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The Mediterranean - Security Turnstile: An overview
From the Barcelona Process to the Union for the Mediterranean

Astrid B. Boening

Abstract

This paper seeks to expand the theoretical concept of a Middle Eastern Regional Security Complex (MERSC) (Buzan and Waever 2004), based on the literature (e.g. on security, regional integration, development and global governance) towards a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Complex (EMRSC). The center of an EMRSC lies in the regions surrounding the Mediterranean, rather than in the Middle East, as Buzan and Waever (Ibid., map) proposed.

While some authors have pointed to the hesitance of the southern Mediterranean towards the north, regional economic integration is not new to the Mediterranean, but was present extensively e.g. between the ancient Venetian traders and the Middle East for over two millennia, prevailing economically when political and military harmony had ceased (Spence 2007).

This paper suggests that the member states of the Union for the Mediterranean (UMed), as the successor program of the EuroMed Partnership (EMP) (also referred to as the Barcelona Process), have reached a proactive commitment to a broader framework for national development and reform programs in the greater interregional context of the Euro-Mediterranean, addressing those goals which were not achieved in many security sectors and levels (Buzan and Waever 2003) within its predecessor program, the EMP.

Introduction

In this paper I seek to explore a region of the world, the Mediterranean, which has through the millennia been significant as a passageway for peoples, their trade and cultures. Previous experiences with regional Mediterranean integration, such as the Roman Empire or the spread of Christianity in the East and West Roman Empires were certainly not always peaceful.

In this paper the complex political, economic and social interrelationships in the EuroMed Partnership (EMP) (also known as the Barcelona Process) (compare Appendix 1), an IGO, which was “re-


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1 The buffer states of an EMRSC would be e.g. the eastern EU neighborhood states (in contrast to the Scandinavian and the Balkans as Buffer States in a MERSC). The insulator states of an EMRSC would i.a. equatorial AfHca. A super-and great power would be Russia. A subcomplex would be e.g. the Gulf Cooperation Council, with an Asian supercomplex (compare Ibid.).
launched” on July 13, 2008 as the “Union for the Mediterranean” (UMed), are examined in terms of their impact on (inter-regional) security in the Euro-Mediterranean region (Euro-Med).

The EMP represents a modus operandi for regional integration in the Mediterranean. It is intended to serve not simply as a peaceful “bridge” not between “Them” and “Us”, or “the West” and “the Rest”, but utilizes approaches beyond functionalism and institutionalism, which have been historically successful in integrating neighboring countries that had an extensive history of “un-neighborly” relations. An example would be France and Germany, which were able to integrate into a structure eventually, i.e. the European Union (EU), which has brought not only prosperity, but also peace to these countries for the past sixty years. This paper examines i.a. whether there is in fact integration occurring in the Mediterranean region through the activities of the EMP, and how this reflects on its inter-regional implications. While the EMP, as a North-South integration project, has the aim of security through the EU’s democratic principles of inclusion, and rejecting explicit power politics among the member states (Vasconcelos 2004, 8), the Euro-Med as a region has been the stage to continuing hard-power confrontations during the existence of the EMP, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Lebanese civil war, Algerian internal “turmoil”, and other “incidents”. One major difference between soft and hard power is the former’s long “leadtime” vs. the greater potential for “immediacy” of hard power.

Background: European Security Context

With the end of the Cold War, the EC recognized “the transition to a new European order as a positive opportunity to develop its external role” (Pace 2003, 164). Hence it appears appropriate to position the EMP, beyond its three-basket parameters also as an intra- and interregional dynamic per se, e.g. within the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and potentially with the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), and IGOs.

The European Security Strategy (ESS), initiated in 2003, lists the threats of the 21st century as follows: failed and rogue states, regional conflicts, civil wars, political instability and terrorism, as they have implications for the EU at the global, regional and (member) state levels (Senyucel et al. 2006, 6). Potential threats are particularly emphasized in the ESS at the regional level, as they are particularly relevant to the EU for their proximity to it, and due to the socio-economic and political heterogeneity of its neighborhood.

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2 Since the UMed is only a couple of months old at the time of writing (and its initial progress by the EU French presidency delayed by intervening priorities), this paper will focus on the EMP, in whose footsteps the UMed follows.
Rosa Balfour (2004, 1) writes that

the EU, by nature and because of its history, is ill-suited to embracing paradigms such as the clash of civilizations. Limited by its capabilities as a ‘civilian power’, it has sought to develop relations based on dialogue, on economic integration as a means of building secure and stable environments, and on diffusing its norms through persuasion rather than coercion.

She observes (2004, 1) that the Wider Europe Strategy, published by the Commission in March 2003, and the new European Security Strategy, prepared by the High Representative for CFSP the same year “propose major conceptual changes in the EU’s relations with the rest of the world which, if implemented, could transform the EU’s still hesitant status as an international actor”.

The debate surrounding basic and comprehensive security revolves around general as well as universal values and their policy implementation (Aliboni 2002, 11), which may be either more immediate, or address broader issues, involving political, economic, and/or socio-cultural responses, as well as more longer-term crisis management, such as through peacekeeping and peace-building as a structural approach to national or regional instability from the perspective of the EU. Evaluating the EMP from these policy considerations, we observe that its basic institutional structure follows this paradigm. The EU General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) of the CFSP as the forum for EU-foreign ministers and the political Committee of the EU explicitly underlined in its concluding remarks on 18/19 June 2007 that strengthening the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) represents a core foreign policy which should continue dynamically, particularly by exploring the alignment of the EU’s Mediterranean partners with EU declarations, demarches, and positions on CFSP issues as other ENP members (such as Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) have decided to do. Some authors (Danner 2006, quoted in Senyucel et al. 2006, 6) have stated that “the EU has realized that actualizing its ambitions at the international scale is very much related to how successful it is in its regional policies” (italics added).

The recognition that no European country can tackle today’s complex security challenges alone led in December 2001 also to the adoption of a declaration on the operational capability of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) (European Commission CFSP 2008) by the European Council at Laeken, recognizing the EU’s capability – and responsibility – to conduct some crisis management operations. Heisbourg (2001, 8), who writes that the “ESDP and its Rapid Reaction Force does not exist in a historical vacuum”. On October 1, 2008 EU defense ministers met to focus on building a European fleet of helicopters and transport planes (in light of the deployment of the EU mission to Georgia on the same day, which highlighted a logistics deficit in this regard) (EurActiv 10/1/08). While previously EU peacekeeping missions, such as the one deployed in Chad had to rely on external contributions, such as from Russia, the EU can no longer afford this dependency. This expansion in EU defense logistics includes initial talks for joint EU officer training, “inspired by the ERASMUS student exchange programme” (Ibid.). While this indicates certainly a continued defensive EU, it suggests a deeper military integration, triggered by necessity arising from external circumstances as mentioned above.

Interregional Security in the Euro-Mediterranean

Against this background of the CFSP, this section will examine the parameters of a possible Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Complex Structure. The discussion of security cooperation is significant in the contemporary international system as it is taking place in a dynamic of a declining prominence of military alliances, and the reciprocal rise in importance of composite regional security frameworks (Attina 2005, 3): following the end of Cold War, bilateralism, the “de-polarization [since then] of the international system” (Ibid.) has affected nations’ security cooperative behavior. Hence the past twenty years are a prime example of the time changes in security practices through the development of new ones, especially as this security cooperation is not only positively, but also functionally related to increased inter-regional economic cooperation (Ibid.). While through the ages foreign trade was protected
more by a nation’s own military capacity (e.g. the armadas), today (especially regional) trade experiences “front-line” protection through the institutional framework of cooperative political and economic agreements, bolstered by socio-cultural confidence building measures (Attina 2005, 3). This “security regionalism” (Ibid.) has been analyzed in terms of levels of conflict and security among states of different regions (Singer and Wildavsky, 1993 and Kakowitz, 1998, quoted in Attina 2005, 4), or in terms of the relationship between conflict, integration and democracy (Gleditsch, 2002 quoted in Attina 2005, 4), in addition to the other theories on war and regional integration, such as (neo-) realism, liberal institutionalism, (neo-) functionalism, and social constructivism.

However, this “security regionalism”, based on regional security partnerships, holds for analytical purposes (Attina 2005, 5) that states, who have come to an agreement on “co-managing security problems” as a result of their realization of reciprocal interdependence, as well as common dependence on transnational problems, and, significantly, the “international relations in the regional are not polarized by great power competition” (Ibid., italics added). I would consider that the hegemonic impetus in the establishment of an effective intergovernmental organization can, however, not be ruled out yet. Hence the EMP indicates a very diverse number of accomplished milestones since 1995, because the EU does not represent a “great power” polarization in it (countering the colonial argument raised against it), though contributed substantially both with logistic as well as financial support to development in a region with millennia of disharmonious political and socio-economic relations.

This evolution in a regional security partnership received a new impetus following 9/11 through the “new discourse of threat and danger” (Attina 2005, 9) as national responses to deal with rogue states and political actors deemed aggressive and unresponsive to cooperative mechanisms. While these actors cannot be judged irrational from their viewpoint in attempting to achieve their own political agenda, states have taken steps to dissuade their interests, i.a. by enhancing their own military facility, “including the development of the European Security and Defense Policy” (ESDP) for worldwide use, and in some cases, the enhancement of the Euro-Atlantic strategic preponderance as condition for international stability and peace” (Ibid.). As a further authoritative speech act of a decade-long scholar in this area, this statement would confirm the identification of the Euro-Med beyond a Regional Security Complex as a Regional Security Super Complex transatlantically

Collective security involves keeping the armed forces under national control, but states agree to make them available to intervene against an aggressor in a third country (Attina 2004, 3). The regions surrounding the EU have been termed part of the “new strategic geography” (Senyucel et al. 2006, 6) (emphasis added). Many of these regions are the sources of instability, yet rich in natural resources, especially critical energy reserves, which make successful relations with these neighbors essential (Ibid.). EMP-member states, in addition to their shared history and geographical space, and through their formal inter-linkage of the “three-basked”-parameters of the Barcelona Process per se are also formally linked

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3 Compare the announcement by the UN (Financial Times 11/3/08) that its forces would patrol the Strait of Hormuz against piracy

4 In accordance with regime theory (e.g. Ruggie 1999).

5 These are: a) The political and security partnership with the aim of strengthening the political dialogue is based on “observance of essential principles of international law, and to reaffirm common objectives in matters of internal and external stability” (EU Commission website 2006: Barcelona Declaration). EMP partners agreed to act in accordance with the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (such as guaranteeing “the effective legitimate exercise of such rights and freedoms, including freedom of expression, freedom of association for peaceful purposes and freedom of thought, conscience and religion, both individually and together with other members of the same group, without any discrimination on grounds of race, nationality, language, religion or sex”(EU Commission website 2006: Barcelona Declaration)) as well as other obligations under international law, including their regional and international agreements.

b) As both Abdullatif Ahmida (2000) and Joffé (2001, 34) point out, already the 1957 Treaty of Rome made specific provisions for the economic relationship between the Maghrib and the EC. However, while these were based stronger on colonial patters of the former as a raw material and labor supply, and market for EC/EU goods, the economic aspect of the EMP is directed towards economic development in MENA to reduce the gap between the northern and the southern periphery of the Mediterranean.

c) Some writers view the social-cultural “basket” of the EMP as “mainly aspirational in nature…, primarily devoted to supporting the growth of civil society in the South” (Joffé 2001, 38), while the EMP’s documents also indicate plans to develop
beyond mere diplomatic and foreign policy ties through a complex structure of “formal” hard and soft
security ties, including conflict resolution.

Attina (2004, 2) (emphasis added) points out that “the construction of security co-operation in the
Mediterranean region” rests in the design of two constellations within the EMP: the multi-dimensional
strategy of its three Chapters, and the specific initiatives of the partners within the First Chapter frame.
“For this reason, the Barcelona Declaration [represents] the fundamental agreement of a regional security
system that … create[s] the operative mechanisms and measures that set up a comprehensive and
cooperative security” (Ibid.) partnership. Attina (2004, 2) suggests analyzing security systems according to
the level of institutionalization in their security cooperation, as well as the social integration of their
members, represented by the following graph (after Attina 2004, 3):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No formal</th>
<th>Amalgamated</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrangement</td>
<td>x----------x---------------x----------x---------x------------x</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A:</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A:</td>
<td>Opposite Alliance System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B:</td>
<td>Collective security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C:</td>
<td>Regional security partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1:</td>
<td>Loosely coupled Pluralistic security community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D2:</td>
<td>Tightly coupled Pluralistic security community</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The European security system evolved from an Opposite Alliance System since the 1970s towards greater
security integration, while the southern Mediterranean portion of the EMP is currently not an Opposite
Alliance System, but has the potential to develop in either direction, depending on the institutional and
political context, according to Attina (2004, 3).

European stability overall is based on several premises, i.a. economic prosperity and continued
growth in its “neighborhood” as discussed above in the context of the EMP’s three Chapters. The EU’s
CFSP, which was only three years old upon the founding of the EMP, evolved parallel to it with the
objectives of safeguarding the common values and fundamental interests, independence and integrity of
the EU, in compliance with UN principles and those set out in the Helsinki Declaration (EU website).
Nevertheless, there is also a marked asymmetry in security institutions between the countries of the
northern and the southern Mediterranean due to the density of institutional development, much more so in
the former and somewhat less in the latter (Vasconcelos 1999, 29). Other regional integration projects in
MENA, such as the Arab League or the Arab Maghreb Union, did not develop a real security dimension,
partially due to the stalled Middle East peace process and its “brake” on South-South integration. In this
context, the EMP is by far the most significant security mechanism in the Euro-Med due to its multilateral
character, and its “multi-layered” dimensions (Ibid., 30).

Some scholars have accused the EMP of being an imperialist tool of the EU for an extension of
territory, and herewith power. I would view the EMP rather as a model for assisting its member states to
develop politically, economically and socially, in order to contribute to internal (national) stability as well
as to discourage the southern neighbors of the EU to emigrate illegally in droves to the EU north of the
Mediterranean. Additionally, especially thanks to the EMP financial programs, the Middle East
Development Assistance (MEDA), the EMP political/security, economic/financial and socio-cultural
human resources and to promote understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies (e.g. European
Commission 2000, 2006, 2007), aims which have been substantially supported in turning them into reality by NGOs such as the
Anna Lindh Foundation. The EMP participants recognize that the traditions of culture and civilization throughout the
Mediterranean region, the dialogue between these cultures and exchanges at the human, scientific and technological levels are
essential factors in bringing their peoples closer by promoting understanding between them and improving their perception of
each other.
options and tools available to all members, such as through a harmonization of practices, for the potential integration into some areas of the EMP of the EU’s “Four Freedoms” (goods, people, services and capital), and for the mutual security-reinforcing effect they have on a peaceful coexistence in the culturally, politically and economically diverse North African and Middle Eastern “neighborhood” of the EU.

Organization for Security Cooperation Europe (OSCE)

Security cooperation towards the end of the Cold War and the years following it needs to be understood in the context of the OSCE and its preceding Charters, which led to its establishment and evolution. The OSCE, with currently fifty-six member countries, is the largest security organization. It builds on the Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) of the early 1970s (culminating in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975) as a forum of dialogue between East and West. As the above map shows, it involves a broad membership ranging from North America to five former Soviet Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kirghizistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) and the European countries in addition to the Partners for Cooperation countries.

Following the shifting security dynamics post-Cold War it was decided during the Paris Conference of 1990 (culminating in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe) that the OSCE’s activities should evolve from predominantly meetings and conferences to greater field involvement, i.a. through the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the Office of the Representative on Freedom of the Media, the High Commissioner on National Minorities, in addition to the field missions and activities in member countries (Ghebali and Warner, 2001 and Hopmann, 2003, quoted in Attina 2005, 8). This security structure complements the European Security Partnership as operative agreements to the declarations of fundamental agreements (Attina 2005, 8). Its first test during the Balkan unrest at the end of the last century showed which of these aspects required improvement.

The significance of both the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe lies in providing the intellectual basis, as well as the structural frameworks for other regional security partnerships and communities, such as the EMP. The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 already contained a Three-Basket structure, i.e. the “Principles Guiding Relations between States” as follows:

1. Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty
2. Refraining from the threat or use of force
3. Inviolability of frontiers
4. Territorial integrity of States
5. Peaceful settlement of disputes
6. Non-intervention in internal affairs
7. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief
8. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples
9. Co-operation among States
10. Fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law

Additional agreements included areas of cooperation in the fields of economics, science and technology, and the environment, as well as commercial exchanges, industrial co-operation and projects of common interest, as well as provisions concerning trade and industrial cooperation, the harmonization of standards and arbitration, and the exploration of possibilities for improving cooperation, such as in agriculture, energy, new technologies, the rational use of resource, transport technology and environmental concerns.

UN

The concept of hegemony, based on control and force, may be relevant to the maintenance of security communities (in terms of a neo-Gramscian form of hegemony), or may be traced back to Thucydides, as *hegemonia*, founded on moral, cultural and intellectual leadership, and based on consent and rooted in legitimacy among the secondary states (Flockhart 2007). When Turkey’s bid for EU membership becomes successful, the EU will border at that point Iran, Iraq and Syria. With these countries as potential new EU neighbors, it is understandable that the EU is not only following developments in Iraq very closely, but showing a definite self-interest in the current developments there. From its position of strength in soft power, the EU’s Commissioner for External Relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, is actively participating in the Iraqi Compact as “a new partnership with the international community aiming to help Iraq on the path of peace and political and economic reconstruction” (EU News release 5/3/2007). While the US has obviously had endless meetings with Iraq and its neighbors since 2003 (if not before) on these topics, the “shock and awe”-effect of the Anglo military engagement appeared to have interfered with the motivation of Iraq’s multiple (tribal etc.) actors (and those of some of their neighbors) to jointly participate in their country’s future structural continuities and processes (and appear to instead favor asymmetrical warfare against the occupation instead) during the first few years. Some of these countries implicated in this interference, such as Syria, are EMP-member states, which explains the broader effect of the current Iraq war on regional stability, not only transatlantically, but also in the Euro-Mediterranean.

Furthermore, in the interest of this potentially ever “widening” European security “region” (now potentially including Syria, Iran and Iraq, as mentioned above, as potentially new EU-neighbors) the EU, through its Neighborhood Policy (of which the EMP is the specialized regional program), intends to assist Iraq by focusing mainly on the rehabilitation of basic services, support of the political process, including elections, support of job creation and of Iraqi capacity building and humanitarian assistance (Ibid.).

The irony will not be lost on the reader that these are actually also the very programs and intentions the US had for Iraq – but proceeded to impose them “top down” on Iraq without, I claim, securing the absolutely essential “mutual constitution” between agent, structure, interests and identity in this process. This is an inconvenient and time consuming process indeed, which may have to be modified or even largely sacrificed, when time is of the essence in an acute security threat. However, the establishment and effort in the maintenance of a long and trusting relationship between unequals, such as countries in MENA and the US may be more legitimate in the longterm and hence have greater longterm benefits, than a hasty and poorly thought-out and implemented hard power initiative. This may be especially true in political relationships in the southern Mediterranean, partially of a difference in the perception of “time” between the “old” continent and the “new” world in matters of progress (or perhaps, for no other reason, for the “old” continent not being able to afford to waste resources blindly). With other words, despite similar interests between the EU and the US as actors, their different identities inform different processes, leading to different structural outcomes at times, especially with respect to some initiatives in the greater Middle East.

One of the greatest security threats to Europe today, despite and because of events surrounding the Iraq invasion, would be a disrupted trans-Atlantic relationship due to a potential ideological fall-out. The Cold War and its nuclear stalemate as central to the European security community have changed now into
an acute threat from the potential use of WMDs, especially in asymmetrical warfare globally, and potentially with respect to a revisionist Russia. Security today needs to be approached differently to respond effectively to the needs and threats in the contemporary Mediterranean (including taking into consideration the re-emergent activities of Russia) from the military to the environmental, politico-economic and the socio-cultural of the societal sphere.

**The Transatlantic Euro-Med Dimension post-Cold War: NATO**

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had been responsible for territorial defense of Europe and "peace-making" after the Cold War, while since 1999 the European Union is responsible for the implementation of missions; i.e. peace-keeping, policing of treaties etc.

1996: At their June meetings, NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers decided that NATO’s internal adaptation would involve building the European Security and Defense **Identity within** NATO, in order for the European Allies’ shared responsibility to be expressed more effectively and coherently in their contribution to the missions and activities of the Alliance, and reinforce the transatlantic partnership.

This “New-look” NATO has been described as a process of redefining the organisation’s role and operation” (Europa-website New-look NATO”, 8/19/2008), recognizing a European defense identity, strengthening the European component of the transatlantic security system, the new role of the WEU, as well as NATO’s eastern enlargement and its establishment of a stable and sustainable partnership with Russia and Ukraine, as well as NATO deepening its relations with third countries, e.g. through Partnership for Peace and Mediterranean Dialogue programs.

**NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Initiative**

In comparison, NATO’s mandate also shifted post-Cold War from defending a clearly delimited territory to a new strategy of committing member states to defend unbounded interests beyond Europe’s theater of operations: NATO’s new mandate is as global as the Western interests it has pledged to defend … [implying] that the Arab world will received its fair share of NATO attention … [such as] crisis operations … to keep risks at a distance by dealing with potential crises (which could affect Euro-Atlantic stability) at an early stage (El-Gawhary 1999, 16/7).

NATO changed post-Cold War from that of a collective defense organization to a collective security organization, seeking to avoid new polarizations and the creation of new dividing lines between former friends and foes, but to seek cooperation between former adversaries through integration in Allied progress, e.g. Partnership for Peace ( PfP ) and special relationships as mechanisms for exporting stability to new member countries.

NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative specifically was formally launched in December 1994 as the “Mediterranean Dialogue” (“Dialogue”), reflecting the alliance’s recognition of the Mediterranean’s unique regional security challenges. The Dialogue was also intended to reach out to non-NATO member countries who might be interested in collaborating with NATO’s Mediterranean security and stability projects. These “partners” would not be allies at the beginning but would be involved in confidence building programs, to become members when some major qualifications were met, e.g. irreversible commitments to democracy, civilian control of the military and development of a nation’s military capability to a level of interoperability with those of NATO members” (Kaplan 1999, 195).
The “soft” power ideas and programs of the EMP/UMed to co-constitute structures for peace hence would be balanced in an EMRSC e.g. with NATO’s Article 5 mission: “Security is indivisible within the Euro-Atlantic region” as a pact against war (Yost 1998, 6) as well as the (now favored) non-Article 5 missions of collective security of an alliance to “deter, and if necessary defend, against one or more identifiable external threats”. This goes back to the Wilsonian conviction that collective security is an international morality superior to that on which the realist balance of power system is based (Yost 1998, 8) – and it has always been understood that NATO would not undertake a mission without UN Security Council approval (especially after the U.S. overcame this restraint on national action with the invasion of Iraq with limited success at the time of this writing, partially due to this unilateralism).

The ESDP exists as the bridge to the EU’s hard power options, ranging from previously only national militaries and NATO on the one hand, and the EU’s soft power approach on the other. While the EMP’s approach has been basically one of soft-power, focusing on economic and social assistance through the EU’s MEDA, NATO per se overall also boasts U.S. military hard power capabilities, while NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue on the other hand aims to build confidence and cooperation. Vasconcelos (2008, 8) suggests questioning the understanding of, and consensus on comprehensive security by EMP member states, i.e. whether e.g. the post-9/11 security perspective are really law and order related.

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6 Comparable to the theme of the League of Nations that “peace is indivisible”
Mediterranean Intra- and Inter-Regional Relations

Romano Prodi, as then President of the European Commission, in a speech at Louvain University in November 2002, stated that there is not demarcation line between some Mediterranean countries and others, but that the Mediterranean is

a girdle of peace and cooperation, the focal point of a vast political and economic region stretching from Spain to the black sea and the Persian Gulf, … [a region that] must not start from a closed, one-sided Eurocentric position; [but that] we must base our approach on a certain idea of belonging together which in essence already exists within the processes already under way, but needs to be bolstered with firmness and vision (First Jordan 2002).

These words, as an “authoritative speech act” in terms of securitization (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1998), identify the multi-lateral Mediterranean “region” as one of belonging together socio-economically as well as politically in terms of a zone of peace, viewed from its inter-regional aspect towards neighboring regions.

Integration theories are meso-theories rather than relying on a single universal theory to explain collective decision-making of political actors in distinct national settings who are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities to a new center (E. Haas 1961, 1958). These political actors still exercise rational choice (i.e. they are utility maximizers with exogenously determined preferences, such as the national interest and the relative power of a state remaining significant, even in the EU) in new regional arrangements. Regional integration is also not static, but a dynamic process, both path-dependent on the context of the historical period, the sociological actors (state and non-state), and the specific issues involved.

The main thesis suggested here is that regional integration is taking place to the point of a regional security complex being established among EMP-member countries⁷ (Boening 2008a and 2008b) (compare Appendix 1). This would represent a revision of the Middle East Regional Security Complex suggested by Buzan and Waever (2003). The study is significant for two reasons: First, this paper focuses on the Euro-Mediterranean region and the role of the European Union and its southern Mediterranean neighbors (“MENA”) in the context of the EMP in “constructing” this space, and hereby giving it meaning in the context of regional stability. Secondly, this integration could additionally lead to a reciprocal “re-construction” of EMP members’ self-identity and interests in the structural context of a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Complex (EMRSC).

⁷ EMP-membership at its founding in 1995 consisted of the European Union (EU) member states, plus Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Libya (as an observer), Morocco, the Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey.

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership as of September 2008 consisted of the twenty-seven EU member states, three EU-Candidate States: Croatia, Macedonia and Turkey, and eleven Mediterranean Partners: Albania, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria and Tunisia. Libya has had observer status since 1999.
If such as Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Complex can be traced to have evolved through the dynamics of EMP activities, it would also have potential reverberations vis-à-vis a transatlantic “umbilicus” as a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Super Complex (EMRSSC). I operationalize an EMRSC and an EMRSSC by analyzing the levels and sectors in the EMP, as suggested in the literature on RSCT (Ibid.) (Boening 2008a, and 2008b).

The analysis of an EMRSC, i.a. through the dynamics of the EMP, can be traced in several ways. First, the EMP seeks to achieve economic harmonization to optimize development through neoliberal and functional interdependence, such as a Free Trade Area (aimed for by 2010). Secondly, it re-constituted the actors and structures in member countries through social-cultural rapprochement, and increased facilities for the movement of people (and hopefully labor under the potential terms of the UMed). Thirdly, it involves beyond traditional political aspects of military security/hard power (such as through intra-regional harmonization within NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue) and the evolving ESDP, also constructivist dynamics of regional security complex sectors and levels. Fourth, taken as a whole, these dynamics have characteristics of a security community, which involves, according to the new framework for security analysis (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1998), additional security sectors such as members emphasizing the development of civil society, the securitization of food, water, finances, energy and the environment.

These are addressed in an EMRSC on a number of levels and can be analyzed i.a. through neo-hegemonic and Second/Third Generation Regionalism theories in terms of their inter-regional significance, such as vis-à-vis the Black Sea region, the Gulf Cooperation Council, Russia or Latin America.

While this paper focuses on the Euro-Med, it does not exist in a vacuum but has an inter-regional dimension. There are two aspects to this discussion: the EMP-internal transformations, and the interregional interactions between the EMP and neighboring regional organizations. Intra-regional EMP transformations pertain e.g. to the status of Turkey as EMP-member, or Turkey as additionally an EU-member state one day as well. This will re-define the entire south-eastern neighborhood of the EU, whereby i.a. Iran, Syria and Iraq will be the EU’s neighborhood. Schumacher 2004, 99) suggests that this would require the EU not to limit itself to a mere political dialogue and trade agreement with Iran, and … [not] continue to treat war-torn Iraq simply as a recipient of reconstruction aid, thereby leaving the country in the power sphere of the occupying powers… [but rather that] the EU will have to consider redefining the EMP’s geographic scope and transforming it into a more inclusive and flexible Euro-Middle East Partnership.8 (italics added)

8 compare also Neugart and Schumacher (2004)
Schumacher (2004, 100) suggests that this would involve redesigning the EMP’s intergovernmental framework with enhanced bi-, and/or multilateral inter-, intra and sub-regional cooperation layers/rings of cooperation, such as an enhanced infrastructure within this partnership and as well as within the south-south dimension, including transport enhancements to support its economic aspirations and interdependence. Additionally, the intra- and interregional socio-political evolution on these levels would need to be furthered through confidence-building measures, and intercultural learning, including intra-Arab civil society cooperation (Schumacher 2004, 101). Coherence and coordination within the EMP would give a much broader base in managing regional post-“Operation Iraq Freedom” stability. These statements, as a further “authoritative speech act” from a research institution focusing on the Euro-Med, not only views the EMP as the preeminent institutional framework in the Euro-Mediterranean to develop this enhanced socio-political and economic infrastructure in the widest sense.

The inter-regional aspect involves e.g. the status of the Middle East Peace Process. There are a number of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) overlapping with the EMP, from the EU to e.g. the Arab Maghreb Union, which seeks South-South integration through a sub-regional free trade area (Gillespie 2000, 95). The African Union, whose Protocol of 2002 relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council represents the start for building a formal security cooperation (Attina 2005, 7 and 16) within a regional security partnership encompassing fifty-three state, including the prevention, management and resolution of African conflicts, including early warning and preventative diplomacy to promote peace, security and stability.

Attina (2004, 2), in studying the constructive processes of the Euro-Mediterranean security system, utilizes analytical approaches of other regional security systems and regional security partnerships from a comparative perspective. He points out that the existence of different multilateral initiatives on security in the Mediterranean is pointed out as a strategic tool for the future of the Euro-Mediterranean security project, and the proposal for increasing the relations between the EMP and other multilateral initiatives is put on the table as a step forward to strengthen the process for building the Mediterranean security system (Ibid.).

The Adriatic Sea Partnership

The Adriatic Sea Partnership is an example of an intra-regional “region” within the Mediterranean. It represents a political deepening, through mainly epistemic cooperation. It was initiated in March 2006 by the Slovenian Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning as a protective approach against the environmental challenges to this sensitive and vulnerable marine ecosystem, modeled as an elaboration of the positive experiences with the Sva River Basin Initiative (MAP Bureau 2006, 1) in terms of integrating the Adriatic under the UN’s Mediterranean Strategy for Sustainable Development (Ibid.). This institution would coordinate national and international public and private level institutions of involved shareholders, such as financial, waste water management, integrated coastal zone management, etc. (Ibid., 205).

The Black Sea Synergy Initiative

The Black Sea Synergy Initiative was established in 2007 to deal with the opportunities and challenges of the region, which is “rich in natural resources and strategically located at the junction of Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East (Commission of the European Communities 2007). The EU Council in its conclusions of 18/19 June 2007 welcomed the initiatives aimed at strengthening a coherent EU engagement towards the Black Sea area. The Council pointed out that they explicitly recommend building on the experience gained through the Barcelona Process (as well as lessons learnt in the Northern

9 The Black Sea region comprises Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine.
Dimension of the ENP) to extend synergies with other regional cooperation processes, as the EU-accession process by Turkey, the ENP as well as the Strategic Partnership with the Russian Federation are of relevance to the EU.

The EU-Africa Strategic Partnership
The EU-Africa Strategic Partnership is a further southern extension of the ENP beyond the Neighborhood, and in this case specifically the EMP, (European Commission: EU-Africa Summit 2007), to provide a long-term vision to face common challenges, ranging from climate change to development, energy, migration, peace and security, trade and regional integration and good governance human rights, between the countries beyond the southern Mediterranean and the EU. These issues represent some of the sectors, which Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998) have referred to as “sectors” in operationalizing their new framework for security (as reflected in this book’s title under the same terminology). Additionally, this EU foreign policy towards the south could be explained with Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) (Buzan and Waever 2003) in terms of the Euro-Mediterranean region as a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Complex, whereby sub-Saharan Africa could be viewed as buffer-region to a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Super Complex under this theory. As the dynamics currently are not particularly intense between Europe and sub-Saharan Africa, this aspect of the EMP exceeds the limits of this paper.

While the future geographic and political ENP-membership may be contested (Lippert 2007, 183), the ENP’s potential is not\textsuperscript{10}. The following sections will discuss these opportunities further.

The Gulf Cooperation Council
The GCC and the EU have held regular ministerial meetings during the last two decades on issues of mutual interest, such as terrorism, WMDs, human rights and regional political issues pertaining to “ensuring security in a broad sense in a region of tension, and guaranteeing long-term prosperity and job creation by diversifying the economy and reducing dependence on oil income” (EU Council Interim Report 2006). Both the GCC and the EU view especially this area of energy and security on a regional basis in need of enhanced regional and a wider international dialogue, e.g. through a stronger EU presence, enhanced coordination and higher visibility in the Gulf states (Ibid.). The GCC financial sector has been partially integrated with the West through Petro-investments. Reciprocally, global financial crisis of autumn 2008, however, left especially some Kuwaiti banks (e.g. Gulf Bank) weakened (England 2008). The financial “inter-regional” role of the GCC in the EU, beyond Petro-investments, is also exemplified by the $10.7 bn capital injection by Libya and Qatar into Barlcays Bank (Financial Times 10/31/08), indicating that Arab Gulf banks are overall well capitalized.

\textsuperscript{10} Compare Senyucel et al. 2006.
As this interim report is an official EU document, it represents an authoritative “speech act” which explicitly states not only the inter-regional security significance between the EU and the GCC, but also the interest of the EU to especially support the mutual security concerns between these two regions. In this context, the EU welcomes elections in the regions (Ibid.).

The GCC has actively supported the EMP when brokered the Doha Agreement in 2008 to normalize relations between Lebanon and Israel (compare Chapter Five), facilitating the participation of both countries at the Mediterranean Summit in July 2008 in Paris.

**Select Special Powers and the Mediterranean**

**U.S.**

As the Doha negotiations have broken down since the writing of this paper, the complexity of trade liberalization and integration as a function of regional trade have been highlighted. Tovias (2008, 39) has elaborated on the strategic consequences of cross-regional free trade agreements in that it expands the influence of larger powers in regions beyond their past spheres, and lessens the dependence of smaller powers on previous alliances.

This remarkable change in the trade policies of both large and small countries could lead in the medium term to a sort of meltdown of still-existing, although loose, spheres of influence (such as the one the EU has in the Southern Mediterranean and in Sub-Saharan Africa or the US in North and Central America) (Tovias 2008, 39).

As least developed countries tend to be losers in these dynamics, since “neither economic powers nor emerging economies consider” (Ibid.) their markets worthwhile to be included in an FTA, it should be a caveat for the EMP in the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean FTA to avoid this temptation and the socio-political repercussions it might bring. Additionally, these dynamics gain salience by the U.S. Middle East Free Trade Area Agreement (formerly proposed in 2003, to be implementation within ten years), which broadens the U.S. influence in MENA beyond the military influence and specific petroleum trade, with broader trade agreements as well.

The concept of hegemony, based on control and force, may be relevant to the maintenance of security communities (in terms of a neo-Gramscian form of hegemony), or may be traced back to Thucydides, as *hegemonia*, founded on moral, cultural and intellectual leadership, and based on consent and rooted in legitimacy among the secondary states (Flockhart 2007). When Turkey’s bid for EU membership becomes successful, the EU will border at that point Iran, Iraq and Syria. With these countries as potential new EU neighbors, it is understandable that the EU is not only following developments in Iraq very closely, but showing a definite self-interest in the current developments there. From its position of strength in soft power, the EU’s Commissioner for External Relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, is actively participating in the Iraqi Compact as “a new partnership with the international community aiming to help Iraq on the path of peace and political and economic reconstruction” (EU News release 5/3/2007). While the US has obviously had endless meetings with Iraq and its neighbors since 2003 (if not before) on these topics, the “shock and awe”-effect of the Anglo military engagement appeared to have interfered with the motivation of Iraq’s multiple (tribal etc.) actors (and those of some of their neighbors) to jointly participate in their country’s future structural continuities and processes (and appear to instead favor asymmetrical warfare against the occupation instead) during the first few years. Some of these countries implicated in this interference, such as Syria, are EMP-member states, which explains the broader effect of the current Iraq war on regional stability, not only transatlantically, but also in the Euro-Mediterranean.

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The Caribbean/APC Countries
The comprehensiveness of EU development cooperation consists of three elements and are intended to synergistically put into action relevant UN resolutions:

- The European development policy agreed on by the European Commission and EU development ministers in the Development Council in 2000
- The new Cotonou Agreement (which replaces the Lome’ convention) agreed upon between the EU and seventy-eight African, Caribbean and Pacific (APC) countries, entering into effect on April 1, 2003.

The key objective of the Cotonou Agreement is the reduction of poverty through an innovative economic and trade cooperation framework which supports regional integration and cooperation efforts between ACP countries to help them integrate gradually into the world economy, partially by paving the way for increased foreign direct investments to which the EU contributes. Peace-building and conflict prevention policies and migration issues have also been introduced into this agreement (Ibid.).

Russia
The current Russian-EU relationship is based on the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) of 1994 (entering into force on December 1, 1997), which regulates their political, economic and cultural relationship. The Russian Federation (“Russia”), as a regional power in its own right, has pivotal economic relationships towards the West both with Europe and in the wider Mediterranean region. The substantial economic relationship between the EU and Russia involved\(^\text{11}\) e.g. seventy-five percent FDIs from EU-MSs\(^\text{12}\), and is tightly interlinked with the EU-Russian political relationship due to Russia’s strategic use of its petroleum exports. However, the alarm over its peaceful intentions which Russia raised in Europe following its operations in Georgia in late summer of 2008 endangered Europe’s trust, and as Russia appears to realize of late, this reciprocally might slow down the successor agreement to the PCA, as a “deep and comprehensive economic integration agreement between the EU and n economies” (European Commission – External Trade 2008, 1), which was envisioned for the first half of 2008. An additional consequence of these recent political and economic crises might also be the progress of Russia’s WTO membership aspirations. The complexity of the EU-Russian relationship became further complicated as a result of the global financial crisis in the autumn of 2008, which saw a substantial fall in petroleum prices. This appears to have moderated the Russian revisionist assertiveness of the August 2008 Georgian crisis in favor of a more cooperative tone by early fall 2008.

Judging by Russia’s more conciliatory tone at that time, it appears that Russia understands that it can ill afford European distrust at this stage is something, especially under conditions of the “perfect storm” with halving gas prices (as Russia’s prime source of income), a global financial system which appears to simultaneously have lost much investor confidence (especially pertaining to foreign direct

\(^{11}\) While the research for this paper concluded in the summer of 2008, Georgian-Russian crisis of August 2008 is recognized as reducing investor confidence in Russia. Additionally, it impeded the signing of the replacement of the current PCA.

\(^{12}\) such as the liberalization of the state-controlled electricity industry through the sale of strategic stakes to “foreign power groups, such as Germany’s E.on, Italy’s Enel, and” (Wagstyl 2008c) the Finnish Forum (in addition to big Russian investors).
investments in Russia, under domestic economic conditions which had not matured since the Cold War): With shrinking revenues, any country’s soft as well as hard security can be compromised\(^{13}\), especially in countries relying on oil exports.

**Neo-Hegemonic Regionalism**

The end of the Cold War and with it that of the global power bipolarity “led to systemic transformations reshaping the global order” (Reus-Smit 2005, 195), and with it questions about the “dynamics of international change, the nature of basic institutional practices, the role of non-state agency and the problem of human rights” (Ibid.). While some previous cooperative endeavors in the Mediterranean region were less successful (e.g. the Western Mediterranean Forum), it has been argued that as a result there was an absence of a strong web of regional interaction at state and non-state levels, … the cross-cutting strategic interests of the key states involved … and the low and strongly asymmetrical rate of economic integration between the two shares of the Mediterranean Sea (Christiansen, Petito and Tonra 2000, 403)

were contributing factors. The institutional and ideological structures of the EMP on the other hand were designed to address the weaknesses observed in other cooperative efforts in this region. In fact we observe how the ideational structures of the EMP influence, democratic institutionalization as well as their norming effect e.g. on gender relations, the enhanced integration of market economics, and environmentally protective measures.

I would argue that in order to transcend millennia of clashes in the Euro-Med, I suggest exploring the possibility of changing the assumptions about peace in the Mediterranean definition of security to identify post-structural, sub- and supra-state agents (such as terrorist groups, NGOs and of course the post-Westphalian EU) post-Cold War. Although the traditional referent object in matters of war and peace has been the state, its centrality is questioned as criteria like the mutual co-constitution of interests, identities, agency and structure of the individual or society have been identified as decisive in the security community discourse (Bicchi 2001, 2). In the post-Cold War environment, despite the continuing nuclear and terrorist threat, mutually assured destruction is not necessarily assumed by state actors, and hence deterrence is not necessarily the primary motivation in foreign policy any longer. Rather, the possibility of escaping from this limited military perspective is explored by both, the Mediterranean Dialogue and the EMP, which acknowledge other securitizing factors, e.g. environment or citizens’ welfare and governments.

The complementarity of these two multilateral IGOs in the Mediterranean, reduces transaction costs by avoiding duplication of the security and defense mechanisms. This advantage in the efficiency of harmonizing among members reduces the power balancing maneuvers of the Cold War, which consumed so many resources that could be much better spent on the development of human capital in the south and eastern regions of the Mediterranean. Instead, the multi-lateral mechanisms of the Dialogue and the EMP enable the Mediterranean security community to move beyond the retaliatory rhetoric of the Cold War to contribute to regional stability available for the socio-economic development of this region, and reduce e.g. the dividing lines between north and south which i.e. the demographic developments\(^{14}\) bring through more graduated responses.

The EMP is primarily a regional multilateral mechanism, enhanced by bilateral relations between member states. The fact that the US and the former Soviet Union both were essentially its godparents

\(^{13}\) It must be noted that Russia had created a stabilization fund in 2003 at the start of the rise in petroleum prices, and “paid off the accumulated state debts and amassed gold and foreign currency reserves” (Gaidar 2008), giving it a cushion to cope with unfavorable economic changes.

\(^{14}\) i.e. countries in the south and east of the Mediterranean find it difficult to provide (gender equal) basic education amidst the great population growth in their region - and hereby adequately address the social and security challenge this represents to the northern Mediterranean countries.
rather invalidates some claims (e.g. Crawford 2005) that the EMP is an imperialistic tool of the EU to out-
do the US. However, the synergy between the EU and MENA member states makes it a truly cooperative
Euro-Mediterranean project, rather than the reverse of this hypothesis as one might suspect, a “colonial
project” by the US or the Soviet Union.

Ulla Holm (2004, 1) views the dialectic faced by the EU in the Mediterranean in terms of the tension
in the conceptualization of the Mediterranean as a cultural cradle of great civilizations versus as a conflict
laden zone, interlinked with the discourses of the EU as an exporter of democracy through a model to copy
rather than an empire-builder through respect for cultural diversity and Arab sovereignty while exporting
political shared European values. The relationship between security and regional stability is well known,
was it not the basis of the Truman Doctrine for Europe (Coufudakis 2004, 235). With the Maastricht
Treaty the EU’s self-appointed mission arose to propagate human rights and democracy through the
development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law, and to foster fundamental freedoms
within the framework of cooperation policy. This became one of the explicit objectives of the emerging
Common Foreign and Security Policy (Lannon, Inglis and Haenebalcke 2005).

Third Generation Regionalism

Referencing the sectors and levels proposed by Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998) in their new
framework for security analysis, the “levels” pertaining to a theoretical EMRSC are i.a. the sub/intra-
regional (e.g. from some viewpoints the Israeli-Palestinian conflict), the inter-regional (e.g. the Euro-
Mediterranean region and the Black Sea region), the bilateral level (e.g. France and Morocco), the
international level (i.e. the foreign relations among the states within and outside the regions in question),
and, lastly, as Van Langenhove (2008b) proposed, a neo-Westphalian level. This last level is from a
viewpoint of global governance where the world of states gradually becomes “a world of states and of
regions” (Van Langenhove 2008a, 115) (italics added. The concept initially of neo-Westphalian “Second
Generation Regionalism” (Van Langenhove 2008b) identified integration in non-economic matters such as
justice, security, culture (Ibid.). An emerging EMRSC then could be interpreted as evolving into a “Third
Generation Regionalism” (Costea and Van Langenhove 2007) in some parts of the world, whereby the
regional institutional environment for dealing with ‘out of area’ consequences of regional policies would
become fully consolidated. As such regions become more proactive engaging in inter-regional
arrangements and agreements, going beyond purely trade issues, with a multidimensional character with
the potential to affect more relations at the global level. Ultimately in third generation regional integration,
regions would become more actively engaged at the U.N. (Ibid.), and exhibit a greater “global
governance” identity.

Conclusions: Transnational Political Will in the Euro-Med later

Mediterranean Regionalism

The Euro-Mediterranean as a region is not only significant from the regional level on the basis of shared
history and a common future, but also from an inter-regional perspective vis-à-vis the strategic
significance of neighboring regions, as well as the reciprocal security effects on it from a global level.
Although threats might seem distant from the homelands in the Euro-Med, some global threats need to be
addressed through a coherent (regional EU-Mediterranean) policy to effectively address these challenges,
and act on the international stage, not only as pro-active measures, but also “in order to take greater
responsibility in promoting peace and stability, or, put another way, its won ‘core values’” (Senyucel
2006, 6) (italics added).

In the past the Euro-Mediterranean region had not been the object of extensive regional analysis,
because it was viewed as not sharing cultural and institutional homogeneity. Nevertheless, “new
regionalism gained ground in the 1990s, and the Mediterranean area has been increasingly considered by
researchers as a region in which cooperation is in progress and institution-building is feasible and
desirable” (Attina 2007, 198). However, the perception of the Mediterranean as a region has been debated
among scholars: either EU action in the Mediterranean has been interpreted as a European hegemonic act, while other scholars interpret the EMP as socialization of its member states as a response to globalization in order to make the Euro-Med region a more effective economic block. In view of the privatization efforts starting in the 1980s, which followed the economic crises of the 1970s, as well as in light of the “consequent reforms of national economies, based on deregulation and restructuring imposed by the developed states, … world economics and financial institutions, like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank” (Attina 2007, 198), the economic argument is a strong one.

Additionally, Mediterranean regional analysis cannot be separated from security considerations. The asymmetries existing between EMP members from the northern Mediterranean as compared to the southern Mediterranean are recognized as placing the European economies in a dominant position and forcing other economies to adapt to their interest, “at least until the former reach high industrialization standards and fully integrate into the world economy” (Ibid.). The EMP, as part of the European Neighborhood and its aim to surround the EU with a circle of stable and prosperous countries could be viewed as empowering EMP member states (MSs) in MENA to even out North-South discrepancies.

1. There are multiple multilateral structures in the Euro-Med, such as the UN declarations to which its members have subscribed.
2. The EMP as an EU-MENA multilateral IGO to stabilize and harmonize and support development
3. NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue, broadening Euro-Med region transatlantically beyond the traditional US involvement in the Middle East. It is significant today on many respondents view the role of the US’s hard power – as more significant than the EU’s soft power is viewed in MENA frequently as trumping soft power.

Despite this relation that multilateral institutionalism in the region beyond Euro-Med, enhanced by the new UMed its inter-regional potential is not yet projected, as many intra-regional (South-South) linkages are weak due to traditional hostilities (e.g. conflicts in Western Sahara, the Israel-Palestine, or the Lebanon-Syria). Yet the interregional potential is not necessarily optional in developing: as oil resources will diminish in some parts of the Middle East, it will need to be integrated in the region beyond traditional bilateral links or those with select western partners.

While throughout the evolution of the EMP some of its member states have increasingly set “more collective goals and ambitions, not least in external spheres such as defence, previously shielded from collective decision-making, if not collective action, … the gap between expectations and capabilities15, between declaratory policy and its implementation” (Spencer 2001, 13) in the EU has been lamented in the EU as a foreign actor, e.g. during the first years of the EMP. Spencer (Ibid.) suggests that this could i.a. be related to an absence of ‘political will’ (as concrete incentives and penalties attached to action) either in the beginning or during the progress of a policy’s implementation. The EU as a security actor in the Mediterranean shows the blurring of the internal and external security agendas16 (Spencer 2001, 14), which vary according to their (inter-)national context, sometimes quickly. While in the Mediterranean at times migration topped the security agenda, recently oil has also risen (again) towards the top, and with it the EMP’s inter-regional poignancy in terms of new actors’ alliances in the region (e.g. Russia’s cooperation with Libyan exploration) or renewed inter-regional alignments (e.g. Turkey’s “turnstile”-role vis-à-vis the Black Sea region, becoming ever more significant – and subject to realignment - with the recent destabilization in the Caucasus.

Some authors such as Spencer (2001, 9) suggest approaching the EMP not from an internal perspective, but rather view it in the context of the broader challenges facing the EU as a full-fledged security actor, especially as a process rather than substance (Ibid., 10). Her words in 2001 (Ibid., 11) that “the EU needs to reassess the EMP in a context which goes beyond the parameters of the Barcelona template alone” are particularly prophetic in light of the events of August 2008 in Georgia and Syria’s immediate consultations with Russia following the latter’s invasion.

15 Compare Hill 1993
16 The EU security agenda overall expressed in the discussion on EU values in terms of neighborhood economic and socio-political stability and prosperity
Throughout the evolution of the EMP some of its member states have increasingly set “more collective goals and ambitions, not least in external spheres such as defence, previously shielded from collective decision-making, if not collective action, … the gap between expectations and capabilities”, between declaratory policy and its implementation” (Spencer 2001, 13) in the EU (as some have lamented about the EU as a foreign actor, especially during the first years of the EMP). Spencer (Ibid.) suggests that this could i.a. be related to an absence of ‘political will’ (as an absence of concrete incentives and penalties attached to action) either in the beginning or during the progress of a policy’s implementation. The EU as a security actor in the Mediterranean shows the blurring of the internal and external security agendas (Spencer 2001, 14), which vary according to their (inter-)national context, sometimes quickly. While in the Mediterranean at times migration topped the security agenda, recently oil has also risen (again) towards the top, and with it the EMP’s inter-regional poignancy in terms of new actors’ alliances in the region (e.g. Russia’s cooperation with Libyan exploration) or renewed inter-regional alignments (e.g. Turkey’s “turnstile”-role vis-à-vis the Black Sea region, becoming ever more significant – and subject to realignment - with the recent destabilization in the Caucasus.

Spencer (2001, 14), among other authors, recognizes geographical proximity as contributing to a “blurring of purely internal and external security agendas, particularly in an area of key concern to the EU, namely the very human issue of migration in all its dimensions”. This necessitates i.a. addressing the economic insufficiencies of the “sending” states which lead to emigration out of this despair (i.e. mostly from northern Africa to the southern EU), and cooperating in the repatriation of these EU-immigrants. Joffé (2001, 48) points out that this is one reason why the EU is not taking a stronger stand on civil society and political reform expectations towards MENA, i.e. in order not to have e.g. social reforms by themselves disrupt a regional security identity. Of course, some authors (such as Chourou 2001, 58) doubt that “security ought to be on the Euro-Mediterranean agenda at all” unless they are very long-term considerations and that participation must be open to all countries that have clear stakes in the issues to be discussed, even if such countries are not Mediterranean in strict geographical terms. He further advocates that non-EU Mediterranean countries must negotiate as a single entity if a genuine partnership is to be set up between the shores of the Mediterranean (Chourou 2001, 59/60).

Additionally, the intra- and interregional socio-political evolution on these levels would need to be furthered through confidence-building measures, and intercultural learning, including intra-Arab civil society cooperation (Schumacher 2004, 101). Coherence and coordination within the EMP would give a much broader base in managing regional post-“Operation Iraq Freedom” stability. These statements, as a further “authoritative speech act” from a research institution focusing on the Euro-Med, not only views the EMP as the preeminent institutional framework in the Euro-Mediterranean to develop this enhanced socio-political and economic infrastructure in the widest sense.

In this context, the EMP/UMed are a manifestation of what van Langenhove (2008) has termed not a post-Westphalian world order, but a neo-Westphalian world order:

The old world of states has made positive developments in governance, but has also created what Nobel prize-winning economist Amartya Sen called an illusion of destiny that has resulted in incredible violence. The multiple world of regions could be a way to replace the illusion of a single national identity with the more realist view that people hold plural regional identities. As such, the world of regions might not only be a more complex world but also one with more chances of peace and freedom. (van Langenhove 2008, 15).

It is being recognized transatlantically that America will not single-handedly shape a New World Order (SpiegelOnline 4/19/2003) as some speculated at the turn of this century. Instead, a neo-regionalism appears to be developing in many parts of the world, including the Euro-Mediterranean, with the potential for a more democratic paradigm through which to approach new and old security threats of partner

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17 Compare Hill 1993
18 The EU security agenda overall expressed in previous sections on EU values in terms of neighborhood economic and socio-political stability and prosperity
countries – and to perhaps allay the fear of an all-too powerful America being replaced by a fear of its imminent weakening (British Council 2008).

This paradigm would fit Van Langenhove’s (2007) concept of a (hypothetical) “Third Regionalism”, whereby the institutional environment for dealing with ‘out of area’ consequences of regional policies would become fully consolidated, regions become more proactive in engaging with inter-regional arrangements and agreements, going beyond purely trade issues with a multidimensional character, and having the potential to affect more relations at the global level. And finally, in third generation regional integration, regions would become more actively engaged at the U.N. The EMP’s potential in contributing to regional security and stability, (as nested in the EU’s permanent delegation to the UN), despite its brief thirteen years’ existence has the potential to consolidate the competing preferences intra-regionally, while building on the shared history and cultural and institutional structures existing today in the Euro-Mediterranean “region”.

Joffé recognizes the reciprocity between the evolution of societal values and political change, but he discounts the role of institutions in this process. I would point out Alexander Wendt’s (1999) and Ruggie’s (1998) arguments concerning the co-constitution of identities (e.g. societal, political), actors and structures (e.g. institutions) as the process for social, political, economic etc. change. This reciprocal “construction” of a regional security identity within a EMRSC then has traditional military components, but also perception-based components (as social constructivists would argue) which co-constitute structures. A pertinent example would be the regional security implications of the current global financial crisis. This economic threat has the potential for severe political consequences (as did the economic crisis of 1929 for the Weimar Republic). Beck (2008, 2) writes that “the traditional methods of management and control are proving unreliable and ineffective in the face of global risks… the social and political explosive force of global market risks is becoming palpable. Governments are overthrown, civil wars become a threat.”

In this context, the EMP/UMed are a manifestation of what van Langenhove (2008) has termed not a post-Westphalian world order, but a neo-Westphalian world order:

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Attina (2004, 2), in studying the constructive processes of the Euro-Mediterranean security system, utilizes analytical approaches of other regional security systems and regional security partnerships from a comparative perspective. He points out that

the existence of different multilateral initiatives on security in the Mediterranean is pointed out as a strategic tool for the future of the Euro-Mediterranean security project, and the proposal for increasing the relations between the EMP and other multilateral initiatives is put on the table as a step forward to strengthen the process for building the Mediterranean security system (Ibid.)

through an evaluation on the basis of their level of institutionalization of security cooperation and members’ social integration (Ibid.).
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### Membership Comparison: EU-EMP-NAYO-Union for the Mediterranean-WTO

(Status: September 2008)

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