Enhancing the Efficacy of the EuroMed Partnership through intensified Iterations

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Introduction

The conference on the EuroMed Partnership (EMP) in Crete in October 2007 shows considerable synchronicity with the current focus of the EU presidency under Portugal and its interest in the Euro-Mediterranean region. An additional “sign of spring” for the EuroMed region is the recent conference of all EU European Neighborhood Program (ENP) foreign ministers as a group to assess the potential for ENP enhancement. It served as a forum to exchange suggestions for approaches which have been successful in the ENP, such as the EuroCities Program, to augment the economic and social development of the countries surrounding the EU overall in order to bring reciprocal stability and enhance the EU’s neighbors’ prosperity. And of course the current significance of the EMP’s role in particular to contribute to the prosperity and socio-political stability of the EU’s southern neighbors is especially significant in view of the expected destabilizing spill-over in relation to the current war in Iraq.

Furthermore challenges to Mediterranean stability current are e.g. the potential of the drastically increasing Chinese investments in sub-Saharan Africa (i.e. the backyard of the EMP’s southern border) may contribute little to transparency and accountability in these countries, and may be of questionable value in enhancing the socio-political development and stabilization of sub-Saharan Africa and its neighbors in the Magreb. Similarly, the fate of the Palestinian territories, especially the economies of the West Bank and Gaza following the recent divisions by Hamas and the Palestinian Authority and Israel’s ensuing even greater restrictions on the movement of their people and goods into and out of Israel, which represent an additional area of the EMP region in dire need of economic development and political stabilization (Blitz 2007; Wilson 2007).

This paper argues that the ambitious goals formulated during the Barcelona Process in November 1995 address those elements which have been recognized in the literature as significant in enhancing the reciprocal relationship between economic development, political stability and...
socio-cultural understanding within and among regions. While there has been no shortage of initiatives to contribute to the socio-economic and political stabilization of the Magreb and Mashriq in past years, such as the G-8’s Broader Middle East and North Africa Fora for the Future in 2004 - 2006 (in which the EMP was included), for example, as cooperative efforts for regional civil society and business groups to express their reform goals to their governments and to “advance the universal values of human dignity, democracy, economic opportunity and social justice” (U.S. Department of State November 7, 2005, 1), few have succeeded in contributing to a unified zone of peace, not to mention in establishing a security community in Karl Deutsch’s terms, and much less to establishing a Euro-Mediterranean security complex in Buzan and Waever’s terminology, aside from NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue. In fact, the International Crisis Group calls the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative “imperiled at birth” (ICG briefing 7 June 2004), 2). Nevertheless, regional integration in the Middle East has made strides in the past decade especially, e.g. in a broader context with the Gulf Cooperation Council 1 taking an active role in balancing between trade with Iran and their support of Sunnis in Iraq (Kerr and Bozorgmehr, 2007).

In its almost twelve years existence, the EMP has nevertheless made significant strides in increasing harmonization of trade between the northern and southern EMP member states, migration policies and in increasing cultural understanding among the very diversified Magreb, Mashriq and EU EMP-partner countries. Despite this continual evolution, many would agree that the EMP relationship could be substantially enhanced, last but not least due to the newly enhanced EU Neighborhood Policy overall, as well as the declared goal of EMP partners for an economic Free Trade area (EFTA) among them (to say nothing of the need for peace in the South-Eastern Mediterranean now more than ever).

Some broadcasts of speeches from the recent ENP ministerial conference on September 5, 2007 also suggest that not only interactions among ENP members need to become more routinized, but that the EMP specifically would benefit from a more structured approach to its integration according to its Barcelona goals: economic, political and socio-cultural.

The EMP from a Security Perspective

To recall, the EMP strives to be a strictly civic approach to regional integration, increased development and prosperity and increased understanding between the cultures among its member states, and is hence distinctly secular, regardless – or perhaps especially because of - the European history of jihads, crusades and reconquistas. It recognizes:

1. the definition of a common area of peace and stability through the reinforcement of a political and security dialogue;

2. the construction of a zone of shared prosperity through an economic and financial partnership and the gradual establishment of a free-trade area;

3. and the rapprochement between peoples through a social, cultural and human partnership aimed at encouraging understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil society (Horizon 2020 Bulletin 2005, 2).

Addressing these three general areas in the EMP from the very start indicates the recognition by its founders which the different sectors (in Buzan, Waever and de Wilde’s terminology) (1998) in the EMP structure play in security: in addition to the traditional military and political to also include environmental, individual/societal”, and economic security.

1 The GCC was formed in 1981 in the wake of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman and Bahrain (Financial Times September 18, 2007), in which the Gulf states backed the Sunni regime in Iraq.
How then can the EMP be evaluated from a security standpoint? International organizations (IOs) overall are considered to reduce anarchy due to the structure of cooperation they build in the international system (e.g. the UN), based on increased trust (due to explicitly written rules and the transparency this fosters) (e.g. Keohane 1988, 1984; Krasner 1983; Kratochwil 1993; and Ruggie 1998), the lengthened shadow of the future (according to Rousseau’s fable of the stag hunt) making defection from the IO less likely and hence expanding trust among its members. IOs enable a solution to the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Oye 1986; Olson, 1971) by allowing for a changeable pay-off matrix to make cooperation likely by changing the interests of the actors, and hence reduce transaction costs. According to these theories, the benefits of well-functioning IOs lead to absolute gains2 for all states who are members of the IO/regime, large and small, (though under sub-optimal conditions) and, as a result also effect more peaceful cooperation between states.

I argue in this paper that cooperation among all EMP members could be augmented by modifying individual preferences of states3 and their actors to one of enhanced joint cooperation in order to enhance the security within the EMP regime, since security is not divisible among different sectors of a single country (witness any sectarian violence in a country), nor divisible between neighboring countries (e.g. Iran-Iraq), and, ultimately, not divisible ultimately globally.

Collective security

In this paper I argue that a social-constructivist approach (e.g. Wendt 1999; Buzan et al. 1998; Reus-Smit 2005) to the security dilemmas (e.g. Jervis 1999) facing the Euro-Mediterranean region historically is helpful as it focuses on the construction of ideas (which in turn inform preferences) through social learning, which impact (Kaufman 2001) identity (re-)formulation, and their impact in (potentially) (reciprocally) (co-) constructing amicable structures among the parties involved in a security dilemma, especially when these include non-state actors (e.g. farmers of neighboring countries with watering rights disputes etc.), or religious factions, such as within Islam, or among the different religions. By introducing the constructivist concept of “identity/interest”-construction (e.g. Moravcsik, 1997) into the process of this type of cooperation, neo-liberals recognize that interests of states are neither homogenous nor eternally fixed, but can they can be “modified” to lead to better (more peaceful) outcomes for all members. There are also several other enabling and constraining variables in the neo-liberal program of “complex interdependence” (Keohane and Nye, 1977), such as Putnam’s (1993) Two-Level Games, which refer to plurality and its dynamics, and which can be modified in IOs/regimes to improve outcomes of their agendas.

This indicates that states have neither homogenous interests, nor that material (hard) power is the only deciding factor in many security dilemmas, but that soft power and negotiations, especially within an IO/regime-structure, can go a long way in providing paths to resolving conflicts. It also shows that anarchy is not inevitable, but rather that it is “what states make of it” (Wendt 1992). This in turn points to the conclusion that collective security interests (e.g. Adler and Barnett, 1998) can be developed in an environment supportive of this effort.

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2 The enhanced debate to what extent states also benefit in relative terms under neo-liberal institutionalism will not be entered here due to parsimony

3 and, ideally, the identity of (neighboring) states within the EMP from one of enmity to one of amity where this had been the case, in terms of reciprocal agent-structure-interest formulation (Wendt 1999, 1987): compare the following sections
Development as freedom?

Amartya Sen has argued that security, socio-economic and political development are inseparable. This recognition is extremely significant e.g. as we face increased asymmetrical warfare, motivated by ideologies which often intend to distract from domestic problem as is the case to an extent in Iran and with Hamas in Gaza. In these cases, where purely material resources are neither automatically nor exclusively helpful, but rather the “hearts and minds” (i.e. the interests and ideas, for example) have to be “co”-engaged in dealing with this type of security threat. Hence security must consist not simply of more arms, but also a socio-economic integration (Jervis 1988, quoted in Wendt 1992, 393).

Some authors, such as Bettina Huber (2005, 3) writes that cooperation in the EMP is based on the assumption that deepening neighborhood relations cannot be achieved through governmental agreements alone, but that essential participation and contribution by civil society is urgently needed to bring the partnership to life and to create the greater understanding and closeness between the peoples envisioned by the Barcelona Declaration in 1995. The EU posits the security environment of the EMP in the human dimension of good governance, human rights and the rule of law (Balfour 2004, 3).

While the intentions of the EMP are not only laudable but were intended to address many of the criteria which scholars and political leaders (e.g. note the criteria for the Madrid Peace Conference) have identified as contributing to economic growth and development in general, hereby enhancing regional stability, we need to remember that the EMP is not legally binding, i.e. participation is not uniformly strong. Instead it applies concepts of “benchmarking” and “differentiation” on an individual country/case basis, “allowing countries to make progress without jeopardizing the entire regional approach” (European Commission: The EuroMed association agreements, 10/3/ 2006). Hence this “common model of relationship does not exclude a certain degree of differentiation among the states which are part of this model” (Flaesch-Mougin in Thiele and Kostelnik 2005, 63).

This approach by the EMP varies from a purely realist one which might suggest that the overall wealthier North might keep its distance and rather remain vigilant toward the Southern and Eastern regions of the Mediterranean. In fact, the EMP seeks to counteract the risks and threats from the Other, and to increase understanding between the cultures (Ortega in Batt et al. 2003, 5) in Constructivist fashion. This is to the credit of the EMP as a specialized regional exception of the ENP, the latter having been accused of “one size fits all” (Aldis 2005, 5) programs and approaches.

Options for EMP Modalities to enhance its Regional Security Potential

The EMP, as a distinct program of the European Neighborhood Policy, offers more flexibility, options and leeway than the latter. For one, the establishment of an EFTA within the EMP, while significant as mentioned above in addressing the reciprocal relationship between political stability, economic development and socio-cultural understanding and cooperation, as i.a Amartya Sen has argued, will not in itself contribute to the type of intra-regional network density which scholars, such as Robert Keohane, have argued as necessary for the quantitative iterations which lead to the benefits which institutions can provide their members in terms of transparency, increased trust,
reduced uncertainty and, as e.g. John G. Ruggie argues, the transformational benefits of international regimes in particular.

How then can the EMP be augmented to accelerate those transformations which can contribute to regional security? It is against this background that I propose utilizing some of the mechanisms and approaches, which the Central European Initiative (CEI) in Trieste has used in contributing to the stabilization of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) following the Cold War. The Central European Initiative (CEI), an intergovernmental organization (IGO) was founded by Italy and Austria in 1989 to undertake a regional integration process and to stabilize post-communist CE democracies at a time when Austria’s and Italy’s eastern borders were threatened

5 The acronym “CE” will be used in this study to refer to the current member states of the Central European Initiative. CEI member states currently also encompass some Southern- and South-Eastern European countries as well as some NIS states, such as Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. The reason this following geo-political complexity is elaborated below is to indicate the socio-political complexity of CE which has parallels with the great socio-political diversity among EMP members.

By comparison, in geographic terminology, Central Europe refers to “the region lying between the variously and vaguely defined areas of Eastern and Western Europe. In addition, Northern, Southern and Southeastern Europe may variously delimit or overlap into Central Europe. The understanding of the concept of Central Europe varies considerably from nation to nation and also has from time to time. The region is usually used to mean: Germany, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Slovakia, Poland, Czech Republic, Austria, Hungary and Slovenia (Wikipedia, Central Europe). This region is defined by its geographic boundaries, the Baltic countries in the north and the Apennine peninsula (Italy) across the Alps. The east-west borders are culturally more fluid (Ibid.), since these countries were historically part “of the central European kingdoms and empires, such as the Holy Roman Empire, the Kingdom of Hungary, the Habsburg monarchy, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and Imperial Germany” (Ibid.). Within the cultural definition the following countries belong to Central Europe: (western) Belarus, Croatia, Lithuania, Romania (Transylvania), Serbia (Vojvodina), Ukraine (Galicia, Volhynia, Pdoiia) and Italy (South Tyrol, Friuli-Venezia Giulia) (Ibid.). Historically, following World War II, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia were considered Central European to distinguish them from those behind the iron curtain (i.e. Balkan-, Baltic and Russian Orthodox and Muslim countries) (Ibid.).

In contrast, Southern Europe refers geographically to the southern half of the landmass of Europe (Southern Europe – Wikipedia). “This definition is relative, with no clear limits” (Ibid.). While the Alps represent a north-south barrier in the eastern part, this boundary disappears further west. While the official UN designation does not include France, a climatic definition would only include the immediate land strip bordering the Mediterranean. Linguistically and culturally, one could divide Southern Europe into the Iberian Peninsula (Portugal, including Azores, Madeira), Spain (including Balearic Islands, Canary Islands), Andorra, Gibraltar, and Southern France (including Corsica), Monaco, the Italian peninsula (including Sicily, Sardinia, Vatican City and San Marino), the Balkan Peninsula (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece (including Ionian Islands, Aegean Islands, and Crete), Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia and the European part of Turkey (Rumelia) plus the Mediterranean States of Cyprus and Malta (Ibid.).

Eastern Europe is similarly vaguely defined geographically as the region between Central Europe and Russia (Eastern Europe – Wikipedia), with the “eastern limit either the Ural Mountains or from the pacific coast of the Russian Far East [and] its western limit is the boundary between the European Union and the Commonwealth of Independent States (sometimes excluding Kaliningrad)” (Ibid.). The overlap and fluctuation in regional boundaries extends politically to Eastern Europe covering “all of northeastern Eurasia, since Russia is one single transcontinental geopolitical entity. Cyprus is also frequently taken to be a European state, although geographically it is in Asia. The same approach is also sometimes taken with the post-Soviet states of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan in the Caucasus” (Ibid.). With the fall of the Iron Curtain, Eastern Europe refers retroactively sometimes to that European region which was part of the Soviet Union (Ibid.). Culturally Eastern Europe was defined by 19th century German nationalists “synonymous with ‘Slavic Europe’, as opposed to Germanic (Western) Europe” (Ibid.).

Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Greece, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia and Turkey are also sometimes referred to as Balkan countries.

As we can see, the geographic and cultural boundaries in this region are vague and socio-politically dependent (more on the topic of “fuzzy boundaries” in the sections on “Space and Boundaries” and “Identity and Ethnicity” of the literature review in Chapter Two).

CEI membership as of June 2006 is comprised of the following eighteen countries: Albania, Austria, Belarus (this country represents an exception to regional membership but it does not influence the results of this case study), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Macedonia, Montenegro, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine.
by the neighboring political destabilization post-Cold War. In light of these huge geo-political realignments due to underlying socio-political instability, Western Europe became alarmed at the prospect of the potential spill-over effect from the civil wars and political upheavals in the Balkans. Though the concern was not in terms of spreading political unrest immediately into Western Europe, the prospect of hundreds of thousands of refugees, illegal weapons trading and other activities reflective of lawlessness due to ineffective new governments were cause for grave concern in countries bordering Central- and Eastern Europe.

This paper suggests that augmenting routine processes of the EMP by the model of those which are utilized by the CEI would contribute to increasing the efficacy of the EMP in attaining its goals in regional (political) stabilization through socio-economic development, and enhancement of the regional political institutionalization and civil society building. The CEI is a little known inter-governmental organization which was formed in 1989 by some EU members with initially just a few Eastern neighbors. Its goal is to assist them in the peaceful transition post-Cold War to consolidated democracies and free market economies by involving them in a mutually “constructed” network regime structure (Krasner 1983; Ruggie 1998) of political, economic and social-cultural programs with routinized meetings of ministers and cabinet similarly to the EU, joint programs between countries based on consensus to engage democratic processes between countries which may not have been previously at peace with each other, and joint social and economic programs to enhance regional integration. While in financial terms these programs are relatively modest, the norming effect, the political harmonization, i.a. through spill-over from (functional) economic development programs (compare E. Haas) between member countries (which now are much more numerous and diverse), and the political stabilization, to which CEI programs contribute in no small measure, have led to an impressive mutual co-constitution of (peaceful) agents and structures in CEE7.

Were the EMP to develop a more routinized structure and hereby increase its iterations among members, e.g. through the model which the CEI could provide8 to enhance the EMP’s public institutionalization, education, and involvement of the private sector not only in business promotion, but also ostensibly in taking corporate social responsibility in the EMP’s overall political, economic and socio-cultural programs, the goals of the EMP as a regional security complex (e.g. in terms of Barry Buzan, based on Karl Deutsch) and Economic Free Trade Area (EFTA) could be enhanced through this thickened institutionalization and routinized participation of all EMP members, rather than making it a top- (“Brussels”) down project.

The Euro-Mediterranean is not a zero-sum game but needs to be recognized and supported as an endeavor for cumulative growth on all shores of the Mediterranean to achieve peace and stability within and among all its members. Escrivánó (2005) points out that the EMP’s economic prescriptions overall are perceived as merely cosmetic. The EMP per se needs to continue to focus on the increased participation of its members in an EFTA, involving the Four Freedoms (of the movement of goods, services, capital, and workforce), in addition to all the other options it offer them socio-culturally and for political regional integration. It is about inclusion rather than exclusion.

Without some “augmentation” to enhance aspects of security, such as e.g. civil society, institutionalization, environmental sustainability, gender equality in education to satisfy future employment requirements of EMP member states in their anticipated economic expansion, the

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7 Measurable in the case of the CEI in terms of the speed in which some members were able to become EU members, although one must remember that not all CEI-members, similarly to the South- and Eastern Mediterranean EMP members, are potential EU candidates per se.

8 the great extent and modi operandi utilized by the CEI currently being too extensive to be detailed in this paper, but which are, of course, available from the author or from contacting the CEI in Trieste directly.
EMP’s FTA with the Southern and Easter Mediterranean might just become another Caricom, Mercosur, or Andean Community. I draw the parallel with how the Central European Initiative contributed to the stabilization of the new, post-communist Central Europe (CE) similarly to how the current war in Iraq has the potential for increased regional destabilization, particularly in the Middle East as well as the spread of asymmetrical warfare (“the war on terror”) to neighboring continents in addition to previous instabilities in the region.

While several European regions, sub-regions, local governments (Stavridis 2003) as well as non-state actors have multiple socio-political and economic agreements and arrangements with North African countries and the Middle East, this paper focuses on EU-level interactions with non-EU Mediterranean countries on a level of equal partners within the EMP, rather than on an EU top-down, uni-directional process of regional integration, security and socio-political stability in the Euro-Mediterranean region. As such a security community, the region may also re-define its raison d’etre in the future as a Mediterranean Security Complex (Buzan and Wæver, 2003).

Conclusions

Crawford (2007) writes e.g. that today's migrants from North Africa to the EU, especially Spain, see it as a land of opportunity, and seek job contracts and residence permits, not conquest. Yet it is exactly this often welcomed migration which still needs to address the integration of human beings on all shores of the Mediterranean to permit each to have a share in belonging to this dream, rather than perpetuating those that belong, and those that are simply “others”. It is about creating a new “we” in this region (compare research by Putnam 2007). It is about integration, rather than segregation. (Kuper 2007). As the GCC has recognized, and as the EMP needs to follow: it is about renewed attention to domestic economic development to reduce the huge amounts of government revenue traditionally earmarked for defense (Kerr 2007).

Were the EMP to increase its iterations among members, e.g. through the model which the CEI could provide, in its political, economic and socio-cultural programs, the goals of the EMP as a regional security complex could be enhanced through development envisioned to address the different security sectors i.a. economic development and prosperity, environmental security, societal security, e.g. socio-cultural issues such as gender equality, which not only have not been achieved world-wide, but especially not in countries bordering the southern Mediterranean, which in turn can contribute to additional tensions in integration of different religions, to name a few.

At the same time we need to be alert to what several authors, such as Goldstone (2007) have referred to as the distributional consequences of international trade, producing not only relative winners and losers in each society, which then of course affect these groups’ relative foreign policy preferences – which the EU, as does the CEI, explicitly try to resolve from the start. Goldstone showed in his research that “cooperative and multilateral security policies will likely encourage peace, while conformational and unilateral policies are more likely to lead to conflict” (ibid.), phenomena enhanced by globalization influences on specific instances.

It is this context that Ulrich Beck (in Judt 2007) poses the need for promote a more cosmopolitan order on the basis of international law. It is not about taking sides (compare Khalaf 2007), but as Juergen Habermas (in Judt 2007) has stated, as “governance beyond the nation-state”. While a Mediterranean Union (compare Bennhold 2007) may as yet be a faint glimmer on the horizon, the EMP affords avenues which need to be broadened to be frequented. It is not simply a European impulse, but one supported by many of its southern and south-eastern neighbors, as frequent calls from this region confirm (compare Associated Free Press September 43 2007, Cohen

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9 With the exception of the military which is handled nationally by member states and multi-laterally through NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue.
2007). Peace is increasingly neither a single state’s achievement, nor based on a single sector, the military, as in the past. Rather, security needs to be addressed multi-laterally, multi-sectorally, and on different levels, from sub-state to the state to the regional and beyond to be successful.

As we know, peace processes in the Middle East are still more hope than reality at the moment, with the extent of spillover from possible greater regional fragmentation post-Iraq yet unknown, and future threats, be they cyber threats or questions of energy security, growing daily. In this institutional vacuum of other regional security cooperative institutions, such as the Arab Maghreb Union or the Arab League (Vasconcelos 1999, 30), the realization of the EMP’s intent to extend beyond the EU a zone of “peace, prosperity and stability”, utilizing proven approaches of EU soft power, and CEI specific modi operandi, to address regional (in-) security in the Mediterranean through step-by-step processes of harmonization are more urgent than ever, especially as extra-regional threats have increasingly more harmful potential.

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