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REVIEW ARTICLE

Population Transfer, Cleansing, and Partition

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European Population Transfers 1939–1945. By Joseph B. Schechtman. New York: Oxford University Press, 1946.
Postwar Population Transfers in Europe 1945–1955. By Joseph B. Schechtman. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1962.
Warpaths: The Politics of Partition. By Robert K. Schaeffer. New York: Hill and Wang, 1990.
Severed States: Dilemmas of Democracy in a Divided World. By Robert K. Schaeffer. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999.
Ethnic Cleansing. By Andrew Bell-Fialkoff. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996.

State leaders—sometimes acting unilaterally and at other times planning in concert—have sought to 'solve' the dilemma of inter-ethnic violence through a variety of political solutions, each of which either produces or prevents large-scale refugee flows across borders as well as within them. These policies include negotiated population transfer, forcible expulsion (i.e. ethnic cleansing), territorial partition, and the granting of autonomy and other minority rights. The five books reviewed in this essay serve as book-ends to Cold War-era thinking on these subjects, spanning more than half a century of political and academic plans, actions, and reflections. In this way we can trace the opinions and policies throughout this portentous and contentious era. As a whole these works can shed light on what lessons, if any, scholars and policymakers have learned from the tumultuous recent history of human upheaval and collective calls for self-determination.

Ethnic conflict, its resolution, and the implications for refugees lie at the nexus of current debates within Comparative Politics and International Relations over the relative importance and operationalization of culture, identity, and nationalism, as well as debates in Security Studies on individual and group safety versus national security. The issues and events treated in these books also fall within the realm of contentious politics (encompassing both social movements and revolutions), as well as studies of the state.

The books lend themselves to consideration in three sets. Therefore, below I will treat the two Schechtman books together, followed by the two works by

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Schaeffer, and finally the Bell-Fialkoff book on its own. First, I will briefly outline each set of works, touching on: the pertinent question that the author attempts to address; the larger theory or hypotheses, if any, being tested; the literature or tradition in which the work is rooted; a brief summary of the argument; and the potential importance and relevance of the work.

Next, I will proceed to analysis and evaluation, based on the following criteria: the salience of the research question and findings in the fields of Comparative Politics and International Relations; the explicitness of positioning the work within the literature (i.e. the degree to which the author was concerned with cumulative knowledge); real world relevance and applicability of findings; clarity in defining terms; effective identification and testing of variables (if applicable to the nature of the work); appropriateness and adeptness of chosen methodology for the research question at hand; the degree to which the book achieved what it set out to do; and its overall style and readability.

Outline of the Books

The historical accounts of population transfers during and in the decade following World War Two were the object of inquiry in Joseph Schechtman's two works, the first being published in 1946, the second in 1962. Schechtman (1946: x) defines population transfer as 'the organized removal of an ethnic group from its country of residence, and its subsequent resettlement in territories under the sovereignty of its ethnic homeland, an operation generally based on interstate agreement.' His stated purpose was to give comprehensive, detailed descriptions of all sizeable transfers of peoples throughout these two periods. The author was motivated by daunting events and concerns demanding attention: could the transfer of ethnic minorities from one state to another, a project undertaken by many governments in that period and affecting millions of people, produce international peace and stability? Is it possible to learn from the transfers already under way to ensure that future transfers are both more effective and more humane? In beginning to examine these questions in the heat of World War Two, these works are pioneers in the field. Nevertheless, Schechtman does root his research in the writings of important European and American statesmen and scholars of the early and mid-century.

As a classical historian, Schechtman opts for the detailed case description, eschewing generalization, schematization, and abstract theorizing. His concern is with the myriad and particular features of the process of each transfer, their specific origins, the broader policies involved, and interpretations of these events in the context of the 'larger international political constellation' (1946: x) of the era. For his second volume, that dealing with post-war transfers, he made study trips to eastern Europe and gained greater access to official documents to which he did not have access previously.

His main argument is as follows. The presence in virtually every European country following World War One of sizeable ethnic, religious, or language

HeinOnline -- 14 J. Refugee Stud. 437 2001

minorities was a significant contributing factor to the general instability within European states in the interwar period, as well as a major reason for the onset and intensity of World War Two. Post-World War One efforts of redrawing borders to grant greater self-determination and of formalized protection of minority rights under the League of Nations resoundingly failed to address Europe's chronic security concerns, leaving millions inside the 'wrong' country, and thus making war inevitable.

As a result, the recipe for a permanent peace lay in massive population transfers, an idea of recent origin (appearing prior to World War One), and one that gained serious currency among statesmen and scholars in the following decades, reaching its zenith during and in the decade following World War Two. This massive undertaking in Europe resulted in more than twenty million persons being evacuated from one state to another, the greatest number being ethnic Germans. The author explores arguments for and against large scale transfers, and based on his case studies, concludes that such transfers are desirable if all other avenues have been exhausted.

Finally, Schechtman sets out tentative conditions to facilitate such transfers, which include: a clear agreement signed between both governments; careful planning and organization; quick execution of the transfer; good medical care en route; advance mass evaluation of property followed by a payment made between sender and receiver governments, with resettlement payments being handled by the receiving country and supported by international loans. He further suggests that peasants, contrary to popular belief, are more ready to relocate than urban dwellers, and that two-way transfers of peoples work better than single-group transfers. He notes that programmes where individuals may elect to stay but thereafter must renounce all rights as a minority and be fully integrated meet both national and international security needs as well as individual human rights standards. One lesson drawn specifically from the post-war flows is that, if transfer is undertaken, then no trace should be left of the minority as a collective entity in the sending state.

Perhaps the most important contribution of Schechtman's exhaustive and meticulous case analyses was the compelling evidence that population transfers did, overall, help to ameliorate chronic ethnic antagonisms that have plagued Europe. He was the first to establish basic guidelines for successful transfers and to argue persuasively that transfers should be treated as preventive measures, not retaliatory ones. Going further, he argues that statesmen shy away from ethnic separation and transfers at the world's peril: 'A "Babel of tongues and peoples", even if historically created and no matter in what part of the world's area, can and must be disentangled if threatening the peace of the world. There is no life-and-death organic connection between land and people' (1962: 369).

The second set of books, those by Robert Schaeffer, were written just before and after the end of the Cold War. These works are less scientific or historical investigations than plodding treatises on why 'divided states' are bad. Specifically, Schaeffer attempts to demonstrate that partitioned states increase

HeinOnline -- 14 J. Refugee Stud. 438 2001

the risks of war, particularly nuclear war. No larger theory or hypothesis is explicitly being tested in Schaeffer's work. Although he does at the outset express his gratitude to Benedict Anderson, and often cites his work on nationalism and the prominent role of language, this is not done in a systematic way that tests or specifically adds to the line of research begun by Anderson.

Schaeffer's method is the persuasive essay, drawing largely on secondary scholarly materials. Cases are discussed but not analysed systematically; rather, in a marked departure from Schechtman's works, he treats them schematically, focusing his attention on patterns and problems that supposedly emerge out of partition in general rather than the intricacies of each particular case.

He argues in his first book (1990: 3) that 'the division of countries into separate states has been a singular failure', but then is grudgingly forced to temper this assessment in the second work, as the collapse of the Soviet Union brought a new round of secession and partition with uncertain outcomes. In that work he amends himself somewhat:

> My analysis of the past indicates that partition was less of a solution and more of a problem than diplomats, scholars, and politicians have been willing to recognize... [P]artition everywhere led to three common problems, which frequently triggered violence and war (1999: 7, 3).

The first book looks at two types of devolution and partition, those of the British colonies—Ireland, India, and Palestine—and those that were conceived of and maintained by the Cold War superpowers—Germany, China, Korea, and Vietnam. The second book deals with these as well as new cases from the twenty-four successor states that emerged from the recent disintegration of Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, the USSR, and Yugoslavia. Schaeffer asserts that partition in general has brought little more than brutal and unnecessary hardship to millions, eroded sovereignty in newly independent states, exacerbated competition among 'sibling' countries, drawn superpowers into regional wars, and corrupted and frustrated popular movements against colonialism and military dictatorships elsewhere as a result.

By first tracing the political history of partition in a variety of cases and then examining the causes, processes and consequences of each case, patterns can ostensibly be discerned. In the end, Schaeffer seeks to reveal the dangers endemic to all partitions that threaten regional and international peace, in the hope of scotching plans for new rounds of partition. In his latest work, the author briefly explores three alternatives to partition—those of reunification, shared sovereignty, and democratization. In the conclusion of both books, he calls for us to look to Martin Luther King Jr.'s cosmopolitan, integrationist dream as the optimum solution to ethnic conflict.

What is potentially important about these books are their sobering examples of how partition, far from solving ethnic conflict, has time and again led to

HeinOnline -- 14 J. Refugee Stud. 439 2001

even greater insecurity and warfare. From the patterns that emerge from Schaeffer's comparisons, world leaders could potentially learn from past mistakes in order to deal more effectively with current and future calls for partition.

The third author, Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, returns us directly to the topic of population transfers, although this time the definition and time period have been greatly expanded. The author looks back into antiquity and brings us up to the current day in his tracing of the anatomy of 'population cleansing', defined as

> the planned, deliberate removal from a certain territory of an undesirable population distinguished by one or more characteristics such as ethnicity, religion, race, class, or sexual preference. These characteristics must serve as the basis for removal for it to qualify as cleansing (1996: 3–4)

Drawing on vast literature, he also specifically roots himself in Joseph Schechtman's work in order to create an index potentially to guide decision-makers in determining whether and which party to relocate in a population transfer.

As Bell-Fialkoff's considerable research demonstrates, cleansing has proliferated since the end of decolonization throughout the Third World and has re-emerged with a vengeance in the First, in the former Yugoslavia. This massive upheaval of human beings, carried out as recently as 1999 in Kosovo, drove home to Westerners the seemingly cyclical nature of cleansing as well as its all too often devastating and destabilizing effects.

The method used by Bell-Fialkoff in his study is traditionally historical at the outset. In the mid-section of his work he turns to the comparative case study in his analysis of contemporary population cleansing. Finally, as just stated, he develops an ordinal measure of variables (i.e. an index), drawing largely from the historian Schechtman's guidelines gleaned from World War Two cases.

The author does not test or even offer an explicit thesis in his work, but rather seeks to explore and describe the historical patterns and trends, general typology, and contemporary manifestations of population cleansing. Drawing on these, he then explores potential resolutions for 'irreconcilable ethnic conflicts', concluding that, if certain conditions are favourable, partition and the creation of a new state (or the ceding of territory to another state) may be the best solution.

This work shows the greatest promise in building on Schechtman's scholarship and thus addressing the glaring dearth in the literature since his last instalment in the mid-1960s. Specifically, Bell-Fialkoff's systematization of Schechtman's guidelines for successful population transfers in order to develop a framework for dealing with contemporary ethnic conflict through separation offers exciting prospects for advancing knowledge and addressing contemporary policy dilemmas.

HeinOnline -- 14 J. Refugee Stud. 440 2001

Analysis and Evaluation

That Schechtman's works were pioneers in the systematic study of population transfers is important in itself, a fact attested to by scholars who succeeded him—Schaeffer and particularly Bell-Fialkoff among them—who cite his works heavily as foundational texts. But Schechtman's scholarship is not only the first, but appears to be the most definitive, historical treatment of European population transfers in the first six decades of the twentieth century. In this regard, then, Schechtman really set the standard for future research; few, if any, have achieved the breadth and depth of description that he demonstrated, even given the limited sources he had at his disposal.

His work was extremely germane for the times in which he wrote: 'enemy' minorities were diffuse, abundant, and commonly viewed as a major source of domestic and international instability. Furthermore, the Potsdam Declaration and other international agreements stemming from World War Two clearly envisaged the large-scale transfers of these minorities as a crucial component in any final peace agreements, recognizing the groups to be a primary causal factor in the most recent war which necessitated their transfer if future wars were to be prevented.

Schechtman chronicles international trends of great import in his two volumes, one being the near complete abandonment of Wilsonian liberal principles of self-determination (in the form of statehood) by the peacemakers in the aftermath of the Second World War. The failure of the minority rights provisions of the earlier period to prevent these domestic sources of instability from exploding onto the international stage also helps to explain why collective minority rights have been slow to be resurrected throughout this century, whereas the rise of individual rights has been championed as a way to guarantee freedoms without encouraging collective diasporan nationalism.

A culturalist critique, perhaps unfair given that Schechtman was writing in the middle of last century, stems from the little attention he paid to the complexity and mutability of ethnicity. For example, diaspora Germans are largely taken to be 'German' no matter where in the continent they had settled, even if for centuries. Schechtman alludes to the possibility of layering of various identities when he comments that many of the so-called 'Germans' of Italy's Tirol region and the 'Turks' of Greece resisted repatriation to their 'homeland', and sometimes had to be forced to migrate or be coaxed by promises of relocation into their 'own' communities. But he spends little time (perhaps because he lacked sufficient data) pondering how individuals as part of an immigrant collective may have conceived of themselves as something other than their original ethnicity. Interviews with members of these groups could have been extremely useful in fleshing out the subtle contours and changes of ethnic identities among these diaspora peoples.

The author does not favour treating transfers on a thematic rather than regional basis, claiming that the approach would be 'conducive to a rather deadly schematization'. As a traditional historian, he is adamantly opposed to

HeinOnline -- 14 J. Refugee Stud. 441 2001

abstraction or theorizing from the cases, insisting that any 'such treatment would also obscure the peculiar features of each transfer and their special origins'. Regardless of one's views about being able to generalize so as to theorize from a broad number of cases, Schechtman remains true to his methods and intentions, and resoundingly achieves the considerable task of detailed case description upon which he embarked. Although his epistemic and methodological commitments preclude him from testing causal variables, the detailed case descriptions readily lend themselves to a re-formulation by later, more scientifically-oriented researchers, which could yield interesting results. Nonetheless, he very much leaves this task to others.

Schechtman's voice was refreshingly objective without appearing too clinical when dealing with a highly contentious topic. He approached the study with enthusiasm, achieving a difficult balance between long-term national and international security concerns and those of individual hardship and freedoms. One gets a sense that only authors of the time could write as objectively and calmly as Schechtman did of the Third Reich's population transfer policies, dealing with each case on its own merits. In the second volume, his cases are even more richly descriptive, benefiting from greater access to sources, and he brings into the equation psychological factors and explanations somewhat lacking in the first volume. There is a sombreness to the latter book, as well, that may reflect the mood of the times: the collective hangover that the continent felt as so many people were uprooted once again, followed by the comprehension and reckoning with the extent of the Third Reich's sinister transfer and annihilation plans, events that cast a long shadow over the idea of population transfer to this day.

Turning to Schaeffer, his is a sobering picture of a blunt technique wielded to ameliorate international conflict and promote greater self-determination, but often achieving the opposite. The case descriptions and the statistics he marshals ostensibly attest to partition's failure: 'Since 1945,' he writes, 'wars in the divided states have claimed nearly 13 million lives and have directly affected the lives of more than 2 billion people, two-fifths of the world's population' (1990: 7). Given these alarming figures, partitioning should be a serious concern to just about everyone—academic, lay person, and elite alike.

Yet Schaeffer's books are fraught with problems. His argument that partitioned states per se cause regional and international instability is imprecise. First, it is obvious that even if partitioned states did cause instability, certainly they are not the exclusive causal factor. An array of equally plausible independent variables could be offered instead of, or in addition to, partitioned states. Indeed, regional and international instability existed well before such states came about, and presumably will persist even if all these states were to be re-unified. But a more fundamental question begs itself: What exactly is it about partitioned states that makes them unstable? Schaeffer argues that it is solely the fact that they are partitioned. This is an extremely simplistic and unsatisfying explanation; surely we must at least look within the particular state to see what else may be causing instability!

HeinOnline -- 14 J. Refugee Stud. 442 2001

Furthermore, Schaeffer never attempts a counter-factual analysis of any of his cases to explore what may have become of them had they remained undivided. His silence in this regard suggests the contestable assumption that civil war is less compromising of regional or international stability than tension among neighbouring states.

Related to this point, Schaeffer (1990: 100) quickly mentions other former British colonies that were not partitioned upon gaining independence—namely 'Burma, Ceylon, and a host of other Asian and African colonies'. Surely it cannot be argued that Burma or Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon), not to mention many among this 'host' of new Third World states, are less dangerous either to their own people or to regional and international security then are, say, Northern Ireland or the former East Germany. Yet these glaring examples that do a great deal of damage to Schaeffer's theory of partition *per se* causing war are not seriously addressed in his works.

He further blames partition for massive social upheaval and population flows in some (although not all) of his cases. Yet the statistics he offers—for example, 'that between 25 and 30 percent of North Korea's population had migrated South by 1953' (1990: 155)—do not adequately demonstrate that *partition*, and not war, famine, opportunity, or what have you, was the major cause of these flows. In his incessant drive to hammer home his point of 'partition—*bad*', he entirely shirks testing or even adequately supporting his assertions.

There is much putting the cart before the horse (i.e. inverting dependent and independent variables) in Schaeffer's analysis. In just one example, he would have us believe that oppression of minorities and irredentism were *born* out of partition, rather than a major force driving attempts at partition in the first place. Yes, new minorities were created when partition took place, but were there not many more people who were disenfranchised, oppressed, and disgruntled prior to partition?

Further, Schaeffer's cases to be compared suffer from selection bias. At the outset he excludes some plausible contenders, such as the partition of post-war Austria, the Congo, and Nigeria, citing their brevity due to quick reunification. But much later in the same volume he generalizes about partitioned states:

> [R]egardless of whether devolution was a unilateral or a multilateral affair, whether it proceeded along ethnic or ideological lines, or whether it resulted in the contraction or expansion of spheres of influence, the result was the same: permanent partition (1990: 149).

To exclude cases where partition was *neither* permanent *nor* of malconsequence weakens the validity of his conclusions and compromises the potential import of his findings.

He also contradicts his thesis when he writes that

> Despite conflicts over the course of devolution in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, they [the superpowers] generally agreed to disagree and frequently found that partition was a practical way to do so. Through partition, they managed to contain their disagreements and avoid a third world war (1990: 117).

HeinOnline -- 14 J. Refugee Stud. 443 2001

Although this assertion is not backed up with much more than anecdotal comments, it nonetheless directly counters Schaeffer's major premise, that partition in itself increased the threat of nuclear war between the US and USSR. While for the most part he retains a steady drum beat to that effect, this slip in his reasoning merely demonstrates how easy it is for him to argue anything, given that there is no systematic testing of data to be found in his works, but rather facts and opinions marshalled to drive us toward a particular conclusion.

Regarding methodology, there is something jarring about moving to Schaeffer's works from Schechtman's sweeping yet deeply meticulous descriptions of a myriad of transfer cases as well as his concomitant rejection of comparison and abstraction. In sharp contrast, Schaeffer writes:

> It would be difficult to analyze partition in each of these countries separately [why so?]. Not only would such a study take up many volumes [interesting, since Schechtman achieved much more in less space], but a case-by-case examination would suggest that each has had a unique history [undoubtedly]. They have not [he firmly asserts before even investigating the claim]. The problems of particular divided states are not manifestations of individual maladies that can be understood and treated separately. Rather their problems are endemic. They must be examined as part of a general phenomenon whose specific symptoms vary (1990: 8; reviewer's comments in square brackets).

With recurrent emphatic statements such as the above, one gets the distinct impression that Schaeffer has skipped past any attempt at objective inquiry and is rather rushing headlong into generalization and wholesale condemnation.

In the first volume Schaeffer granted much credence to human agency, particularly that of American and Soviet premiers, while in the second book he almost completely abandons it for structural arguments. No longer did great men decide to devolve power and to partition; as the Cold War drew to a close, global ideational trends like democracy, path-dependency creating constraints such as communist constitutions, and economic and political crises sweeping dictatorships from power were all seen as 'causing' the latest partitions (1999: 221–222). Rather than relying on one approach or the other, both books could have benefited from a more balanced use of elite decision-making, institutional constraints, and global trends and pressures.

To Schaeffer's credit, he successfully draws on the work of Benedict Anderson to offer an insightful explanation of the importance and manipulation of language on the part of elites involved in contentious politics. Furthermore, his chapter in the first book dealing with 'self-determination' adeptly and intriguingly explores the unlikely parallels between Woodrow Wilson's and V. I. Lenin's ideologies, as well as the respective institutions that each championed, the League of Nations and the Communist International (Comintern), demonstrating how both, in their own way, helped to ready the ground for Cold War era partitions.

HeinOnline -- 14 J. Refugee Stud. 444 2001

In the final analysis, Schaeffer fundamentally fails to explain adequately *why* some states, divided or not, continue to convulse with ethnic rivalry which threatens regional and international security. Schaeffer's work could have been strengthened by reflecting on the findings of Schechtman in order to analyse systematically the refugee flows in divided states beyond just cursory treatment. Furthermore, in moving beyond inquiry to that of offering potential alternatives, Schaeffer missed a great opportunity to build upon Schechtman's scholarship by contemplating the potential for organized population transfers of the sort chronicled in Schechtman's two volumes as a possible solution for ongoing ethnic conflicts in the partitioned states of his study.

Like Schaeffer, Bell-Fialkoff fails to delineate clearly what variables, hypotheses, or larger theories are being tested in his study. He asserts that, contrary to some opinion, democracy and modernity have not softened intolerance or prejudice (both seen as precursors to cleansing). Yet he supports this statement only by quoting two scholars writing five decades ago. He further claims that both phenomena actually entrench and exacerbate ethnic tensions (1996: 48). Is the author asserting, then, that democracy and modernity cause population cleansing? He then casually cites the 'real' causes of ethnic tensions: ideals of freedom, self-determination, and representative democracy. That many could empirically support claims that these processes at times also lessen ethnic conflict is here beside the point; Bell-Fialkoff's assertion is one of several sweeping causal statements insufficiently supported by research. He further goes on to predict that ethnic homogeneity will become more prominent and cleansing will continue; not an outrageous claim, but neither one that many political scientists would feel justified in making given the nature of his study.

Turning to precision in defining terms, Bell-Fialkoff devotes an entire chapter to this endeavour. He states explicitly, 'Cleansing applies not only to ethnic groups. In fact, I deliberately omit the term "ethnic" from our discussion since cleansing can be applied to many other kinds of groups, such as those characterized by religion, race, or class.' And he indeed does avoid the term throughout. One is a bit mystified, then, as to why the title of the book remains Ethnic Cleansing, after its author goes to such lengths to inform the reader of the study's more general object of inquiry.

To the author's credit, the book is extremely well-researched, detailed, and ambitious in scope. His historical overview chapter of population transfers is impressive and lucid. Case selection criteria are sound and explicit, and case descriptions are insightful yet concise. His work differs from that of Schaeffer's in a number of ways, almost always in Bell-Fialkoff's favour. For example, the fact that his cases of population cleansing occurred both in states that had been partitioned and in those that had not highlights the insufficiency of Schaeffer's variable 'partitioned state' in causing ethnic strife and instability. He also argues counter to Schaeffer when he cites democracy as exacerbating, rather than ameliorating, inter-group strife. A more fundamental difference is found in Bell-Fialkoff's positing ethnic partition as a potential remedy to ethnic

HeinOnline -- 14 J. Refugee Stud. 445 2001

conflict, wisely rooting himself in Schechtman's works. The fact that in such a well-researched work Bell-Fialkoff relies almost exclusively on Schechtman in his examination of population transfers, demonstrates both the enduring quality and utility of the the World War Two historian's work, as well as the glaring paucity in the post-war literature in dealing with such an important and recurring topic.

In attempting to develop a 'Resettlement Index', Bell-Fialkoff offers a sound explanation of why this tool was chosen. Yet the index he constructs suffers from a number of flaws. First, since he relies so heavily on Schechtman for his index criteria, and Schechtman explicitly states that transfers should not be used to punish one particular group, Bell-Fialkoff's factoring in of degrees of 'victimization' and 'culpability' is in direct contradiction to Schechtman's core finding and guideline for justifying partition. Second, his conclusions for Israel/Palestine are highly suspect and bordering on outrageous: the author denies that there is even a Palestinian identity to speak of (referring to them instead as 'Palestinian Arabs'), and suggests relocating them to '22 other Arab countries' or packing them all into the West Bank. Third, and in the next breath, in analysing Kosovo he states that the Albanians were there first but that Serbs also have a long history in the region, and gives ample credence to Serbian claims on religious sites in the region. He therefore finds against a full-scale transfer of all territory to Albania. That these two claims—centuries on the land and much more substantial claims to religious sites—could also be made on the part of Palestinians does not even occur to Bell-Fialkoff, demonstrating the bias in his analytical reasoning, the fallibility of his index, and the dangers of attempting to discern just, wise, and feasible outcomes from faulty indices.

Conclusion

Though controversial and uneven in quality, these works when taken together demonstrate the trends in political scholarship and action for remedying ethnic conflict and the subsequent refugee crises that they generate throughout Camus' poignantly termed 'century of fear.' Most importantly, this review has revisited and reaffirmed a tremendous resource, the World War Two scholarship of Joseph Schechtman. In so doing it has underscored the need for current conflict resolution and refugee scholars to plumb his works for insights into cultural, identity, and nationalist conflict, as well as into concrete strategies for addressing these conflicts and protecting civilians. Scholars writing today on contentious politics—both social movements and revolutions—could rework Schechtman's historical case studies using contemporary methods. Researchers concerned with the weakening, strengthening, or transformation of the state would do well to ponder the lessons of negotiated population transfer as a potential antidote to the antithetical aspirations of state consolidation and group self-determination.

HeinOnline -- 14 J. Refugee Stud. 446 2001