be achieved through governmental agreements alone, but that essential participation and contribution by civil society is urgently needed to bring the partnership to life and to create the greater understanding and closeness between the people envisioned by the Barcelona Declaration in 1995.

In “imagining” a new European foreign policy and security order beyond the Cold War, the EU posits the security environment with respect to the Mediterranean in the human dimension of good governance, human rights and the rule of law (Balfour 2004, 3). While the intentions of the
EMP are not only laudable but address many of the criteria which scholars and political leaders (e.g. note the criteria for the Madrid Peace Conference) have identified as contributing to economic growth and development in general, hereby enhancing regional stability, we need to remember that the EMP is not legally binding, i.e. participation is not uniformly strong. Instead it applies concepts of “benchmarking” and “differentiation” on an individual country/case basis, “allowing countries to make progress without jeopardizing the entire regional approach” (Ibid., 4). Hence this “common model of relationship does not exclude a certain degree of differentiation among the states which are part of this model” (Flaesch-Mougin in Thiele and Kostelnik 2005, 63). In fact, the EMP seeks to counteract the risks and threats from the Other (Wendt 1999), and to increase understanding between the cultures (Ortega in Batt et al. 2003, 5) in Constructivist fashion. This is to the credit of the EMP as a specialized regional exception of the ENP, which has been accused of “one size fits all” (Aldis 2005, 5) programs and approaches.

The Eastern Mediterranean in particular is poised today more than ever before to become the epicenter of global strategic concern writes S. Victor Papacosma (2004, 19) due to the much greater number of variables involved than existed during the Cold War. This leads to much greater difficulty in determining common policy among traditional allies and neighbors. The continuing security dilemmas facing the states in this region validate in my oppion Adler’s (1998, 120, quoted in Attina 2000, 5) belief that multilateral institutions and the community-building practices and the “institutions they activate produce the necessary conditions for peaceful change, i.e. cognitive and material structures, transactions between states and societies and collective identity or ‘we-feeling’”. Helle Malmvig (2004, 3) also echoes the dialectic in the EMP’s security discourse, one as being a liberal reform discourse, and the other as a cooperative security discourse. He furthermore argues that the simultaneous intermingling of these two discourses has meant “that the EU has wavered uneasily between different priorities and logics in its Mediterranean policy” (Ibid.). Not only does this make EU policies somewhat schizophrenic, they also “cause suspicions in Arab states about the real intentions and goals of the EU in the region” (Ibid.).

The threats identified in the ESDP’s Security Strategy, such as terrorism, failed states, organized crime, proliferation and regional conflicts, all manifest in Africa (Chaillot Paper No. 87, 2005, 31). It is argued in this paper that widespread insecurity in the EU’s “neighborhood”, i.a. in (Northern) Africa, e.g. is reduced with increasing success of the EU’s traditional development policy. In this paper regional integration programs are viewed as a force for progress and are natural allies in the quest for effective multilateralism as a way to ensure a sense of international order, of building trust and of combining effectiveness with legitimacy, in particular to support those parts of the EMP which are over-armed but under-institutionalized (Ibid., 31/2). This is particularly significant also with respect to subregions, as Hazem Saghieh (quoted in Kumaraswamy 2006, 1) writes: “we are brothers but others are dividing us”, e.g. due to state creation in the post-colonial period, without regard to ethnic lines. Hence socio-political and economic harmonization and integration between the northern and southern Mediterranean are not the only concerns of the EMP, but stability and security on the sub-regional level (e.g. Palestinian Authority and Israel) are also affected by the agenda of the EMP.

Today, twelve years after the inauguration of the Barcelona Process, Ruggie’s (1992, 561) advocacy of multilateral institutions as contributing to Europe’s collective destiny – and the need for these multilateral institutions and community-building practices are more needed than ever on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean, while the political hurdles loom larger than over. I agree with Rosa Balfour (2004, 1) who writes that

the EU, by nature and because of its history, is ill-suited to embracing paradigms such as the clash of civilizations. Limited by its capabilities as a ‘civilian power’, it has sought to develop relations based on dialogue, on economic integration as a means of building secure and stable environments, and on diffusing its norms through persuasion rather than coercion.
Rather, her observation (Ibid.) that the Wider Europe strategy published by the Commission in March 2003 and the new European Security Strategy prepared by the High Representative for CFSP the same year “propose major conceptual changes in the EU’s relations with the rest of the world which, if implemented, could transform the EU’s still hesitant status as an international actor”: This however, not optional in my opinion today, 2007, but imperative in light of the geopolitical “reconfigurations” taking place in the region. The risks and challenges make not only strategic thinking but an enhanced focus on action vis-a-vis the EU’s southern neighbors a priority.

V. Conclusions

Ulla Holm (2004, 1) views the dialectic faced by the EU in the Mediterranean in terms of the tension in the conceptualization of the Mediterranean as a cultural cradle of great civilizations versus as a conflict laden zone, interlinked with the discourses of the EU as an exporter of democracy through a model to copy rather than an empire-builder through respect for cultural diversity and Arab sovereignty while exporting political shared European values. The relationship between security and regional stability is well known, was it not the basis of the Truman Doctrine for Europe (Coufudakis 2004, 235). With the Maastricht Treaty the EU’s self-appointed mission arose to propagate human rights and democracy through the development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law, and to foster fundamental freedoms within the framework of cooperation policy. This became one of the explicit objectives of the emerging Common Foreign and Security Policy (Lannon, Inglis and Haenebalcke 2005).

The EMP was initially designed utilizing the neo-functional approach which had also proven useful in expanding the European Coal and Steel Community into the European Economic Community through linking essential functions beyond industries “to make war unthinkable and materially impossible”. The existence of a common model for the relationships within the EMP does not exclude a certain degree of differentiation among them, as an organized and structured form of diversity (O. Jacob 1997, quoted in Flaesch-Mougin 2005, 63) among EMP members. Hence the EU in its external relations vis-à-vis its South-Eastern Mediterranean partners adapts “to the characteristics of each partner, to the nature of the traditional links maintained with the partner, to its geopolitical positioning (and) to its level of economic development” (Ibid., 66), partially by some historical bi-lateral relations, especially between the EU Mediterranean countries and MENA.

Nachmani (2004) cautions, however, that in the discourse of the West, external support takes place as shared with Arab political leadership. However, this discourse does not exist in Arabic countries, where political leaders “do their utmost to guard the borders of the states, as if all the state’ plights and diseases are something external, as if it always comes from abroad, as if nothing that causes any wrong is to be found within our borders, inside our states” (Ibid., 28). The Arab Human Development Report (2002) points out the “existence of deeply rooted shortcomings in Arab institutional structures” (Ibid., 27) which pose obstacles to building human development (Ibid., 27/28) in terms of deficits relating to freedom, empowerment of women and knowledge. While the EMP may not yet have achieved complete success, this may have been attributable in the past to this sense of lacking necessity for reforms. Now that internal shortcomings in MENA are being recognized, it is hoped that the dialogue between the northern and south- and eastern members of the EMP is shared to a greater extent to achieve an enhanced utilization of the multilateral and multilevel mechanisms available to EMP members for the purpose of development in the political, economic and socio-cultural arenas. As Krahmann (2003, 34) confirms,

multilevel network theory proceeds form the premise that political actors seek to ensure that their political preferences will be served by the outcome of the decision-
making process… The interactions which evolve due to these attempts are a result of the structure of the network on one hand, and the distribution of preferences with regard to a political issue on the other... Actors can choose among their network linkages [and] … actors choose whether to change their preferences and join a coalition in favour of a particular policy. … By hypothesizing about the choices of network actors, multilevel theory proposes a causal link between the structure of the network and the behaviour of political agenda in the decision-making process.

Hence we observe in this analysis of the EMP and its role in regional security, that it integrates factors of identities, norms, aspirations, ideologies, and simple ideas about cause-effect relationships (Ruggie 1998, 855) in literally attempting to construct, albeit slowly, not only a security community but a zone of shared prosperity and inter-cultural understanding. As Max Weber (quoted in Ruggie, Ibid.) stated: “We are cultural beings, endowed with the capacity and the will to take a deliberate attitude towards the world and to lend it significance”.

The end of the Cold War necessitated a complete rethink about European regional security terms of the subtle dialectic between Atlanticism and Europeanism, which had been painstakingly knitted together over the previous decade through shifting patterns of interest (Howorth 2004). The EU does not usually challenge the US directly in MENA especially in light of the common NATO bond. However, the EU is likely to take on a greater sense of responsibility for peace in the Southern- and Eastern Mediterranean, based respect for the political liberty of the parties involved and through the promotion of the economic interests of all actors, including the least advantaged (Gokay 2005, 12), by seeking multilateral and bilateral constructive approaches on trade, cultural exchanges and security consultations with its Southern neighbors in the twenty first century, while the US might still be fighting demons from the last century (Carapico 2001, 28): although unipolarity may have proven easier for the US in the period immediately following the Cold War, multilateralism may become the forward approach in the twenty first century as it enhances cooperation and spreads transaction costs as “any country which had a voice shaping a particular policy is also bound to contribute to the execution of that policy” (Mohamedi 2001, 15).

And in this paper I have tried to show that the EMP has the potential in terms of multilateral institutions, cultural diversity and economic commitment, though not fully realized, implemented or complied with, of creating a virtuous cycle on the collective regional level for societal security, based on development and freedom in the post-Cold War European Mediterranean neighborhood. September 11th only augmented the need for cooperation and coordination i.e. in the Mediterranean region as a security community. How this will evolve vis-à-vis the ESDP dialogue remains to be seen. Fernandez and Youngs (2005, 158) confirm that the EMP’s first ten years have not been fully satisfying (partially because of the perception that the U.S.’ presence has been increasingly felt in the EMP’s evolution), and that its revitalization requires more than simply “doing more of the same”.

As we know, peace processes in the Middle East are still more hope than reality at the moment. However, the EMP’s purpose to extend beyond the EU a zone of “peace, prosperity and stability” applies a proven approach to address regional security in the Mediterranean – keeping in mind Baumann’s (1991, quoted in Holm 2004, 2) caution that “post-modernity cannot … posit itself as superior to modernity because the modern idea of progress has faded and because it expresses a mood of differentiation and variety, that is, of not excluding or destroying the different. Hence in post-modernity, modernity cohabits”. We will need to keep this in mind ever more as fears of a spillover into other countries cannot be excluded as Europe deals with impending new security threats, e.g. that of spillover from Iraq sliding into a civil war (Dinmore 2007), Jordan’s King Abdullah II announcing the desire of his country wanting its own atomic program (Miami Herald January 20, 2007 p. 17A) and of Russian present Putin “open” to
forming a gas “Opec” with Algeria, Qatar, Libya, Central Asian republics and perhaps Iran (Peel 2/7/2007).

Hettne (1991, 279) wrote already sixteen years ago that it is crucial to understand the interactions between ‘high” and “low” politics, i.e. security and development issues in understanding Europe’s recent history and immediate future. This is true today more than ever as regionalization in the world economy, the growth of sub-regionalism within Europe, and the development of smaller multinational economic regions create a new balance of power globally, one more economic than military (Ibid.). The complexity of socio-political and cultural asymmetries in the regions surrounding the Mediterranean, especially in the post-9/11 security context, possible spillover from post-Iraq instabilities and Russian revisionist moves continue to require a renewed commitment by the EU in its southern neighborhood rather than inviting complacency. While the EMP’s results are neither entirely positive nor completely negative, “the very existence of the process already constitutes an important contribution by the EU to stability and prosperity in the zone, as well as building up a region in the political sense where it only existed in a geographical one” (Ortega in Batt et al., eds., 2003, 5).


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