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Chapter 1

NATO, the European Union, and European Security

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Introduction

The end of the Cold War concluded a period of clear division of Europe into east and west, each closely tied for security and other purposes to the Soviet Union or the United States.¹ With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 and the scramble of its former members to enter into what until then had been Western organizational structures, the definition of 'Europe' became blurry. For most of the prior half century the term was usually associated with the European Community/Union or with the broader group of Western European democratic countries. As the European Union moves ahead with its plans to absorb an unprecedented number of entrants from the east and the south, its geographic center will shift even more toward Germany, adding to that country's already increased political and economic weight on the continent, as Mayhew (1998) and Kaufman (2001) have noted. In the meantime, the questions concerning where political and economic Europe ends and what shape it is likely to take in the future continue to be debated by observers and politicians alike.

Enlargement has become the major new undertaking of the European Union, as well as of NATO. With more than a dozen countries lining up to enter over the next decade, the Union is facing an historic opportunity to end the division of the

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continent, thereby creating the foundations for durable peace, stability, and prosperity on a pan-European basis. This turn in the European integration project will likely change the global stature of the EU and require substantial geopolitical as well as economic and political readjustments within the organization (Lund and Kanet, 1999; Mayhew, 1998).

Europe's New Security Environment

The end of the global confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States marked the beginning of the reconfiguration of the security environment in Europe. It brought to an end security arrangements, based in large part on a military standoff in Europe that had lasted for close to half a century and had sustained the bipolar world dominated by the superpowers.² With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in spring 1991 and the implosion of the Soviet Union later in the year, the primary external threat for the West disappeared; almost immediately calls were heard for the dismantling of NATO as an unnecessary anachronism. However, the West was faced with a new set of security dilemmas, some of which were related to the rise of ethnically based conflict in portions of former communist Europe and the concern that the new disorder might spill over into the West. Within a very brief period, as Aybet (2000) and Yost (1998) have demonstrated, the conclusion was reached – in Washington and more broadly within NATO -- that the new situation required the reconfiguration of the existing security arrangements, including specifically an expanded and active peacekeeping role for NATO outside its historic borders.³ The process occurred in several stages between 1990 and 1995. After the redefinition of European security, including NATO's mission and relevance to the new situation in Europe, the process of gaining acceptance for these views ensued. Both the Gulf War and the conflicts in former Yugoslavia helped to solidify the view that the existing Western security community and its institutions should be expanded to incorporate other parts of the continent.

A decade later NATO remains the lynchpin of Euro-Atlantic security. After the initial calls for its dismantling, the organization has undergone much adaptation, including both a redefinition of its mission and the addition of three former adversaries as new members, with close to three dozen other countries involved in the Partnership for Peace program, widely accepted as the waiting room for possible future NATO membership.⁴ At the same time the European Union is in the process of establishing a Common European Security and Defense

² Kolodziej (1991) and Kremenyuk (1991) argue that after the mid-1950s U.S.-Soviet relations represented a form of 'cooperation' in managing global conflict.

³ See, also, the examination of the various national debates that preceded the expansion of NATO membership in Mattox and Rachwald (2001).

⁴ On NATO expansion see Clemens (1997) and David and Lévesque (1999). On the further expansion of NATO membership to include other former communist states see Kempre. (2001) and Hutchings (2001).

Policy. The creation of a European defense force is intended to complement NATO's ability to act and to enable the Europeans to engage in operations that the United States would not join, but for which it would permit the use of NATO military capabilities.⁵

The present essay will examine the importance of U.S. and Russian policy, including the enlargement of NATO (plus the initiation of the European Union's Security and Defense Policy) and their implications for future security throughout East-Central Europe. We argue that, although a new round of NATO enlargement would enhance European security, increase regional stability, and strengthen democracy within the newly admitted member states. Russian concerns must be addressed, as well as those of other states left out of the process, if enlargement is not to create new problems. Absorbing the Central and Eastern European countries into NATO and the European Union is seen in the West as an extension of the multilateral frameworks that made peace and prosperity possible for Western Europe. But, ignoring Russia's continued reservations about NATO expansion, even after the recent policy shifts in Moscow, and excluding it from European security and economic integration could lead to renewed confrontation reminiscent of that which characterized the Cold War era. Moreover, it would place those East-Central and Southeast European countries not admitted to European security institutions in a very difficult situation -- a sort of security limbo.

Despite assurances from Europe and the United States that the dual NATO and EU expansion eastward is not targeted against Russia and should not be construed as a threat to Russian security, expansion has in fact until now reinforced the feeling of exclusion in Russia, since it challenges directly Russia's place within its self-proclaimed sphere of influence (Black, 2000; Facon, 1997; Kobrinskaya, 1997).⁶ NATO's actions in Kosovo also fueled the perception among some in Russia of a direct threat from the alliance to Russia's interests, including the concern that in the future the West might be willing to put military pressure on Russia in a confrontation between the federal government in Moscow and a recalcitrant minority region, such as Chechnya. In sum, to understand the emerging security environment of Europe, one must take into account a complex set of factors that include the enlargement of NATO, as well as of the European Union, and the EU's initiative in developing its own defense capabilities as part of the establishment of a common foreign and security policy capability. While these steps indicate a movement toward the development of security arrangements with pan-European features, the continued dependence of Europe on the United States and the positive engagement of Russia, of the type that has been under way since

⁵ On the development of a Common European Security and Defense Policy see Hay and Sichertman (2001), Croft, *et. al.* (2000), Roper (2000), and Hoffmann (2000).

⁶ Although Russian concerns have focused on NATO, current Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov (1998) has warned that Russia has underestimated the negative implications of EU expansion, as well.

the terrorist attacks on the United States, are essential for any viable security arrangement.⁷

NATO Enlargement

During the past decade Russian relations with NATO have at times been marked by acrimony and have marred other aspects of Russia's interactions with the West, particularly the United States (Kanet, 2001; Kanet and Ibryamova (2001). Although NATO has been evolving in parallel with the European Union as the centerpiece of the new political organization of Europe, it has nonetheless effectively excluded Russia from its decision-making -- thus contributing to the perception of Russia's being left at the sidelines of Europe without a voice in the critical issues of the continent. The collapse of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 and NATO's expansion has meant for Russia a loss of old allies. Perhaps worse still, this course of events led Moscow to look elsewhere for friends and allies who shared its concerns about U.S. global dominance, thus drawing it farther from Europe geopolitically and ideologically and sending an alarming signal that the country's development may progress in a direction opposite to the one taken by Europe (Baranovsky, 2000, p. 446; Black, 2000, p. 119 ff.). The enlargement of NATO faces the fundamental challenge of treading the fine line between the inclusion of some former communist states and the exclusion of others, the most important of which is Russia. Yet, since the terror attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 President Putin has reoriented Russian foreign policy in a pro-Western direction and indicated a willingness to discuss security issues related to both NATO and to national missile defense that have concerned the Russians, despite vocal opposition among various groups in Moscow (McFaul, 2001; Rogov, 2001; McFaul and Zlobin, 2001; Daniszewski, 2001).

The classic rationale for NATO's existence was to keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down. At the end of the Cold War the calls for the dissolution of the alliance did not succeed in their objective, as NATO adapted to the new international dynamics and even expanded to include three Central European states of the former Soviet bloc and become a central element of the new security environment in East-Central Europe. Enlargement was primarily a U.S. project. The role of its European allies, although essential, was overshadowed by Washington's decisions concerning who would become members, and when (Goldgeier, 1999; Michta, 1999). Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic had argued that they should be relieved from their position as a buffer between Western Europe and Russia. Entry into NATO would supposedly remove them from the Russian sphere of influence and eliminate the possibility that they would ever

⁷ The authors are well aware of the potential role of other European states, such as Ukraine and Serbia/Yugoslavia that are not short-term candidates for entry into European institutions. However, the current analysis will focus only on the reactions and importance of the Russian Federation for the creation of a new security system centered on Western and Central Europe.

again fall under domination from the east. Moreover, the leaders of the candidate states argued, they still required the benefits of collective security and the consolidation of the processes of democratization and market development of the region that would result from membership ('Official Perspectives from Eastern Europe,' 1997).⁸ In the United States the process of enlargement generated support from groups with three distinct sets of concerns, each of which was seeking guarantees against different, historically based, threats to security. One factor that drove enlargement was the concern about the containment of unified Germany and the desire to enmesh it in multilateral institutions anchored in the West, and to move NATO's boundary from the eastern border of Germany to that of Poland. The second factor was the goal of preventing in East-Central Europe conflict situations like those in former Yugoslavia – although, in fact, the potential for such conflict in that region was never significant. For Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary membership in NATO was actually a reward for their efforts at democratization and marketization. It was believed that encouraging the development of these institutions would lead to peace and prosperity that could be consolidated by NATO. Lastly, the concern that Russian imperial aspirations might reemerge was yet another reason to proceed with expansion. Hence, the traditional Cold War justifications for NATO's existence still remained in the background of its decision to incorporate members from Central Europe after the end of the Cold War (Kennedy-Pipe, 2000, p. 51, and Goldgeier, 1999, pp. 170-171).

The overall objective of the new security arrangements created in the mid-1990s was to provide stability and security without creating new dividing lines. The concept of security was expanded to include political and economic, as well as military, components; the new security architecture would, therefore, be built using gradual processes of integration and cooperation through organizations such as NATO, the WEU, the European Union, and the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe. NATO enlargement, therefore, was intended to extend the benefits of common defense and integration to the countries of the former eastern bloc and, thereby, contribute to the overall integration of these countries into Europe (NATO, 1995; Michta, 1999, pp. 198-203; Aybet, 2000, p. 230).

Almost from the outset the Russians opposed NATO enlargement, not just because of the changed strategic orientation of its former allies, but also because of the direction in which the European security organization was headed. Moscow argued that enlargement created new dividing lines in Europe, betrayed the terms on which the Cold War had ended and Germany had been reunified, and affected its domestic politics. Consequently, Russia argued in favor of strengthening pan-European organizations such as the CSCE as the primary security organizations on the continent, an argument that along with providing Russia a major voice in major

⁸ On international support for democratization in the region see Sharman and Kanet, 2000, and Mattox and Rachwald, 2001.

security issues in Europe carried implications for a diminished U.S. role and a rebuff to its efforts to continue to operate in a unipolar world.⁹

The expansion of NATO affected Russian domestic politics, as well. The pro-Western leanings of Foreign Minister Kozyrev and the liberal Westernizers in the early 1990s provided fodder for nationalists and communists alike. The issue of NATO enlargement was one area where Kozyrev and his allies could agree with their political opponents, allowing for unanimous condemnation of the Western alliance's actions across the spectrum of Russian politics. Nonetheless, early discussions and plans for NATO enlargement contributed to the decline of the liberal Westernizers in Moscow. Even if Russian policy makers and analysts eventually realized that, despite their strongest opposition, Russia could not prevent the expansion, some in Russia continued to see it as a threat. This trend was further reinforced by NATO's actions in Kosovo and its new strategic concept adopted at the anniversary Washington Summit in May 1999, confirming the alliance's open door admission policy. Nationalists interpreted the war in Kosovo as a training ground for attacks that would be repeated elsewhere, thus presenting a direct threat to Russia.¹⁰

The instruments of participation that NATO had offered to Russia were the Partnership for Peace and the Russia-NATO Founding Act, signed in 1994 and 1997 respectively, with the latter establishing the Russia-NATO Permanent Joint Council (PJC) (Delpech, 1997; Umbach, 2001). The Partnership for Peace Program, although initially regarded by Russia as a success in having its concerns taken into consideration by the West, in effect was clear evidence that Russia was unable to prevent NATO enlargement. Russian participation in the Partnership for Peace may have been driven more by a desire to retain some influence on the decisions of a body over which it was unable to obtain a veto and which was going to expand to include the Central European countries regardless of Russian approval. As Russia continued to argue for a pan-European organization to handle the security issues of Europe, the Permanent Joint Council was set up as the primary mechanism for consultation between the two sides. Russia, however,

⁹ In early 2001 President Putin and Sergei Ivanov, head of the Security Council, restated in very assertive and harsh terms the Russian opposition to NATO expansion and to the U.S. development of a missile defense system. 'We consider the policy of NATO enlargement to be a mistake and we say that it is unacceptable to us,' Putin (2001) noted in a public statement on 26 January 2001. 'The normalization of our relations with NATO is advancing with difficulty and our relations have moved backwards since the events in the Balkans,' he added. Less than two weeks later at a security conference in Munich organized by NATO Ivanov, in terms reminiscent of the Cold War, charged NATO with creating a 'Chernobyl-like nuclear disaster' in Kosovo and virtually demanded that the West write off part of Russia's debt or run the risk of Russia's expanding its dealings with what the U.S. calls 'rogue' states. (Socor, 20001).

¹⁰ Shiraev and Zubok (2000, pp. 122-126) discuss in some detail the internal debates in Russia concerning the meaning of U.S. policy in Kosovo and the most fruitful Russian response, while Lynch (2001) notes the relative stability of policy over time. The noted Russian foreign policy analyst Alexei Arbatov (1993, 1997) provides perceptive analyses of Russian policy.

neither obtained a veto over NATO decisions, nor had any hopes at the time of becoming a member itself, considering its inability to fulfill NATO's political and economic criteria for admission (Carr and Flenley, 1999).

Until very recently the Russian view of further NATO expansion to the east has remained negative. Despite this the Baltic republics have reiterated their strong desire to join NATO and, along with several Central European countries, have come closest to achieving that goal (Heurlin, 1998). Moreover, at a meeting in Bratislava in early May 2001 thirteen Central and East European countries reminded the West of its commitment to admit the former communist states into full membership in the Western community, including NATO (Kempere, 2001; Hutchings, 2001). The outcry among Russian political circles against the prospect of a Baltic presence in NATO has been quite strong. In early 2001, for example, Sergei Ivanov, head of the Russian Security Council, voiced the position long taken by Russian nationalists who have warned of the possibilities of increased military spending, a renewed arms race, and the search for new allies, should NATO proceed with its plans for further expansion (Socor, 2001). Tony Lake (2000, pp. 230-233), former National Security Advisor to President Clinton, has written that it was disingenuous to pretend that Russia is a partner of the United States or that Russia could exercise a veto on NATO membership:

It is very important that we made clear to Russia from the start of the process that NATO enlargement was on track and would happen, with or without Russia's blessing. To the degree that Russian leaders made opposition to NATO enlargement a test case of their international power, to that degree they would appear all the weaker. This would hurt them at home as well as abroad. It is essential that Russian leaders understand now they cannot force NATO to deny the Baltic states entry into the alliance, if they meet the criteria for membership....Any European nation that meets the criteria for membership, including the Baltic states and Russia itself, must sooner or later be allowed entry.¹¹

This kind of realism has been present in Russian perceptions as well, as most members of the political elite understand that Russia's response to U.S. security initiatives must be curbed by its limited economic and political capabilities. In addition to its inability to prevent NATO expansion in the Baltic region, at present Russia can do little to stop NATO from taking a more active role elsewhere. As an example, the air strikes over Serbia during the Kosovo war -- against the strong vocal opposition of Moscow -- arguably made a mockery of the NATO-Russia

¹¹ In a speech in Aachen, Germany, on 2 June 2000 President Bill Clinton (2000) reiterated the point about possible eventual Russian membership in NATO: 'No doors can be sealed shut to Russia, not NATO's, not the EU's. The alternative would be a future of harmful competition between Russia and the continent.'

Founding Act, which supposedly provided Russia with the ability to influence NATO decisions. However, Moscow's countermeasures were largely symbolic and it very soon resumed its participation in the activities of the PJC. As one Russian analyst noted, although Russian concern about the welfare of fellow Slavs in Serbia was praiseworthy, it was important to recognize that NATO jets represented a market for Russian oil (Druzenki, 1999). Even prior to the terror attacks in the United States, Russian relations with NATO and with the United States had begun to improve (Zagorski, 2001; Umbach, 2001).

The events in Kosovo appear to have had a two-pronged effect on Russia. They justified Russian hostility toward a NATO-centered Europe, consolidating the anti-NATO and related anti-American attitudes; but, they also drew Russia's attention to Europe. The war in Kosovo also showcased the marginalization of Russia, underscored by the circumscribing of the role of the PJC, and the adaptation of the alliance itself to its newly expanded security roles.

This adaptation and the evolution of NATO during the 1990s as a military alliance are indicative of the multiple factors that have shaped its character and role. Although there have been fluctuations over the future role, shape, and functions of the alliance, the member states have demonstrated the ability to build consensus, as in the case of Kosovo.¹² Along with its traditional functions, NATO has a new role to play, defined by the new post-Cold War European reality. Specifically, it has been instrumental in drawing the Central and Eastern European countries toward a Western-centered focus. It has served as a major driving force in bringing the end of open hostilities to the Balkans and in mediating tensions between Greece and Turkey -- two issues that the Europeans alone have been unable to tackle successfully. Moreover, there exists the possibility, enhanced since September 2002, that NATO will have a role in further developing relations with Russia (Nye, 2000; Colton and McFaul, 2001). In the words of Javier Solana (1999), former Secretary General of NATO and now responsible for the development of EU security policy, 'there can be no security in Europe without a stable Russia,' and the NATO-Russian Founding Act and the Permanent Joint Council have set the stage for cooperation with Russia on issues of proliferation, environmental damages, nuclear safety, and terrorism.

In some ways NATO's approach has become more incremental and conditional following the first wave of enlargement, and reinvigorating the ties with Russia remains a priority. Enlargement is consistent with NATO's current strategic objectives, while at the same time it takes advantage of the inclusiveness and partnerships with the countries from Central and Eastern Europe. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are unlikely to remain the only new members of the alliance, but relations with Russia are too important for European security not to be given careful consideration in NATO decision-making. Some analysts have advocated the pursuit of policies that give primacy to the concerns of Russia, explicitly limiting further enlargement and providing special types of support for those countries of the region that remain excluded from membership (Croft, *et al.*,

¹² For a detailed analysis of the complexities of group decision making in NATO see Daalder and O'Hanlon (2000); Both (2000)

2000, p. 517; Arbatov, 1998).¹³ Engagement with Moscow seems to be the leading and most obvious answer with regards to managing the post-Cold War international relations through NATO as well as the European Union. Until very recently, however, this approach was not likely to gather support with the current Bush Administration in Washington, which at the beginning of 2001 had adopted a unilateralist approach to the pursuit of virtually all of its foreign and security policy objectives (Kanet and Ibryamova, 2001). Moreover, the primary factor determining whether successful engagement will be possible will depend on the development of Russian policy itself more than on specific Western policies. Whether or not NATO absorbs other members over the next few years will likely be less important in determining Russian policy toward the West than political and economic developments in Russia itself – although they will surely have some influence on that policy.

However, the terrorist attacks on the United States of 11 September 2001 have provided the stimulus for precisely such a shift in Russian policy – as well as in that of the United States. President Putin has taken the opportunity presented to begin to craft a new relationship with the United States – despite concern, even opposition, from various groups within Russia. Soon after the attacks Putin opted to support U.S. efforts to track down and root out terrorism and has provided unprecedented assistance – from its support in the U.N. Security Council to the use of former Soviet military facilities in Central Asia. On the U.S., as the Bush Administration has sought support for its campaign against terrorism, it has been forced to reconsider its earlier unilateralist approach to international politics and to collaborate more closely with both formal allies and with other states, such as the Russian Federation. These shifts have meant that U.S.-Russian relations have been reinvigorated and that the possibility exists that the major issues that have strained relations – NATO expansion, the creation of a U.S. national missile defense system, and Russian policy in Chechnya – may be resolved (McFaul, 2001; Colton and McFaul, 2001). The meeting of presidents Putin and Bush in Washington and Crawford, Texas, in mid-November 2001 highlighted the changes in both Russian and U.S. policy and in relations between the two countries that would have been almost impossible to predict two months earlier. Putin, for example, has indicated his willingness to work out a rapprochement with NATO, while Bush has muted criticism of Russian policy in Chechnya and committed the United States to massive reductions in nuclear weapons. Immediately following the summit meeting, Prime Minister Blair of the United Kingdom followed up with a public proposal for a new security partnership between Russia and the NATO alliance (Gornostayev, 2001; Evans, 2001).

¹³ For an important set of articles that provide arguments on both sides of the issue of NATO expansion see David and Lévesque (1999).

The Enlargement of the European Union

EU officials, who have often reiterated the fact that they do not want to create new dividing lines, nonetheless seem to face that very prospect, if enlargement stops at the borders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.¹⁴ The first two countries are both strategically important, with Russia still possessing the status of a nuclear power with its due share of influence on international affairs. The main frameworks within which their engagement with the EU occurs are the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, the TACIS program [Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States], and the European Council's Common Strategy on Russia adopted in 1999 (Gianaris, 1994, pp. 147-186; Zagorski, 1997; Wettig, 1998; Crawford, 90-127; Wedel, 1998). Despite these and a number of other, more specific, cooperative arrangements, Russia has largely been excluded from the process of European integration, at least for the foreseeable future.

Having defined themselves as European in their identity and orientation, the Ukrainians have given serious consideration to possible future membership in the Union (D'Anieri, Kravchuk, and Kuzio, 1999, pp. 229-232; Bukkvoll, 1997, p. 61 ff; Lieven, 1999, pp. 153-161); in contrast, Russia, while generally not openly opposed to the EU's eastern enlargement, has no such aspirations for membership. The perception of Ukraine's future, especially among nationalists in the western part of the country, seems to be one of little choice but to be an integral part of European integration. The lack of any indication from the EU of the desirability of Ukraine's membership has been a source of frustration, despite Brussels' criticism of its slow economic reforms, protectionist measures, and refusal to abandon plans for constructing new nuclear reactors. There is also the awareness of the problems EU enlargement would pose for Ukraine itself, including visa restrictions for Ukrainian citizens in the accession countries with which they had enjoyed largely unobstructed travel for the past decade. Enlargement that does not include Ukraine is likely to have negative economic consequences for that country because of Central Europe's continuing reorientation of trade toward the Union.¹⁵ It is also

¹⁴ For an assessment of the status of the applicant countries see Richter *et al.* (2000) and Solovev (2001).

¹⁵ An illustration of the dramatic shift in trade patterns can be seen in the following data:

Central and East European Exports and Imports by Region

Shares in the total, in per cent

Country	Trading Partner	1990		1999	
		exports	imports	exports	imports
Bulgaria	EU (15)	5.6	11.5	52.4	48.6
	Russia	64.0	56.5	5.5 (98)	20.0 (98)
Czech Republic	EU (15)	38.4	40.5	69.2	64.0
	Russia	25.1	24.3	1.4	4.8
Slovak Republic	EU (15)	40.8	44.8	59.5	51.7
	Russia	25.1	16.6	1.7	12.0

likely to have an impact on bilateral Ukrainian-Russian relations, since, many analysts believe, it will result in Russia's putting increasing pressure on Ukraine for the coordination of policies. In sum, it will most likely deepen the already existing sense of exclusion in a country that sees its European orientation as only way it can become a 'normal' country (Light, White, and Lowenhardt, 2000).¹⁶

The implications of exclusion will probably be even more acute in the case of Russia, which has always had an ambivalent relationship with Europe. Geographical considerations aside, Russia has long exemplified – along with the Ottoman Empire and later Turkey – Europe's 'other.' Iver Neumann (1998, p. 67) maintains that its status has been that of a 'learner,' a country always seen in some stage of Europeanization, without ever quite reaching the goal of full integration. This image has sometimes been difficult to reconcile with the conviction of most Russians that theirs is country of great power – a claim now supported almost solely by its nuclear arsenal. Although, historically 'Europe' has been equated with the West, as the embodiment of enlightenment, rationalism, liberalism, secularism, and materialism (MacFarlane, 1994, p. 237), perceptions of Europe and the United States have changed considerably during the 1990s. In contrast to the rising anti-Americanism in the second part of the decade, Russian attitudes about Europe remained positive.¹⁷ They regard themselves as Europeans, and more than two-thirds of them consider Russia to be a natural part of Europe and think that it will develop closer ties with the rest of the continent in the future. The Eurasian cultural and historical orientation is also widespread, but not dominant – less than one third of Russians support the actively popularized version of Eurasianism (Working Group of the Russian Independent Institute of Social and National Problems, 2000; Chulos and Pirainen, 2000; Allensworth, 1998). This is reflected in the attitudes toward the EU and NATO, as well; whereas the latter is seen as an instrument of the United States and as a threat to Russia despite assurances to the contrary, the former has enjoyed a far more favorable image. NATO's eastward expansion has raised grave concerns in Russia and continues to have a negative

Hungary	EU (15)	42.1	43.1	76.2	64.4
	Russia	20.2	19.1	29.2	5.0
Poland	EU (15)	52.7	51.1	70.5	64.9
	Russia	14.5	17.0	2.6	5.9
Romania	EU (15)	33.9	21.8	65.5	60.4
	Russia	25.6	23.2	0.6	6.8
Slovenia	EU (15)	64.8	69.0	66.1	68.6
	Russia	13.3	6.4	1.5	1.6

Source: Havlik *et al.* (2000), pp. 17-18.

¹⁶ For an assessment of the likely economic impact of EU enlargement on those countries not accepted see Gligorov (2000).

¹⁷ On growing anti-American attitudes see Shiraev and Zubok (1998); on recent shifts in Russian attitudes see Colton and McFaul (2001). Recent poll data in Russia support Colton and McFaul's argument ('Rossiiane vyskazyvaiutsia za sushchestvennoe sblizhenie c SShA,' 2001).

influence on Russian-U.S. relations. Conversely, the overtures of the Central and Eastern European countries toward the EU were looked upon more favorably, even as a substitute for NATO membership (Zagorski, 1997). As we have already noted, however, Foreign Minister Ivanov (1998) has pointed to the potential negative economic implications for Russia of continued EU expansion.

The reason for the divergent attitudes toward the two main Euro-Atlantic organizations lies also in their different natures. NATO has been seen as the main political and security organization for the continent, but one that remains strongly influenced by the United States, while the European Union, with its emphasis to date on economic integration represents a less direct challenge to Russian political and security interests. Not surprisingly Russia has continually insisted on the increased role of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE], in which it is a member, to replace NATO as the pivotal organization in European security matters.

An important part of Russia's policy toward Europe has focused on limiting the role of NATO – and, hence, that of the United States. In this respect, initially Moscow saw the nascent European Security and Defense Policy of the European Union as an opportunity to move Europe in this direction, but also as a means for Russian participation in European military operations and above all as an instrument for driving a wedge between the United States and its European allies.¹⁸ Since it has become clear, however, that the ESDP is likely to be implemented only in a manner that will complement, rather than compete with, NATO, Russia's position has taken on a more critical tone (Light, White, and Lowenhardt, 2000, pp. 77-83). Russia does not share the EU's perceptions of itself as the emerging other great power on the continent. It still prefers to emphasize its bilateral relations with the other European states, particularly with Germany. The *Foreign Policy Concept* of Russia (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 1993; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2000; Knabe, 2000; Kassianova, Alla, 2001, esp. p. 829 ff.) points to the traditionally high importance given to European affairs, with the EU as a key player. Moscow states that the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) of 1994 has not yet achieved its full promise. Moreover, President Putin has positioned himself as a 'Europeanist,' further underscoring the importance of relations with Europe for the course of Russia's development, as well as its influence in international relations (Timmermann, 2000; Diligenskij and Tschugnow, 2000). Since the terrorist attacks on the United States the Western orientation of his policy has become even more visible. Problematic areas between the two exist, but there has also been the attempt on both sides to develop political and security cooperation, the exact nature and parameters of which are yet to be determined.

¹⁸ It is most interesting to note that events in former Yugoslavia, especially in Kosovo, have played an important role in influencing the West European commitment to building up its own foreign and security policy capabilities that will enable it to act independently of the United States. See, for example, Van Oudenaren.(2000), pp. 296-303. For a discussion of Russia's policy toward the EU see Timmermann, (1999).

Yet, making Europe the focus of its foreign policy would help to reinforce Russia's claim to the status of a great power; hence, it is in Russia's fundamental interest to pursue such a policy approach. Only by establishing and nurturing close economic and political ties with the West will Moscow be able to obtain the technological and financial resources necessary to effect the country's transformation.

Reciprocally, an indication of Russia's importance to the EU was provided by the fact that first Common Strategy to be adopted by the European Council (1999) following the Treaty of Amsterdam dealt with the Russian Federation. Building on the experience of the 1994 cooperation agreement and the technical assistance agreement (TACIS), the document aims at reinforcing the 'strategic relationship' between the Union and Russia. Its principal objectives are the consolidation of democracy and the rule of law in Russia; its economic and social integration with Europe, and cooperation in security challenges in Europe and beyond.¹⁹ Along with TACIS, the core legal instrument of EU-Russian relations is the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement signed in 1994, but not ratified by the former until the end of 1997, partly because of the Western concern about human rights issues in Chechnya. The PCA covers mainly economic and commercial issues, such as the potential move toward the establishment of a free trade area, and sets up the institutional framework for regular political dialogue. Among its objectives are also the consolidation of democracy, the establishment of a functioning market economy, and a framework for the 'gradual integration between Russia and a wider area of cooperation in Europe.' (European Communities, 1998; Zagorski, 1997, pp. 527-530). Within the TACIS framework, the EU provides technical assistance and support for a number of specific projects, thereby allowing Brussels some influence, albeit limited, on the development of stable democratic institutions and a functioning market economy.

Although often driven by the perceived need to support liberal reforms in Russia, in recent years the EU's long-term strategy has become clearer and communication more regular. The EU remains committed to the development of channels of cooperation with Russia that cover a wide gamut of issues, in the hope of anchoring it in the broader security, political, and economic map of Europe. Problems do exist, though; some of them quite serious. The future eastern enlargement of the EU, including the Baltic states, is not seen in Russia as a threat, so long as it does not include countries that Russia perceives to be in its direct sphere of influence, such as Ukraine. Russia has demanded that its concerns and sensitivities be given serious consideration; this Brussels has attempted to do in an ongoing dialogue. Officials in Moscow, nonetheless, recognize enlargement's potentially negative consequences, which are similar to those to be faced by

¹⁹ Then Prime Minister Putin personally turned over the Russian policy response (Russian Federation, 1999) at a Russia-EU meeting in October 1999 that lays out Russia's positive response to the EU initiative. Other statements of Russia's official foreign policy orientation under Putin can be found in Russian Federation (2000a) and Russian Federation (2000b).

Ukraine. Since the Union has not granted Russia the status of a market economy, it regularly initiates anti-dumping measures against Russian exports. As the countries from Central and Eastern Europe adopt the *acquis communautaire* and their trade volume with the Union increases, there is the potential for adverse effects on the trade relations with Russia – an outcome that Russia is determined to avoid (Höhmman and Meier, 1999; Ivanov, 1998). The EU is already Russia's main trading partner and enlargement will likely expand this dependence. In addition, as the accession negotiations progress, the CEECs are increasingly working to tighten their border controls, thereby making it more difficult for Russian citizens to travel. Kaliningrad, the Russian exclave between Poland and Lithuania, is also a matter of concern; as an economic free zone, it has the potential to contribute to trade relations or to be a locus of tensions because of its role as an important Russian military and naval base. Ultimately, however, the cooperation with Europe will depend on Russia's domestic political stability. Both the PCA and the Common Strategy on Russia contain provisional clauses that reinforce the crucial importance of continuous reform and stability in Russia. The ability to move forward with reform toward completing the transition to a full-scale market economy and consolidating its fledgling democracy will be the deciding factors in Russia's further integration in or exclusion from European structures.

Paul-Henry Spaak (1971, p. 141) once noted that the title 'father of European unity' belonged to Stalin because, without his aggressive policies and the threat the Soviet Union posed to the West, the movement for European unity would not have been as successful as it was. At present, despite occasional references in the Russian press to eventual Russian membership, the prospect is not pursued seriously.²⁰ In Europe there exists the understanding that security and stability on the continent cannot be achieved unless Russia is firmly anchored in the new European order; economic interdependence could be the way to achieve that objective. The goal with regards to Russia seems to be a model of integration without membership; the challenge – how to keep Russia from disengaging, without actually letting it into the organization (Baranovsky, 2000, p. 446; Gower, 2000, p. 68).

NATO and the Common European Security and Defense Policy

As we have already noted, the European Union has taken steps toward the Europeanization of some security arrangements on the continent. The Treaty on the European Union of 1993 allowed for the possible common foreign policy of the member states, which would lead to common defense policy, thereby strengthening the European pillar of the NATO alliance (Dinan, 1999, pp. 515-516; Gärtner, 2001; Schmidt, 2001). As a consequence of the Bosnian debacle, even the most ardent Europeanists came to support NATO's supremacy in European security, thereby

²⁰ As late as 1997 Premier Chernomyrdin said that Russia's aim was eventual membership. (Mannin, 1999, p. 1).

justifying the necessity for a continued strong U.S. military presence. These two factors contributed to bridging the divide between Europeanists and Atlanticists within the EU that had become evident at the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. Moreover, in the 1990s the initial U.S. suspicion of the Common Foreign and Security Policy gradually turned into support for European security and defense cooperation, which in effect meant that the United States encouraged the strengthening of European military forces capable of dealing with militarized conflicts on the continent – although differences remained about the relationship between NATO and the new EU security force (Hay and Sicherman, 2001). In 1994 NATO had agreed to the establishment of Combined Joint Task Forces to make available to the alliance’s European members NATO’s capabilities for operations outside the NATO area in which the US chose not to participate. In 1997, the NATO summit in Madrid endorsed the enlargement of NATO and asserted its primacy over the attempts of the EU to create its own defense mechanisms (Dinan, 1999, p. 526; Yost, pp. 1998, 199-217). NATO’s expansion had been a contentious subject since the early 1990s, but it was the final decision made by the United States concerning which countries would be included in the first wave of entrants that drew the most criticism from EU officials. Nonetheless, the support for NATO remained strong among all the member states, and there appeared to be a consensus on the approach to establishing post-Cold War European security (Mattox and Rachwald, 2001; Aybet, 2000).

Despite the commitment to develop a common foreign and security policy, the members states of the European Union have made little practical headway in establishing the mechanisms necessary to accomplish this goal. The divergence of the foreign policies of the EU member states, as well as the deficiencies of the European military capabilities came to the fore once again during the crisis in Kosovo and the subsequent postwar efforts.²¹ In fact, some have criticized the United States for taking the lead in Kosovo and for its proneness toward unilateralism, citing the location of the problem in Europe’s “backyard.” Critics have argued that by taking the leadership role, subsidizing European defense, and moderating European conflicts the United States in fact ensures continued European passivity and provides disincentives for the development of independent defense capabilities.

In contrast to his predecessor’s policy of specific emphasis on a NATO-focused approach to security in Europe, President Bill Clinton was more sympathetic toward European efforts to develop a common defense policy that diverged from the NATO collectivity. This support for the creation of a unified European defense force, however, was contingent upon its operating as a complementary mechanism to the central role of NATO in transatlantic defense cooperation. From the beginning the creation of a stronger and more autonomous European security capability has been a EU political project and a NATO military

²¹ For an excellent discussion of the issues involved in reaching foreign policy agreement within the EU see Both (1999)

project (Bandow, 1999; p. 82). Proponents argued that “separable but not separate” forces would give NATO a flexibility it did not possess before and would also head off any effort by the French to turn the Western European Union into a competitor to NATO in the European security environment (Goldgeier, 1999). The existing doubts regarding the project are still related to these concerns: namely, how far can the CESDP go and especially what the nature of relations with the U.S. and with NATO will be, and how the non-EU members of NATO will be accommodated. While the United States has been urging increased burden sharing, Washington has tied the development of European capacity and autonomy to alliance enhancement (Croft, *et al.*, 2000). Relations were complicated almost immediately by the reduced support of the Bush Administration for European initiatives and by its willingness – at least until September 2001 -- to push ahead on security matters regardless of the views of its European allies – as on the issue of the establishment of a national missile defense system.²²

Indeed, there have been voices in the United States that have argued that the European plan may be riskier than it appeared earlier, leading to a waste of European military assets, the alienation of NATO members outside the EU, and the creation of rival military structures that might make it difficult for the United States and the EU to respond coherently to future crises (Drozdiak, 2000). The most serious objection has been the perception of the Europeanization of the alliance as a step toward the eventual decoupling of the alliance. From a more practical point of view, the leadership in Washington could scarcely imagine security crises that would not involve NATO and the United States. Hence, behind Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s argument (2000, p. 4) of “no duplication, no decoupling, no discrimination,” the United States seems to have been able to impose on the EU the perspective that its new force is not to be seen as a European army distinct from NATO, that it can be used only for peacekeeping purposes, and

²² Some in the U.S. political establishment, including President Bush, have argued that the ABM treaty is dead and invalid, and that instead of amending the United States should simply scrap it altogether, clearing the way for building a national missile defense system. The Bush Administration has been strongly committed since its very inception to the deployment of a far more comprehensive NMD than that under consideration by President Clinton until his decision in summer 2000 to delay a deployment decision. For early statements of the Republican position see the comments of Senator Jesse Helms, the former powerful chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Helms, 1999; U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 2000). In introductory remarks before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator Helms stated that the hearings would proceed from the presumption that the ABM Treaty has ceased to exist and that will be defeated (U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 1999.)

Given the largely unilateral approach to foreign and security policy exhibited by the Administration of George W. Bush in its first six months in office, as well as the dramatic changes occurring the relationship between the United States and its European allies, there is little likelihood in the near future of U.S. support for an autonomous European security capability. The commitment of individual West European countries to the continued reduction of military spending also makes the development of an independent security capability in the near future highly problematic.

that its use will almost always involve NATO in one way or another. Thus, the U.S. position has combined an attempt to accommodate the European endeavor, while keeping NATO intact – and the United States in a leadership position in the continent's security (Croft, *et al.*, 2000, p. 510; Pond, 2000, p. 11).

The latest developments, however, show that the European Union still expects to implement the military goals upon which the members agreed in December 1999, goals that were at least partially prompted by the shortcomings that appeared during the air campaign against Yugoslavia. Despite the fact that many EU countries are downsizing their Cold War military structures, the plans for the formation of a new defense force are set to be realized by 2003. The United States remains skeptical of the success of this project in view of the shrinking military budgets of the large EU member states, but nonetheless supportive, provided that the primacy of NATO remains unchallenged.²³

At the beginning of the new century the security challenges for NATO are shifting from Europe's center to its periphery and beyond.²⁴ The response to the terrorist attacks of September 2001 is clear evidence of this fact. The United States remains the dominant security actor in Europe. At the same time U.S. and NATO security concerns extend increasingly to areas outside the traditional geographical focus of the alliance in Europe, the Middle East, and Eurasia. At the same time the reorientation of security priorities to the south and east increases the risks of confrontation with Russia. If Russia continues to conduct a more assertive foreign policy, underscored by a rising sense of nationalism, it may challenge Western interests in areas such as the Balkans, the eastern Mediterranean, the Caspian and Gulf regions – something it can no longer do in Central Europe (Lesser, 1999, pp. iii, 2; Lynch, 2001). Yet, as we have seen, since the terrorist attacks on the United States President Putin has opted for an approach to relations with the United States and the West that is based much more on cooperation. What is not clear is the durability of this approach, which will depend both on domestic politics in Russia and on the willingness of the Bush Administration to work out policy differences with the Russians.

In view of these developments, Russia has continued to express its support for a pan-European security organization in which its role would be granted. Partnership with the newly emerging common European Security and Defense initiative appears desirable, especially in view of the possibility of its diminishing Washington's influence. In fact, the major U.S. European allies, led by the UK and Germany, have not intended to pursue a policy of decoupling from NATO; rather,

²³ For recent discussions of European efforts to develop a coordinated defense and security policy and compatibility see Roper, 2000; Hoffmann, 2000; Gärtner, 2000). Recently former Defense Secretary Cohen warned that NATO could become "a relic of history" if the European members of the alliance did not closely coordinate with NATO (Cited in Black, 2000).

²⁴ A study commissioned by the U.S. Air Force poses the question of NATO's potential role in the Caspian region (Sokolsky and Charlick-Paley, 1999).

the CESDP is to complement NATO, focusing on humanitarian and peacekeeping operations, in which the United States did not wish to participate.

Following a decade that saw the countries of the former Soviet bloc striving to achieve membership in Western institutions, especially the two most demanding clubs, the European Union and NATO, and the first steps toward the possible resolution of the last Balkan hotbed in ex-Yugoslavia, the prospects for incorporating East-Central Europe into a single Europe-wide security community are becoming more plausible. However, the parameters of this community remain unclear and undetermined and, in fact, they may not be incorporated within one single institution. What the leaders of the West will have to do is to clarify Russia's role in the new European security environment. Stephen Hadley (2000, p. 3) has argued that, while 'the primary interest of Europe lies in building a regional system conducive to economic and political integration without compromising national sovereignty, Russia is stuck in a 19th century realist calculus without the ability to influence outcomes.' But Russia's perception of its own economic weakness and the limitations on its ability to wield power is shared among some Western analysts and politicians. Nonetheless, there exists a general consensus that Europe cannot be 'whole and free' without a stable Russia that is part of that Europe. Toward that goal many advocate expanded consultations with Russia to try to keep the rising anti-Western character of its national security strategy from becoming the new reality of Russian policy. The new agenda should include new forms of engagement between the European Union and the United States, as well as the establishment of new 'rules of the road' to order relations with Russia in the post-Kosovo world (Hadley, 2000, p. 3; Solovev, 2001). Integration and cooperation within well-defined political, economic, and security parameters on a pan-European basis can be a safeguard for the security, peace, stability, and democracy within member states, obliterating the dividing lines of ideology and making war unthinkable.

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